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 Abstract 
 
A Struggle Unfinished: Riots, Race in America, and the 
Failures of the 1968 Kerner Commission   
By 
 
Sam Abramson 
 This dissertation explores the life of the Kerner Commission—a task force 
founded by President Lyndon Johnson on the heels of riots across America—from its 
inception in the summer of 1967 to its aftermath in the spring of 1968. The dissertation 
examines the primary actors involved with the commission and seeks to explain why they 
arrived at the conclusions they did, how those who resisted along the way did so, why 
such conclusions fell on deaf ears, and how the report ultimately failed to accomplish its 
stated objectives. It argues that the Kerner Commission’s report—a comprehensive study 
on race in America and the causes of rioting that was unprecedented in its scale and 
particularly poignant in the afterglow of landmark civil rights legislation—was an 
inspired, unsparing document that failed for a number of reasons beyond its control, 
including a cold reception from the Johnson White House, a conservative Congress 
unwilling to spend due to partisan politics and the Vietnam War, a majority of white 
Americans believing that the report—in its twin calls for increased domestic spending 
and focused dialogue to amend white racial attitudes—was misguided, Johnson’s 
televised announcement that he would not seek reelection, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
assassination, among other reasons. This dissertation traces the trajectory of a lost 
opportunity to confront questions on race, rioting, and unfinished civil rights work in 
America that remain unanswered to this day.
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 Introduction 
 When I started writing this dissertation in November 2014, a grand jury in 
Ferguson, Missouri, had just announced that it would not charge police officer Darren 
Wilson in the fatal shooting of Michael Brown three months prior. The announcement 
sparked a wave of protests and rioting in the early portion of Thanksgiving week. As my 
eyes darted between my computer and cable news, I was unnerved by the similarities 
between the two screens. Brown's death and the aftermath of the grand jury's decision 
rekindled familiar narratives of police brutality: brutality that involved white officers, 
impoverished neighborhoods, and unarmed, nonwhite victims. Reaction to the rioting 
quickly splintered, often along partisan lines: in the nascent days of the Black Lives 
Matter movement, many viewed Michael Brown as the latest notch on a harrowing 
timeline, a timeline riddled with racial profiling and institutional racism and a failure to 
bring murderers to justice. That these notches signaled unprovoked death devoid of 
respect for people of color was precisely the issue. Protesters had tired of this treatment, 
of much of America ignoring pockets of black poverty—whether in suburbs or city 
centers—of a cycle of decline and hopelessness that too often faulted its victims for their 
own burdens. Rioting did not simply lash out at injustice over one particular event; it did 
so over a broader apathy toward urban squalor and the conditions that yielded rioting in 
the first place. Perhaps outsiders simply did not care. Perhaps they believed conditions 
were self-inflicted or exaggerated. Perhaps they feigned concern but did nothing 
constructive to help those in need. Regardless, the violence and destruction was a last 
resort, a plea for outsiders to listen.  
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 On the other side, there was confusion over why rioters destroyed their own 
communities as well as a refrain to obey law and order. This posited that shootings would 
not happen if everyone obeyed the law, that rioting threatened peace, that movements 
fueled by outrage over fatal police shootings besmirched the name of good cops. Riots 
and subsequent protests were the doings of a select few, critics claimed, of outside 
agitators who only wished to foster chaos. Police had no obligation to coddle criminals or 
have their integrity questioned, these critics said, and protesters only empowered others 
to break the law and worsen the situation. These two camps harbored opposing 
viewpoints on rioting, police, and the state of race in America; after each incident, 
predictable talking points resurfaced. When Freddie Gray died in police custody in 
Baltimore, Maryland, five months later, in April 2015, there was again scrutiny of the 
specific circumstances of his death and the broader implications of blackness in America. 
Conversely, there were critics of the riots themselves, of gratuitous criminal behavior, of 
rushing to judgment and assuming police wrongdoing without all of the facts.  
 What struck me with every development, every headline, every piece of 
commentary on these events, was just how much the television on in the background felt 
like my chapter one—America in the summer of 1967, embroiled in urban violence and 
fearful of how it might end. A half-century ago, in the afterglow of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, riots besieged American ghettoes when 
temperatures ran hot. The events precipitating these riots often followed a tragic and 
longstanding script in American cities: accusations of police brutality, usually wrapped 
up in racial profiling, that often fed off rumors or broader, racially tinged frustrations 
with ghetto life. Frayed nerves and simmering resentment often mushroomed into death 
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and destruction after dark, snarling into a mess of confusion and inebriation and damage 
that left many Americans wondering what had gone wrong or how any of it had started. 
Only after curfews, or sending in the National Guard, or, in the case of Detroit, sending in 
the U.S. Army, could cities restore order.  
 This dissertation is about the aftermath of those riots, a brief window in American 
history when they were the foremost domestic issue and the federal government set out to 
answer pressing questions. President Lyndon Johnson tasked an eleven-member 
commission with evaluating the riots and determining how to prevent copycat sequences 
going forward. It is disheartening that these events and forthcoming dialogues abound in 
the present day, and it is also sadly instructive. Fifty years ago, in the halcyon days of 
civil rights achievement, America had the same conversation on Newark and Detroit that 
it has recently had on Ferguson and Baltimore. With the banner pieces of civil rights 
legislation signed into law, the fury of summertime riots undoubtedly shocked much of 
white America. What about the progress? What about the goals attained? How could this 
happen in a decade so amenable to civil rights progress and confronting racism in 
America? It was up to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders—chaired 
by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner and known colloquially as the Kerner Commission—to 
find out. 
 Johnson had assigned the commission to answer three primary questions on the 
heels of deadly riots in Newark and Detroit in the summer of 1967: “What happened? 
Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?”1 On March 1, 
1968, their report answered these questions, attributing the ugly inner-city violence, in 
                                                
1 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1968), 4.  
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part, to white racism and social inequality, and detailing how political and economic 
structures contributed to suppressing the nation’s poor.  With the ominous observation 
that “our nation is moving toward two societies—one black, one white—separate and 
unequal,” the Kerner Commission called for billions of dollars in spending on existing 
and new programs as well as white accountability in confronting the problems plaguing 
America’s cities.2 The report infuriated Johnson, a man consumed by the specter of the 
Vietnam War who interpreted the commission’s suggestions of increased spending as an 
indictment of his own domestic agenda—after all, he reasoned, had he not done more on 
these issues than any previous president? When a staffer asked him to sign thank-you 
letters to the commissioners responsible for the report, Johnson fumed. “I can’t just sign 
this group of letters. I’d be a hypocrite…Just file them, or get rid of them,” he told chief 
speechwriter Harry McPherson Jr. in a telephone conversation on March 13, 1968.3 The 
letters expressed a “deep appreciation for your service” and “fulfilling a great 
responsibility for your country” to each commissioner.4 They were never signed or 
delivered, symbolizing the fractured relationship between the president and the 
commission he had established. 
 With an administration intent on discrediting the commission to preserve its own 
political reputation, and with reported discord among the commissioners themselves, the 
commission’s findings and recommendations had virtually no momentum for change. 
The Kerner Commission went from a promising study on how to address crucial urban-
                                                
2 Report of NACCD, 3.  
3 Lyndon B. Johnson, telephone conversation with Harry McPherson, Jr., March 13, 1968, Folder 16, Box 
39, FG 690, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, White House Confidential File, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.  
4 Lyndon B. Johnson to I.W. Abel, et. al, Mar. 13, 1968, Folder 16, Box 39, FG 690, NACCD, CF, LBJ 
Library, Austin, TX. 
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suburban racial issues in America to a group the White House believed “could easily 
wind up creating almost as many problems as the riots themselves.”5 Just three days 
before the report’s release, a memo sought the president’s approval to “start leaking the 
report to diminish its overall impact, point up its enormous cost and the unrealistic nature 
of its recommendations.”6 Internally, commissioner Charles “Tex” Thornton feared the 
report may have embarrassed Johnson and was “troubled by the fact that some of the 
proposals are not realistic,” while fellow commissioner and New York City Mayor John 
Lindsay believed the report could have done more and “come out against the Vietnam 
War because of the resources it’s draining away from the cities.”7 Johnson’s decision to 
ignore the Kerner Commission’s findings betrayed men like Executive Director David 
Ginsburg and commissioner and Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris, who believed the report 
Johnson requested could be “a blueprint for our country for many years to come.”8 
Focusing on the actors who clashed and tried to undercut the commission’s findings will 
illuminate why such a comprehensive and important document never quite gained 
traction. 
 From the moment it was established, there were doubts about the Kerner 
Commission and its objectives. Perhaps it would suffer the same fate as so many other 
presidential commissions, exhaustively carrying out its assignment before submitting a 
sound but ultimately inconsequential report, an unfilled prescription that would languish 
somewhere on a shelf. Perhaps it was too white—how, after all, could America expect 
                                                
5 George Reedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, August 3, 1967, “11/23/63-9/30/67,” Box 386, FG 690, NACCD, 
White House Central Files, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
6 Joseph Califano to Lyndon B. Johnson, February 26, 1968, “1/26/68-2/27/68,” Box 387, FG 690, 
NACCD, WHCF, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
7 Califano to Johnson, Feb. 28, 1968, “2/28/68-3/13/68,” Box 387, FG 690, NACCD, WHCF, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
8 Fred Harris to Lyndon B. Johnson, Mar. 4, 1968, “2/28/68-3/13/68,” Box 387, FG 690, NACCD, WHCF, 
LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
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eight white men, one white woman, and two black men—neither of whom were young or 
militant—to speak authoritatively on the black experience and the conditions that bred 
rioting? Perhaps it was too liberal, handpicked by a Democrat president, and would view 
rioting and race relations through a subjective lens, bound to tell its creator what he 
wanted to hear. Perhaps it was too moderate—filled with middle-of-the-road officials 
who had no desire to unearth unpleasant truths. Would the commission present race in 
America as work unfinished, or would it burnish President Johnson’s resume? There 
were reasons to be cynical and assume that Johnson’s executive order creating the 
commission was an empty political gesture, a maneuver designed to placate critics well in 
advance of the presidential election cycle.  
 In calling for “new attitudes, new understanding,” and “an unprecedented level of 
funding and performance” in its report, the Kerner Commission readily admitted it had 
“uncovered no startling truths, no unique insights, no simple solutions.”9 Task forces had 
studied riots before and identified many of the same factors that spawned them, whether 
it was in Chicago in 1919, Harlem in 1943, or, most recently, Los Angeles in 1965. “The 
destruction and the bitterness of racial disorder, the harsh polemics of black revolt and 
white repression have been seen and heard before in this country,” the report’s conclusion 
stated.10 What differed with the Kerner Commission, however, was both its scale and its 
timing. Previous commissions examined particular riots at the state and local level, but 
there had not been a national, comprehensive effort on the subject. The arduous summer 
of 1967 provided the ideal case study, as no corner of the nation was immune to violent 
outbreaks. One-hundred-and-sixty-four disorders occurred in 128 cities, only eight of 
                                                
9 Report of NACCD, 13. 
10 Ibid. 
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which were deemed “major” by the commission. In its brief existence, the Kerner 
Commission heard testimony from 130 witnesses, conducted field surveys of 23 affected 
cities, and even made visits to 8 of the cities, where they received personalized tours of 
riot-affected neighborhoods. The commission held 44 regular meetings, “usually in a 
former snack bar in the Senate building,” as well as “innumerable night sessions” off the 
record.11 It produced a 250,000-word report, had a budget of $1.6 million, and boasted 
170 people on its payroll. This report did not have an isolated incident as its target, nor 
was it a small operation researched and written by a select few. 
  It also went to press in the aftermath of both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, two landmark pieces of federal legislation passed by nearly 
all-white Congresses and signed into law by the same white president. The Civil Rights 
Act was a culmination of the nonviolent protest movement against racial segregation in 
the American South, a sweeping act of civil rights legislation that outlawed race-based 
discrimination (among other forms) and dealt a federally codified death-blow to the Jim 
Crow era. When it passed in the House and Senate in 1964, there were five African 
American members of the House and no African American senators. When the Voting 
Rights Act forbidding racial discrimination in voting—again aimed at state and local laws 
in the South—passed the following summer, there were six African American members 
of the House and no African American senators. Each act had vindicated the tireless work 
of civil rights activists, from student-led sit-ins in Nashville and Greensboro to the 1963 
Birmingham campaign to voting registration in Mississippi to Selma’s Bloody Sunday on 
the Edmund Pettus Bridge. That so many white legislators witnessed the civil rights 
                                                
11 “Roots of Riot—Call to Battle,” Newsweek, Mar. 11, 1968, “Reaction: Pre-Report”; Box 5, Series 39, 
Records of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Record Group 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
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movement helmed by Martin Luther King Jr. and agreed was also significant; it was not 
just a movement for black students and white liberals, nor did its goals represent a 
minority view.  
 Less than four years later, however, President Johnson and members of Congress 
had a report on their desks that blamed white America for urban riots and the continuing 
black struggle. “What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro 
can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto,” the report 
declared, adding: “White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white 
society condones it.”12 The message was clear: long-awaited civil rights laws were 
watershed moments in the civil rights movement, but they had not corrected racial 
injustice nor the deep-seated hardships of the black experience wholesale. Yes, activists 
had toppled de jure segregation targets in the South, but that did little for the vagaries of 
ghetto life in Los Angeles, Newark, or Detroit. The Kerner Commission sought out the 
structural deficiencies that explained why civil disorders persisted, the unabated cycle of 
residential segregation, poor schooling, inadequate employment, and police 
discrimination that evaded a single uplifting speech or federal law. In an unrivaled era of 
civil rights goodwill, the Kerner Commission’s deliberative indictment of white America 
was a bold statement, one that emphasized how suffering in the shadows still 
accompanied progress in the limelight. For all of its achievements, the civil rights 
movement had not resolved the issues enveloping the state of race in America. 
 In its research phase, the Kerner Commission sought out public officials, 
academics, civil rights leaders, and others for testimony. Witnesses repeatedly told 
commissioners that they needed to provide an honest portrait of black life in America. 
                                                
12 Report of NACCD, 1. 
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Whether a task force of eight white men, one white woman, and two African Americans 
would grant this wish was certainly in doubt. Johnson himself endured criticism for 
excluding a “voice of the ghetto” from the proceedings, and this ended up a fortuitous 
choice. By snubbing young black voices from a commission focused largely on the lives 
of young black men, the president seemed to ensure that his commission would chart a 
safe course, shunting controversy or anything too incendiary about American race 
relations. Yet this choice, in a sense, only magnified the Kerner Commission’s final 
message of increased ghetto spending and curbing white racial attitudes. Had the message 
come from a commission of young radicals—particularly black radicals—it would have 
had more skeptics, more accusations of subjectivity. This was not a radical commission, 
however; its members were very much in the purview of mainstream American politics, 
and in this sense, it had stronger resonance, evident in the fact that the report sold a 
million copies in the first month after its release. When a body of white moderates spoke 
of pervasive white racism and the need to increase spending for cities, America listened; 
the commission was not a single voice, nor was it comprised of anti-war flag-burners or 
anyone likely to march with the Black Panthers. The moderate reputation preceding the 
Kerner Commission’s report only made its final product more striking.  
 For many of the subjects covered in both the Kerner Commission’s report and this 
dissertation—President Lyndon B. Johnson, his domestic political agenda, the civil rights 
movement, the conservative counterrevolution, the Vietnam War, rioting in America, 
employment, welfare, housing, public education, and presidential commissions, among 
others—there are entire literatures. In the landscape of 1960s American history, the 
Kerner Commission is frequently mentioned but seldom the focus of a sustained study. 
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Accordingly, the number of works I am directly in conversation with is meager; when the 
literature itself is thin, it makes a historiographical intervention rather difficult. Of the 
works that have dealt with the Kerner Commission specifically, most have a narrower 
focus. Historian Thomas Hrach, for example, examines how the media section of the 
commission’s report forever altered how print and broadcast journalism approached poor, 
black neighborhoods in The Riot Report and the News: How the Kerner Commission 
Changed Media Coverage of Black America. In the summer of 2016, Princeton 
University Press reprinted the Kerner report in its entirety with an introduction by Julian 
Zelizer; Zelizer briefly discusses how the report and its themes remain relevant today, 
and how the nation veered from the report’s bold recommendations in 1968 in favor of a 
more conservative course. An unpublished dissertation by Donald Lee Scruggs at the 
University of Oklahoma examines the Kerner Commission at length, but it does so 
through the joint lenses of presidential task forces and how the Johnson Administration 
approached domestic policy prior to the commission’s inception, respectively. 
 Other works have mentioned the Kerner Commission in passing as well, weaving 
the report and its impact into larger political narratives. In Law and Order: Street Crime, 
Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s, historian Michael Flamm couches 
the notion of “law and order” as an effective, malleable political tactic that harped on the 
relationship between race and security. In addition to signifying a split among prominent 
liberals, Flamm notes that the Kerner report and its reception also spoke to the dire 
situation in American cities and how that situation emboldened a burgeoning 
conservative movement built on law and order. Lindsey Lupo’s Flak Catchers: One 
Hundred Years of Riots Commission Politics in America argues that riot commissions in 
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the twentieth century frequently made bold, unfulfilled promises in the interest of 
projecting power; she examines the Kerner Commission briefly using this framework. In 
Urban Rebellion: The Long, Hot Summer of 1967, historian Malcolm McLaughlin 
characterizes the riots as conscious, radical, political acts, and mentions the Kerner 
Commission as an example of how the Johnson Administration misinterpreted the riots 
and their meaning. 
 My dissertation places the life of the commission—from its inception in the days 
following the Detroit riots to the aftermath the following spring—at the center of the 
narrative. This is not a dissertation on the details of the Kerner Commission’s final report 
as much as it is one that tries to chronicle how eleven officials and scores of highly 
qualified staffers spent seven manic months arriving at such a report. It considers the 
causes, effects, and the report itself, of course, but not at the expense of a month-by-
month account, which no historian has written to this point. In chronicling the day-to-day 
work of the commission through its correspondence, minutes of meetings, newspaper 
clippings on its daily affairs, and other materials, I seek to show how the commission 
arrived at the conclusions it did while also tracking how the White House sought to 
undermine those conclusions at seemingly every juncture. The commission endured 
internal disagreements—between commissioners, between commissioners and staff, and 
between staff—worried about funding, amended its timetable on multiple occasions, and 
constantly had to stave off accusations it was merely a mouthpiece for the Johnson 
Administration. Its detractors wanted to undermine it for different reasons, and several 
circumstances beyond its control dulled its influence and message. This project examines 
the primary actors—both behind the podiums and behind the scenes—and seeks to 
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explain why they arrived at the conclusions they did, how those who resisted along the 
way did so, why such conclusions fell on deaf ears, and how the report failed to 
accomplish its stated objectives.  
 Beyond a president who took the commission’s recommendations as a personal 
insult, those on the commission’s payroll had to account for other portions of the political 
calculus; even if Johnson had endorsed the report’s findings, a conservative Congress 
wished to cut spending rather than increase it. This opposition lay partially in partisan 
disagreement on how much the federal government needed to spend on comprehensive 
social programs and partially in the costs of the Vietnam War, an exhaustive, by now 
unpopular conflict that hoovered funds relentlessly and was rarely far from the center of 
any conversation on American spending. Commissioners knew that the president and 
Congress would not welcome every single one of their recommendations; they knew that 
the dialogue they sought to encourage on racial attitudes was, in some respects, as 
important as the funds they wished to set aside. 
 Despite the fact that the commission’s report was clearly intended for white 
Americans, there was also the issue of whether this was the report on rioting and inner-
city life that many white Americans wanted to read. Conservatives bristled at what they 
called the report’s notion that “we in the suburbs should be forced to take the Negro into 
our communities so that he can make shambles of our suburbs just as he has the central 
city.”13 Columnist James Kilpatrick noted that “when one inquires why the city is 
burning, it ought not to be amiss to direct a few questions as the man with the torch in his 
hand,” while a Birmingham News editorial described rioters as “subversives committed to 
                                                
13 Anonymous to Wallace and Kerner, March 5, 1968, “A,”; Box 14, Series 28, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ 
Library, Austin, TX.  
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the violent destruction of American society.”14 Many elected officials also criticized the 
commission’s findings, touting respect for law and order, decrying increased government 
spending, and defending what they believed to be their fundamental rights as 
suburbanites. If Johnson believed the Kerner report to be an indictment of his own 
agenda of Great Society legislation and programs, many conservatives believed the riots 
themselves were the real indictment, proof that big-government and liberal spending had 
failed. A separate investigation, conducted by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, was the type of exercise many moderate and right-leaning citizens 
welcomed. Chaired by Arkansas Senator John McClellan, a veteran conservative, staunch 
segregationist, and anti-communist, the subcommittee sought to criminalize rioters and 
tie them to communist or other radical influences that did not speak for the majority. 
McClellan’s group searched for evidence of conspiracy, of “outside agitators” planning 
riots in advance; these were classic tactics used against the civil rights movement for 
years, but they remained compelling arguments to many Americans, which arguably 
proved the commission’s point that race in America remained an unsolved problem. 
Much of white America showed more interest in punishing those presumed responsible 
for riots than in examining the conditions that created those riots. 
 Ultimately, two events that had nothing to do with Vietnam, nor the budget, nor a 
manipulative Johnson Administration, helped bump the Kerner Commission from the 
spotlight. First: President Johnson announced to the nation on March 31, 1968, that he 
would not seek re-election. Given Johnson’s animosity toward the final report, this might 
                                                
14 James J. Kilpatrick, “A Conservative View: Riot Report a ‘Whitewash,’” Birmingham News, Mar. 8, 
1968, 11, “3/15/68-3/21/68,” Box 388, FG 690, NACCD, White House Central Files, LBJ Library, Austin, 
TX; “False ‘Leaders,’” Birmingham News, November 20, 1967, “Office of Congressional Relations-
Clippings,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
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have seemed a godsend, but it ensured that the focus would be on the presidential election 
and that the commission and its recommendations would be just as much of a “lame 
duck” as Johnson himself. Johnson resented the report, but he did not ignore it entirely, 
nor did he disagree with some of its fundamental observations. When he announced he 
would not accept the Democratic nomination, it weakened the rebranding effort of 
existing programs and undermined future programs and liberals’ ability to mobilize 
behind the Kerner report. While Johnson had not embraced the report, it did not mean 
aides or fellow Democrats could not try to persuade him going forward, or that perhaps 
his mood would not change if he won another term in office. If the commission had any 
hope of salvaging momentum in the spring of 1968, that hope had now dissipated. The 
Kerner Commission’s report was not the “final straw” that dissuaded Johnson from 
continuing his political career, but it was certainly one setback of many that accumulated. 
Amid blistering criticism for leading America haplessly into Vietnam, Johnson could 
always fall back on the domestic accomplishments that were his Administration’s 
crowning achievements; the Kerner Commission did not belittle these achievements, but 
it did argue that viewing them as a final chapter in the civil rights struggle was a mistake. 
“They always print that we don’t do enough. They don’t print what we do,” Johnson said 
gruffly in a March 1968 meeting.15 If Johnson believed he could always return to the 
domestic programs for support even while censured for Vietnam, the Kerner report and 
its positive reception from many Democrats and liberal Republicans indicated that many 
lawmakers believed his domestic agenda was no longer ambitious enough after four-and-
half years in office. 
                                                
15 Max Frankel, “President Calls Report on Riots Worthy of Study,” The New York Times, Mar. 7, 1968, 
“Reaction: Post-Report,” Box 4, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
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 A second unforeseen complication was the assassination of Martin Luther King 
Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee, on April 4, 1968. This tragedy brought rioting and ushered in 
a total reset on the issue of race in America. When the face of a triumphant civil rights 
movement was murdered, it shifted the conversation. Nobody wanted to discuss how to 
prevent rioting in the summer of 1968, or the finer points of funding recommendations, or 
re-read a description of America’s racial problems that was suddenly both chillingly 
relevant and also out of date. In a span of five days, the Democratic Party had lost its 
standard-bearer and the civil rights movement had lost its brightest light forever. If 
lukewarm support from the Johnson Administration and questions about funding in the 
current political climate at home and abroad put the Kerner report on tenuous ground, 
March 31 and April 4 sank it, or at least damaged it irreparably. Two months later, 
Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in Los Angeles, as another long, hot summer began 
anew. The Kerner Commission’s missed opportunity was, to an extent, a victim of 
historical circumstance, but it was a missed opportunity nonetheless.  
 The Kerner Commission’s twin calls for massive spending increases in American 
cities and earnestly confronting white racial attitudes constituted an unprecedented 
moment in post–World War II American history. It both offered recommendations that 
required billions of dollars and recommendations that would cost nothing. It reflected the 
true civil rights movement—an unglamorous, protracted, incomplete struggle that 
rejected resting on laurels and demanded that the nation address shortcomings with 
additional resources and changed attitudes. If the opportunity for a massive increase in 
domestic programs dwindled due to an Administration determined to save face, a cost-
cutting Congress, and an American public with markedly conflicted views on who to 
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blame for riots, the opportunity to address white racism, and police brutality, and how the 
ghettoes formed to begin with, vanished because of two monumental events—Johnson’s 
announcement and King’s death—in a span of five days.  
 While the report was far too comprehensive and written, researched, and released 
in a political climate far too fraught and complex to attribute its failures to a single factor, 
it is fair to say that the Kerner Commission’s final product failed, in large part, because 
white America did not want it to succeed. In the most fruitful civil rights era in American 
history, blaming white racism was simply a bridge too far. The commission wanted white 
America’s money, blamed their attitudes, and absolved rioters themselves of the bulk of 
the blame. The majority of conservative and moderate white Americans rejected this 
approach, Congress included, as did the very same Johnson Administration that had 
commissioned the task force in the first place. Beyond its subversive decision to listen to 
the grievances of many black Americans and the historical events that blunted its 
immediate and lasting impact, the report’s twin prescriptions for increased spending and 
improved attitudes had little chance for success when so much of white American found 
those prescriptions problematic. 
 There is no guarantee, of course, that ramping up programs or extending dialogue 
would have curbed riots or racial tension in the unstable political climate of 1968, but 
when the Kerner Commission’s well-researched, eloquent message fell flat, America 
never had the chance to find out. The commission aimed its tangible programs at helping 
black America and its cultural observations at convincing white America. Even after the 
former seemed implausible, hope persisted that America could have a fruitful dialogue on 
how and why white Americans were complicit in the origins and travails of poor black 
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neighborhoods. On both scores, it failed. The Kerner Commission was never going to be 
a catch-all solution to all of America’s postwar problems, but it is fair to wonder, had the 
report and its message had more time as a lead story, if it could have perhaps changed the 
conversation and reduced the chances of history repeating itself in Ferguson and 
Baltimore fifty years later. Instead, another presidential commission took its place—led 
by White House adviser Milton Eisenhower and focused on violence—and the 
Democrats lost the presidential election. Richard Nixon rode a wave of law-and-order, 
“silent majority” rhetoric to the White House, running fear-mongering commercials of 
riot footage along the way. In the aftermath of the report’s release, the events of 1968 had 
galvanized the very people that the Kerner Commission had blamed for the riots. Liberals 
would be removed from the Oval Office for most of the next quarter-century; in the 
short-term, the fundamental questions about America that the commission sought to 
answer had disappeared. In the blink of an eye, its chance had come and gone.  
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July 1967 
 
 On a muggy summer evening in Newark, New Jersey’s Central Ward, African 
American cab driver John Smith was arrested for tailgating a police cruiser, dragged into 
police headquarters, and beaten so severely that he had to be rushed to a hospital. The 
officers questioned about the incident claimed that Smith “began using profane language 
and struck both officers,” at which point they placed him under arrest.1 Smith’s account 
of that night—July 12—differed; the trumpet-playing native southerner recalled he had 
“snapped [his] turn signal on and then went around” the double-parked police car, “like 
I’ve done many other times.”2 This prompted the officers to pull him over, at which 
point, Smith claimed, they “shoved me into the back seat of the police car where the 
officer first hit me with his fists, and then with a billy club, finally striking me in the 
groin which temporarily paralyzed me.”3 Fellow cab drivers and residents from the Hayes 
Homes housing project across the street saw Smith being dragged out of a vehicle and 
into the Fourth Precinct station. Rumors of police brutality spread quickly. Smith said the 
officers “dragged me out of the car, and beat me again and again…and then they took me 
inside and I was really worked over. I was kicked and beaten and struck with pistols.”4 A 
civil rights leader permitted to visit Smith in his cell found him bruised and in need of 
medical treatment; he was hospitalized and diagnosed with a fractured skull and bleeding 
in his brain.5 
                                                
1 Sean Patrick Dockray, “Containment: The Architecture of the 1967 Newark Riots,” (1999), 4. 
2 Ibid., 6. 
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Kimberly Siegal, “Silent No Longer: Voices of the 1967 Newark Race Riots,” (Undergraduate Thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2006), 26; The police report claimed that Smith “had to be carried into the 
police station when he refused to walk, and then declined to give his name.” Newark-Evening News 
account. 
 19 
 In Newark, a community described in Newsweek as “a gothic tangle of factories 
and slumping stores and molding tenements” and mired by poverty, crime, 
unemployment, and inadequate housing and medical care, the relationship between law 
enforcement and African Americans was one of tension and mutual distrust.6 Robert 
Curvin of the Congress on Racial Equality declared that Newark police were “conducting 
a war against the black community.”7 As in the case of many American cities, white 
flight to Newark’s affluent suburban rings had rendered its city center a desolate place, 
barely resembling the enclaves of quiet privilege that lay ten miles away. Plans to build a 
new medical facility were tempered by the fact that the facility would displace thousands 
of residents. Summer programs designed to keep teenagers employed and off the street 
had “snarled,” leaving thousands with idle time and no way out of the turmoil.8   
 When word broke that Smith might be dead, citizens and local civil rights leaders 
headed to the station and demanded accountability from the police, chanting and 
throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails in frustration. Deeming the police response to the 
outcry as insufficient, angry citizens, many of them teenagers, began looting and rioting 
on a mile-long stretch of Springfield Avenue in Newark’s primary commercial district. 
Looters, according to an article in Time, smashed windows and vandalized liquor stores, 
stripped clothes off mannequins, and left the street in a “fine, crunch layer of window 
glass” while sparing many businesses that “contained signs indicating they were Negro-
                                                
6 Model Cities reports from 1966 on Newark found it had the highest rates of tuberculosis, venereal disease, 
maternal mortality, and infant mortality in the nation—Siegal, “Silent No Longer,” (Undergrad Thesis, 
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“an unemployment rate so stubbornly high that it is one of only five U.S. cities that qualify for special 
economic aid.” “Newark Boils Over,” Newsweek, July 24, 1967, “General,” Box 2, Series 25, Records of 
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Record Group 282, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential 
Library, Austin, Texas.  
7 Siegal, “Silent No Longer,” (Undergrad Thesis, UPenn, 2006), 26. 
8 “Newark Boils Over,” Newsweek, July 24, 1967, “General,” Box 2, Series 25, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ 
Library, Austin, TX. 
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owned.”9 Gunshots and fires erupted across the city as well. Efforts by local leaders to 
prevent rioting in favor of peaceful protests against police brutality, which included 300 
people marching across the street peacefully, chanting “beat heads, not drums!” the night 
after Smith’s arrest, proved futile amid the escalating tension.10  
 As it became apparent that the looting was not going to dissipate the following 
night, police donned riot gear and were given permission to “use any action to stop the 
looters and to protect yourselves.”11 In the early hours of Friday morning, Newark Mayor 
Hugh Addonizio telephoned New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes and requested 
assistance from the National Guard and state police. Addonizio, a liberal Democrat and 
veteran of the U.S. House of Representatives who championed urban renewal programs, 
declared that the city had deteriorated from a serious disturbance into a riot. Hughes 
clumsily described Newark as “a city in open rebellion” where “the line between the 
jungle and the law might as well be drawn here as any place in America.”12 In a matter of 
minutes, 3,500 guardsmen and 600 state police had entered Newark; for five days, 
Newark was an urban battleground, the product of decades of ghetto frustration with 
police and underrepresentation within the local power structure that finally boiled over 
into unchecked violence.  
 In the chaos, hundreds of confused, unprepared, trigger-happy police and National 
Guardsmen fired at alleged snipers and struggled to quell the rioting and looting in a 
campaign plagued by insufficient riot training and poor radio communication. An NBC 
                                                
9 “Sparks and Tinder—The Nation,” Time, July 21, 1967, “Causes,” Box 2, Series 46, NACCD, RG 282, 
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News report broadcast during the riots told a different story, one where a valiant Gov. 
Hughes led “the fight against lawlessness” and the “numbers and weapons” of National 
Guardsmen had “done much to end the disorder.”13 Many of the riot’s victims died 
accidentally, the result of police firing aimlessly toward buildings, rooftops, and alleys 
while hoping to hit snipers whose mere existence was often in doubt. Among the most 
publicized riot deaths was Eloise Spellman, a mother of eleven children who was killed 
by a stray bullet in the hallway of her public housing high-rise. Authorities had to hang a 
white sheet from the building to deter shooting long enough for her ambulance to arrive. 
Others were gunned down, according to police, after they refused orders to cease looting. 
A freelance photographer on the scene reported that a black teenager was shot and killed 
for stealing a six-pack of beer; when an officer was questioned about the incident, he 
said, “the guy’s better off dead.”14 Authorities were “helpless to stop the looting” and 
“merely sought to contain it.”15 
 In Washington, President Lyndon Johnson’s staff monitored the situation in 
Newark. On the morning of July 15, Johnson’s special assistant, Joseph Califano, sent a 
memo to the president indicating he had spoken to a member of Hughes’s staff about 
“trying to get Negroes to go into the riot area…and begin negotiations with the dissident 
elements” while noting that “the situation is still very bad and there are still many snipers 
in the riot area.”16 Hughes and Addonizio reportedly disagreed on the course of action for 
                                                
13 The Huntley-Brinkley Report Transcript, “Newark Riots,” NBC News, July 14, 1967, “Riot Documentary 
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negotiating, and the governor wanted to ask about “federal program assistance” in 
Newark.17 Califano wrote to Johnson that “this is probably going to be a very difficult 
situation” and that assistance risked the appearance of “rewarding rioters.”18 He also 
recommended the administration “begin to find out what programs we have in Newark 
and what we could do” while telling Johnson he “assume[d] you want to keep the White 
House out of this.”19 The coming weeks would render that request impossible.  
 By the time National Guard troops and state police departed the city on July 17, 
twenty-six people were dead and Newark had suffered tens of millions of dollars in 
property damage. Garbage “rotted in piles on the sidewalks,” and closed businesses 
meant a food shortage in the city, forcing cops to hand out food to the hungry.20 Even in 
the wake of the destruction and “five days of rock-throwing, bombing, and rooftop 
sniping,” anger among African Americans burned white-hot; after police busted open 
grocery bags carried by two African American men on suspicion of looting, one of the 
men lamented that he had “been back from Vietnam for 2 days, and this is what I get. I 
feel like going home and getting a rifle and shooting the cops.”21 Governor Hughes 
declared on July 18 that “the restoration of order” was “accomplished,” but such order 
came at a devastating price.22 
 The basic details of the Newark riots were not unique; in the summer of 1967 and 
the two summers prior, accusations of police brutality and unlawful arrests yielded 
smaller riots and skirmishes across inner-city America. These conflicts brought white law 
                                                
17 Califano to Johnson, July 15, 1967, “Commission on Civil Disorder-1,” Box 11, Office Files of Joseph 
A. Califano Jr., LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Huntley-Brinkley Report, NBC News, “Disorder, et. al,” July 17, 1967, “Huntley-Brinkley Tapes 15-24,” 
Box 2, Series 40, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
21Ibid.; Report of NACCD, 38. 
22 Siegal, “Silent No Longer,” (Undergrad Thesis, UPenn, 2006), 193. 
 23 
enforcement into impoverished black neighborhoods in the swelter of June, July, and 
August, when squalid living conditions were most unbearable and resentment of these 
conditions most palpable. With the exception of the 1965 riot in the Watts District of Los 
Angeles, however, most of these incidents occurred on a smaller scale, with fewer lives 
lost and fewer buildings in ruins. Newark was a larger version of a pattern of death and 
destruction that reached all regions of America; now it was time for the federal 
government to take action rather than simply taking note.  
 Reaction from Washington came swiftly. Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Robert Weaver observed that the riots “underscore the immediacy of the 
problem of our cities…they are the inevitable consequences of scores of decades of 
neglect, discrimination, and deprivation.”23 Attorney General Ramsey Clark claimed 
Newark was “another reason for restriction on the sale of firearms” given that “a large 
number of persons engaged in this murderous rioting in Newark were in possession of 
firearms that they obviously could not have obtained in New Jersey.”24 Whitney Young 
of the Urban League told a congressional committee there “might easily be more riots 
like Newark’s” and that “the remedy was to eliminate poverty with government money, 
more than one hundred billion dollars over the next ten years.”25 A meeting of civic 
leaders at Rutgers University concluded the riots were caused by “an absence of Negroes 
in the city power structure, police representing a lawless element, and indescribably bad 
housing.”26 
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 Speakers at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) convention in Boston also reacted to Newark’s riots. Longtime NAACP 
Executive Director Roy Wilkins blasted the authors of an anti-riot bill aimed at black 
militants that had surfaced in Congress just two days before John Smith’s arrest. Wilkins 
called out the lawmakers who engaged in “wordy parliamentary debates in considering, 
trimming, altering, or rejecting a civil rights bill” while “hav[ing] no trouble lining out 
punishment for alleged rioting.”27 These politicians, Wilkins claimed, were “creating an 
atmosphere in which an outbreak of violence can occur,” one where civil rights measures 
were ignored but rioting punished.28 Speaking at the same convention, Massachusetts 
Senator Edward Brooke stated that “Black Power is a response to white 
irresponsibility…if Congress, out of fear or anger, continues to choose the path of 
inaction, the lightning of violence will strike again and again.”29 
 On the floor of the U.S. Senate, West Virginia Democrat Robert Byrd advanced a 
conservative line of thinking that displayed little sympathy for those affected by riots. 
“We hear the usual excuses for the riots…the ghettos are blamed, yet people of all races 
have lived in ghettos in the past, and not rioted,” Byrd said.30 He compared the behavior 
of poor whites to poor African Americans, claiming that if “living in poverty reposes in 
one a duty or a right to riot, then Abraham Lincoln would have been the Stokely 
Carmichael of his day.”31 Byrd recalled his own childhood experiences in a coal-mining 
town during the Great Depression, a town where citizens “took pride in their 
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surroundings” and kept neighborhoods clean and safe.32 Immigrants had come to 
America and “didn’t react with violence, even though they lived in ghettos.”33 Instead, 
Byrd said, they had worked hard; “if people are dirty and irresponsible in their way of 
living, and have no desire to put forth the effort to improve their surroundings, then we 
will have slums with slovenly people living in them,” he said.34 In conclusion, Byrd told 
the president that if the urban poor “obey the laws, the laws will protect them,” but that a 
“Government of laws cannot tolerate disrespect for, and violation of, its laws…We 
cannot stand idly by and tolerate the shameful rape of democracy in our republic…those 
who choose to step outside the law must be punished.”35 Byrd’s rhetoric, which was 
hardly new among conservatives in 1967, demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the plight of African Americans throughout the course of the nation’s history while 
relying on racist tropes. Yet as the coming weeks and months would reveal, many white 
moderates and conservatives agreed with him, seeking to remove the racial undertones 
from the riots while focusing on the importance of obeying the law. 
 Back in Newark, the National Conference on Black Power proceeded as 
scheduled with an empowering message just three days after parts of the city lay in ruins. 
The riots illuminated many of the issues at the heart of a Black Power movement that 
called for African Americans to play a dominant role in cultivating black institutions and 
articulating black interests rather than relying on interracial, moderate approaches. One 
attendee said the conference sought to foster an “introspective, ongoing” dialogue among 
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blacks and had “nothing to say” to white people.36 Responding to Mayor Addonizio’s 
criticism of local black leadership, CORE officials said that African Americans were not 
monolithic “sheep” led by one person or group.37 Only through the central belief of black 
self-determination in political, economic, and social organizations could ghetto residents 
free themselves from harsh conditions and gain access to the post–World War II 
prosperity in America that had eluded them for so long. One Newark man interviewed for 
the Huntley–Brinkley News Report distilled the plight of poor African Americans in the 
inner city: 
 In the country of America, they don’t want the black man to have nothing. If he’s 
 black, he’s just wrong from the ghetto when he’s born…And this bugs you…And 
 it makes your blood boil…So you get to a point where you don’t give a damn if 
 you live or die…Right now I would tear this damn city down, right now…They 
 still haven’t learned yet. The 24 people they killed, maybe they better off, they 
 don’t have to go through poverty no more…some of them died like some of us 
 died. And if they still don’t get the point there are going to be some of us dead 
 and there are going to be some more of them dead.  
 
 White guys come out in the taverns around here, they come falling out all over the 
 street, nobody touches them. But we, the Negro man, we are the only people in 
 the world that has to protect ourselves against our own protection. The area here, I 
 resent living in this area for the single reason you got dilapidated buildings here, 
 you got garbage trucks sitting around with garbage on them, and the area smells, 
 and sewers the sewers they’re not working properly. You’ve got rats, roaches and 
 water running into basements. Yes, I would like to move out of the area. But 
 where am I going? Who’s going to sell me a place? If I buy a place in some other 
 area, before the night is over they’re going to stone the windows. So where am I 
 going?38 
 
 For a presidential administration that had prided itself on the Great Society, an 
unprecedented agenda of federal legislation and domestic programs committed to social 
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welfare, this tragic explanation out of Newark served as a reminder that the civil rights 
movement was a complex, ongoing event without a concrete endpoint. President Johnson 
had signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a comprehensive act that banned segregation in 
public accommodations and outlawed discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, 
and national or religious origin; the act was widely considered among the most important 
pieces of civil rights legislation in American history. He had signed the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, a Great Society centerpiece committing billions of dollars to 
the War on Poverty that sought for the poor both federal relief and a say in how that relief 
was appropriated. He had signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, an act that abolished 
voting discrimination in federal, state, and local elections with an eye on African 
American enfranchisement in the South. He had overseen the creation of Medicare, 
Medicaid, the first Food Stamp program, the National Endowment for the Arts, and a 
host of other domestic programs aimed at remedying inner-city ills.39 Yet a riot outbreak 
for a third consecutive summer indicated the need for more action from the White House. 
A second major disturbance the following week would prompt Johnson to address the 
nation.  
 Five days after the Newark riots subsided, Detroit police raided five “blind 
pigs”—illegal underground clubs where patrons drank and gambled—in the middle of the 
night. Eighty-two in attendance at the blind pigs were arrested and taken away; within 
hours, reports of police brutality tied to the arrests had spread. The raid had come in an 
African American neighborhood in a city with a longstanding tradition of racial tension 
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and riots; several of the blind pigs were on 12th Street, a district that had “deteriorated 
from a prosperous commercial thoroughfare to one ridden by vice.”40 Many of the issues 
facing the impoverished, mostly African American section of Detroit in question 
mirrored the issues in Newark’s Central Ward. According to a 1966 survey, 93 percent of 
neighborhood residents wished to move out, 73 percent felt the streets were unsafe, and 
91 percent believed crime at night was probable.41 As was the case in Newark, white 
migration to the suburbs had dire, isolating consequences for inner-city Detroit, and the 
rioting was, in part, a reaction to those consequences. Schools, health care, and housing 
were all substandard. In the early hours of Sunday, July 23, crowds began smashing 
windows and looting businesses along 12th Street. Attempts to appease the angry crowds 
were unsuccessful in the daylight, and more rumors of police brutality spread. Fearing the 
worst, Mayor Jerome Cavanagh called for National Guard troops on Sunday afternoon to 
reinforce an overextended, overmatched local police force.  
 By Sunday evening, Detroit burned. Molotov cocktails flew and fires engulfed 
parts of the city, destroying businesses and homes on the city’s West Side. Michigan 
Governor George Romney, who flew over the stricken area, later told officials it “looked 
like the city had been bombed on the West Side and there was an area two-and-a-half 
miles by three-and-a-half miles with major fires, with entire blocks in flames.”42 NBC 
News reports claimed “almost 100 city blocks have been destroyed” and that the “most 
often heard reaction from people who see this ruin is how much it resembles the bombed-
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out cities of World War II.”43 Firefighters fearing for their safety had retreated and waited 
for additional state police and National Guard troops to arrive. Chrysler and General 
Motors suspended production, and the Canadian border was “closed to all except tourists 
and others who can prove they are heading toward their own homes.”44 News accounts 
described neighborhoods overrun by “arsonists, looters, and vandals” for hours on end.45  
 In the early hours of Monday morning, 800 state police and 1,200 National 
Guardsmen were on the ground in the city; rioters blamed their presence for inciting 
much of the violence. At that time, Romney and Cavanagh both agreed that federal 
assistance would be necessary; well after midnight (2:15 am), Cavanagh phoned the 
White House and spoke to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who referred the mayor to 
U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Clark warned Gov. Romney of the ramifications of 
such a request and stated that “before Federal troops could be brought into the city, 
[Romney] would have to state the situation had deteriorated to the point that local and 
state forces could no longer maintain law and order.”46 Romney balked, concerned that 
“insurance policies would not cover the loss incurred as a result of the riot.”47 Requesting 
and deploying federal troops was a contentious issue that would remain in dispute 
between the White House and local officials long after the riots had ended. 
 With the situation unchanged the following morning, Romney and Cavanagh 
reiterated their request for federal troops due to the city’s “distressing, desolating 
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condition” that had “built on an accumulated basis” and “doesn’t have anything to do 
with civil rights.”48 President Johnson instructed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
to put 5,000 paratroopers on standby at nearby Selfridge Air Force Base and sent a 
telegram to Romney informing him that they would arrive on Monday afternoon.49 
Meanwhile, McNamara’s special assistant, Cyrus Vance, and several other administration 
officials flew over the area on Monday afternoon for an assessment; when they did not 
see widespread looting or sniping, they reported back to the White House to hold off on 
deploying federal troops, deeming it as unnecessary. But when the riots picked up again 
later in the evening, President Johnson, the man whose administration had taken more 
steps to assist the urban poor than any in American history, finalized the order to deploy 
paratroopers into the Detroit slums. It was the first time in five years that federal troops 
were sent to deal with a civil rights disturbance. Privately, Mayor Cavanagh praised 
Johnson for displaying “moral and political courage” in deploying federal troops to 
Detroit, adding, “one hopeful result of this most devastating situation might be an 
awakening on the part of the country to do far, far more both publicly and privately for 
the distressed people of our nation’s cities.”50 
As with Newark, and Watts before it, dropping inexperienced local police and 
National Guardsmen into volatile urban Detroit bore tragic results. Many officers and 
guardsmen were woefully unprepared and coped with the fatigue that came with 30-hour 
shifts; they were provided “on-the-spot instruction on mob control” but discovered that 
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“there were no mobs…on the darkened streets” where street lights had been shot out.51 
Instead, confusion reigned, as officers and guardsmen responded haphazardly to calls of 
alleged sniper fire. In an effort to avoid detection by the alleged snipers, officers taped 
over their metal badges and fired without clearance—into buildings and toward fleeing 
looters and the sound of bullets, often making “little attempt to determine whether their 
shots had hit anyone.”52 Gunshot victims emerged from the carnage, prompting 
speculation of phantom snipers and, perhaps, a host of stray-bullet shootings that were 
the product of a climate of fear and uncertainty. When Army troops arrived, they had 
“strict orders not to fire unless they could see the specific person at whom they were 
aiming,” but state and local officials had fired so many rounds to that point that the 
situation was beyond reproach.53 As in Newark, relief agencies handed out food when 
groceries “ran out of bread and milk because deliveries were too afraid to go in the 
area.”54 The Kerner Commission’s forthcoming report concluded that “action by police 
officers accounted for 20 and, very likely, 21 of the deaths; action by the National Guard 
for seven and, very likely, nine;” while “action by the Army” only resulted in one death.55  
When the carnage finally ended on July 27, the Detroit riot was one of the 
bloodiest in American history; 43 people were dead, 7,200 arrested, 200 blocks 
destroyed, and $22 million incurred in riot damages. Romney sent a telegram to the 
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White House asking Johnson to declare Detroit a disaster area, but the president declined, 
instead sending food, drugs, and hospital equipment.56 NBC reported officials were 
reluctant to “pay for the damage every time a city has a race riot,” and that the issue 
“remains unsettled and the political chilliness between the President and Governor 
Romney continues.”57 With Romney mulling a presidential campaign in 1968, political 
tension with President Johnson was inevitable. Implicit in Johnson’s decision to stall on 
the request for federal troops was the notion that Romney was an ineffective leader who 
was incapable of controlling his state in a time of crisis. For the second time in less than 
two weeks, an American city resembled a war zone.  
 The unrest had compelled President Johnson to make his first public address to 
the nation on the issue on July 24, as rioting in Detroit continued. “The fact of the 
matter…is that law and order have broken down in Detroit, Michigan,” Johnson said.58 
He criticized the “pillage, looting, murder, and arson” as having “nothing to do with civil 
rights” and stated that the nation “would not tolerate lawlessness.”59 Johnson called for a 
nationwide effort to “maintain law and order” and “firmly show that by word and by deed 
that riots, looting, and public disorder will not be tolerated.”60 His appeal to the rhetoric 
of law and order, the first of its kind during the tumultuous period, would have 
unintended consequences. While uttered with the idea of curbing violence and keeping 
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the peace in affected areas, the rhetoric also divorced the acts of rioting from the reasons 
that such acts occurred in the first place. Law and order meant keeping peace, but for 
many white Americans, it also essentialized the problems besetting the ghetto into 
controlling unruly black mobs without further critical examination. White Americans saw 
criminal behavior rather than the dire circumstances that spurred it; they saw justified 
police action rather than the checkered relationship between law enforcement and poor 
black communities across the country. To call for law and order was, contrary to the 
president’s stated intent, to ignore the roots of rioting, to ignore the reasons for looting, 
and instead vilify participants to the point that the roots were obscured.  
 After two days of turmoil, Republicans in Washington linked the “national crisis” 
with the Johnson administration. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen decried that the 
country was “rapidly approaching a state of anarchy and the president has totally failed to 
recognize the problem.”61 The grandstanding Illinois Republican, considered an ally of 
Johnson’s on many issues, blamed the riots on “a few false leaders” having “betrayed” 
the “Negroes of America,” asking, “How many thousands wounded, maimed, or killed 
over the years before the president will support or approve legislation to restore order and 
protect the people of this country?”62 On the other side of the political aisle, Democrats 
responded that the riots were an American issue, not a political one. On July 25 
Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale, and several others 
introduced a joint resolution on the Senate floor to “establish a special commission on 
civil strife, authorizing the commission established to investigate riots and civil strife in 
cities and urban centers of the United States, and to report and make 
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recommendations….for the prevention of such riots.”63 Harris envisioned a presidential 
commission “similar to the Warren Commission” that had investigated the assassination 
of the late John F. Kennedy; it would consist of nine members from different branches of 
government and across racial and political lines and release a final report with 
recommendations on how to eradicate future riots. “I think we need to realize that this 
matter of civil strife, lawlessness, and violence has become a serious national domestic 
crisis, and that action is required immediately on several fronts to meet that national 
crisis,” Harris said, citing summer incidents in Wichita, San Francisco, Jackson, Houston, 
Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Tampa, Cincinnati, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, among 
other cities.64 He dispatched a copy to the president and encouraged him to create the 
commission via executive order. “I had originated the idea of the Kerner Commission,” 
Harris recalled in his autobiography.65 
 Other notable public figures weighed in on the crisis as Detroit burned. Martin 
Luther King Jr. supported the deployment of federal troops to the city but added that riots 
were “the language of the unheard” and that it was “an indifferent attitude of Congress 
toward anti-poverty legislation,” not the work of outside agitators, that had created the 
conditions for such tumult.66 Senator Robert Kennedy pointed to issues with substandard 
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housing, education, and a “broken-down welfare system” as catalysts for the rioting.67 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. called the riots “a necessary phase of the black 
revolution” and “the greatest civil war since 1863,” while Michigan Congressman John 
Conyers described the rioters as “the black have-nots of this country, who have stored up 
more resentment than I or anyone else thought they could store up, and it’s coming out—
it’s ugly, it’s vicious, it’s unfortunate.”68 A joint statement issued by King, Wilkins, 
Whitney Young, and A. Philip Randolph from NAACP headquarters in New York said 
that it was “crystal clear that the primary victims of the riots are the Negro citizens,” and 
that while “the overwhelming majority of the Negro community joins us in opposition to 
violence in the streets,” respecting the law did not mean “we should submit tamely to 
joblessness, inadequate housing, poor schooling, insult, humiliation, and attack.”69 The 
statement continued that “the disabilities imposed upon Negro citizens are a century old. 
They remain because the white citizenry in general supports these restrictions.”70 With 
this statement, the NAACP towed the line of criticizing violence while reminding those 
in the power structure of the “hardships of ghetto dwellers” and shortcomings in the 
system that led citizens to resort to such violence.71  
 Before a Senate Subcommittee hearing organized by Harris seeking answers on 
the riots, Young continued to express the anger and frustration felt by many in the 
African American community of “being penalized and threatened and warned because of 
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the actions of a few.”72 In a day that brought endless political squabbling over whether 
federal funds to the inner cities was a sufficient answer to inner-city problems, 
particularly in light of the unrest, Young spoke, in part, for some of those who had “been 
here 400 years giving up our blood, sweat, and tears to this country.”73 He continued: 
 It’s not a joke anymore. It’s not optional. They’re talking about the stability 
 of the American republic. And we could tear this country, we could tear this  
 country apart and you know it. Nothing would be more monstrous, more 
 irresponsible than having every white middle class official…saying, ‘no 
 flinching, no reward for violence, no sir, we’ll show them, never explain, just 
 starve them out.’ That’s so easy, and it’s so stupid.74 
 
Young’s words were a reminder that not every reaction to rioting involved platitudes or 
outright condemnation; some in the African American community felt the riots were an 
inevitable consequence of longstanding conditions, and that the dialogue would benefit 
from a candid discussion rather than the familiar, patriotic, law-and-order routine. 
 Not all political figures who reacted to the riots showed sympathy. Former 
President Dwight Eisenhower demanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation examine the 
riots. “We keep hearing in Washington that this will all leave a chasm between white and 
black so wide and so deep it may never be closed,” he said.75 Eisenhower added that the 
“political realities now seem to say that it will be a long time before another politician 
runs for office promising civil rights progress” given the “evidence that Negroes no 
longer believe in them and white people are less willing to support them.”76 The result, he 
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concluded, would be “an increased separateness in society, not more integration but 
less.”77 
 On the afternoon of July 27, Vice President Hubert Humphrey sent a memo to 
Johnson expressing his concern that “the character of the riots suggests widespread 
rejection of our social system and not simply dissatisfaction with conditions.”78 
Humphrey had met with high-ranking officials in Johnson’s Cabinet to discuss the crisis 
in the cities; present at the meetings were Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Secretary of 
Commerce Alexander Trowbridge, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Secretary of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare John Gardner, Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Robert Weaver, Director of the Office of Budget and Management Charles 
Schultze, and Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano. Humphrey told the 
president that the Cabinet members believed “shockingly large numbers of Americans, 
including many liberals, are displaying extremely hostile racial attitudes…these trends 
must be stopped.”79 The administration, he suggested, should remain levelheaded without 
downplaying the significance of the riots.  
 Cabinet members also expressed the need for a “televised appeal to the nation by 
the President to repair the deep wounds in our society.”80 Only Johnson, they agreed, 
could make such an appeal. Doing so would convince  “patriotic Americans to draw 
together in the crisis” and show the public that “strong national leadership is being 
exercised to eliminate the cause of the disorders.”81 The administration, wrote the vice 
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president, needed to take inventory of its domestic programs and rebrand them in 
“language which gives new and exciting visibility to [their] potential” in order to “gain 
fresh public support….to popularize and explain the Great Society programs.”82 Rather 
than proposing new programs, officials agreed the focus should be on the programs 
already in place and whether any could be reframed to “effectively show presidential 
leadership relevant to the crisis.”83 This also entailed criticism of the Republicans who 
sought to block funding; Humphrey told Johnson that “where the minority in Congress is 
failing to exercise its responsibilities, that failure should be clearly identified.”84 The vice 
president concluded by stating that the group would meet again and “act as an advisory 
body on new or pending legislation, and on possible Executive actions relating to the 
causes of dissatisfaction.”85 
 Later that evening, President Johnson heeded his Cabinet’s call to address the 
nation. Speaking from the Oval Office, Johnson announced his administration’s response 
to the riots: the formation of the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders. 
Fifteen minutes before his address, Johnson telephoned Harris. “Fred, I’m gonna appoint 
that commission you’ve been talking about,” the president told him, saying he hoped the 
senator was “gonna watch me on television…I’m gonna put you on the damn thing.”86 
After Harris assured the president that he would do his best when serving, according to 
Harris’s autobiography, Johnson reminded the young senator that he was a “Johnson 
man,” and to keep that allegiance in mind.87 For a president renowned for violating his 
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colleagues’ personal space and conducting business meetings from the bathroom, 
referring to the significance of own political alliances in third person would have been 
enough; instead, Johnson decided to add one more threat for good measure. He told the 
senator he would “take out my pocketknife and cut your pecker off” if Harris forgot his 
role, adding, “You’re from Oklahoma; you understand that kind of talk, don’t you?”88 A 
dumbfounded Harris said he did, and hung up. While serving as a reminder of President 
Johnson’s frank, colorful nature, the exchange was also one of many examples disproving 
the notion that the Kerner Commission was not about politics; political alliances 
surrounded and were inseparable from the entire process. 
 After he had managed to shock one of his commissioners, Johnson got on with his 
address. He declared the commission’s purpose was to “investigate the origins of the 
recent disorders in our cities” and make recommendations “for measures to prevent or 
contain such disasters in the future.”89 Among the members announced to serve on the 
commission were Illinois Governor Otto Kerner and New York Mayor John Lindsay; 
Senators Edward Brooke and Fred Harris; Congressmen James Corman and William 
McCulloch, a liberal Democrat and conservative Republican, respectively; Atlanta Police 
Chief Herbert Jenkins; NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins; Kentucky 
Commissioner of Commerce Katherine Graham Peden; United Steel Workers President 
I.W. Abel; and private businessman Charles “Tex” Thornton. Eight white males, one 
white female, and two African American males comprised the commission. After 
condemning the criminal behavior associated with the riots, President Johnson also 
announced new riot control standards for National Guard troops, a direct response to the 
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fiascos that had unfolded in Newark and Detroit. Rather than settling for “order that is 
imposed by the muzzle of a gun,” Johnson said, the “only genuine, long-range solution 
for what has happened lies in an attack—mounted at every level—upon the conditions 
that breed despair and violence.”90 The president called on the commission—and the 
nation as a whole—to “attack these conditions—not because we are frightened by 
conflict, but because we are fired by conscience.”91  
 Woven into the 18-minute address was a reminder to both the American people 
and Johnson’s political opponents that his administration had directed “the greatest 
Governmental effort in all of our American history” at fighting poverty, discrimination, 
disease, unemployment, and poor schooling. Speaking deliberately and forcefully in his 
Texas Hill Country drawl, the president listed by name some of the Great Society 
programs that already addressed issues related to the riots, ranging from the Civil Rights 
Act to the Voting Rights Act to Head Start and the Job Corps, as well as “many, many 
more acts too numerous to mention on television tonight.”92 He targeted those 
Republicans “who feel that we cannot afford a Model Cities program” and “feel that we 
cannot afford for the children of poverty…or new efforts to house those who are in most 
need of housing.”93 In addition to calling for legislative action, Johnson sought to diffuse 
racial tension, praised the “law-abiding Negro citizens who hope most fervently—and 
need most urgently—to share in America’s growth and prosperity,” and proposed a 
national day of prayer for “reconciliation among men.”94 He concluded with a plea to all 
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Americans: “if your response to these tragic events is only ‘business as usual’—you 
invite not only disaster, but dishonor…let us work for better jobs and better housing and 
better education that so many millions of our fellow Americans need so much tonight.”95 
With a call for action to Congress, city halls, and communities across the country, 
President Johnson signed off. 
 The president planned to meet with the newly appointed commissioners at the 
White House on Saturday morning; he sent each a memo thanking them for their 
willingness to serve. “No task is of greater concern to our people,” Johnson wrote, adding 
that the “resources of the government will be at your disposal as you study this complex 
problem.”96 Privately, presidential aide Douglass Cater told his boss the commission “can 
have useful but only somewhat limited value in terms of dealing with bigger problems of 
the cities.”97 Its primary objective, according to Cater, was addressing “whether or not a 
conspiracy existed to cause the riots,” a focus that would “serve to remove that issue from 
partisan conflict.”98 The partisan conflict in question related specifically to clashes that 
summer over several pieces of legislation. Republicans had blocked a bill seeking to fund 
the extermination of rats in inner cities, a measure that became known as the “rat bill”; 
Johnson referenced the bill in his address to the nation in an effort to demonstrate 
Republican callousness when it came to urban issues. In contrast, an anti-riot bill had 
sped through the House of Representatives on the heels of the Newark riots.99 Liberals 
pointed to the two bills as an example of how conservatives in Congress were 
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uninterested in taking any meaningful steps to improve ghetto life. Cater told Johnson the 
new commission could “provide general endorsement for keeping the heat on Congress 
not to run away from your programs” but fortuitously warned of “a danger it may try to 
brainstorm big new programs of its own.”100  
 News broke that Johnson had selected Illinois Governor Otto Kerner as chair of 
the commission. Speaking to a neighborhood association in his native Chicago, the two-
term, “soft-spoken Democrat” pledged to determine “why one American assaults another 
American, why violence is inflicted upon the people of our cities, why the march to an 
ideal America has been interrupted by bloodshed and destruction” in his role as 
chairman.101 Kerner, according to the New York Times, boasted a “long record of efforts 
to achieve more liberal civil rights legislation.”102 He was a veteran of the Illinois 
political scene, having deployed the National Guard to mollify disturbances in Chicago, 
served in the Illinois National Guard himself as a major general, and gained a reputation 
as an effective leader despite Republican majorities in both Illinois state houses.103 
Kerner was described as a tireless and intense worker, a man “always canceling golf 
games” who was supposedly so busy that he barely had time to retreat to southern Illinois 
and partake in his favorite pastime, duck hunting. He had “successfully guided a number 
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of housing, employment, and education programs” as governor and stated there was “no 
room in America for any provocateurs who want to change the course of democracy.”104 
 The White House scheduled a press conference for Saturday morning, July 29, to 
formally sign the executive order and introduce the commissioners. The evening before, 
Califano sent a memo to the president outlining the main talking points, drafted by 
speechwriter Harry McPherson and stemming from a meeting among Johnson cabinet 
members and staffers. The agenda included a copy of the proposed executive order for 
establishing the commission, a history of instances where the president deployed federal 
troops in domestic incidents, and a copy of Johnson’s address to the country from the 
previous evening.105 Johnson would shake hands and pose for pictures with each 
commissioner, lasting approximately 10 minutes, read his talking points, and offer each 
commissioner a fountain pen to commemorate the occasion.106 After the president’s 
remarks, Vance would brief them on his time in Detroit, Johnson would sign the 
Executive Order, and Kerner would hold a brief press conference later in the day.107 
 Johnson welcomed the commissioners, members of his administration, and the 
press to the White House Cabinet Room and spoke to them directly, flanked by Kerner 
and Lindsay—who had been selected as vice chair of the commission—at the podium. “I 
commend you for what you have agreed to do for your country. You are undertaking a 
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responsibility as great as any in our society,” he told the commissioners.108 The American 
people, he said, were “baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that 
has occurred both in small towns and large metropolitan centers…and we in America 
shall not tolerate it.”109 In its investigation of the rioting, the Kerner Commission would 
use three primary questions as its foundations: “What happened? Why did it happen? 
What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?”110 Beyond these basic 
tenets were secondary questions for the commission to consider: “Why [do] riots occur in 
some cities and not others? Why [does] one man break the law, while another, living in 
the same circumstances, does not? Who took part in the riots? What is the relative impact 
of the depressed conditions of the ghetto…in stimulating to riot?”111 In the short term, the 
Kerner Commission needed to offer steps in preventing riots; in the long term, Johnson 
wanted it to offer advice to “make them only a sordid page in our history.”112 He briefly 
departed from his prepared remarks to reiterate that a recent poll showed “80 percent of 
Americans rate racial violence and conflict as the nation’s number one problem.”113 
 The president conceded that the commission’s assignment was a “tall order,” 
adding that it would succeed “only if you come to the meetings of this commission 
regularly, and put your shoulders to the wheel…[only then] can America have the kind of 
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report it needs and will take to its heart.”114 It was not an assignment to underestimate, 
nor was it a time to engage in petty political feuds; the task “goes to the proper 
responsibility of officials in both parties…I think the composition of this Commission is 
proof against narrow partisanship.”115Johnson also urged the commission not to simply 
tell his administration what it wanted to hear; he did not want or expect a report that “put 
the stamp of approval on what the Administration already believed.”116 Given the 
partisan rancor that had already begun and Johnson’s defensiveness over his 
administration’s domestic accomplishments, these remarks rang a bit hollow as the 
Kerner Commission set out to study the riots. Before deferring to Vance, the president 
concluded his remarks with some final words of encouragement: 
  Let your search be free. Let it be untrammeled by what has been called the 
 ‘conventional wisdom.’ As best you can, find the truth and express it in your 
 report. I hope you will be inspired by a sense of urgency, but also conscious of the 
 danger that lies in hasty conclusions. The work you do ought to help guide us for 
 many years—for many summers—to come.  I have great confidence in you. You 
 are all leaders and you, Governor Kerner and Mayor Lindsay, are leaders among 
 leaders.117  
 
The president had informed his commissioners of the stakes, letting both them and the 
general public know of his expectations; the onus was now on Kerner, Lindsay, and their 
nine colleagues to devise a plan and report back promptly. The coming months would 
reveal discrepancies, however, in terms of the president’s public and private stances on 
the commission’s philosophy and eventual recommendations. 
 The roll call for the Kerner Commission was certainly lacking in racial and 
gender diversity, but it boasted a cross-section of professional affiliations and 
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worldviews. The commission had civil rights veterans, precocious politicians, older 
moderates, law enforcement officials, and private businessmen; it had members who 
favored stringent policy with rioters and members who placed much of the blame on law 
enforcement tactics. Most had dealt with “urban strife” in some form; none had fringe 
political beliefs.118 The political profiles of those selected were moderate, well-respected, 
and safe. The hope was that Kerner, a Democrat from the Midwest, and Lindsay, a 
Republican Mayor used to canvassing in New York’s five boroughs, would provide 
balanced leadership at the head of the table. Lindsay, an outspoken critic of the Vietnam 
War, emphasized the commission’s need to speak with “people who know the problems 
and have lived with [them].”119 In addition to Harris, the young congressman who had 
stumped for creating a commission on the Senate floor the previous week, Johnson had 
picked Corman and McCulloch, veterans on urban affairs; Thornton, a “political 
independent with a long record in promoting [Johnson’s] antipoverty program”; Abel, 
whose union had “an extremely good record on race relations,” and Jenkins, one of the 
longest-tenured police chiefs of a major city in the country.120 The two African 
Americans selected, Brooke and Wilkins, were “the first Negro member of the senate in a 
century” and “an influential moderate Negro leader who has been arguing against the 
extremist advocates of so-called Black Power,” respectively. Peden, the only woman 
serving on the commission, believed the government should “carry a big stick and get 
tough with rioters and looters.”121 A White House source reported that Johnson had left 
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“militant Negro leaders” like H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael off the commission 
because “the President was interested in accomplishment.”122  
 The staff for the “Kerner Commission,” as it became known informally, would 
likely be mined from the Departments of Justice, Labor, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Health, Education, and Welfare. Speculation on when the commission 
would release its report differed; one estimate said by January 1, while Senator Harris 
hoped for a preliminary report in a month and a final edition in six months. The official 
Executive Order proclaimed the commission “shall make an interim report as to its 
findings of fact not later than March 1968, and shall present its final report and 
recommendations not later than one year from the date of this order.”123 The order also 
affirmed that all executive departments and agencies were “authorized, to the extent 
permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and 
assistance to the commission.”124 
 When Johnson had finished, Vance offered his update on Detroit, which he 
described as having “almost returned to normal as of Saturday morning.”125 He reported 
that arson in the city had ceased and lighting restored. Federal officials were leading the 
effort to distribute food and provide health and emergency services, and “about 90 
percent of the small shops and business establishments are functioning.”126 Like President 
Johnson, Vance also used “law and order” rhetoric; the loss of law and order, he said, 
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was “a tragic accident…in our society, law and order must remain the responsibility of 
state and local authorities.”127 At that point, Vance reviewed his own experiences in the 
city from the previous Monday; he had flown to the city and met with military personnel 
and local officials, some of whom said the “situation was critical and that Federal troops 
should be employed to restore order.”128 After a tour of the damage and a meeting with 
15 additional community leaders who were divided on the use of a military intervention, 
Vance contacted the White House, noted the reduced tension in Detroit that day, and 
recommended against using troops. When crime spiked again that evening, Vance 
changed course, phoned the president, and recommended troops be “moved into position 
at the Detroit fairgrounds.”129 Johnson had “reviewed the constitutional and statutory 
authority and the history of requests from state and local officials for federal troops to 
quell civil disturbance,” then officially authorized the deployment.130 Vance praised the 
performance of the U.S. Army troops in Detroit and added that there was “no evidence 
which would indicate an organized movement behind the riot.”131 Vance also cast doubt 
on the majority of sniping incidents, saying that “only two could be positively identified” 
out of fifty-three reported incidents.132 He speculated on the reason for the confusion and 
misleading reports surrounding snipers: 
  That is not to say sniping is not a problem. It is. But I think that it 
 probably has been exaggerated as a problem. Somebody hears a shot and they 
 report it to the  police net as a sniping incident. There may be several people who 
 hear that same shot fired, and they all report it so it comes in as six or seven 
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 sniping incidents when, in fact, it was one, or it might have been somebody 
 shooting at a street light.133 
  
 Questions surrounding the presence of snipers would prove critical in the 
forthcoming investigation of the riots, helping determine whether some of the police 
action in the chaos was justified or whether many innocent people had been criminalized 
and killed due to rampant errors. Ultimately, Vance told the press he hesitated to deploy 
troops because he thought it might “inflame the situation rather than to quiet it down…I 
have been through six or seven of these over the last six years or so that I have been here, 
and in some situations the over-commitment of force tends to produce a counter 
result.”134 Attorney General Clark also reviewed the sequence of events from the time 
Romney had telephoned him to Johnson green-lighting the use of federal troops. Multiple 
administration officials reiterating the timeline from Detroit sent a clear message to Gov. 
Romney and Republicans: the president had waited to deploy federal troops because he 
wanted to make sure he had all of the information and that such a deployment was 
necessary, not as part of some shrewd, ulterior political strategy to undermine a 
forthcoming campaign. 
 As photographers and newsreels made their way into the Cabinet Room, Kerner 
and Lindsay expressed their gratitude at being called to serve on the commission. Both 
agreed it was a massive undertaking that had no time for partisan conflict. Johnson read a 
brief statement issued to the mayors of hundreds of American cities before departing the 
Cabinet Room. At that point, according to minutes, the Kerner Commission conducted its 
first official meeting. The chairman noted the operation would have offices in 
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Washington and Chicago and would name an executive director shortly. Members 
planned to call witnesses and conduct hearings in investigating the riots, so there was 
discussion of whether or not to use subpoena power if necessary; no one in the room 
opposed it. There was also the matter of whether to make the hearings private or public; 
commissioners decided to postpone this decision after agreeing that such hearings would 
not be televised nor discussed publicly at that time.135 
 After breaking for lunch, commissioners reconvened. Lindsay suggested the 
commission meet again in a few days to “define its role.” Several commissioners spoke 
up about their own views on the commission’s purpose beyond the official language and 
presidential oratory surrounding the operation. Lindsay, along with Fred Harris and 
William McCulloch, “expressed an explicit desire to take on the broad problems that lie 
behind the riots.”136 Tex Thornton felt the top priority was to “support the President’s 
commitment to stop the riots—for the riots, in addition to the problems they cause at 
home, add to our problems abroad.”137 Here, the Texas native and California-based 
businessman tapped into the long-held belief, rooted in the Cold War’s tense early period, 
that America must project a positive, progressive image to the world to serve its 
geopolitical interests. 138 Edward Brooke added that he did not want the commission to 
“just be another study group” and hoped it would “convey to America that something will 
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be done.”139Commissioners agreed to meet the following week and hear an official report 
from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on the Detroit riots. There were also discussions on 
assembling a commission staff; Thornton wanted no one with “pre-conceived views,” 
while Roy Wilkins requested a staff that “represented the entire country and a spectrum 
of views.”140 The commission adjourned, still unsure of its exact schedule for the 
upcoming months. 
 The final order of business on Saturday was Kerner’s press conference at the 
White House. The governor told reporters that the commission would meet in 
Washington “all day Tuesday and Wednesday” and that “philosophically we are all of 
one mind…it is important that we move as quickly as possible, but we do not want to 
move to a point of quickness where we lose direction.”141 Priorities included finding an 
executive director, speaking with Vice President Humphrey on subpoena power for 
potential witnesses, and meeting with “individuals who have done work on similar kinds 
of conditions.”142 Kerner refused to comment on whether the commission would conduct 
open or closed hearings, nor did he speak to the interim report deadline of March 1, 1968, 
set by President Johnson in the executive order. He evaded a question about the 
commission’s makeup, specifically the notion that “the voice of the ghetto is not 
represented,” saying that all views considered were “not limited to any group by color of 
skin.”143 President Johnson’s call requesting he head the commission had surprised him, 
and he remained guarded on the exact direction of the commission in terms of examining 
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“the basic causes of urban decay.”144 On Sunday, Johnson asked David Ginsburg, a 
longtime, left-leaning attorney in Washington, D.C., to serve as executive director of the 
Kerner Commission. The 55-year-old Ginsburg had taught as an adjunct law professor at 
Georgetown University and held several government posts before going into private 
practice in 1943. Ginsburg accepted the position, and the two had planned to meet the 
following day in Washington. 
 The following Monday, John Lindsay made his first public address since his 
appointment as vice chairman of the Kerner Commission. Mayor Lindsay, speaking at the 
Congress of Cities in Boston, separated the majority of the urban poor from the rioters 
who “are more interested in a free television set than the human condition.”145 Rather, the 
majority wanted “to see something…they want visible, palpable evidence that their city 
cares about the conditions under which they live and is working to change them” so that 
they may “obtain a piece of the action.”146 Harris described Lindsay as “tall and 
handsome…urbane and sophisticated…the nationally famous mayor of America’s largest 
city.”147 Lindsay, who had served in the Navy in World War II and in the House of 
Representatives for eight years, was just 44 years old when elected mayor of New York 
in 1966. An outspoken critic of the Vietnam War, he had witnessed the conditions that 
bred riots firsthand and was adamant in his promise to examine those conditions. “The 
ghetto resident cannot be categorized by stereotypes or group thinking,” Lindsay said, 
adding that “resignation and militancy existed side by side” in the nation’s poorest urban 
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areas.148 He acknowledged that there was no place for such rioting but placed much of the 
blame on the conditions and a society that had failed to reach “the cop-taunters and 
bottle-throwers who have been in the vanguard of almost every outbreak in the cities.”149 
Such failure was understandable given the widespread hopelessness, Lindsay said, so it 
was up to a collaborative effort, pooled from public and private resources, to enact 
change. It would be a slow endeavor, accomplished on a “painstaking, street-level, block-
by-block basis,” and require “enormous amounts of both money and time.”150 
 The mayor criticized the private sector for placing too much of the burden on city 
governments and faulted the federal government, which he said “only within the last 
decade…[began] to use its power and resources against the problems of the cities.”151 
Neither branch of Congress, however, had a “Committee on Urban Affairs to oversee 
legislation dealing with the country’s metropolitan centers,” and Lindsay proposed an 
urban coalition featuring officials from “the country’s most powerful institutions—
business, labor, religion, education and communications.”152 He also targeted city 
governments themselves, particularly law enforcement, which he said were seldom 
concerned with addressing inner city problems constructively. When white officers 
represented “the man,” it was little wonder that rioters “turned so viciously against the 
police.”153 For the Kerner Commission, he said, “speed is essential…if the function of the 
commission is to sort out the shortcomings of the cities, and to point out means of 
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correcting them, we must move with due deliberation, but with all possible haste.”154 
After repeating his condemnation of criminal behavior in the riots and support for law 
and order, Mayor Lindsay informed his audience that the stakes were the “achievement of 
full citizenship for American Negroes and the preservation of the American city as the 
nucleus for our civilization.”155 The speech foreshadowed why Lindsay would struggle to 
get along with the administration or many of his fellow commissioners; he was not 
satisfied with the status quo and spared no one when advocating for change. As a 
Republican criticizing Vietnam involvement and the current resources allocated for urban 
problems, Lindsay was critical of President Johnson and had thus positioned himself as a 
quiet adversary whom the president would come to detest. What began as political 
differences would eventually grow into open contempt.  
 At his weekly press conference that Monday morning, the president encountered 
pointed questions related to Vietnam, the Kerner Commission, and his political future. It 
was a reminder that the Kerner Commission was only one of several crises the president 
dealt with daily. When told by a reporter that 52 percent of the American public did not 
agree with the military action in Vietnam, Johnson expressed skepticism as to whether 
that was an accurate reflection. Pressed on the poll once more, the president said it did 
not matter to him, adding that his administration did not “base our actions on the Gallup 
Poll.”156 He declined to answer whether his administration would consider cutting 
funding on Vietnam and the space program in order to “increase the flow of funds to the 
cities” but later remarked that the United States had the wealth to “meet our 
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responsibilities at home without neglecting our responsibilities in the world.”157 
Reporters read quotes from Romney and Cavanagh that criticized Johnson; Romney 
claimed the riots stemmed from “national conditions rather than local conditions,” while 
Cavanagh had asked on “Meet the Press” why the administration was “trying to pacify 
the villages of Vietnam while we should be pacifying American cities and that we were 
going to send a man to the moon by 1970 when he couldn’t walk down Woodward 
Avenue in Detroit.”158  
Johnson addressed neither of these comments directly and restated his support for 
the Kerner Commission and its eventual findings. He defended the makeup of the 
commission as well, saying commissioners were handpicked “without regard to any 
label” and with those “who could make a study of this matter” in mind.159 The best way 
to address the riots immediately, Johnson said, was to fully fund proposed programs such 
as Model Cities and the Poverty Bill, and to allocate funds for summer employment 
among young people in inner cities. He also declined comment on a report that many 
former Democratic National Committee delegates wanted him to resign for the sake of 
the party. As the questions revealed, Johnson’s popularity was clearly waning, even 
among his allies. A final question came concerning the potential findings of the Kerner 
Commission: what if recommendations involved more spending? Could the government 
finance them, mired in debt and double-digit inflation? Johnson said the administration 
would “do whatever is necessary to do” while pointing out that “if the nation had the 
same tax rates applied this year to our income as we had when I became President about 
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three and a half years ago, we would be receiving in the Treasury some $23 billion more 
than we will receive.”160 The press conference properly contextualized the Kerner 
Commission as part of a broader tumultuous period endured by the Johnson 
administration.  
 As the riots unfolded and the commission formed, letters from private citizens 
flooded to the White House and Governor Kerner’s office in Springfield. Some of the 
letters acknowledged that the exigencies of the riots made action necessary; many, 
however, expressed concern of a different variety. Many of the white Americans writing 
in were concerned not about the plight of poor African Americans in Newark, Detroit, 
and other cities, but rather about the direction of the country. In their broad criticism of 
Johnson and liberalism writ large, the letter-writers echoed Senator’s Byrd’s words from 
mid-July and relied on old-fashioned tactics originally employed against the civil rights 
movement. The riots, they claimed, were surely part of some kind of conspiracy, perhaps 
initiated by communists, or outside agitators, or both. What these people saw were poor 
blacks, prone to violence, whose limitations were self-imposed and whose actions were 
anti-American. They had little or no sympathy, appealing to patriotism, law and order, 
and religion, among other topics, in expressing why the Kerner Commission was a waste 
of time. They ranged from articulate to incoherent, polite to bigoted.  
 Perhaps the most common tactic used among the letters involved accusations of 
Communism and conspiracy. Despite the fall of McCarthyism more than a decade earlier, 
anti-Communism remained an effective tool in the minds of many Americans, nebulous 
enough to counter almost any liberal cause even in the late 1960s. Letters faulted “negro 
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radicals [who] have felt encouraged to commit murders, rapes, thefts, and property 
depredations” and mentioned “how quickly communist guerillas with a few machine 
weapons could take over this nation of helpless individuals.”161 Communism, socialism, 
and conspiracy were subsumed into the idea of radicalism, embodied by men like 
Carmichael and Brown, “trained by the communist party, whose intentions are not 
good…they go into the ghetto and give the same communist bull, we’ll take from the rich 
and give it to the poor…Black Power has just about pushed [other civil rights leaders] to 
Siberia.”162 One citizen wrote to the commission claiming “the Negro people are just 
being used as cannon fodder to take over the United States.”163 Another blamed the 
“stupid iliterate [sic] negro mobs who…are aiding and abetting the communists and 
threatening to destroy our land and economy.”164 By framing riots and rioters as radical, 
these “concerned citizens” presented what was happening across the country as un-
American, as something beyond societal norms. The ghetto, its residents, and its 
problems were thus “other-ized” by these critiques, foreign and dangerous in comparison 
to the orderly white suburbs.  
 Writers also labeled themselves as law-abiding citizens as a method of 
distinguishing themselves from those in violation of law and order, which one citizen 
described as “a spineless mockery in this country…the hard-working, law-abiding citizen 
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is short-changed.”165 Linked to law and order was the idea that a careless, liberal 
government was wasting money and condoning criminal behavior in the ghetto. As with 
the connections to communism, it also allowed citizens to frame rioters and rioting as 
outside of the norm; plain, everyday Americans touting respect for law and order stood in 
contrast to violent rule-breakers. “I believe I should be able to feel safe in my country, 
even though I am a law-abiding Caucasian,” one man wrote.166 Many letters associated 
whites with obeying law and order, and blacks with criminality. Calls for punishment of 
the rioters were harsh; many wanted to give “the police a lot more power” to maintain 
law and order, and some went so far as to say rioters should be “shot dead on sight.”167 In 
the minds of many white citizens, rioters were threats rather than victims. 
 Perhaps most disturbingly, many letters to public officials used overt racism when 
describing riots and rioters and the solutions for handling them. Blacks were 
characterized as ungrateful and subhuman in letters ranging from bold typeface to barely 
legible scribblings. “The only worthwhile poverty money is spent on education to bring 
them up to our standards so they won’t act like animals,” one letter claimed.168 Another 
asked: “Why does the administration close its eyes to the fact that these Negroes are 
criminal in nature…the fact that a man’s skin is black does not give him license to kill, 
burn, and pillage!”169 Against the standard of law-abiding white citizens was the notion 
of anti-American “hoods and people too lazy to work for a living….if they were worth 
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helping, they’d help themselves.”170 One man posed whether the government “should try 
to buy some real estate in Africa and send some of these U.S. haters back so that they 
could have a homeland.”171 It was easy to explain these letters away as fringe elements in 
the dialogue on race and riots in America—while acknowledging there was also plenty of 
encouraging, constructive feedback as well—but the fact that thousands of them reached 
officials like Kerner and Johnson underscored the fact that virulent racism was very much 
alive even in the wake of the passage of landmark civil rights legislation.  The Kerner 
Commission would have to contend with the fact that portions of its intended audience 
held such beliefs.  
 July did not end peacefully. Riots in Milwaukee exploded, prompting officials to 
seal off inner parts of the city, issue a curfew, fend off alleged snipers, and shut down the 
airport temporarily. Federal troops began to withdraw from Detroit, but the anxiety 
remained; Governor Romney reiterated in a press conference that President Johnson had 
stalled and “played politics in a time of tragedy and riot.”172 With hundreds of American 
cities on edge as August approached and a beleaguered presidential administration 
searching for answers, the Kerner Commission began to craft a blueprint for researching 
its forthcoming report.  It had to offer explanations and solutions quickly and efficiently. 
It had to satisfy bipartisan expectations. It had to prove that it was more than a well-
intentioned study whose ideas were unrealistic or would never come to fruition. To 
everyone involved with the fledgling project, the stakes were quite clear. 
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August 1967 
 “I think it is tremendously important that there be some continuing visibility for 
the commission and its work during its early days,” Fred Harris wrote to David Ginsburg 
and Otto Kerner on August 1 in barely legible blue ink.1 Harris wanted the Kerner 
Commission to demonstrate “something is being done,” that it was not “just another 
study.”2 If the commission retreated to engage in under-the-radar fact-finding for six 
months, he feared, it could undermine “its ultimate recommendations with the public and 
the Congress.”3 Recommendations in the August 1 memo included regularly 
disseminating information to public officials, including expert testimony and research 
results, and taking “preliminary positions” related to training standards and support for 
local police and National Guard troops.4 Harris also made a recommendation he wanted 
less publicized: for small groups of commissioners to take trips to cities affected by riots. 
The commissioners were to have “little advance fanfare” on such trips, which would 
serve as a way “just to see the conditions, get a feel for them, and visit casually with 
ordinary citizens.”5 Harris’s recommendations sought to avoid critiques of past 
presidential commissions said to be too private and too isolated. Quietly making trips to 
riot-affected areas while releasing relevant testimony and stances on riot training might 
engender goodwill among inner-city residents, Congress, and the broader public.  
 With the strategy for public relations underway, the Kerner Commission had 
already begun interviewing expert witnesses in early August in Washington. Among 
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those expected to testify were J. Lee Rankin, formerly of the Warren Commission, 
Warren Christopher, formerly of the McCone Commission that investigated the Watts 
riots, and J. Edgar Hoover. Following Harris’s handwritten recommendation, Kerner 
decided to release some of the findings from the hearings to the public. Hoover’s 
testimony attracted the most attention. In his closed-door testimony, the FBI Director told 
commissioners that his bureau had found no evidence of conspiracy or organization by 
communists or subversives in the recent riot outbreak. The FBI had also found no evident 
pattern in the alleged sniping incidents in Newark, Detroit, or elsewhere. Hoover did add, 
however, that while there were no apparent connections between riots, the FBI had 
discovered “non-residents taking part and agitating racial trouble in some of the cities.”6 
Hoover noted that he did not assign much significance to these outside agitators, but 
publicizing such a charged phrase made headlines nonetheless. The notion of “outside 
agitators” in civil rights had significant connotations that suggested that any kind of civil 
rights activity—or, in this instance, rioting—did not reflect the beliefs or desires of the 
local population. Outside agitators were frequently linked with radicalism in an effort to 
weaken civil rights endeavors through the mid-twentieth century. 
 Hoover’s released testimony prompted former White House Press Secretary 
George Reedy to write to President Johnson. Reedy, who had left his post in the 
administration over military action in Vietnam, warned his former boss “unless the 
current policies of the riot commission are changed, the group could easily wind up 
creating almost as many problems as the riots themselves.”7 Reedy cited Hoover’s 
testimony released in a press briefing as a “case in point” of creating “a considerable 
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amount of confusion” with conflicting reports on conspiracy and outside agitators while 
maintaining that the agitators were not significant.8 Kerner’s press briefing 
mischaracterized the remarks and allowed media outlets to focus on the presence of 
agitators. Reedy pointed out that the Kerner Commission was not the only body tasked 
with investigating the riots, either; the Senate Judiciary Committee, headed by notorious 
Mississippi segregationist Jim Eastland, and the Permanent Senate Investigation 
Subcommittee, chaired by Arkansas conservative John McClellan, were also 
investigating with an eye toward conspiracies and radical influences. “No person should 
take it upon himself to ever characterize the conclusions of another man,” Reedy wrote, 
reasoning that it would only “start an argument,” especially with those clamoring to 
unearth conspiracy and agitators anyway.9 Reedy advised that the commission should 
either hold open hearings for the press to attend or issue verbatim transcripts of anything 
behind closed doors, offering witnesses the opportunity to speak to reporters directly. 
Better communication would prevent handing political leverage to those more interested 
in crushing disturbances than addressing the conditions that bred them. 
 On August 2, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond addressed a frequent 
target for criticism related to the riots: former SNCC head and Black Power advocate 
Stokely Carmichael. Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, who had replaced Carmichael as the 
leader of SNCC earlier in the year, had given several incendiary speeches advocating that 
blacks engage in guerilla warfare against whites. The two leaders, both of whom were in 
their mid-20s, had played important roles in moving SNCC’s civil rights activism from 
the rural South to the urban North, making a conscious decision to exclude whites in the 
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burgeoning Black Power movement along the way. On the Senate floor, Thurmond said 
Carmichael was “in Cuba calling for the overthrow of the American government by 
force…he should be brought to justice the moment he returns to this country, if he returns 
at all.”10 The senator further labeled Carmichael a Communist, a race baiter, and a “clear 
and present danger” who was responsible for hijacking the civil rights movement and 
throwing inner cities into open rebellion.11 “That he is an insurrectionist can be 
understood by anyone who can read the printed word,” he said.12  
 Carmichael was indeed in Havana, meeting with Castro and calling for black 
activists in the Western Hemisphere to “take arms and fight…[and] seek vengeance” 
against imperialist enemies.13 “The fight is not going to be a simple street fight…It is 
going to be a fight to the death,” he told a Cuban audience.14 Brown, who had stated “if I 
had a gun, I might just shoot [President Johnson’s wife] Lady Bird,” was linked to 
starting a riot in Cambridge, Maryland, the previous month, calling for activists to burn 
the city down.15 Together, they were part of the inspiration for the antiriot legislation that 
had sped through the House of Representatives with the support of Republicans and 
southern Democrats. To the American general public, Carmichael and Brown were the 
menacing faces of Black Power, intent on fomenting violence and toppling white power 
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structures. The prevailing sentiment was that they had “declared war against white 
America.”16 
The White House took note. In an August 2 cabinet meeting, Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark reiterated the need to “give support to the responsible Negro leaders” and 
“isolate the radicals” in order to prevent an all-out “race war.”17 Vice President 
Humphrey added that fifty-two American cities were “about to explode…there is much 
fear and panic throughout the country.”18 When Humphrey reiterated Hoover’s stance 
that “the Justice Department has no hard evidence of conspiracy or of overall 
organization,” the president chimed in, “I don’t want to foreclose the conspiracy theory 
now. Keep that door open. Even though some of you will not agree with me, I have a 
feeling there is more than we see at the moment.”19 Secretary of State Dean Rusk finally 
asked if there was “a remedy or legal way to take care of Stokely Carmichael or H. Rap 
Brown,” citing each “threatening the lives of multiple administration officials.”20 
Informed that officials were monitoring both situations but that there was likely no basis 
for a case at the moment, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler said it was “incredible 
to think that you can’t make a case against Brown and Carmichael” given the 
circumstances.21 “What about a man who called for the assassination of the president?” 
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Rusk asked, to which Clark replied: “We will have to see on this.”22 Johnson, according 
to the minutes, told his Cabinet that “everybody recognizes the potential explosion inside 
our cities” and “asked each cabinet member to think of ways to avoid another Newark or 
Detroit.”23   
 In the meeting, Johnson also asked his Cabinet what they thought of the notion of 
engaging with Carmichael and other radicals considered closer to “the voice of the 
ghetto” than commission members like Roy Wilkins.24 The criticism had originally 
surfaced when the president named the Kerner Commission members. If those in the 
room did not care what Carmichael or Brown had to say, there were some in Washington 
interested in understanding the riots beyond violating law and order, including some 
members of the Kerner Commission. Carmichael and Brown’s over-the-top statements 
encouraging violence overshadowed their salient points as grassroots activists about the 
ills of ghetto life. The Kerner Commission did not offer this perspective among its eleven 
members, but that did not mean it did not wish to understand it. As Chicago-based 
activist Jesse Jackson put it, “riots are illegal, but make no mistake about it, they are not 
illegitimate…they are the result of legitimate grievances from people who have a 
legitimate claim upon the society.”25 One article argued the “astonishing thing is that the 
Negro kept his cool as long as he did in the face of legislative travesties and 
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neighborhood brutalities systematically dealt to him, even into the hot summer of 
1967.”26 
A study released by the School of Police Administration and Public Safety at 
Michigan State University that summer boosted Jackson’s point. It described rioting as 
“an outlet for the frustrations encountered by the victims of ghetto living...although it 
may indicate a failure of certain programs and responsibilities of society as a whole, it is 
more important to view riotous behavior as an expression of needs, wants, and protests of 
the ghetto community.”27 The study noted “the people of the ghetto lack psychological 
and social resources to communicate their wants, needs, and grievances.”28 This stemmed 
from a fundamental misunderstanding of the urban poor. The study observed: 
There is a predominant feeling that those who live in the culture of poverty must 
be socialized to possess middle-class values…The pathology of our suburbs is 
seen in the emptiness reflecting a futile struggle to find substance and worth 
through the concretes of things and possessions. This lack of understanding of the 
culture of poverty, the condescending moralizing of the middle-class toward the 
lower-class, and the pressure for all to be governed by the ‘good’ middle-class 
values has resulted in rejection of middle-class society by those being pressured to 
change.29 
 
The study linked this misinterpretation of the urban poor to the “obvious” cause of each 
riot, “police action of one type or another.”30 It listed the examples as a reminder:  
In Watts, it was a routine traffic arrest; in Chicago it was the shutting off by 
police of a fire-hydrant providing some degree of relief from heat to ghetto youth; 
in Newark it was the arrest of a taxi-cab driver for a minor traffic violation; and in 
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Detroit it was a police raid on an illegal afterhours drinking establishment.31 
 
Even while remaining firm on the importance of maintaining law and order, 
commissioners like Fred Harris and John Lindsay also believed understanding riots from 
this perspective—understanding the disconnect between the ghetto and suburbs and the 
widespread distrust of law enforcement among the urban poor—was crucial to the final 
report; engaging with some of the ideas put forth by activists like Carmichael and Brown 
without wholly endorsing their platforms would yield a fuller, more accurate picture of 
riots and the motivations behind them.    
 Reaction to how the administration had handled the riots varied. One editorial 
stated Johnson should “be commended for not being over the top in vilifying rioters nor 
giving into liberals...he was appropriately measured.”32 His decision to take the “middle 
course” on a “crisis of national purpose” would take criticism from liberals for 
“temporizing out of fear of alienating the ‘white backlash’ vote in 1968” and criticism 
from conservatives for “failure to maintain law and order,” the editorial claimed, but it 
was nonetheless a sound decision.33 A Wall Street Journal editorial described the riots as 
a “painful embarrassment” for an administration that had learned a hard lesson in the 
Watts riots of 1965.34 Johnson’s decision to send “rush-delivery aid” to Watts, the 
editorial stated, gave the impression that “the only way to get government help was 
through violence.”35 As a result, Johnson “sent to Detroit not a team of federal experts to 
pull together the best known programs,” as he did in Los Angeles two years prior, but 
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rather “battalions of federal troops to secure the city.”36 The danger with the “don’t-
reward-the-rioters” mentality, however, was that it might “serve as justification for a 
wholesale scuttling of Great Society welfare legislation.”37 Indeed, Time noted that an 
already “economy-minded Congress” would be “determined not to reward violence” and 
might turn “sharply unsympathetic toward new social legislation,” while sociologist 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in the Los Angeles Times that not only was there “no 
political will for the executive branch to move in any direction, and nothing but fear as to 
what direction Congress will take,” there was also the issue of Vietnam having “used up 
all the available income [for increasing urban renewal] and taken us beyond that to a 
massive deficit.”38  
In Congress, supporters of outstanding civil rights legislation conceded it was a 
difficult climate to try and pass such legislation, while smirking conservatives like 
Mississippi Congressman Thomas Abernethy told peers “you have more trouble in one 
Northern state than in the whole South combined…[LBJ] used the rhetoric of ‘We Shall 
Overcome’ in past speeches, but now the ‘Black Power’ boys came back for more, and 
more, and more.”39 In spite of all the platitudes spouted by commissioners and 
administration officials about a commitment to non-partisanship, complex political and 
economic realities, coupled with a muddied view of the president’s course on seemingly 
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every issue in the Vietnamese jungles and American ghettoes, loomed large as the Kerner 
Commission outlined its plan of action.  
 Privately, commission and administration officials acknowledged such issues. On 
August 7, the commission drafted a memo of its “proposed program of fact-finding, 
research, and study,” which included sections on identifying basic riot factors, 
contextualizing riots in a long-term perspective, the appropriate methodology for 
research, and how to allocate and coordinate such daunting research work between 
commissioners, professional staff, and outside researchers, among numerous other 
topics.40 The same evening, Califano sent a memo to the president indicating there was 
internal pressure in the commission, particularly from Harris, to “do something in the 
next few days.” He added that “while David and I both believe the commission should 
focus its attention both publicly and privately on a thorough study of the riots,” there was 
concern it might be “hard to stop the Commission from issuing statements in support of 
certain programs such as the Safe Streets and Crime Control Bill, the Gun Control bill, 
and commenting on the riot control and integration of the National Guard.”41 Executive 
Director David Ginsburg’s intent was to “try and stop” the commissioners from 
commenting, particularly about the “Guard’s riot training or integration since they have 
almost nothing in the record to support such statements.”42 Califano’s missive to Johnson 
concluded: “Unless you disagree, David will do everything he can with Tex Thornton and 
perhaps others to keep the Commission from shooting from the hip, which we both 
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believe would be damaging.”43 Only a little more than a week after Johnson had said, “let 
your search be free,” to the commissioners, there were already efforts to stifle individual 
commissioners voicing opinions on the riots in the interest of preserving political capital. 
Such reservations from Ginsburg, Califano, and Johnson were understandable given the 
aforementioned tension of the political landscape, but they also seemed to contradict the 
spirit of the Kerner’s Commission’s establishment: a government-approved body tasked 
with determining causes and solutions related to the riots was, almost instantly, asked to 
censor its members. Califano’s memo spoke to the difficult path the Kerner Commission 
had to navigate: it needed to provide honest answers while remaining safe and 
uncontroversial as it searched for those answers.   
 In a memo to the president the following day, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz 
expressed concern over the results of recent interviews conducted in inner-city Detroit. 
After explaining the methodology and analytical value of the survey, which polled 496 
African American males who had participated in the riot, Wirtz was direct in his 
assessment: “this report is dangerous in its present form…it will be hard to keep it 
confidential.”44 The thoroughly researched and organized survey indicated that most of 
the Detroit rioters were in their 20s or early 30s; surprisingly, “four out of five had jobs 
and were working at the time of the riot,” a revelation that flew in the face of the notion 
that unemployment in the long, hot summer played a major role in triggering the 
disorder.45 Among a smaller portion of those surveyed, 101 participants cited police 
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brutality as the chief cause of the riots, 66 attributed them to frustrations related to 
gaining equality, 65 said they did not know, 20 said a dearth of job opportunities, 17 said 
poor housing, and 17 said outside agitators. Along the same line, 363 men were polled on 
their favorite black leader; Martin Luther King, Jr. led the way with 178 votes. Beyond 
that, 52 said Stokely Carmichael, 21 said Muhammad Ali, 20 said Malcolm X, 12 said 
Elijah Muhammad, and 56 replied “other.”  
While the unemployment numbers were certainly startling, the data on housing in 
Detroit’s riot-torn areas matched expectations. Wirtz noted that there “is considerable 
evidence of overcrowded housing…the average number of households per person is over 
5...about 12 percent live in households of 8 or more.”46 Asked whether living conditions 
were better, the same, or worse compared to recent years, 53 percent said better, 25 
percent said they had stayed the same, and 22 percent said they had gotten worse. The 
reason Wirtz had characterized the results as “dangerous” was obvious: the rioters 
surveyed did not match the expected profile of young, idle men willing to burn and loot 
to express their grievances. Instead of showing federal programs that had failed the urban 
poor altogether, the survey seemed to indicate that large numbers of young men with jobs 
were rioting anyway. In the wrong hands, that data could prove damaging to the goals of 
both the Kerner Commission and the Johnson administration.  
 On August 10 the Kerner Commission announced the formation of the Advisory 
Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, a panel assigned to “seek answers to 
questions…with respect to high costs and difficulties in obtaining property and liability 
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insurance in areas where riots have occurred or where they are considered a threat.”47 
With the sudden, widespread damages to businesses in Newark, Detroit, and other 
American cities experiencing riots, how insurance coverage would apply was not always 
clear; the panel’s members included chairman Richard Hughes and a number of insurance 
executives. Kerner and Lindsay also sent a signed letter with the commission’s first 
formal recommendations to President Johnson. The letter, which stemmed from talk in 
the previous two weeks of improving National Guard standards as well as the 
commission’s need to offer some type of “concrete proposal” to the administration, was 
forwarded to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.48  
 Based on the initial testimony from witnesses before the Kerner Commission, 
Kerner and Lindsay offered two primary recommendations to the president in their letter; 
first, “increase substantially the recruitment of Negroes into the Army National Guard 
and Air National Guard.”49 As evidence of the lack of diversity within the organization of 
citizen-soldiers, they cited official statistics compiled at the end of 1966. Of the 404,996 
officers enlisted in the Army National Guard, only 4,638 were African American—a 
staggering 1.15 percent of the total personnel. The percentage in the Air National Guard 
was even worse, with only 475 African Americans serving out of a total of 80,822 
officers and airmen—just 0.6 percent. Kerner and Lindsay told the president that “the 
commission believes strongly that this deficiency must be corrected as soon as possible,” 
and that doing so would “require the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, 
                                                
47 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Press Release on Formation of Insurance Panel, Aug. 
10, 1967, “Press Releases,” Box 3, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
48 “Panel Urges More Negroes Be Added to National Guard,” The New York Times, International Edition, 
Aug. 11, 1967, “Newspaper Clippings Related to Commission,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ 
Library, Austin, TX. 
49 Otto Kerner and John Lindsay to Lyndon B. Johnson on National Guard, with New York Times 
Demographic Breakdown of National Guard, Aug. 10-11, 1967, “Press Releases,” Box 3, Series 15, 
NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX.  
 73 
state officials, and the Negro community.”50 A larger black presence in the National 
Guard would, the commission reasoned, alleviate the traditional tensions between African 
Americans and law enforcement when future disorders arose.  
 The second recommendation Kerner and Lindsay made proposed to “improve and 
expand riot control training in the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard…we 
wish to underscore the importance of doing this as rapidly as possible…we recommend 
special emphasis in training over the next several weeks.”51 Specifically, they urged a 
“review by federal and state officials of the qualification and performance of all 
observers…the Department of Defense should also review federal recognition standards 
and procedures to insure that they are adequate to preclude the promotion of substandard 
officers.”52 Upon reading the recommendations, President Johnson told McNamara to act 
on them given that they were “a matter of the highest urgency.”53 Privately, Harris told 
Ginsburg that he “had good comment on this evidence of early action by us…I hope we 
can make other recommendations...much of what our commission does will necessarily 
be controversial.”54 The senator added he was “proud” of the way Ginsburg had 
“performed [his] duties as Executive Director…it was well done in your usual way and 
the coverage was great.”55  
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 As the commission made its initial recommendations, other bodies investigating 
the riots—most of which had differing philosophies on the causes, solutions, and proper 
approaches to such investigations—continued to craft their own plans for research. 
Eastland, head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, called for a broader inquiry into 
rioting that would include interviewing subjects beyond police chiefs. McClellan’s riot 
probe as part of the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, authorized by the 
Senate and intending to focus on the criminal elements of the riots, had removed 
language suggested by liberals to examine social and economic factors. In the House of 
Representatives, meanwhile, the anticrime bill that had passed 377 to 23 had seen “a 
coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats [rewrite] the bill on the floor to take 
most controls away from federal officials.”56 The proposed aid for local governments 
would instead be funneled to state officials in block grants, meaning that the bill “bore 
little resemblance” to Johnson’s original Safe Streets and Crime Act.57 According to an 
article in Newsweek, this rewriting coincided with “model cities, rent supplements, school 
aid, rat control all [being] slashed in Congress by a ‘Republican-Dixiecrat’ coalition.”58 
Longtime Texan Congressman George Mahon said the riot issue “is not one of dollars but 
one of discipline,” while conservative North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin said the 
disorders were “a product of past civil-rights bills which held out the promise that people 
would be transported to heaven on the wings of federal laws.”59 A coalition of 
Republican governors, led by Nelson Rockefeller and George Romney, had met in New 
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York to discuss tentative proposals for state plans of action on rioting. All four plans 
came from political factions opposing President Johnson, a reminder that the 
administration-approved Kerner Commission’s activity would be contested every step of 
the way until the release of the report. Prior to a forthcoming meeting, staff member John 
Koskinen reminded colleagues that “the commission is not in rivalry with other 
investigations being conducted at the same time…our posture is to be thankful and 
helpful.”60 
 The commission’s recommendations were challenged directly by Louisiana 
Congressman Edward Hebert, who bristled at the criticism of the National Guard. 
Anonymous Army officials had conceded that the Guard “doesn’t have the hard-skilled 
sergeants you need” in riots and could not “measure up to full-time troops who have full-
time training and are under professional leadership,” but Hebert, the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Armed Services, admonished commissioners nonetheless.61 He 
denied that there was any discrimination in the National Guard, branding any such 
conclusion as “prejudice and bigoted,” with no sufficient supporting evidence.62 
Mississippi Democrat G.V. Montgomery, himself a lieutenant colonel in the National 
Guard, was so incensed by the criticism that he suggested abolishing the Kerner 
Commission. “The American people are fed up with indictments of policemen and 
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guardsmen. What the people want is some action taken against the people who murdered, 
looted, and burned, and who have no respect for law and order,” Montgomery said.63 
 In mid-August the commission also began fulfilling Harris’s recommendation of 
sending commissioners and staffers to visit riot-affected cities. According to the first 
press release on commissioner trips, Lindsay and Ginsburg visited Newark; Kerner, 
Peden, and Thornton visited Detroit; and Wilkins and Abel visited New York. Each trip 
consisted of meetings with local citizen and organizations as well as a tour of the riot 
damage. Commissioners had already met in Washington with officials from Newark and 
Detroit, respectively, when the trips to individual cities began. After riding in a red 
convertible and touring the Central Ward by helicopter, Lindsay played basketball with 
and bought sodas for Newark youngsters on a walking tour of Newark’s most damaged 
neighborhoods, describing the local mood of “people who want and need help.”64 He also 
met with Newark Mayor Hugh Addonzio, who had promised local officials would not 
interfere with the tour, and members of the city’s antipoverty agency. In Detroit, visiting 
commissioners followed a similar schedule (though they did not shoot hoops), meeting 
with a dozen black leaders from the religious and business communities. The Detroit 
Free-Press claimed the talks were “so tightly secured that one of Kerner’s aides only 
gained entrance to the [hotel] meeting room after someone inside slipped him a key under 
the door.”65 Kerner told the newspaper that the trip was for “atmosphere and background” 
for the report, and that the trip confirmed “this seething undercurrent, not only in Detroit 
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but in every city in the United States.”66 He also reiterated that the commission would not 
be political “under any circumstances…it is going to be an objective job.”67 
 Kerner’s visit to Detroit came amid reports of dissension in the commission ranks 
as well as a Wall Street Journal profile that seemed to question his leadership 
capabilities. The controversy stemmed from a misunderstanding between Kerner and 
Ginsburg concerning the role of Theodore Jones, who had resigned from the Kerner 
Commission after less than two weeks as staff director. Ginsburg believed Jones was 
hired as a permanent staff member, when, in fact, Kerner had always wanted Jones to 
return to his job as Director of the Illinois Department of Revenue once the commission 
had stabilized. Both men denied the incident caused friction and disputed that Jones had 
left the commission “after becoming disenchanted with the investigation.”68 A profile of 
Kerner speculated that “very few people know him well,” and that White House sources 
indicated he was handpicked to chair the commission because “he is just about the only 
Democratic governor of a state that has suffered no major racial violence,” an explanation 
the author described as “not completely convincing.”69 Anonymous colleagues wondered 
whether the appointment was politically motivated and described him as possessing 
“mixed credentials,” acting quiet, cold, and aloof while governing Illinois, and serving as 
“something of a straggler in the personality sweepstakes.”70 His own speechwriter from 
his 1964 gubernatorial campaign said Kerner worked hard but was “no dynamic thinker.” 
Another associate said he was “not an intellectual powerhouse…I don’t think he’s read a 
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book since high school,” while still another said Kerner’s idea of political courage was to 
“lean forward in his foxhole.”71 Despite the noticeable and frequent barbs, there were 
also quotations on Kerner’s honesty, toughness, and ability to “find a place in the middle 
where a majority of reasonable men can agree.”72 Ultimately, there was a consensus on 
Kerner’s integrity and evenhanded approach that existed even among his political 
adversaries.  
 On the national political scene, Martin Luther King Jr. continued to offer 
unsparing criticism of President Johnson’s policies in Vietnam. On August 12 he had 
proposed a national referendum on the Vietnam War, claiming that both the Congress and 
the president had been “unresponsive or indifferent in the face of deepening grassroots 
opposition to our policy in Vietnam.”73 King contrasted the resources spent on Vietnam 
with those focused on the conditions that bred riots, observing “while our domestic 
programs are drastically cut back, we are spending $16,000 a minute on every minute of 
the day on one of history’s most cruel and senseless wars.”74 Six days later, King 
announced that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference would “definitely oppose” 
Johnson in the 1968 presidential election if he did not change his stance on the war. “By a 
clear majority, the American people repudiate the war in Vietnam,” he said. King’s 
repeated anti-war statements reflected the rift between Johnson and many civil rights 
leaders who had praised him just a few years prior. Critics linked Vietnam to a struggling 
economy, neglect of the cities, and flawed geopolitical motives; the war colored how 
many Americans viewed the administration and thus cast a shadow over the Kerner 
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Commission’s work. In a monthly interview, Harris defended the president, saying the 
war was not a situation of his own making and that while “riots, Vietnam, taxes…are 
reason enough for his popularity to be down,” Johnson still led potential Republican 
candidates in preliminary polls for the next election.75 The senator predicted Johnson 
would serve another term. Commissioners would differ in how they addressed the 
Vietnam War in the coming months, but all would have to contend with it.  
 Administration officials did not take kindly to the criticism. Vice President 
Humphrey pointed to the fact that the administration “has requested for fiscal [year] 1968 
some $25.6 billion for programs to aid people below the poverty line—this is double the 
expenditure in 1963.”76 He also pointed to the requested $10.3 billion to appropriate for 
“use in urban development and general improvement of living conditions” and said 
comparing the defense budget with the domestic funding budget was unfair.77 Vietnam, 
according to the vice president, was an international situation that America had “not had 
the luxury of ignoring…we cannot back away from the role that history has given us.”78 
Additionally, the Johnson administration had “almost tripled the aid to our cities in the 
last six years,” he claimed, “so when I hear people say that we haven’t done enough, all I 
can say is: we’ve done more than anybody else had done previously.”79 The vice 
president also clarified comments made in Detroit earlier in the month related to his use 
of the phrase, “domestic Marshall Plan” when mentioning proposals for urban aid. 
Humphrey had called for massive aid from public and private resources, pointing to 
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Johnson’s Model Cities Program as an example; federal money would go to those local 
governments with cogent plans to rehabilitate slums as part of a “massive, long-term, 
public-supported commitment.”80 The urban crisis was not a situation of “men who 
simply want money handed to them…we’re dealing with people who are non-
participating, isolated members of society.”81 Humphrey’s desire for massive federal aid 
with accountability from local officials seemed incongruent with Johnson’s own wishes 
to avoid additional spending, however; reconciling calls for social welfare with economic 
realities would prove quite complicated.  
 On August 21 Newsweek released the results of a survey that reflected sharp 
divisions between white and black Americans’ attitudes toward riots and the inner cities. 
A majority of those polled in the Louis Harris survey agreed that “riots have hurt the 
Negro cause” and that “Negroes themselves suffer worst in the rioting.”82 That is where 
most of the interracial agreement ended in the survey. As many as 45 percent of whites 
attributed the rioting to outside agitators and 71 percent believed the riots to be 
organized. By contrast, black Americans polled tended to believe riots were 
“spontaneous” and “by 2 to 1 they feel police brutality is a major cause—a proposition 
whites reject by 8 to 1.”83 Only 16 percent of whites felt that police brutality against 
African Americans existed; both whites and blacks agreed that looting was a criminal act, 
but 62 percent of whites believed looters should be shot, in comparison to just 27 percent 
of blacks surveyed. The article noted that the white responses were “eerily out of 
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register” with the black responses to the same questions.84 It described the “firmly held 
view” of “93 percent of Negroes that an essential lack of progress in jobs, education, and 
housing contributed critically to the riot atmosphere.”85 This section of the survey aligned 
with the results of a National Gallup Poll conducted during the Newark riots. In the 
Gallup Poll, only 1 in 100 white Americans believed African Americans were treated 
“badly,” and 75 percent felt they were treated the same as whites.86 Just 4 percent of 
African gave the same answer on the latter question.  
The Harris survey also underscored the diminishing support for the civil rights 
movement on the part of white America as well as a reversion to supporting “discredited 
myths” and “accepting stereotypes” that had seen a “sharp downward trend” in the 
previous four years.87 Asked to name the primary causes of rioting, 37 percent of whites 
“cited [riot] causes such as ‘Negroes are too lazy to work for their rights,’ ‘uneducated 
people don’t know what they’re doing,’ ‘the law has been too lax,’ etc.”88 Only 55 
percent of whites believed blacks were discriminated against, compared to 61 percent in 
1966 and 71 percent in 1963. On the subjects of jobs and education, 63 percent of whites 
surveyed believed African Americans got a “better break,” in comparison to just 41 
percent asked the same question in 1963.89  Responses indicated whites were “clearly 
angry” about the riots and “felt freer to express their basic mistrust of the Negro.”90 
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White fear had also increased, according to the survey, with 76 percent more personally 
worried about race riots than the previous year in comparison to just 49 percent asked in 
1966. The figures were complex—particularly the notion that whites were more 
comfortable with public integrated spaces while also being more likely to agree with 
unfounded stereotypes—but the article concluded they offered “scant real encouragement 
toward the goal of racial peace.”91 
The same issue of Newsweek printed an equally unnerving piece interviewing 
Detroit teenagers from the riot-torn neighborhoods, describing them as “people as 
tragically distant from the ken of most white and many Negro Americans as the dark side 
of the moon.”92 Depictions of a “minority of a minority,” according to the piece, were not 
limited to Detroit.93 They applied to the many urban areas where “riots are not criminal, 
but a legitimate weapon in a morally justified civil war.”94 Brown—who was being held 
on $25,000 bail in New York for carrying a firearm on an airplane—and Carmichael both 
articulated what many blacks had believed for years, and riots were “an attempt to seize 
the white man’s attention by force.”95 Dismissing the participants as hardened criminals 
was misguided; life in the Detroit ghetto involved a culture of poverty where “crime rates 
spiral, liquor and drugs beckon the desperate, families spiral and failure becomes an 
accepted part of life.”96 The article argued that riots were an indictment of policies that 
had focused too much on eradicating Jim Crow laws in the South and not enough on 
hardscrabble conditions in the North. In US News and World Report, Los Angeles 
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Country District Attorney Evelle Younger disagreed on the characterization of rioters, 
describing each as “a potential killer,” but cited poorly conceived programs run by 
unqualified people and misappropriated funds as key elements in the urban crisis.97  
One of the commission’s own members, Edward Brooke, told the Christian 
Science Monitor that Johnson needed to stop dragging his feet on programs to address the 
urban crisis, claiming that “in a year…the cities would be burning.”98 The senator 
dismissed the idea of a conspiracy behind the riots but blamed “government, at every 
level,” for failing “to identify and treat the conditions that lead to these tragic 
consequences…it has helped to create the atmosphere for violence.”99 Administration 
officials set out on the defensive regarding recent accomplishments; they pointed to the 
2,500 hospitals that desegregated after the threat of losing federal funding, the one 
million blacks who had registered to vote under the Voting Rights Act, and the $25 
million denied to school districts that refused to comply with integration efforts. A 
Washington Post article stated that while “there is little genuine hope within the 
Administration for new civil rights legislation this year, officials believe they can make 
great strides under existing laws and through executive action.”100 Director of 
Congressional Relations Henry “Boots” Taliaferro had gathered information regarding 
the institution most capable of amending such policies: U.S. Congress. He reported to the 
commissioners that “the general attitude of Congress toward the commission appears to 
be one of friendly skepticism,” and that there were hopes the research would yield “more 
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than just another study.”101 Taliaferro also relayed that Johnson had written to Senate 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield “urging prompt action on 23 programs attacking urban 
problems,” a request the Montanan read on the Senate floor in a show of support.102 
Elsewhere in the Senate, the riot investigations led by McClellan and Eastland continued 
to conduct hearings. In one hearing, UCLA Professor of Social Welfare Nathan Cohen 
urged more Americans to engage with black militant voices; Cohen, who had researched 
the Watts riots extensively, was then “badgered” by Strom Thurmond as to the causes of 
the rioting.103 He disputed the South Carolina senator’s claim that Black Power activists 
had only exacerbated tensions.  
Commission members Jenkins, Corman, McCulloch, and staffer David Chambers 
traveled to Detroit on August 21 to meet with militant African American leaders of 
neighborhood and youth groups to discuss the rioting. On their visit, they heard pleas for 
the commission to “look at the fact that Negroes are systematically excluded from the 
mainstream of life” and realize “the riots are completely the responsibility of the white 
society and until they are willing to indict themselves, we will live in guerilla warfare.”104 
In his travel notes, Chambers noted that although neighborhoods sustained significant 
damage, churches and schools escaped with the exception of “a white plaster statue of 
Jesus, face and hands of which were meticulously painted black.”105 The request to “talk 
to white America” from local leaders was tempered by the cynicism of those leaders’ 
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belief that the meeting was “just another talk session and nothing would come out of 
it.”106 The commissioners would say all the right things, but ultimately, calls for better 
job programs, police protection, open housing, and an end to the Vietnam War would be 
fruitless. Chambers noted that the meeting with black leaders yielded “graphic 
illustrations of the frustration and day-to-day humiliation of Negro life, the expressions of 
bitterness at the complacency of whites, and the open distrust at the Commission as a 
mechanism for change.”107 McCulloch challenged the notion that nothing had changed 
and was described as defensive when touting civil rights measures that had passed. As 
Walter Cronkite noted on a CBS newscast later in the month, “this is part of the core 
problem of Negro progress: human spirits maimed by generations of slavery and the 
whole spiritual cargo of its legacy which has poisoned both races.”108  
A survey conducted by the Urban League and the Detroit Free-Press polling 
African American Detroit residents regarding the causes for rioting seemed to reinforce 
what militant leaders had told visiting commissioners about the city’s race relations. 
While the survey turned up expected results in some areas—rioters tended to be younger 
and poorer, according to the data—an article in the Akron Beacon-Journal noted the 
“remarkable sophistication in the answers Negroes gave in the follow-up 
investigation.”109 An analysis of the survey’s results “indicates what some observers have 
been claiming all along: that the riots sweeping the nation’s cities are rooted in deep 
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frustrations but have many similarities to a revolution of rising expectations.”110 Living 
conditions, police brutality, and a communitywide perception that blacks were treated 
differently from whites were the most frequently cited reasons that the riots occurred. 
Some participants also referred to class, in addition to race, claiming that rioters formed 
an underclass in Detroit’s most destitute areas. A key to rioters’ attitudes changing, the 
analysis concluded, was changing “the attitudes of the rest of the society” and offering a 
stake to those “who consider present channels of advancement too narrow.”111  
On August 22 Newark Mayor Hugh Addonzio gave five hours of impassioned 
testimony before the commission that made national headlines. Addonzio’s testimony 
comprised part of a broader presentation featuring officials and community leaders from 
Newark. The commission had heard testimony from several high-profile witnesses such 
as Office of Economic Opportunity Director Sargent Shriver, Vance, and Cavanagh, as 
well as a similar presentation on Detroit in recent weeks. There were a few noteworthy 
moments, including former CIA director John McCone saying that failure to halt future 
riots “is going to destroy our country” and Mayor Cavanagh’s plea to “write a new 
textbook for the two Americas with which we are faced,” but much of it consisted of 
shopworn rhetoric on the need to rectify urban poverty and prevent violence.112 Addonzio 
directed most of his ire toward the suburbs, harping on the myth that “middle class 
America has an interest in saving the cities” while declaring America was “a suburban 
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nation…only fools consider the suburban rings around a city to be urban.”113 Affluent 
residents in the suburbs, he told commissioners, were “gripped more by the need to buy a 
vacation home, a sports car for their college-bound son, and a second color television set 
than they are with sharing their [wealth] with the poor.”114  
Addonzio’s scathing remarks toward the middle and upper classes in the suburbs 
was the most public example yet of implicating those living beyond the ghetto boundaries 
in the riots. Rather than solely blaming the poor for their problems and detailing how 
rioting reflected violent, flawed character traits, he wondered why the educated and the 
wealthy watched as passive observers with little interest in offering solutions. The 
suburbs would “vote the cities out of existence if they could,” he said.115 Addonzio also 
blamed the riots on insufficient programs and lamented the riot-prone “who are not being 
reached in these programs except the publicity…they were and are out of the mainstream 
of American life and they acted exactly that way.”116 After listing the maladies that still 
plagued Newark—subpar schools, housing, sanitation, and employment rates—Addonzio 
eviscerated his peers in local government, claiming that the “image of a local so-called 
power structure with a vested interest in poverty is so absurd.”117 There were too many 
officials, according to Addonzio, who “use democracy in order to destroy democracy.”118 
Other Newark witnesses who testified challenged the mayor, and they “openly said, with 
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Addonzio sitting there, that there was no meaningful communication between 
government at any level and the Negro community.”119 Officials described the “electric 
intensity” of the testimony from African American Newark residents that depicted black 
youths as fearless and “willing to risk their lives wantonly because they had lost faith in 
progress by any other route.”120 The testimony did not receive the same press coverage as 
Addonzio’s comments, but it served as a reminder of the complexity and difference of 
perspectives in each instance of disorder.  
A Newark Star-Ledger editorial applauded Addonzio for calling out the affluent 
and recognizing that federal and state efforts would require “active support” from 
suburbanites; the piece expressed reservations, however, that his remarks were too harsh 
and would “aggravate and antagonize, when the need is for understanding and 
cooperation.”121 A Wall Street Journal piece argued that Addonzio’s “all too common” 
critiques of the middle class were misguided considering the middle class’s “productive 
effort provides money to aid the poor.”122 The riots stemmed from government programs 
suffering from “a lack of adequate management, or even of plain ordinary common 
sense,” not suburban neglect.123 “It had always been our impression that getting ahead in 
life was considered a good thing in this country,” the editorial stated, adding that if “that 
impression is no longer valid the future looks dubious.”124 Given the forthcoming 
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incensed reaction from many suburbanites when it came to assigning blame for inner-city 
turmoil, these were prescient observations.   
 Elsewhere in Washington, the debate over the Kerner Commission’s 
recommendations on diversifying and improving the training standards of the National 
Guard reignited. In a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, Louisiana 
Congressman Edward Hebert laid into the commission and accused both them and 
members of the press of indicting the Guard “without one scintilla of evidence.”125 
Hebert claimed that Kerner did not understand the intricacies of the National Guard well 
enough to levy such a critique. The commission, Rep. Hebert stated, was unqualified to 
issue such reckless statements, comprised of “people who probably never heard of the 
National Guard before they were put on the commission” who were recklessly “playing 
politics with the Negroes.”126 He also criticized the Army for its willingness to even 
entertain the commission’s suggestions and the swiftness of the conclusions when the 
commission had officially formed at the beginning of the month. “Did you ever hear of 
such speed?” Hebert exclaimed.127 When Deputy Secretary of the Army David McGiffert 
fired back that Kerner himself had headed the Illinois National Guard at one point, an 
incredulous Hebert replied, “that doesn’t mean anything…he’s governor,” and demanded 
to see the evidence supporting the recommendations.128 Soon thereafter, Hebert sent a 
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formal request to Ginsburg to view the “testimony and background information upon 
which it based its recommendations” on the National Guard.129  
 On August 24 Lindsay was the keynote speaker for the convocation of the newly 
minted Urban Coalition, an organization co-chaired by Andrew Heiskell and A. Philip 
Randolph committed to “overcome citizen indifference, encourage interracial 
cooperation, and enroll national support until racial peace is a reality.”130 The coalition 
had its roots in a National League of Cities meeting from the previous year and had 
formed officially, at the request of Lindsay and Mayor Joseph Barr of Pittsburgh, just 
days after President Johnson had established the Kerner Commission; it planned to focus 
on job training programs for the urban poor, involving the private sector more often in 
such programs. Reports indicated that Johnson was not pleased with Lindsay’s 
commitment to the coalition—he had told him directly to focus on his Kerner 
Commission duties, and the mayor had reportedly responded that the two organizations 
had differing, equally valuable objectives. In his keynote address in Washington, which 
included a reply from, among others, Roy Wilkins, Lindsay told an audience of over a 
thousand mayors and leaders of labor, civil rights, business, and religious groups that the 
nation’s top priority should be the cities, even if it meant reevaluating commitments in 
Vietnam and to the space program. “We routinely are dazzled by the trappings of new 
programs and then disappointed by their performance,” the mayor told those in 
attendance, concluding that “in short, we must close the gap between promise and 
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performance.”131 In a memo that provided an overview of the Urban Coalition 
proceedings to each commissioner, Ginsburg stated that “what the coalition is concerned 
with is also a large part of this commission’s charge in terms of effects of poverty, decay, 
and isolation in major urban areas.”132 
 If Johnson was concerned about his vice chairman tending to commission 
obligations, staff members of the commission were equally concerned about how the 
administration might react to future recommendations. In a memo to Califano, staffer 
Fred Bohen conceded that it would be “immensely difficult, if not impossible, to cut 
much ice with the [civil rights] strides made in the last few years…I think we have to be 
quite cautious in the way we cite the increased commitments in the Johnson era.”133 
Bohen recognized that the progress in the previous three years was, “relative to the needs, 
still clearly a modest effort,” and he acknowledged that “those who would be 
impressed…are also going to know how long the road is and how few steps have been 
taken.”134 In addition to self-awareness at how its own suggestions might go over, the 
commission and its staff were also “extremely sensitive now to ‘railroading’ by the 
administration.”135 Bohen claimed the White House wanted “the commission’s quick 
endorsement of hastily drawn reports and statements…I listened as almost every member 
expressed sensitivity ‘between the lines’ about serving as a rubber stamp.”136 He also 
referred to Kerner “barely [getting] the watered-down statement which Lindsay 
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subsequently killed” that required the Chairman to “ignore a delaying motion which had 
the votes to get what he got, however unsatisfactory it was,” but did not elaborate on 
specifics.137 Only weeks after the commission had expressed its lofty goals, there was 
tension affecting its research and communications on the riots as well as fears that the 
White House might be machinating to undermine the final analysis.  
 By late August it was clear that the issues facing the Johnson administration did 
not have quick remedies. Newsweek took the president to task, declaring he was “still 
unable to communicate to the American people a sense of what the U.S. is doing in 
Vietnam.”138 The magazine also accused Johnson of remaining passive on riots, saying, 
“instead of being seen on the ghetto battlegrounds this summer, he has repeatedly posed 
for pictures.”139 As the public fretted over the war, the riots, and the scourge of higher 
taxes and higher deficits, there was an “ever-widening spectrum” of political opponents 
for Johnson, from the liberals who wanted massive federal aid to the ghetto to the 
conservatives who wanted him to get tough on rioters to those who despised his middling 
stance on Vietnam.140 Republican support for the war waned, while at home, the 
“responsible civil rights movement” faced “a crisis for survival” amid slum violence that 
tested white America’s patience.141 In addition to the Kerner Commission, Vice President 
Humphrey asked governors to form statewide and local councils designed to prevent 
violence. Republican leaders suggested measures beyond the commission, including the 
GOP-sponsored Opportunity Crusade, a program to “use private industry and the states in 
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partnership with the federal government in the fight on poverty” and “a total overhaul and 
redirection of the Poverty War” to empower the qualified local community leaders rather 
than the wasteful ones.142 
 Commission staff members discussed the need for good publicity as August came 
to a conclusion. Newly appointed Director of Information Alvin Spivak sent Ginsburg a 
memo stating, “my heart leaps at the suggestions of public hearings on Sept. 12,” adding 
that “the commission could use exposure of this kind to good advantage for itself and for 
the public.”143 Spivak parsed out the pros and cons in his message; the proposed hearings 
would allow the commission to “establish itself publicly as seeking to get at the heart of 
the problem, rather than only looking at bigger and better methods of containment.”144 
This would benefit the commission, Spivak reasoned, given that it had offered only one 
public recommendation to date. Public hearings would “prove” to the urban poor that 
“someone is concerned about the root causes of riots.”145 On the other hand, such 
hearings risked accusations of political motives and questions about why the conducted 
its business openly in the first six weeks. Spivak concluded that the pros outweighed the 
cons, and that public hearings with “proper preparation” would benefit the commission’s 
goals.146  
 In Congress, Republicans went on the offensive again by linking Carmichael, 
Brown, and the specter of black radicalism with President Johnson “losing the war” 
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against crime.147 Gerald Ford said the White House “appears to be in full retreat…the 
homes and streets are no longer safe for our people.”148 It was time, the House Minority 
Leader declared, to “slam the door and slam it hard” on Carmichael and Brown so that 
they would not “threaten law-abiding Americans with injury and death…never in our 
history have our people been so threatened.”149 Ford reiterated his support for an anti-riot 
bill, receiving the backing of Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen. Deputy Attorney 
General Warren Christopher fired back at the GOP’s obstructionist strategy on crime 
control, noting that Republicans “talk about fighting crime, but…they’re too busy 
blocking stuff to get anything done…where are they when the chips are down?”150 
Authorities, meanwhile, sought to extradite Brown from Virginia to Maryland to face 
charges of inciting a riot and arson for his alleged role in the Cambridge, Maryland, riot, 
prompting a debate on “the right of free speech as against the advocacy of the overthrow 
of the government by force and violence.”151 On August 31 Kerner advisor Kyran 
McGrath and commission members Peden and Abel traveled to Cambridge, where they 
met with local officials and listened to a tape recording of the Brown speech that had 
allegedly sparked the July riot. The commissioners also met with Black Power leaders—
who voiced their complaints about employment, housing, unequal pay, and police 
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brutality—and profiled the political climate, educational system, and recreation facilities 
in Cambridge.  
 As the commission formulated plans for open hearings, it also set soft deadlines 
for disseminating a “first phase report” addressing topics such as police-community 
relations and the ability to prevent and control disorders.152 Commission Deputy 
Executive Director Victor Palmieri wanted the outline for such a report to go public by 
December 15. Palmieri described the date as crucial because it would allow Congress to 
look at the report before it reconvened in January; he told a colleague that it seemed 
“highly probable…that the major impact of our findings and recommendations will have 
to ride on the strength of this first report, because if we wait for the terminal date, which 
is next August, we may well have passed out of sight and the report may go in the 
shelf.”153 The urgency of releasing guidance for the government and the public 
necessitated meeting the deadline and “establishing with some degree of certainty and 
clarity the actual facts concerning the disorders of this summer and…a meaningful 
interpretation of these facts and their relationship to the underlying economic and social 
problems.”154 Ideally, Palmieri said, the analysis and interpretation from the report would 
“jolt the public mind.”155 
 An article in the August 30 edition of the Staten Island Advance indicated that the 
White House had settled on “inadequate housing for African Americans living in the 
major cities” and “a widespread feeling among African Americans in the ghettoes that 
they are unfairly treated by local law enforcement officers” as the two primary motives 
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for rioting.156 Privately, Johnson disputed that the riots were related to unemployment and 
cited the confidential reports from Wirtz earlier in the month revealing that most of the 
rioters arrested had jobs. The article stated unemployment needed addressing, just not as 
one of the instigators for what had happened in Newark, Detroit, and elsewhere in 
America. President Johnson also wanted Democratic Congressional leaders to “push his 
new housing and anti-crime proposals.”157 If Johnson was seeking ways to avoid 
increasing spending, the results of the confidential survey buoyed his wishes. A month 
prior, he had requested a thorough and forthright report from the Kerner Commission; 
now, his stance on housing—not unemployment—as the primary cause of rioting was 
leaked to the public, foreshadowing a divide between the administration and the 
commission that only worsened in the coming months.  
 On the final day of the month, Palmieri sent Ginsburg a comprehensive memo 
reviewing the commission’s accomplishments from the last half of August and stating its 
intended goals for the first half of September. He candidly wrote that the hearings with 
Newark and Detroit officials were “time-consuming and not very productive in terms of 
evidence, but necessary.”158 A primary objective before the end of the year was to 
“develop a plan for the hearings through the end of the year” based on “our conception of 
the initial report.”159 Palmieri said staffers hoped to have a definitive plan by September 
12, and that the report would include thorough details, analysis, and recommendations on 
how to avoid future violence for each city’s disorder.  The commission intended to 
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profile each city’s social and demographic characteristics, each riot’s participants, and 
each sequence of events, followed by a list of causative factors and proposed immediate 
action programs going forward. It also needed to figure out how to divide research and 
investigating disturbances; Palmieri wanted three investigative teams by mid-September, 
two more by October 1, and for all teams to complete travel, briefing, and debriefing by 
November 1. By December 1, he wanted all analytical, interpretive and assigned studies, 
followed by two weeks for editing and rewriting, then allotting 30 days for production 
and printing. Four recommendations were offered to meet such a tight schedule: “(1) be 
more efficient than we have been so far (by 200 pct) (2) be tough about restricting the 
scope of the initial report, (3) be oblivious of anything other than the initial report and (4) 
be very lucky.”160 Palmieri also pressed for the need to “discuss the commission’s work 
with the individual commissioners.”161  
 There was also the matter of how an interim recommendation might play with the 
president and the commission’s public image. “All the polls shows a unique level of 
public acceptance for employment programs and…this proposal could find quick 
acceptance despite the difficult budget situation in Congress,” Palmieri wrote, adding he 
wanted to “urge that it could make a most important difference to the President in terms 
of public reaction.”162 The commission needed to establish credibility in neighborhoods 
and the academic community as well, he argued. Lastly, Palmieri expressed concern over 
the commission’s budget in the coming months. He described the situation as “serious for 
several reasons,” most notably that “no one in the administration is in a position to do 
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anything about it.”163The only response from White House officials on the budgetary 
issue was to “suggest that we use our wits to see to it that a major part of our cost is 
carried by the agencies…what agencies, or how this can be accomplished in a way that 
would meet our needs, is not clear to anyone.”164 Palmieri ended his memo with the 
ominous thought that the commission might “be heading for more of a problem than 
anyone is willing to concede on funding.”165  
 As the Kerner Commission completed its first full month of operations, pressure 
to issue a timely, coherent report mounted. The economy remained in disarray, the 
Vietnam War and its proponents grew less popular by the day, polls showed that many 
white Americans had regressive racial views following the riots, black militant patience 
for the dawdling pace of civil rights progress had worn thin, and Republicans and 
Democrats were determined to undercut one another’s statements on disorders at every 
turn. None of this turmoil even broached the challenge of Johnson and an administration 
already wanting to control the commission’s message and privately voicing concerns at 
what the commissioners might find, or the differences of opinion within the body itself 
that might inhibit finding causes and solutions. By the end of August it was obvious that 
Harris’s concern over the commission’s fleeting relevancy was unfounded; the bigger 
issue was how to navigate a volatile political climate where every quotation or statement 
on riots would be contested and release a salient final product that would offer workable 
suggestions rather than lip service to abstract ideas. It was a staggering ask of a 
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commission whose members could count the number of times they had met in the same 
room on two hands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
September 1967 
 
 The slick, red-and-black magazine advertisement had copy and images as if it 
were hawking a luxury car to its reader. “Stop the riot before it gets out of hand,” the 
tagline said. The vehicle, a Bauer Ordinance Armored Police Car, boasted a water 
cannon, a flame thrower, a grenade launcher, a 360-degree turret for mounting a machine 
gun, and the ability to stop rifle bullets at point blank range. Designed by the same people 
who constructed tanks for Vietnam, the cars could “be used to control riots or just patrol 
the tough districts.”1 They could also, according to the ad, “mark the troublemakers with 
dyes, break up crowds with smoke, clear the streets with fire, protect the lives of your 
police, put out the small fires with fog or foam, keep the crowds away with electricity, 
and drive the snipers out of hiding with teargas grenades.”2 This was America in 1967, a 
nation where a customized riot vehicle designed by those responsible for engineering war 
machines was marketed to law enforcement like a Corvette. Bauer’s product was an 
asset, a means of keeping the peace and maintaining law and order. It offered reassurance 
to law enforcement and, as a result, to those fearful of more disorders. The 
commercialization and marketing of a weaponized vehicle fit for Saigon or Berlin for use 
in American inner cities was unsettling to say the least; it provided little recourse for 
those denying that what had unfolded in previous months was domestic warfare. 
 “The emotional uplift attendant upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 gave way to disillusionment and resentment when it became clear that 
the recognition of rights did not mean any substantial increase of opportunities,” the 
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Labor Day statement from the United States Catholic Conference read.3 The statement, 
issued by the conference’s Social Action Department, discussed the reasons behind the 
rioting in America; it emphasized a breakdown in communication between white and 
black Americans and legislation that was “stronger in promise than fulfillment.”4 The 
social and economic progress in recent years was substantial, but long-term problems 
related to unemployment, housing, and police brutality remained unsolved. The Catholic 
Conference also made recommendations, calling on public support for the Kerner 
Commission, a commitment by the media to “probe and report in depth the underlying 
causes of anguish in the ghetto,” and an increased effort to “reach understanding across 
racial and economic lines.”5 Rather than “stop-gap palliatives rushed out each spring” in 
an effort to quell summer tensions preemptively, the country required solutions to break 
the “vicious cycle” of urban riots and suburban fears.6  
 On the heels of the summer riots, liberals found themselves the target of critiques 
from both civil rights activists and a burgeoning conservative coalition. The former group 
felt the Johnson administration had rested on its Great Society laurels amid persisting 
insufficient conditions in the inner city, while the latter targeted the riots as an indictment 
of Johnson’s entire domestic agenda. Billions of dollars flowing into Vietnamese jungles 
also complicated the issue. One side wanted even more government funding to see social 
welfare commitments through, while the other believed widespread bloodshed on ghetto 
streets signified misguided policy that needed no further action given other pressing 
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commitments. Republicans and southern Democrats in Congress had steadfastly rejected 
increased social welfare funding following the riots, prompting Johnson to defend his 
administration’s record. On the other side, as the Labor Day statement had alluded to, 
civil rights activists ranging from frustrated Johnson liberals to Black Nationalists 
believed that the commitment to social welfare had sputtered. Combined with an 
unpopular war, plummeting approval ratings, a lingering reluctance to increase spending, 
and whispers as to whether he might be vulnerable in the upcoming presidential election, 
President Johnson faced an unnerving political climate from all directions as the fall 
approached.  
 The Catholic Conference was not alone in noting the psychology behind riots. Its 
Labor Day statement noted that psychologists “tell us that violence is often a form of 
blind protest, a desperate attempt to call attention to an intolerable situation.”7 Martin 
Luther King Jr. spoke to the American Psychological Association and argued that looting 
“enables the most enraged and deprived Negro to take hold of consumer goods with the 
ease the white man does by using his purse…Often the Negro does not want what he 
takes; he wants the experience of taking.”8 He further described riots and looting as “born 
of the greater crimes of white society…Negroes live in [ghettoes] but do not make them 
any more than a prisoner makes a prison.”9 President Johnson and Congress were making 
“an extravagant gamble with disaster” by offering only “trivial programs” to aid urban 
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slums despite widespread public support for more substantive measures.10 King called for 
a comprehensive jobs program reminiscent of the Works Progress Administration of the 
1930s. An article in a leading medical publication led with the headline, “Is Mass 
Violence an Epidemic Disease?” and discussed a study in affiliation with the National 
Institute of Mental Health to examine “predictors” of riots.11 The study broke riots down 
into four crucial phases and identified “lack of jobs, poor housing, and the failure of local 
officials to solve these problems” as the three areas of dissatisfaction for the urban poor.12 
As the Kerner Commission prepared to assemble and hear testimony from expert 
witnesses all month, the public statements on the psychology of riots and rioters reflected 
the complexity of the riots and their aftermath; in addition to determining causes and 
solutions, the commission needed to avoid an uncritical stance that might characterize 
violence as mindless or ghetto residents as passive subjects whose struggles and reasons 
for rioting did not warrant thorough examination. 
Statistics compiled by the Department of Labor reinforced the significance of 
unemployment among African Americans in the slums. According to a Washington Post 
article from September 5, employment in America was at an all-time high, but African 
American employment was at an all-time low. In nine major cities, black unemployment 
registered at 9.4 percent; when classified as “under-employed,” the figure rose to a 
staggering 33.9 percent, including “48 percent in some areas of Chicago, 34 percent in 
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Los Angeles’s Watts District, and 36 percent in Philadelphia.”13 The article examined 
how the Great Migration of millions of African Americans from the rural South to the 
urban North in the mid-twentieth century had resulted in overcrowded cities with 
untrained workers; when whites fled city centers for the suburbs, so too did many 
industrial parks and employment opportunities, leaving African Americans either 
unemployed or forced to make expensive commutes. While joblessness did not have one 
underlying cause, it was “so much worse than it is in the country as a whole that national 
measurements of employment are irrelevant…the dismaying reality is that hardly a dent 
has been made in Negro unemployment on the national level.”14 
Accompanying the joblessness in American ghettoes was lawlessness on the part 
of police officers, according to David Ginsburg. In a memo to commissioners dated 
September 5, 1967, Ginsburg referred to a study within the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, known informally as the Crime 
Commission, where observers rode in police cars in Boston, Washington, DC, and 
Chicago to observe the types of complaints that came in while on patrol. Although the 
study was not designed to expose police brutality, Ginsburg noted there were “21 
unequivocal instances of brutality” and a “20 percent level of dishonesty” among 
officers.15 Ginsburg characterized the study, led by University of Michigan sociology 
professor Albert Reiss, as “an extremely important source” but said “whether Reiss will 
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be willing to undertake comparable work for us is another matter.”16 He added that many 
police chiefs knew about the study and “are unlikely to be cooperative again…what Reiss 
made clear is the extent of lawlessness among police in certain of the ghetto areas.”17 
Within the framework of law and order and improving police-community relations, 
brutality and abuse of power had not been mentioned much since the commission’s 
inception; the executive director indicated he was interested in examining it further, even 
if it unmasked some uncomfortable truths.  
As the commission entered its second full month, interoffice memos indicated that 
staff was monitoring how the press reacted to its every move. Alvin Spivak’s message to 
Ginsburg said the editorial reaction to the commission’s work “had been spotty and, as 
the theater critics say, mixed.”18 He offered a litany of articles from August, mined 
mostly from op-ed pages, that gave varying opinions on the commission, its decisions, 
and whether it could offer sound, pragmatic opinions in the present political climate. 
Some believed the commission had displayed “splendid common sense” with a 
“refreshingly swift and perceptive” plan on the National Guard, while others cast doubt 
on the “Fourth of July oratory” in the opening speeches and whether commissioners 
might be willing to veer from platitudes and criticize the administration that appointed 
them.19 Spivak did not offer additional comments on the editorials, but the mixture of 
hope and skepticism was evident, if not necessarily groundbreaking; everyone involved 
with the commission knew the stakes.  
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A report in the Congressional Quarterly on September 6 conveyed that political 
reaction to the riots was mixed as well. The poll, sent to all members of Congress, all 50 
governors, and 421 mayors, received responses from 41 senators, 227 representatives, 16 
governors, and 130 mayors. Overall, the 414 respondents to the poll—comprised of 23 
questions, 13 on riot causes, 10 on riot solutions—cited unemployment as the primary 
cause for rioting. Divides between responding members of Congress were predictable; 
the poll offered tables categorizing Congress as northern Democrats, southern Democrats, 
and Republicans, respectively. As expected, northern Democrats and Republicans tended 
to point to joblessness as a major problem and cause of riots, while southern Democrats 
touted outside agitators in the same category. Of the 57 southern Democrats who 
responded, 36 claimed outside agitators were “of great importance,” a sentiment shared 
by 69 of 123 Republicans polled and just 14 of 88 northern Democrats.20 A “lack of 
responsibility” was mentioned among 122 members of Congress, with some blaming 
leaders like Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. for encouraging disobedience.21 
Some also referred to the “failure of government to fulfill civil rights promises and 
succeed in the eradication of poverty.”22 Rep. Charles Wiggins, a Republican from 
California, commented, “blame can properly be placed upon the rioter, but blame can 
also be placed on those who lavish irresponsible promises upon a group which hungers 
for a better life.”23 Rep. Tom Gettys, a southern Democrat from South Carolina, 
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emphasized the need for “individual responsibility” and “protecting rights of majorities 
rather than minorities.”24 
Responses also differed across party lines when it came to providing federal aid 
and addressing social and economic issues. On the question of attributing riots to 
insufficient federal aid, education, and job training, 49 percent of northern Democrats 
described these issues as playing an important role, whereas only 6 percent of southern 
Democrats did the same. A “white indifference to Negro needs” was touted by 43 percent 
of northern Democrats as a significant factor, in comparison with just 11 percent of 
southern Democrats. Republican respondents, on the whole, tended to fall somewhere 
between northern and southern Democrats in their answers.25 On one hand, 65 percent of 
Republicans citing a “lack of responsibility among Negroes” and 69 percent blaming 
outside agitators mirrored responses of Dixiecrats; however, Republicans also assigned 
great importance to the issue of joblessness and idleness among African Americans—75 
percent responded it was significant, closer to the 73 percent of northern Democrats in 
agreement with this notion than the 29 percent of southern Democrats.26 With regard to 
neglecting broad social and economic issues in the slums, 31 percent of Republicans 
placed great importance, compared to 54 percent of northern Democrats and 15 percent 
of southern Democrats. The GOP also offered harsher answers on questions related to 
“poor administration of existing programs”; 51 percent felt this was a significant issue, in 
contrast with just 15 percent of northern Democrats and 12 percent of southern 
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Democrats, respectively.27 Only 4 percent of Republicans agreed with a “massive 
Marshall Plan for the cities, using federal funds,” compared to 50 percent of northern 
Democrats and 7 percent of southern Democrats.28 Northern Democrats called for 
“greater state and local efforts,” while 97 percent of Republicans polled favored an 
“emphasis on traditional church and family values,” 77 percent supported “greater 
penalties for rioting,” and 88 percent supported more private sector involvement.29 On the 
subject of Vietnam, a resounding 84 percent of those polled believed that urban riots 
undermined support for the war. Among the 16 governors who responded to the survey, 
most cited joblessness as a primary reason for rioting. On the whole, the governors 
favored private sector involvement more than increased federal aid. Unsurprisingly, 
governors tended to favor block grant funding for states, while mayors polled favored a 
domestic Marshall Plan that would directly benefit cities. Mayors of smaller cities (the 
poll distinguished between mayors of cities with a population under 50,000, cities with a 
population between 50,000 and 250,000, and cities with a population over 250,000 
respectively) skewed more conservative, pointing to outside agitators, whereas mayors of 
large cities honed in on jobs.  
Congressional Quarterly did not offer extensive analysis of the results of its wide-
ranging survey, but the answers made the Johnson administration’s precarious position 
quite clear. Democratic in-fighting that had plagued the party for decades found 
southerners—who had been at odds with their northern colleagues over integration and 
federal spending since the New Deal—alluding to familiar Communist adversaries and 
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expressing more concern for law and order than meeting inner-city needs. Many of the 
same southern Democrats who had opposed Brown v. Board of Education and signed the 
Southern Manifesto in the 1950s remained in Congress; some had voted against the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 or accepted it begrudgingly. Riots in northern Democratic cities with 
strong voter bases that had received substantial federal aid in recent years thus offered a 
chance to gain political leverage against both President Johnson and the liberal agenda. In 
the minds of southern conservatives, the riots illustrated the flaws of overreliance on 
government as well as the decline of moral values and respect for law and order in 1960s 
America. Along these same lines, Republicans focused on the “poor administration of 
existing programs” with their own political interests in mind; the presidential election 
was just over a year away, and as the rift between Romney and Johnson had shown, 
speculation on Republican challengers to the White House had already begun.30 
Congressional Quarterly noted the opportunity for Republicans to win over some 
Democrats in the North—particularly white, urban voters—by falling back on calls for 
law and order. Conversely, some of Johnson’s staunchest allies, the northern Democrats 
instrumental in propelling forward the Great Society, indicated a preference for the kind 
of “domestic Marshall Plan” put forth by Vice President Humphrey, a course the 
president had no real interest in pursuing. Johnson’s dilemma was obvious; two of the 
groups classified in the CQ survey believed he had already failed, while the third offered 
a path to success, in the form of massive hikes in federal spending, which he was 
determined to avoid.  
                                                
30 “Congress, Governors, Mayors, Polled on Riots,” Congressional Quarterly, Sept. 6, 1967, 1-6, “Political 
Structure,” Box 3, Series 25, NAACD, RG 282; LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 110 
Behind the scenes, the commission—which had made a request to the White 
House to “allocate $100,000 from the Emergency Fund to the commission to take care of 
immediate cash problems”—faced a tight schedule to gather information and provide an 
interim report.31 Plans called for staff and researchers to be “in the field” in individual 
cities by September 15, draft city reports by November 1, and offer up an interim report 
to commissioners by November 15. Field operations in 25 cities would consist of a fact-
finding team—comprised of a team leader and five staffers each—arriving in the city and 
dividing into three groups. One group would interview members of local government, a 
second group would interview residents in riot areas, and a final group would interview 
members of the private sector. Each team would also conduct follow-up interviews of its 
subjects; staffers were to incorporate this material into city reports as part of the broader 
interim report. Ginsburg reminded staffers of the importance of confidentiality in 
handling commission data and information; all material was for official purposes only, 
and staffers were not authorized to make statements or disclose policies to the media 
without first receiving permission from superiors.  
With George Romney slated to testify before the commission on September 12 
and 13, the spotlight returned to Detroit once again. A week prior to his appearance in 
Washington, Gov. Romney resumed his criticism of the president at the Midwestern 
Governors Conference in Lake Ozarks, Missouri. “I think everything President Johnson 
does is done on a political basis,” Romney told reporters, adding that Johnson was “a 
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political animal.”32 Kerner, who also attended the conference, offered a contradicting 
account as to whether Romney had agreed to testify before the commission the following 
week and told the press he disagreed with the governor’s partisan attacks.  
Critiques of Washington came from within commission ranks as well, as Mayor 
Lindsay again made headlines with a blistering speech before the National Commission 
of Urban Problems in New York. President Johnson had founded the commission in 
January 1967 as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act, hoping it could 
“provide knowledge that would be useful in dealing with slums, urban growth, sprawl 
and blight, and to insure decent and durable housing.”33 In his speech, Lindsay took the 
federal government to task, saying that HUD had not yet made New York City available 
for Model Cities program funding and thus demonstrated that “once again…the 
bureaucracy has met the rising expectations of the poor, the ill-housed, and the oppressed 
with the empty rhetoric of promises and pledges.”34 The Model Cities program sought to 
“provide cities with unrestricted grants to combat problems of physical blight, health, 
education and welfare in selected poor neighborhoods.”35 If New York did not receive the 
funding, he said, “all the wind in Washington cannot fill the bag the mayors will be left 
holding.”36 The mayor also criticized federal regulations that made existing programs 
“virtually useless,” citing a $20,000 cap on individual public housing in the most 
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expensive real estate market in the country as an example.37 He acknowledged that 
bureaucratic gridlock was sometimes inevitable but that the delays in securing federal aid 
were unacceptable. While there is no archival evidence of how Johnson or his inner circle 
reacted to Lindsay’s speech, it certainly did not help the already contentious relationship 
between the president and the mayor. Johnson had grown accustomed to his political 
rivals employing “failed promises” rhetoric, but having his handpicked vice chairman of 
a prominent committee say such things was another matter.  
Lindsay was not the only commissioner to speak candidly about Johnson. Edward 
Brooke described the president as “vulnerable on many scores” and predicted that if 
Republicans chose the right candidate, “I think we can win in 1968…I don’t think an 
extreme conservative or extreme liberal can win in this country.”38 The Massachusetts 
senator also urged the public to pay attention to “responsible Negro leaders” rather than 
Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown.39 Speaking on a radio program, Brooke added that 
the emphasis “should be placed on the great, great majority of people in the Negro 
community who merely want improved conditions, who want government to respond 
responsibly to their needs and who at the same time recognize the need to help 
themselves.”40 His remarks came after reports that he had visited Harlem and had “held 
his own” with radicals who were critical of his marriage to a white woman and believed 
he was afraid to set foot in the slums.41 Brooke had also authored a piece in Life 
magazine in which he called for maintaining law and order but held the federal 
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government accountable for “indifference, inaction, and delay” that led to “the 
atmosphere for violence.”42 He discounted the idea that riots were tied to communism or 
conspiracy, pointing instead to poverty and a nationwide “failure to identify and treat the 
conditions that lead to these tragic consequences…we have achieved neither the promise 
nor the principle.”43 The Kerner Commission, Brooke wrote, had the opportunity to be “a 
symbol, a tangible demonstration, that the United States government is actually and 
actively concerned…it can give hope to those who have given up hope that their 
government can and will help them.”44 He also criticized congressional inaction and 
expenditures in Vietnam and called on addressing poverty because “it is morally and 
legally right.”45  
Conservative critiques of President Johnson and his handling of the riots 
continued as well. The famously right-leaning John Birch Society rescreened a film 
called “Anarchy USA” in New Jersey in light of the Newark riots. Originally released in 
1965, the 72-minute film argued that Soviet Communists encouraged African American 
civil rights advocates to riot, hoping to expose the civil rights movement as a Communist 
front whose achievements catered to America’s Cold War enemy. While the film 
conceded that African Americans had honest grievances, it lamented their role in a 
“Communist enslavement” plot.46 Society members described the film as “highly 
informative and eye-opening.”47 A separate editorial took Johnson to task for shirking his 
responsibilities to maintain law and order or stop liberal clergy from participating in 
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illegal civil disobedience. Johnson was using the riots, it continued, to salvage flailing 
Great Society programs; Americans wanted law and order and accountability for wasteful 
spending. Instead, it had commissioners who would likely recommend “vast increases in 
government anti-poverty spending” due to a belief that “backward people and the ending 
of public discipline problems can be solved by massive federal expenditures.”48 It 
concluded that Johnson would likely “feel the sting of a real law and order backlash if he 
persists in trying to end street revolution by bowing to the blackmail of Negro 
militants.”49 A letter to Kerner along the same lines warned him not to “think that 
because Barry Goldwater was so badly defeated that the nation can have all sorts of 
liberalistic legislation imposed on us without any protest…we are still a conservative 
nation at heart.”50 
As the commission prepared to resume witness testimony in Washington, the 
annual Southern Governors Conference convened in Asheville, North Carolina, from 
September 10 to September 13. Among the primary topics of discussion at the conference 
was why the South had mostly avoided a bloody summer as the North struggled with 
violence, given the endless headlines the South and its racial issues had garnered earlier 
in the decade. The regional transformation, according to a U.S. News and World Report 
article, was so marked that Johnson had “sent investigators around, seeking to learn why 
the South has been mostly peaceful while the North has been shuddered under racial 
violence in 1967.”51 Governors present attributed the reversal to the South having more 
                                                
48 Editorial, “LBJ and the Riots,” Dover (NH) Foster’s Democrat, Sept. 12, 1967, “Correspondence-
Informative,” Box 2, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Orlando Ciolfi to Otto Kerner, Sept. 22, 1967; “C-Cl,” Box 3, Series 28, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
51 “On a Racial Front: A Quiet South and a Troubled North: Why,” U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 25, 
1967, 76, “Political Structure,” Box 3, Series 25, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 115 
stable populations and less urban congestion as well as maintaining a “stern line that law 
and order must prevail.”52 Furthermore, the Great Migration had left many “lacking any 
sense of personal identification with their surroundings,” a sentiment that bred frustration 
and violence.53 In the South, the article argued, state leaders sought to minimize bold 
promises while improving race relations as well as educational and job opportunities for 
African Americans. Tennessee Governor Buford Ellington proclaimed that “civil rights is 
a dead issue in our state…ninety-eight percent of the Negroes are satisfied that we are 
trying to help them, and they are aware that these things won’t be done overnight.”54 
Others fell back on law and order rhetoric, with Louisiana Governor John McKeithan 
going so far as to say it was “the most important issue we’ve got to deal with…anyone 
who doesn’t take a stand on it in the presidential race is going to be beaten.”55  
The governors were undoubtedly overstating just how ameliorative the racial 
climate was in the South, but according to the report, “no governor was smug about it,” 
with one surmising, “perhaps we’ve just been lucky.”56 Kentucky Governor Edward 
Breathitt believed the disparity finally put to rest the notion that racial tension was 
exclusive to the South, a perception that had lingered for a decade. “This, of course, is no 
longer true, and it’s getting less true all the time,” Gov. Breathitt said.57 Absent from the 
proceedings was Alabama firebrand George Wallace, who was tending to his wife as she 
received cancer treatment. With reports that Wallace intended to run for president the 
following year, governors were noncommittal about supporting him but speculated that 
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he could win several states. On the whole, the Democratic governors expected Wallace, 
who had not yet spoken publicly on the rioting but offered scathing attacks on liberalism 
and the federal government in the past, to hurt Republicans more than Democrats, though 
they conceded that Californians Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan would not be as 
affected. Arkansas Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, a Republican, declared that “only 
extremists in both parties” would vote for Wallace.58  
Officials at commission headquarters took inventory of its progress and goals 
going forward. In a September 12 memo to Ginsburg, Palmieri restated the commission’s 
basic objectives and basic methods while providing an update on staff activity and the 
timeline for completing an interim report.  Objectives included answering the president’s 
questions, giving guidance to officials at all levels on preventing violent outbreaks, 
making recommendations for social and economic action programs, and “focusing the 
attention of the American people—particularly the suburban white population—on the 
critical issues presented by the riots.”59 The methods, as Palmieri restated them, were 
staff studies and investigations on selected cities, surveys of previous research studies 
from scholars and new surveys when necessary, hearings with expert witnesses, and two 
basic reports to the president—one in the interim for December 15, 1967, and a final 
iteration for the following August. While listing the staff activity to date, he also listed 
components of the proposed interim report, including a profile and analysis of riots in 
each city, attitude surveys, a section on police-community relations, and a media effects 
report, among other sections. The timeline called for individual riot scenarios and social 
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and economic action program surveys by November 1, a draft report by December 1, and 
a draft approved for submission to Johnson by December 15. Palmieri concluded his 
memo with a set of questions described as “prime issues”: 
How does commission see itself and its role? Does it understand scope and effort 
in terms of investigation, research, and hearings? Does commission understand the 
December 15 deadline implies concert of view in basic approach and tone? Does 
commission understand scope of commitment in terms of their own time? Does 
commission accept idea that many hearings need to be public?60  
 
While the memo only went to the executive director’s desk, it served as a reminder of the 
scope and complexity of the Kerner Commission’s report. It also reflected how officials 
grappled with reaching its intended audience and what, specifically, it was supposed to 
convey to that audience.  Behind the scenes, the commission remained resolute if not also 
a bit unsure of itself, a fluid, high-stakes work-in-progress even as it projected confidence 
and ambition to the general public. Later in the month, staffers would broach the subject 
of using a professional advertising agency to “sell” the commission’s work to the public. 
“With all the work that has been done by advertising agencies and advertising media to 
influence people to do something, it seems like something of this sort might be applicable 
to the work of the commission,” one memo read.61  
Romney arrived in Washington to testify in a private hearing on September 12, 
accompanied by his legal advisor and several law enforcement officials from Michigan. 
As the commission concluded hearings with expert witnesses from Detroit and Newark, it 
would also delve into African American history by calling on experts to testify and 
expand on historical, social, psychological, and economic factors that informed the black 
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experience in America. Witnesses included Lerone Bennett, senior editor at Ebony, 
Vivian Henderson of Clark University in Atlanta, and renowned sociologist Kenneth 
Clark. Romney’s testimony, which lasted three-and-a-half hours behind closed doors and 
included a 4500-word prepared statement with all commissioners present, reiterated 
claims he had made weeks earlier that Attorney General Ramsey Clark had assured him 
that an oral request for troops was enough to bring federal troops to Detroit. The governor 
said he wished to focus on how the state responded more than his public disagreement 
with Clark; he recalled that by the time troops arrived, however, much of the damage had 
already been done. Romney also maintained that “the enormity of the trouble area and the 
fact that this was not a riot confined to one area was beyond dispute…I always believe 
that Detroit got out of hand as a result of action that was too little, too late.”62 He told 
commissioners he wanted the nation to learn from the shortcomings in responding to the 
Detroit riots and warned of the dangers of guerilla warfare. “The seeds of revolution have 
been sown in America more by our own failures and shortcomings than ideology,” 
Romney declared.63 He was unsparing in his criticism, claiming that “too few whites 
know Negroes and too few Negroes know whites…too many people believe that by 
moving to the suburbs they have escaped the problems of the ghettoes.”64 Romney also 
criticized African Americans for being “supersensitive about race to the point of 
defending those guilty of violating the law” and white America for its failure to “give 
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adequate support to constructive militant Negro leadership.”65 While warning of a racial 
holocaust if things did not change, Romney also urged a climate “devoid of insincere of 
unrealistic promises.”66 
As Romney testified in Washington, Cyrus Vance’s official report on Detroit was 
released, a move Romney staffers viewed as an attempt by the White House to upstage 
the governor’s visit. One article noted that the “political implications of Romney’s 
criticism were clearly regarded as important enough, in the context of the 1968 campaign, 
that the administration decided it was time to try and refute him, once and for all, with an 
overwhelming array of facts and figures.”67 As evidence that the White House had clearly 
not planned on releasing Vance’s report quite yet, the author pointed to the fact that there 
were no copies readied for the press, only a typewritten one. Romney had avoided 
referencing Johnson by name in his testimony, but Vance’s report contradicted the 
Michigan governor’s timeline and claimed “the legal provisions whereby the president 
may order federal troops within a state were not understood by Michigan officials.”68 The 
65-page document, organized by Vance but released officially by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, also reiterated criticism of the actions of the Michigan National 
Guard. Once again, Clark responded as well, saying he “would not criticize Governor 
Romney for his indecision if he did not persist in his distortions.”69 Clark disputed the 
exact time that Romney called and whether he made the formal request for federal troops; 
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he also restated his surprise at the accusations, claiming “at no time did Governor 
Romney utter a word of complaint about constitutional or other legal requirements or in 
any way imply that he had requested troops earlier.”70  
Johnson remained quiet through Romney’s visit. His next political maneuver 
came in a Kansas City speech to the International Association of Chiefs of Police on 
September 14. On the same day he signed gun control legislation prohibiting out-of-state 
purchases and interstate mail order sale of firearms to “keep lethal weapons out of the 
wrong hands, out of the hands of dangerous criminals,” Johnson spoke to the IACP on 
the nationwide effort required to deter violence and demonstrate respect for law and 
order.71 He referenced the Crime Commission, whose conclusions prompted him to urge 
Congress to pass the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act that would “provide grants to 
those cities and to those states who not only increase their present commitment to 
criminal justice, but who are willing to go out and develop programs for better training, 
for better use of their personnel…”72 The president also praised law enforcement for 
confronting the unprecedented challenges the summer riots presented them, riots that 
“damaged a great deal more than the storefronts and the American homes…they damaged 
the respect and the accommodation among men on which a civilized society ultimately 
depends.”73 He described the perpetrators as “wretched, vulgar men…these poisonous 
propagandists, posed as spokesmen for the underprivileged and capitalized on the real 
grievances of suffering people.”74  
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Johnson thus refused to acknowledge that the rioters might be speaking for more 
people than just themselves; he chose instead to push crime prevention and employ 
failsafe law-and-order rhetoric. Speaking indirectly about slum residents, Johnson said 
“the vast majority…believe [in] obedience to the law…they have seen their rights more 
firmly established, their opportunities sharply increased in the last decade.”75  Here 
Johnson seemed to speak in praise of his administration’s own accomplishments while 
reflecting its quiet frustration: for all that liberalism and the Great Society had afforded to 
African Americans, some found it unsatisfactory and incomplete. To say that the riots 
spoke for more than the extreme few was to lend credence to the idea that many of 
Johnson’s domestic achievements were either purely symbolic, insufficient, or altogether 
ineffective; thus he pinned riots on a lawless minority while describing the majority of 
poor blacks as grateful and law-abiding. Although he remained sympathetic to the plight 
of the slum dweller, the president’s strategy was clear: rely on existing programs, respect 
law and order, and curb criminal behavior. Unsurprisingly, there was no mention of the 
need for massive increases in domestic spending. 
The testimony of the experts on black life in the previous days painted a different 
picture from the one articulated by many white officials. While Henderson, Clark, and 
Bennett did not offer outright praise for the rioters, they were much more sympathetic to 
King’s characterization of riots as “the language of the unheard,” as a strategic response 
from the impoverished when all other means had failed. Clark was increasingly 
pessimistic about the nation’s ability to solve problems and address systemic racism. A 
New York Times article on Buffalo summarized the racial divide in many cities that 
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consisted of white leadership believing it had done more than its fair share on behalf of 
civil rights and interracial cooperation and African Americans who labeled such leaders 
naïve to the problems of the ghetto and the structural racism that remained. A Wall Street 
Journal feature examined how urban renewal projects in Boston “never made any 
attempts to involve or educate the poor, and the plan was primarily an instrument for 
displacing them from the neighborhood.”76 Unlike projects that involved lower-class 
white residents, where families were notified, consulted, and even offered arrangements 
to switch housing, those projects in Boston’s African American neighborhoods proceeded 
without consultation, building nicer housing and businesses that the displaced could not 
afford. One Urban League official described the city’s urban renewal policies as “large 
on promise and small on performance.”77  
Police-community relations were still fraught with tension and, as was the case 
with President Johnson and his critics, white leaders seemed to resent the notion that they 
had not done enough and that racism was as bad as ever. Middle-class African Americans 
in Atlanta bristled at “demands that they solve a problem created by whites,” telling a 
CBS News radio broadcast that “to expect more of Negroes than anyone else is a subtle 
form of racism.”78 Dr. Nathan Hare, a sociology professor at Howard University 
considered the father of black studies, attributed the horrors of the ghetto, in part, to “four 
centuries of abuse and cunning treachery to which black people are subjected in 
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America.”79 Not only had “black gains” been minimal, Hare argued, integration sought to 
create “a black face and a white mind” rather than “the right to exist on an equal plane as 
a distinct category.”80 Hare decried African American males emasculated at home but 
expected to fight in Vietnam and praised Black Power as opposition to “the everlasting 
evils of white power…it is extremely American to fight back when attacked.”81 White 
officials, meanwhile, were more concerned with repression than the systemic factors that 
fueled rioting; “it may not be possible to overthrow a racist white America, but clearly 
America can be destroyed…the choice may no longer be left to her,” Hare concluded.82 
One magazine article claimed that “a significant fraction of [African Americans]—
including many of the most articulate and politically active—want integration as little as 
the governors of Mississippi and Alabama.”83 Another reasoned that the racial dissent 
and fallout from the rioting was “more a result of the government’s unwillingness to 
make major economic commitments than it is of any inherent tendencies in the black 
populist movement.”84 
A Robert Coles piece in New York Times magazine described how African 
Americans that had migrated Northward from the Deep South found that northern whites 
“know how to stand together as a race” and keep African Americans in “their place.”85 
Those who believed in the binary of “the oppressive South and the promising North” 
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found it was “as though you’ve been cheated…led down the wrong road.”86 Coles 
referenced a Brandeis University study that found that a higher proportion of native 
southerners in a northern city increased the likelihood that city would experience a riot. 
“A lot of times I wish I was back down South, but I know my kids have it better 
here…maybe,” one resident said.87 Coles offered a comprehensive, disheartening account 
of how substandard living conditions and institutionalized racism affected African 
Americans in the North just as it did in the South. Time Inc. CEO Andrew Heiskell 
articulated the feelings of many white Americans on the riots when he said “suddenly we 
realize that there is something that must be done, and we don’t know what it is and how 
to do it.”88 Cities were unmanageable, he told his Board of Directors, “because most of 
us, and many millions of others, have over the course of the years decided that the 
managing of the city was none of our responsibility.”89 
The plight of American ghettoes yielded skepticism from the broader black 
community on a forthcoming riot report. “Grumbling is heard that nothing will come of it 
but another paper product, another report to be filed and forgotten,” one newspaper 
claimed.90 The article, printed in the Whippany (NJ) News of the Hanovers, continued 
that disillusioned black moderates “cannot imagine that the president’s commission on 
disorders is really going to do any better than” the “largely futile” White House 
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Conference on Civil Rights from the previous year.91 These leaders wanted “action, not 
more recommendations and feelings….they cannot quite shrug off the feeling that the 
president’s institutionalized efforts to deal with racial turbulence…are designed mainly to 
take some of the political heat out of the issue.”92 The “growing tide of skepticism” 
would require repairing a damaged relationship that stemmed from reports that Johnson 
and his inner circle had attempted to dissuade Lindsay and Barr from convening the 
Urban Coalition the previous month.93 While the administration denied this claim, 
according to the article, it reinforced the notion that there was “some small germ of truth” 
to the White House “trying to extract maximum political advantage from the commission 
on racial disorders.”94 The cynicism offered another hurdle for a Johnson White House 
whose list of allies and detractors seemed to be heading in opposite directions.  
Wilkins, one of two African Americans on the commission, considered himself a 
moderate, but he did not share the same cynicism. In a wide-ranging interview with US 
News & World Report, the NAACP head criticized the Black Power movement for 
wanting a separate society while demanding funding from the very institutions it 
castigated. “If the Negro thinks he can go it alone and create a separate black economy, 
he’s going against the whole international trend of mankind, the whole evidence of 
history,” Wilkins remarked.95 Too many young African Americans, he said, believed that 
violence made others listen; patience was critical according to the man who had a sign in 
                                                
91 “Race Study Faces Negro Skepticism,” Whippany (NJ) News of the Hanovers, Sept. 20, 1967, 
“Newspaper Clippings Related to Commission,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, 
TX. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 “Wilkins Calls Black Power Path Wrong,” The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 18, 1967, “NAACP,” Box 6, Series 
24, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 126 
his New York office that read: “bricks through windows won’t open doors.”96 He 
attributed the riots, in part, not to despair, but rather “rising expectations…although 
Negroes are better off now than they have been, they are also resentful of the fact that the 
door is only a quarter or half open.”97 Plenty of moderate African Americans agreed with 
Black Power complaints; they simply did not subscribe to the idea of separatism as the 
answer nor did they necessarily feel, as organizations such as SNCC and CORE did, that 
excluding whites was the proper course. When Black Power beliefs started to affect jobs, 
homes, and children of moderate African Americans, Wilkins noted many hesitated. He 
offered a reminder that “the Negro community is not a solid bloc,” that it consisted of 
plenty of businessmen, homeowners, and professionals who had a stake in the 
economy.98  
He also predicted that when African Americans discovered they could prosper in 
the South—something he believed would happen sooner than in the North—many would 
remain in the region or return from northern cities. “In the North, it is hard for people to 
shake themselves of this false sense of idealism,” Wilkins said, adding that “they have 
this idea they ‘because I don’t hate the Negro, he is my friend and I am his friend’…but 
there is a lot of difference between not hating a man and letting him live in your 
neighborhood and have a good job.”99 As the most prominent African American voice on 
the Kerner Commission—and one of the most prominent African American voices in the 
nation, Wilkins’s words carried weight. At age 66, he certainly had a different philosophy 
for engendering racial progress in America than younger activists like Carmichael and 
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Brown. The interview also underscored why the White House had chosen Wilkins to 
serve: he wished to bring change within the framework of existing institutions, 
nonviolently and deliberately, and thus his leadership did not pose a threat. He rightly 
pointed out that the African American community was not monolithic and thus not 
everyone was going to agree, but this seemed to speak to the Kerner Commission’s 
diversity problem. Not only were there no young, non-moderate African Americans or 
African American women on the commission, nine of the eleven members addressing 
issues in overwhelmingly black neighborhoods were white, leaving the panel’s dialogues 
and eventual recommendations open to reasonable critiques.  
With the commission preparing for another round of testimony related to law and 
order that week, Ginsburg sent a note to commissioners on the possibility of making an 
ad hoc recommendation to President Johnson on a riot prevention and training program 
for top officials. The proposed conference would take place at some point in the winter in 
Washington and invite officials from the nation’s 100 largest cities; it envisioned “a two-
day conference for mayors, a one-week course for police chiefs, and a two-to-four week 
course for other key police personnel.”100 The course, which had an estimated cost of 
$500,000, would focus on subjects like community relations, riot control tactics, rapid 
mobilization, communication systems, decision-making during riots, advance planning, 
and conducting joint operations with local police, state police, the National Guard, and 
the U.S. Army.101 Ginsburg indicated that the commission had discussed the conference 
with the FBI and the Department of Justice and would send forthcoming updates on 
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planning. One goal of the conference was to convince police officials “defensive and 
resistant to change” that the Kerner Commission hoped to offer recommendations that 
could translate into straightforward, practical programs that were easy to implement, 
something the crime commission had failed to achieve due to a complicated, detailed 
report that did not seem to understand its audience.102 By early October, the commission 
would send the president an official recommendation for conferences spearheaded by the 
DOJ to focus on “effective measures for the maintenance of law and order and on 
programs to improve police-community relations.”103 The memo cited expert witness 
testimony as having convinced commissioners that training conferences might aid in 
communicating how to prevent and control civil disorders. Among the topics proposed 
for the conference were advance planning, control techniques, communications systems, 
making decisions during disorders, and coordinating operations with local, state, and 
national officials in stressful scenarios. 
Controversy emerged on September 20 amid reports that NBC had coached an 
interview subject in a documentary on riots in Detroit. The subject, local resident James 
Malone, claimed an NBC producer encouraged him to recite incendiary lines on how 
outsiders inspired local militant groups; NBC quickly denied the accusations, saying that 
Malone was not even interviewed for the documentary (the program showed a silhouette 
of the person in question to conceal his identity) and noting that it was common for 
interviewees to retract statements upon a program’s release. The incident called into 
question the relationship between riots and the media, a relationship some felt had 
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problems that were “clear and undisputed.”104 A Providence Journal article mentioned 
recent sources and studies, none by name, indicating that disorders “have been 
encouraged, stimulated, and perhaps even incited on occasion by the practices of the 
news media, especially television.”105 Media coverage had the potential to “inflame the 
problem,” and on occasion, “the mere presence of a TV camera crew in a neighborhood 
gripped by tension can be the spark that touches off an outbreak.”106 Where, exactly, was 
the line between balanced news coverage of a disorder and inciting even more panic?  
Staffers had discussed the need for a media effects study as part of the interim 
report to determine how television, radio, and newspaper coverage actually affected riots. 
Staffers readied a questionnaire later in the month for the media study, tailoring different 
sets of questions for community leaders and residents, police officials, and city officials, 
respectively. Community leaders and residents were asked what television they watched, 
whether they saw images of rioting on television, whether such images had an influence 
on looting and a broader climate of racial unrest in a given city, if local African American 
news received adequate coverage, and how journalists covered the riots, among other 
topics. The study asked police whether television, radio, and newspapers had any effect 
on the rioting, positively or negatively, asking for specific programs by name and 
whether there were “specific examples of bad conduct by the press” during riot 
coverage.107 City officials received similar questions about how members of the press 
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behaved, whether it impeded their own work, and if there were “any specific examples of 
bad conduct by the press.”108  
Commission hearings on law and order in the final week of September focused on 
grievances and events that prompted disorders, actions police and individual communities 
might take to reduce or prevent such disorders, and techniques for restoring peace once 
disorders had occurred. Among a list of witnesses that included officials from the 
Department of Justice and military as well as Yale law student and Watts neighborhood 
association head Stanley Sanders, the star of the week was Father James Groppi, a white 
Catholic priest from Milwaukee who had allied himself with black radical causes. 
Commissioners traveling to Milwaukee in late August to gather information had sensed 
that Groppi created a lot of tension; a recap of the trip noted that of the four 
commissioners touring the city, Groppi only showed interest in speaking with Wilkins, 
the lone African American.109 In his testimony, Groppi told the commission that cutting 
off federal funds to cities refusing to address housing segregation was a fair punishment. 
He wished to apply this to his hometown “because there is such a tremendous amount of 
bigotry in Milwaukee and practically nothing is being done to alleviate the intolerable 
conditions under which the black man is living in the ghetto,” warning that additional 
rioting could take place and make Milwaukee a “Wisconsin Selma” if such needs were 
not addressed.110 Groppi expressed skepticism that anything would be done, describing 
Black Power as a “redemptive force” that “will teach the white man to respect the black 
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man.”111 Given the ineffectiveness of marches and civil disobedience in Milwaukee to 
that point, he did not rule out advocating violence if “the white man did not share his 
good life with the Negro,” saying he would have to “wait and see.”112  
Although expert testimony seemed to proceed without incident, Ginsburg did 
express concerns to Kerner the following week that the atmosphere was too relaxed, with 
commissioners unwilling to ask focused questions, causing hearings to meander at times. 
Ginsburg did not offer any solutions, only concerns that “we may start running well 
behind in our day’s schedules and squeeze out some important witnesses altogether.”113 
Concern also mounted as to whether the commission’s “social and economic objectives” 
would be “too ultimate and thus hamper the decision-making and pay-off of our 
report.”114 Palmieri’s memo to a colleague described “pie-in-the-sky goals” and 
reservations that “if liberalism carries the day, promises may be made which cannot be 
met.”115  The sensible alternative, he reasoned, was a “limited framework” with tempered 
goals and expectations. He spoke very candidly on the matter: 
Our programs should contribute to reduction of inequalities between black and 
white. Does that mean that our social and economic recommendations will directly result 
in, say, the same income distribution among Negroes as among white? Hardly and it 
would be foolish to even imply that…What we can say, however, is that economic 
equality—that is, equality of opportunity and equality of a pay-off for equal input—is an 
ultimate goal of American society.116 
 
Palmieri’s concerns veered from rhetoric on improving slums and funding urban renewal 
by any means necessary, particularly from Lindsay. Realism permeated his memo that 
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acknowledged the criticism of overpromising when it came to the commission’s 
recommendations. His suggestion that the commission should “start to define its ultimate 
goals” and center them around “limited objectives” prescribed a much milder approach 
than the bold proclamations issued at the commission’s inception.117 Palmieri’s concerns 
offered yet another indication that the commission had a precarious line to tow. 
After the week’s testimony had concluded, Kerner returned to Illinois and gave a 
speech before the Illinois Municipal League in which he lamented the environments 
where riots broke out but also defended police confronting a “nasty job.”118 The governor 
threw away his prepared speech and spoke candidly, describing riots starting with “dry 
grass situations in a congested area full of frustration and broken promises.”119 He also 
posed a question to his audience, “how long would you and I control our tempers under 
the same circumstance?” in reference to law enforcement.120 Despite the fact that police-
community relations in most riot areas were fraught with tension, Kerner portrayed both 
the rioters and the cops as sympathetic figures. The police were “standing like the Rock 
of Gibraltar” in the face of turmoil, while the urban poor dealt with conditions to which 
were many affluent Americans were completely oblivious.121 While Kerner attempted to 
offer a bit of unscripted nuance to the situation in each city coping with riots, the stance 
did not necessarily play in a polarizing political climate. Sympathizing with the rioters 
lent credence to violent, illegal acts and often rewarded them, in the minds of 
                                                
117 Palmieri to Lefcowitz, “Program for Limited Objectives,” Sept. 29, 1967, “Long Term Program,” Box 3, 
Series 37, NACCD, RG 282; LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
118 Robert Howard, “Kerner Calls Riots a Full Time Problem,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1967, 
“Commission,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
119 “Kerner Hits Rioting at State Conference,” Rockford (IL) Register-Republic, Sept. 25, 1967, 
“Commission,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
120 Howard, “Kerner Calls Riots a Full Time Problem,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1967, “Commission,” 
Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
121 “Kerner Hits Rioting at State Conference,” Rockford (IL) Register-Republic, Sept. 25, 1967, 
“Commission”; Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 133 
conservatives, while sympathizing with strained police forces and comparing their 
courage and frustration to the daily struggles of slum dwellers was dangerous and 
misguided, in the minds of liberals.  
Richard Nixon, a moderate Republican and prime contender for the GOP’s 
presidential nomination, entered the riot debate with statements in a 2000-word Reader’s 
Digest article that toned down the rhetoric of hardline conservatives. In the article, Nixon 
described America as lawless and declared the nation “cannot temporize or equivocate in 
this showdown with anarchy.”122 He also lamented that the well-behaved ghetto residents 
were punished due to the actions of a dangerous few, describing rioters as “gravely 
mistaken to think that the threat of pillage is the way to sell Americans on social 
justice.”123 The former vice president was not interested in exploring new programs, but 
rather determining why past ones had failed; he decried the amount of “permissiveness” 
to rioters who “defy the law in pursuit of civil rights,” speaking to “a decline for public 
authority and the rule of law in America.”124 Congress had offered too many promises 
related to social and civil rights legislation, and white America was deluding itself in 
believing that “civil rights acts are going to make full competitors in our society out of 
children who arrived at life’s starting line fresh from broken families, slum conditions, 
inferior schools and crime-and-vice-ridden neighborhoods.”125 Coddling rioters was 
unacceptable, he argued, because it was not up to the individual to “determine what laws 
are good and what laws are bad.”126  
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Nixon also alluded to judges and courts that had “gone too far in weakening the 
peace forces as against the criminal forces.” While Nixon did not mention any court 
decisions by name, the New York Times speculated he was referring to the Miranda v. 
Arizona and Escobedo v. Illinois decisions that had altered the ability of police officers to 
question suspects and obtain confessions. Nixon, who himself had a law degree and had 
argued before the Supreme Court, had not criticized the Court previously, so the Times 
saw his words as an attempt to shore up conservative credentials with a talking point 
previously espoused by Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan. With his statement, Nixon 
offered a preview of his strategy in addressing the riots on the campaign trail. Instead of 
engaging in overt race-baiting, he chose to focus on law and order, better training and pay 
for police officers, isolating rioters as a fraction of residents, and “acknowledging that 
racial animosities and long-standing injustices had contributed heavily,” all while 
assigning blame on the welfare system and a refusal to admit that more spending on the 
same programs might not be the answer.127 His observation that “far from being a Great 
Society, ours is a lawless society” was calculated and politically loaded.128 Nixon offered 
harsh judgments of slum conditions rather than slum residents with the hopes that 
framing an alternative around law and order and reduced spending would attract both 
conservatives and moderates the following year.  
On September 29, Kerner received a memo from his assistant, Kyran McGrath, 
raising a number of concerns. McGrath was at work on the outline of the preliminary 
report and feared that “any report of the size this outline foretells, be it preliminary, 
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intermediate, or final, will scare away the very people in our nation who must read it.”129 
He also noted a rift between commissioners and staff: 
Some grumblings are filtering back that some of the commissioners feel they are 
being more entertained in their work on the commission rather than being allowed to 
enter into the actual work of the report and the direction of the research effort. Criticism 
arises that the schedule of hearings leaves them no time to meet among themselves and 
spread their opinions, etc., out on the table. I gather that a suggestion or request will be 
made that the commissioners set aside an hour or two to meet alone, with no staff present, 
no executive director, nobody but the eleven commissioners. I don’t know how much 
you’ll want to handle this, maybe beat them to the punch yourself or let it come from the 
floor.130 
 
The commission needed to find a balance in incorporating the voices of program 
researchers and staff and the eleven members appointed by President Johnson. With 
many researchers deeply embedded in fieldwork in individual cities and commissioners 
juggling hearings with other obligations, little time existed for a dialogue between the 
two groups. Commissioners, McGrath made clear, wanted more say and more time for 
open discussions on the riots, the hearings, and other matters. The task was now left to 
Kerner and Ginsburg to mediate and ensure that both groups felt they had the platforms 
and the resources to contribute fully.  
By the end of the month, the commission had heard testimony from 75 witnesses 
with more to follow in October. Faced with a pressing deadline, commissioners who 
wanted a more active role, conservatives who wanted it to crack down on the lawless, 
liberals who wanted to hold the federal government and white America accountable, 
answering to a beleaguered presidential administration that could please seemingly no 
one, the inevitable politicizing that came with a looming presidential election, internal 
concerns that it could promise too much, and public cries that it would offer nothing of 
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substance, the Kerner Commission ventured head on into its third full month. The 
heightened tension surrounding the commission, its approach, and its forthcoming 
product was not subsiding anytime soon.  
 
 137 
October 1967 
 Lerone Bennett Jr. had a thorough, unfettered message for white America: when it 
came to the causes of the summer riots and the daily struggles of the black poor, most 
suburbanites were either naïve or in denial. Evil outsiders were not leading mindless 
ghetto residents in these riots; their actions were actions of the aggrieved, of citizens 
whose mistreatment had simmered for so long that the only surprise was that rebellions 
did not occur more often. “Most white people don’t want to believe that black people are 
really mad,” Bennett wrote in Ebony, noting that “if they believed that they would have 
to look at themselves and their institutions…and it is much easier to look at Stokely 
Carmichael and alleged ‘outside agitators.’”1 The rioters, Bennett argued, were in “open 
revolt against a system which denies their humanity.”2  He traced conditions back to 
slavery and its aftermath, to an American tradition that had long denied African 
Americans humanity before finally declaring them second-class citizens. Resentment had 
its roots in “what amounts to quasi-colonial status” for those trapped in ghettoes; it 
manifested itself in 1967 in the form of police brutality and schools, housing, and job 
rates that were all poor.3 Dire schools meant dire job prospects, which often led to crime 
followed by otherwise indifferent white observers eager to pathologize ghetto-dwellers as 
criminals and thugs. The cycle persisted for decades, and when police refused to even 
respect the poor in their own squalor, the frustrations boiled over; as Bennett put it, the 
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riots had “illuminated with a thousand fires the internal agonies of a nation at war with 
itself.”4  
Bennett was not alone in calling out white Americans for ducking the 
uncomfortable questions linked to institutionalized racism. An article in Concern 
characterized America’s social structure as a “form of apartheid that is every bit as 
vicious, albeit uncodified, as that in South Africa.”5 Another piece in the same 
publication, penned by a Detroit pastor, argued the black violence in the ghetto was a 
“revolt against the violence and injustice black people have received from whites ever 
since we came to this country in slave ships,” an unfortunate last result when other 
methods had failed.6 The “continuous pattern of defining a black American as something 
other-than-a-normal American” reflected just how embedded segregation and white 
society often was in the white suburbs, a space where enmity toward the ghetto was 
commonplace and the “total culture constructed on whiteness” and “refusal to accept 
anyone who looks and acts different from the way we do” was accepted without a second 
thought.7  Robert Coles wrote in The Atlantic Monthly of the “terrible historical 
irony…the law which Negroes now defy once decreed them to be chattel, pure and 
simple; and until recently that law, that order, that ‘way of life’ denied them—in their 
                                                
4 Bennett, “How to Stop Riots,” Ebony, October 1967, 32, “Racial Isolation in the Public Schools-
Appendices, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967,” Box 4, Series 5, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
5 “The Urban Riots, the Church—and the Future,” Concern, Oct. 1, 1967, 4, “Concern,” Box 1, Series 26, 
NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
6 Archie L. Rich, “The Black Revolt,” Concern, Oct. 1, 1967, 17; “Concern,” Box 1, Series 26, NACCD, 
RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
7 Richard Newman, “Black Power, Black Nationalism, Black Rebellion,” Concern, Oct. 1, 1967, 5, 
“Concern,” Box 1, Series 26, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. “The Urban Riots, the Church, 
and the Future,” Concern, Oct. 1, 1967, 4, “Concern,” Box 1, Series 26, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
 139 
American homeland—even the right to vote.”8 He characterized much of poor, black 
America as “a nation within a nation, and until that awful division of territory, money, 
and power is somehow bridged, until studies and inquires and prescriptions become 
actions, rioting will continue.”9 
Carmichael himself co-authored an article with activist Charles Hamilton in The 
Atlantic Monthly laying out the horrors of the ghetto and how they drove young African 
Americans to militancy. Carmichael and Hamilton’s piece, titled “Dynamite,” traced the 
plight of African Americans from the stark violence and discrimination of the Jim Crow 
South to the Great Migration in search of a better life in the North. Upon arriving in cities 
like Chicago and Detroit, however, black migrants “were forced into old ghettoes, where 
rents were cheapest and housing poorest.”10 As millions flocked into urban areas, white 
residents and employers fled to the suburbs due in part to the “artificial panics…often 
created by enterprising realtors who raised the cry, ‘the niggers are coming.’”11 With no 
federal open housing law and a refusal by many suburban officials to allow low-income 
housing, those in the ghetto had no way out. The riots and the conditions that bred them 
were nothing new; as Carmichael and Hamilton put it, “the problems of Harlem in the 
1960s are not much different from those of Harlem 1920.”12 Protesters who had initially 
opted for a nonviolent, wait-and-see approach had tired of government’s repeated 
inability to deliver on promises and deal with ghetto problems earnestly. Like Bennett, 
the authors pointed to housing, jobs, and education as flawed institutions that perpetuated 
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the cycle of segregated neighborhoods to segregated schools to poor education to menial 
jobs. Calls for integration and the idea that “the closer you get to whiteness, the better 
you are” had not allayed the patronizing attitudes toward black students that contributed 
to substandard education, inadequate preparation for the workforce and, ultimately, “the 
breakdown of the black family structure.”13 Only when white America grasped the 
psychological and physical toll of these factors over generations could they understand 
why many in the ghetto felt they had no recourse beyond violent resistance.14  
Rather than grapple with the despair and frustration engendered by centuries of 
discrimination, however, the article pointed to the tendency of the white establishment to 
“become[s] indignant and utter[s] irrelevant clichés about law and order.”15 When 
Carmichael and Hamilton targeted the “blue ribbon committee of ‘experts’ or 
‘consultants’ appointed to investigate,” their opinion and expectations of the Kerner 
Commission and its forerunners were made clear.16 The reports would produce little of 
consequence and “everybody either prays for rain to cool off tempers and vacate the 
streets or for an early autumn,” they reasoned.17 Instead of examining how to change 
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ghetto conditions, Americans would cast blame on those who acted out against the 
conditions or offer hapless temporary measures. The “dynamite” they spoke of “ignited” 
and “was placed there by white racism, and it was ignited by white racist indifference and 
unwillingness to act justly.”18 A broad refusal to acknowledge this phenomenon left 
many African Americans unwilling to rely on white institutions or white leaders, even 
those who framed themselves as liberal and forward-thinking, in offering up constructive 
solutions to the problems at hand. As another article surmised, “white leadership in black 
American affairs, however well-intentioned, is a form of plunder.”19  
Unlike Carmichael and Hamilton, who called for a separate, autonomous 
movement, Bayard Rustin conceded that African Americans needed help from white 
liberals in leveraging political power to improve inner cities. In the October issue of 
Commentary, Rustin also took aim at America’s social welfare spending since World 
War II, comparing the $96 billion with the $946 billion spent on military power over the 
same period. He faulted the War on Poverty offering up “the delusion that the poor can 
be helped to organize themselves out of poverty” rather than “adequately attack the 
problems it claims to be attacking.”20 Instead of addressing these problems, according to 
Rustin—he framed the priorities as full employment, raising the minimum wage, and 
offering guaranteed annual income, in no particular order—Johnson wanted to decrease 
domestic spending and ramp up funding for Vietnam. The war had splintered the civil 
rights movement, causing many liberals to “abandon the movement and concentrate their 
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energies on civil rights activities.”21 Rustin urged an interracial alliance to challenge the 
one-party South and merge with a “dynamic Negro political movement” that could make 
“an enormous contribution to solving the problems of the black ghettoes of the North.”22 
This effort would require cooperation and an acknowledgement on the part of white 
liberals that they could not rest on their laurels when the movement remained incomplete. 
The fight for the “objectives of the new period—better housing, jobs, and education,” 
would be “political, not moral,” but much of the onus nonetheless was on the white 
community to see through what it had agreed to support earlier in the decade.23  
These pieces clearly wanted the attention of, among others, those who had 
“engaged in a white flight to avoid the black plight.”24 White author John P. Adams 
conceded that many white Americans “have not been able to understand the anger of 
those who live in the areas that we have evacuated and who live under the conditions we 
deny.”25 In his article in Concern, Adams offered the poignant example of Rosa Parks, 
the catalyst for the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott and a lauded symbol of the nonviolent 
civil rights movement. By 1967, Parks had moved to Detroit, near where the July riots 
unfolded. Adams described her as “watching with sadness the burning and the looting,” 
which resulted in the destruction of the office where she worked.26 Asked how the anger 
of a dozen years prior in the South compared with the anger in Detroit in 1967, Parks 
answered, “Perhaps there is no difference. Maybe our anger is the same. In 1955 there 
were only a few of us. In those less tense days we were more patient. Now there are more 
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of them and they are not as patient. They are younger. They are willing to risk more.”27 
Parks’ words captured the evolution of the civil rights movement from her own famous 
participation to the present; that they came from such a seminal figure only underscored 
that the struggle remained incomplete.  
Bennett had attended the National Conference of Negro Elected Officials at the 
University of Chicago on the final weekend in September, presenting a paper titled “The 
Politics of the Outsider—The Black Man’s Role in American Politics.”28 A representative 
from the Kerner Commission had attended and reported that while there was skepticism 
as to “whether any lasting good would come out of the efforts of the Commission,” there 
was also a sincere hope it could “develop a hard hitting and definitive report on 
conditions giving rise to the eruptions and civil disorders.”29 For its part, the commission 
had taken note of the numerous calls to hold white America accountable, having sent a 
representative to the conference and compiled the aforementioned articles for its own 
collection. October commenced with another round of witness testimony in Washington 
and commission staffers performing field work in various cities where riots had occurred. 
With the Commission’s Interim Report taking shape, those demanding white 
accountability still contended with editorials like the one published in the Albany (Ga.) 
Herald on October 5, a piece claiming a “reversion to the terrors of the jungle” was the 
“sole alternative” to maintaining law and order.30  
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A draft of a staff paper on “causal analysis” of riots by scholar Howard Margolis 
indicated that Kerner Commission staffers had taken to heart the words of Bennett, 
Carmichael, Hamilton, and the authors in Concern. Margolis classified the three broad 
views of the riots as “too much too soon,” “justified protest,” and “structural problems,” 
laying out each view objectively before summarizing the staff’s thinking on each 
position.31 The first view, “too much, too soon,” posited that African Americans and 
white liberals expected civil rights gains to progress at an unrealistic pace, generating 
dangerous conditions where “irresponsible, fanatical” leaders could “exploit the 
frustrations of the ghetto community.”32 This moderate to conservative viewpoint favored 
respect for the law, prosecuting rioters, and submitting a “notice to the Negro 
community” that riots make things “worse, not better.”33 The second cause, “justified 
protest,” framed rioting as a logical reaction to deep-seated conditions. Margolis did not 
spare the federal government when discussing this view, writing that for three years it 
had “largely ceased to be the active, visible ally of the Negro struggle to improve his 
condition.”34 This was not entirely the government’s fault, he clarified, as “the 
momentum went out of visible Federal support for Negro advancement,” in part, because 
“those things the government was prepared to most actively support had been done,” and 
rioting could have occurred sooner and more violently if not for the civil rights measures 
the government did lead.35 Nevertheless, this view did peel back an inconvenient truth 
regarding white America: that much of the civil progress had come at virtually no cost to 
                                                
31 Howard Margolis, “Draft Staff Paper: Causal Analysis,” Oct. 5, 1967, 3, “Causal Analysis,” Box 1, 
Series 60, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 4. 
34 Ibid., 5. 
35 Ibid. 
 145 
them, and that when “the drive turned, inevitably, toward the economic and social status 
of the Negro American generally, this was no longer true.”36 The effort and undertaking 
required to address such large-scale issues would place “great, difficult, conceivably even 
impossible responsibilities on the white economic and political leadership in this 
country.”37  
The final cause, labeled as “structural problems,” argued that a combination of 
black migration to northern cities and white flight to the suburbs had a significant, 
negative impact, rendering many ghetto residents unskilled and uneducated due to a lack 
of jobs and bad public schools. Riots thus represented the breaking point for many 
frustrated residents. Margolis concluded that while each of the three views had some 
merit, the second would be “the most subtle and hardest for white Americans to accept” 
because it “does not allow us to avoid the issue of racism in American society.”38 He 
viewed the chief conflict between the first two causes, claiming the third could be 
integrated into either of them, and proposed a “least-common-denominator” interim 
report that expanded on each view without taking a firm position.39 Focusing on objective 
structural problems could, ideally, “stimulate attention in Congress and the press on the 
fundamental choices…that must be made” while giving the commission more time to 
stake out its own position so that its judgments would ultimately have “maximum impact 
and acceptability.”40 Margolis’s paper, while still a work in progress, offered one of the 
first coherent glimpses into how the Kerner Commission intended to formulate potential 
causes and solutions to rioting in its drafting of an interim report. He emphasized 
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presenting each of the three causes uncritically, but the undertones seemed to indicate 
favoring “justified protest” as well as a concern over how white America might react 
when told it was complicit in the system that spawned all-black riots far from its 
collective doorstep. In the short term, a measured course presenting multiple viewpoints 
would, ideally, promote the kind of dialogue from politicians and the general public that 
might help craft the best long-term solutions. In the long term was the goal of 
recommendations tailored to “meet a basic social problem, the problem of being black 
which has for 350 years undercut the basic ideas of our system of free government.”41  
Amid the articles and speeches decrying white indifference to black poverty and 
an underlying racism that had defined the country for centuries, there were also attempts 
to cast law enforcement as victims performing a thankless job to maintain order. An 
article in Nation’s Business describing the “bitter world” of police officers profiled 
underpaid, despised public servants who encountered racism themselves. “The policeman 
feels that the community is not behind him, that the press is generally against him, and 
that he has been abandoned by the courts,” it said.42 Police recruiting had experienced a 
downturn, it claimed, and some officers were quitting; false claims of brutality and 
misplaced blame for ghetto conditions contributed to a climate of cynicism and fear; an 
emphasis on individual rights and civil liberties by the Supreme Court, it argued, came at 
the expense of public safety and respect for men in uniform. Plenty of Americans would 
take issue with an article that sympathized with police more than the impoverished, but 
plenty more focused on respect for the law and punishing criminals agreed with this 
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assessment. A fundamental division in American public life centered on law enforcement 
and its relationship with poor black communities. Were cops just doing their jobs and 
reacting earnestly to lawbreakers, or did their behavior only worsen an already racist 
society that criminalized black behavior and showed little sympathy for lives lost in 
ghettoes? Summer riots demonstrated this debate as one that remained sharply divided, 
often across racial lines.43 
On October 6, Kerner and Lindsay held a joint press conference in Washington to 
update the press on the Commission’s progress and clarify rumors related to the release 
of the interim report, specifically that both men supposedly lobbied for an “accelerated 
timetable” that would move the interim report’s deadline up to December 15 rather than 
President Johnson’s initial March 1 “target date” in order to give Congress “time to 
examine and perhaps implement its recommendations before the beginning of summer, 
when most urban violence usually occurs.”44 The news report also stated that Kerner, 
Lindsay, and Harris wanted to “issue immediate recommendations supporting the major 
elements of [President] Johnson’s urban aid legislation,” but that other commissioners 
had rejected this request on the grounds that it might harm the commission’s “prestige” 
and “credibility” if it “were suddenly to take sides in legislative battles.”45  
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In the briefing, Kerner told the press he could not guarantee a completed interim 
report by mid-December but admitted accelerating deadlines would aid Congress and city 
governments insofar as influencing policymaking and the Johnson administration’s 
program proposals for the following year were concerned. The Commission did not have 
a firm release date for its final report either, according to the chairman, but hoped to 
finish in May or June rather than the July 29, 1968 deadline; it had now completed 12 
days of hearings with 75 witnesses, having most recently heard testimony from mayors of 
six cities as well as experts on social welfare and employment in impoverished areas.46 
“We have listened to the ghetto grievances, the grievances in jobs, the segregation 
difficulty of the Negro community,” Kerner said.47 It had also done extensive research 
and interviews on-location in Newark, Detroit, and Plainfield, among other cities; 
commissioners had visited 8 cities thus far, and staffers remained at work on surveys for 
the “25 to 30” profiles of riot-torn cities.48 Kerner and Lindsay also mentioned the hiring 
of Milan Miskovsky, a 13-year Central Intelligence Agency veteran, as Director of 
Investigations for the Commission, reiterating no evidence of a conspiracy thus far while 
saying it would not be ruled out as fact-finding continued. Both commissioners issued 
strong denials when asked whether the lack of a black militant on the Commission 
reflected an inability to communicate with black militants. 
                                                
46 The most notable part of the mayors’ testimony was Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier calling civil rights 
activist and Catholic priest James Groppi a “white Uncle Tom” who had done a great deal of harm in the 
name of grandstanding and “wanting to get national publicity.” The Wisconsin Democrat also offered a 39-
point plan in his testimony that sought to address the “segregated metropolis” and emphasized that Groppi 
had done more to obstruct that plan than advance it. James Yuenger, “Groppi Called ‘White Uncle Tom’ 
By Mayor,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7, 1967, “Newspaper Clippings Related to Commission,” Box 1, Series 
15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
47 Otto Kerner and John Lindsay, Official Transcript of Before the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, Press Briefing, (Washington D.C.:  A.R.C. Inc., Oct. 6, 1967), 2, “Office of Congressional 
Relations-Clippings,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
48 James Yuenger, “Negro Despair Deep Seated, Kerner Finds,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7, 1967, 
“Honorable Otto Kerner,” Box 1, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 149 
Most notably in the press conference, the governor touched on the feeling of 
inferiority possessed by many ghetto-dwellers in coping with housing and job 
discrimination and inferior educational opportunities. Kerner noted he was only speaking 
for himself—his experiences touring various riot-affected cities and listening to 
testimony—and told the press that the “white community of the United States is not 
aware of the existence of the problem…how deep and sensitive this is…the breadth and 
depth of the problem is greater than I had suspected.”49 Offering the example of when a 
police officer referred to an African American man as “boy,” Kerner observed, “I am 
certain that that policeman would not speak to a white man the same way.”50 Perhaps 
white Americans knew conditions were harsh, he said, but they did not grasp the extent 
of the poverty and desperation; it was up to the media, as well as the Commission, to 
convey the daily struggle of America’s black poor. The interim report would contain 
recommendations for all levels of government and the private sector, offering “a profile 
of the riots—of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and 
effects,” while the long-term recommendations would be withheld until the release of the 
final report and “make [riots] only a sordid page in our history.”51  
On the same day, Ginsburg sent two memos related to the Commission’s interim 
report and timeline for the remainder of the calendar year. The first, sent to all 
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commissioners, sought to finalize a timeline for remaining hearings and work dates. By 
mid-December, the Commission needed to conduct hearings on “possible action 
programs in the areas of employment, education, etc.,” “the role of private enterprise in 
dealing with urban problems,” and the “point of view of conservatives and conservative 
organizations.”52 Its top members also needed to participate in a conference on the role of 
the media and hold “a large number of sessions devoted to revising and acting on drafts 
of the interim report.”53 Ginsburg tentatively listed the second weekend in November for 
the media conference, to be held in Poughkeepsie, New York, and slated November 20 to 
December 16 as time for work sessions on drafts of the interim report. The executive 
director had also notified President Johnson of what prompted the October 6 press 
conference: Mayor Lindsay had held an off-the-record sessions with media members 
prior to a round of commission hearings. The session was supposed to concern the Urban 
Coalition but quickly became about the Kerner Commission and its status. Although 
Lindsay had been forthright to his peers about holding the session, the discussion on the 
Commission’s progress was concerning enough for Ginsburg and Spivak to recommend 
holding a formal press conference. Johnson did not reply to Ginsburg’s memo, but 
Lindsay’s off-the-record meeting likely did little for a relationship with the president that 
was already strained. The following day, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
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Commission could “prod LBJ” in its report, move its original interim date up because “if 
you wait until March, summer is almost on us,” and ultimately remain split on “how 
much spending to propose” in recommendations.54 Making matters worse, the New York 
Daily News ran a story publishing Lindsay’s supposed off-the-record comment that “even 
Mickey Mouse could beat LBJ [in an election] today.”55  
In addition to speculation about the timetable and methodology of its proceedings, 
the Kerner Commission also kept an eye on what was going on in Congress. On October 
9, Ginsburg messaged the newly appointed Miskovsky, observing that “at some stage the 
Commission is bound to be asked to take a position on the major pending bills in the field 
of civil disorders,” specifically bills related to rioting and gun control.56 According to 
Ginsburg, the Commission needed to anticipate the administration’s stance on these bills 
with an eye toward making “recommendations in the interim report or to respond to 
congressional inquiry if we’re solicited for our views.”57 The anti-riot bill Ginsburg 
referred to had passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and was, as of early October, 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. According to an article in the Charleston (WV) 
Mail, liberals serving on the committee had skipped meetings in hopes of killing the bill, 
much to the dismay of committee member and conservative linchpin James Eastland. 
With police officials reportedly telling the judiciary committee that Black Power agitators 
bore much of the responsibility for the riots, Senator Ted Kennedy and others had 
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protested, claiming that it was not the committee’s job to investigate the riots. The Wall 
Street Journal described the committee as a complicated group, with members of “widely 
disparate ideological bent” who were “sitting atop a swirl of bills on riot instigators, gun 
controls, police training, wiretapping, court procedures, and fragments of the 
Administration’s civil rights package.”58 The possibility remained that the committee 
might adjourn before resolving the measures related to rioting. At the same time, 
President Johnson had supposedly “indicated to White House callers he hopes to either 
neutralize this issue or turn it to his advantage by having the riot investigation 
monopolized by his own hand-picked [Kerner] commission.”59 Johnson and his advisers 
knew that “crime on the streets” would be a seminal issue in the upcoming election and 
thus wanted to “avoid having Congress place a glaring spotlight on big-city riots or pass 
the controversial anti-riot bill” opposed by “Attorney General Ramsey Clark, labor 
unions, and civil rights organizations.”60 Delays with the anti-riot bill and McClellan 
investigation were thus political victories for Johnson, who did not particularly trust any 
parties speaking on the riots beyond the commission he had formed and appointed 
himself.  
Planning for the upcoming media conference in Poughkeepsie began in October. 
The conference would bring together media members and commissioners for a weekend 
of candid dialogue on the role of the press in covering riots. Organized by Abram 
Chayes, a Harvard law professor, it would consist of various roundtables through the 
                                                
58 Arlen J. Large, “New Legislation on Crime, Racial Violence Faces Obstacle in Senate Judiciary Unit,” 
The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1967, “Legislation,” Box 5, Series 46, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
59 Robert S. Allen and Paul J. Scott, “Committee Absenteeism Killing Anti-Riot Bill,” Charleston (WV) 
Mail, Oct. 14, 1967, “Legislation,” Box 5, Series 46, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
60 Ibid. 
 153 
weekend, inviting experts to lead the topical discussions and take questions and answers 
after their presentations. Ideally, Chayes wrote to commissioners, Poughkeepsie would 
“permit media representatives to meet with members of the Commission in an 
atmosphere hopefully free of the suspicion and hostility that might otherwise surround 
this kind of inquiry.”61 Commissioners would receive preliminary reports and statistics on 
riots and riot coverage prepared by the Simulatrics Corporation. The company would 
analyze key words and phrases from video tapes, film clips, radio broadcasts, 
newspapers, and magazines, searching for trends and connections related to how the 
media interpreted riot coverage. Invitations to the conference were sent to members of the 
Associated Press, United Press International, New York Times, Newsweek, Washington 
Post, Los Angeles Times, NBC, ABC, and CBS, among other organizations.62 Proposed 
speakers, in addition to those leading newspapers and television and radio networks, 
included Wilkins, Kerner, Lindsay, and Rustin. Commissioners would thus “appraise the 
outlook and problems of the media in race relations and riot coverage with the men who 
do the reporting and make the editorial decisions.”63 Chayes planned to brief the 
commissioners at a dinner meeting on October 23.  
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The memo came just a day after the DOJ’s Office of Media Relations released a 
preliminary report on the news media and racial disorders indicating that the “evidence of 
repeated public opinion polls detailing the misconceptions of whites” on the riots and 
ghetto life indicated “great opportunities for the news media to help focus the attention of 
whites on the facts.”64 The brief report, written by African American Ben Holman, 
himself a former media member, observed that “many white people were deceived by the 
progress reported,” failing to realize that many African Americans were not even second-
class citizens.65 It posed the question of whether reporting on riots worsened conflicts as 
well as whether the public’s right to know outweighed the potential to exacerbate 
situations. It also compared Detroit, where the media withheld reporting on the rioting 
initially, with Newark, where news of the violence broke almost immediately. “There is 
clear evidence, and not from the Detroit moratorium alone, that this kind of voluntary 
restraint in the early stages, when there is some doubt as to the extent of the violence, can 
be of benefit to the community,” Holman’s report stated.66 The ex-journalist contrasted 
the two cities’ preparation, saying that in Newark, “newsmen had cause to wonder who 
were more hostile—the rioters or law enforcement officials,” whereas Detroit had a 
“prior conceived plan for handling the news media in the event of civil disaster” that 
went “quickly and efficiently into operation.”67  
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The report also criticized some sources for what it perceived as “covering the 
disturbance as if they were war correspondents attached to a conquering army.”68 Detroit 
reports “tended less to view the whole black community as a massive segment of the city 
in rebellion,” but those on the ground in Newark misguidedly gave “the impression that it 
was simply a battle of ‘good guys’ in blues and fatigues against hordes of black snipers, 
bombers, and looters.”69 Training and advance procedures for every medium were 
critical, according to the release; it challenged the media to avoid recklessly spreading 
rumors and convey “the underlying causes of the dilemma and what must be done to 
resolve it” rather than simply chronicling the “fears and discomforts of whites caused by 
Negroes.”70 The question of “who speaks for minorities,” Holman argued, was “aired but 
not resolved” in news coverage.71 The assessment not only reiterated claims of a racial 
disconnect—in this case, related to news coverage—tied to the perils of reporting on a 
violent, nebulous conflict, it also offered a preview of potential topics for commissioners 
and media members to discuss at the upcoming conference.   
 On October 17 and 18, staffers monitored a conference focusing on mass media 
and race relations held at Columbia University. The conference was not affiliated with 
the Kerner Commission but offered a preview of some of the chief talking points that 
would surface in Poughkeepsie. Among the points of contention was how the “white 
press” could fairly cover all-black ghettoes. According to a memo from Alvin Spivak 
summarizing the conference at Columbia, attendees reached a consensus that the press 
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“must begin to cover [the ghettoes] with trained, expert reporters on a continuing day-to-
day basis instead of only in times of crisis and extreme success or failures.”72 The notion 
of when to cover riots, trust issues between ghetto residents and reporters due to a general 
ignorance of ghetto life and conditions, and the role of African American outlets going 
forward resonated with Spivak and fellow staffers determined to craft meaningful 
dialogue for their own event.73 The conference, attended by representatives from various 
media outlets as well as civil rights organizations and federal agencies, offered harsh, 
sweeping criticism for much of the media’s riot coverage but noted that the Washington 
Post and New York Times had exceptional reporters who examined riots critically rather 
than sensationalizing.  
At Commission headquarters, Kerner’s assistant, Kyran McGrath, sent his boss a 
memo expressing concerns over the role of commissioners in writing an interim report. 
McGrath described the “recurring discontent” among commissioners, specifically over 
receiving the interim report “at the eleventh hour, in time for them to add a few token 
paragraphs, but not in time to make any substantial alterations without jeopardizing the 
entire product.”74 The schedule, he said, would not leave time for constructive feedback. 
According to McGrath, “Dave [Ginsburg] and Vic [Palmieri] have left themselves open 
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to the allegation that the White House is writing the report, because they have left little 
time for the commissioners to do it themselves.”75 Ginsburg and Palmieri had not only 
written the interim report, he said, they had generally steered clear of the special 
assistants for each commissioner, a decision that “reflected their attitude toward the 
commissioners” to “keep them busy and out of the way of writing the report.”76 McGrath 
implied that during the time allotted for commissioners to give feedback to Ginsburg and 
Palmieri, the executive director spent so much time talking that commissioners found 
difficulty interjecting. He also expressed concern over the “quality of the factual results” 
from the research trips to the 26 cities; failure to run the statistics by academics or other 
experts, he feared, could discredit the report and cause the commissioners “to suffer 
along with the hopes of the public.”77 Palmieri had supposedly expressed a desire to 
improve communications with the commissioners, but tension over who had the final say 
in articulating the Kerner Commission’s stance remained. In an October 15 memo to 
commissioners seeking to finalize the work program through December, Ginsburg 
announced planned open sessions for commissioners to meet with staff as well as “lunch 
meetings with only one or two staffers to promote freer exchange among commissioners 
only.”78  
On October 17, James Corman sent Ginsburg a four-page memo outlining his 
hopes for the Commission’s forthcoming interim report. Many of the congressman’s 
requests repeated material from public declarations and private discussions on a concise 
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report that offered multiple points of view while reducing the chances of future conflicts. 
The report, he stated, needed to “establish the credibility of the Commission itself in the 
eyes of both the white and Negro communities,” adding that without “this credibility, the 
final report will be of little value.”79 Corman wanted a cogent report that the average 
American could read—and understand—without “devoting more than a day to the 
effort.”80  It needed to “fully and fairly explain the causes of Negro grievance” while also 
“reassuring the nation of our determination to maintain public order.”81 Slavery and its 
“corrosive effects” needed to be a centerpiece of the report, he said, given that the 
institution continued to separate and degrade African Americans 100 years after 
emancipation, but commissioners should not “condone or encourage” the violent 
solutions that “pose a substantial barrier to opening the minds of whites to constructive 
solutions.”82 Those advocating violence represented “growing desperation,” not the 
“genuine desires” of black communities across the country.83  
While white America no longer had the right or control to say who spoke for the 
black community, how white America responded—or did not respond, Corman noted—to 
black leadership was crucial to evaluating urban issues and producing solutions. He 
referred to the pages of testimony in the first two-and-a-half months of the Commission 
that spoke to the “appalling ignorance among white Americans concerning current 
conditions in urban ghettoes.”84 Corman suggested photographs or personal narratives 
instead of statistics to convey the destitution, telling Ginsburg it “is essential that the 
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Commission be brutally honest in this regard.”85 These methods would give a “day in the 
life” glimpse that directly answered what Corman framed as the primary question many 
white Americans had related to the riots: “What do the Negroes want now? We’ve given 
them everything.”86 The report needed to address this line of thinking directly, he said. It 
also needed a nuanced profile of law and law enforcement. Americans had to understand 
that while police faced “an extraordinarily complex and delicate job” in inner cities with 
“woefully inadequate support from the public,” courts and law were historically “more 
often the ‘enemy’ of the Negro rather than his ‘friend.’”87 The memo made the 
congressman’s stance on riots and their solutions quite clear; anything less than an 
honest, reasoned evaluation in the interim risked losing the support of both the general 
public and those in power.  
During several speaking engagements in October, fellow commissioner Katherine 
Graham Peden staked out a more conservative position than Corman on the riots and their 
solutions. At a press conference in Louisville, she told an audience that “in the ghetto the 
attitude seems to be one of destruction for any organization…this is a very strange 
phenomenon,” promising that the Kerner Commission would not release a “staid, old-
fashioned government report.”88 In St. Paul, she told a Business and Professional 
Women’s Association that the commission’s work was akin to “putting together a type of 
crossword puzzle” and noted that based on testimony thus far poverty was “a matter of 
both black and white rather than just the Negro poor...there’s a very striking similarity 
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between the problems of the ghetto poor and the rural poor.”89 She reiterated this stance 
at the Cincinnati Business and Women’s Club, saying that regardless of race, “the 
poverty of one is the concern of all.”90 Peden recognized that the relationship between 
citizens and law enforcement was complicated—most rioters did not have respect for 
authority, but felt this way on an institutional rather than an individual basis, she claimed. 
She often spoke on behalf of women’s issues, claiming that women had a critical role to 
play in halting future riots, and said that improving employment and educational 
opportunities were important steps to prevent future disturbances. Among the 
commissioners, however, she was one of the firmest advocates of law and order, a 
position she had honed as a “get-tough” commerce commissioner in her native Kentucky. 
She had received high marks for stimulating job growth in her home state, particularly in 
the poorer areas of Appalachia. Curbing unemployment and launching “an industrial 
blitzkrieg” in Kentucky that yielded 140,000 new jobs led to the former radio station 
manager receiving a phone call from the White House.91 She remained resolute in 
fighting lawlessness, but eye-opening tours of riot-affected cities had softened her stance 
to an extent; a tour of Detroit had prompted her to compare it to East Berlin in World 
War II, and she spoke more of solutions beyond the hard-nosed, law-and-order rhetoric 
espoused upon appointment.  
Rumors swirled among the national press in a relatively quiet period for the 
Kerner Commission. A Washington Post article reported that the commission intended to 
                                                
89 “Civil Disorder Panel Pushing to Finish Job,” Minneapolis Star, Oct. 20, 1967, “Katherine Graham 
Peden,” Box 1, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX; Carol Rolloff, “Disorder is Called 
Women’s Problem, St. Paul (MN) Pioneer Press, Oct. 20, 1967, “Katherine Graham Peden,” Box 1, Series 
39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
90 “Kentuckian Asks Unity of Effort,” Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 21, 1967, “Katherine Graham Peden,” Box 
1, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
91 “How Katie Makes Kentucky Grow,” Business Week, Sept. 9, 1967, “Katherine Graham Peden,” Box 1, 
Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 161 
link extreme right-wing and left-wing factions in its assessment of the riots, including 
unsubstantiated reports of right-leaning fanatics in Detroit who intended to “finance the 
racial holocaust” to discredit George Romney.92 Commission staffers were allegedly 
combing through tapes of newscasts amid tips from an informant that television crews 
“sometimes faked sensational scenes and provocative interviews in order to collect 
bonuses which reportedly were offered for footage shown on the news shows.”93 Those 
touring riot-affected areas were reportedly convinced that “both the left and the right 
wingers tried to exploit Negro desperation for their own political purposes.”94  
A Los Angeles Times piece claimed the Kerner Commission and the Senate 
investigation on the riots chaired by McClellan might have “sharply different impacts on 
public opinion.”95 Whereas the Kerner Commission sought to unearth the social, 
economic, and psychological factors surrounding rioting in America, the Senate 
subcommittee’s investigation seemed “destined to focus on agitators and law breakers 
and other sensational aspects of the riots, relegating to the background the underlying 
causes of ghetto unrest.”96 The Kerner Commission had private hearings and largely 
guarded data that it would eventually submit to the public, while the Senate 
subcommittee planned to conduct televised public hearings beginning November 1 that 
were “likely to have far greater impact on public opinion than the considered findings set 
forth in the subcommittee’s final report.”97 Although the emphasis of the investigation 
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centered on law and order and the subcommittee’s more conservative members, the final 
report would “likely reflect the views of the liberal-moderate wing of the subcommittee 
which could in a policy showdown outvote McClellan and other subcommittee 
conservatives.”98 However McClellan’s group decided to word its report and diagnose the 
rioters, they had neither the time, nor the funding, nor the broad interest in their 
examination that the Kerner Commission did, thus there was a limitation on the reach of 
their final report. Although the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee was 
unlikely to match the “emotional, visceral force” of the Kerner Commission’s final 
submission, concern remained that McClellan’s report might make commission 
recommendations to secure federal aid more difficult.99  
The Commission’s final round of hearings for the month, which focused in part 
on “the role of the private sector in meeting the problems of the inner city,” took place on 
October 23 and 24.100 In addition to a list of banking, real estate, and manufacturing 
executives, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty were among the 
prominent speakers in these sessions.  King, who would soon head to Birmingham to 
serve a five-day jail sentence stemming from defying an order not to march in the famed 
Birmingham Campaign of 1963, called for a civil rights camp-in to protest conditions in 
American slums. “The time has come to camp right here in Washington if we can’t get 
something done,” he told commissioners before proposing a $20 billion per year program 
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that would “provide jobs, wipe out slums, improve schooling and set up a guaranteed 
income system.”101 Ignoring the problems, he claimed, risked additional violence, but he 
also continued to tout a nonviolent approach for the camp-in; “I don’t think we 
accomplish anything by burning the city down,” he said.102 The camp-ins were an 
alternative to the shorter, nonviolent citizen protests that had embodied student activism 
within the civil rights movement earlier in the decade. King envisioned tents set up by 
activists with the intention of blocking traffic and entrances to federal buildings. The goal 
was a “middle road between riots and peaceful supplication,” according to King, who 
reiterated his criticisms of the Vietnam War and stated he did not expect any meaningful 
progress in slums as long as the war was the first priority.103 Yorty’s testimony focused 
on industry’s move to the suburbs, rendering the inner city as “home of the poor, 
nonwhite, unskilled, undereducated, unstable and unhealthy.”104 The mayor suggested 
incentives for industries to stay in cities, including increased public funding for urban 
industrial parks and federally guaranteed loans to businesses that moved back from the 
suburbs.  
As October testimony came to a close, the commission also released portions of 
witness testimony from its September hearings. Garnering particular attention was the 
testimony of Ernie Chambers, a Nebraska-based black activist who did not mince words 
when he spoke with commissioners. The self-described “Omaha barber” vented to 
officials that African Americans had “marched, we have cried, we have prayed, we have 
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voted, we have petitioned, we have been good little boys and girls…We have done every 
possible thing to make this white man recognize us as human beings, and he refuses.”105 
Chambers, whom accounts said became increasingly emotional as he spoke, continued: 
“You can understand why Jews who were burned by the Nazis hated Germans, but you 
can’t understand why black people who have been systematically murdered by the 
government and its agents…you can’t understand why they hate white people.”106 He 
directed his ire specifically at law enforcement, branding police as “an object of 
contempt” and a “paid and hired murderer” who preyed on “black people doing ordinary, 
reasonable, peaceful things in this country.”107 Beyond racist police who were never held 
accountable “no matter what violence [they commit] against a black person,” Chambers 
identified public schools as complicit in reinforcing racial hierarchies.108 Black children, 
he told commissioners, were taught to “respect authority” and “teach him his place” in 
the world.109 “I wasn’t born with the attitudes I have now,” Chambers told 
commissioners, adding that they were “put in me by Crackers…I sat through [as it was 
being read in class] Little Black Sambo, and since I was the only black face in the room, I 
became Little Black Sambo.”110 Others had articulated Chambers’ worldview in various 
publications and before the commission, but few had offered such charged rhetoric; that 
this rhetoric was now public knowledge only amplified the commission’s research and 
ultimate task.  
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As the commission heard such incendiary testimony in its closed-door hearings, it 
continued to monitor H. Rap Brown and search for possible evidence of conspiracy. The 
Commission’s recently hired Director of Investigations Mike Miskovsky relayed that 
according to sources being corroborated by the FBI, Brown was affiliated with a group in 
Detroit that had constructed an armored vehicle and shipped it to a barn in Selma, 
Alabama. The IRS planned to put the barn under surveillance; a similar investigation 
honed in on one of Brown’s major funding sources in Chicago, identified as a woman 
named Lucy Montgomery. The Commission relayed all of this information to Califano, 
who sent it on to the desk of President Johnson.  
At the same time, it kept tabs on the field activity of McClellan’s investigation; 
officials involved with the investigation had opened offices in Newark and Detroit earlier 
in the month and developed a reputation for aggression and relentlessness in fact-finding. 
Vick French, an aide of Senator Harris, reported on details of the subcommittee’s 
investigation. McClellan’s investigators had also examined summer riots in Houston and 
Nashville.  In Nashville, they had “what they regard as hard evidence of communist 
background among some of the rioters and those who helped investigate the riots.”111 The 
memo also referred to speeches Carmichael had made there and an affiliation with noted 
radicals Carl and Anne Braden as having an influence on the riots. Houston did not have 
the same direct Communist involvement, but the subcommittee targeted Office of 
Economic Opportunity funds used to hire members of SNCC, characterized pejoratively 
as “a black nationalist organization.”112 In both cities, employees of the OEO had been 
involved in the rioting itself; French noted that “Chairman McClellan clearly intends to 
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use this fact to castigate the poverty program.”113 Brown and Carmichael were 
“Communist sympathizers” who had “visited Cuba, North Korea, and Red China…thus 
clearly implying that nationally, at least, SNCC is both Communist-led and has 
committed something bordering on treason.”114 The classified information seemed to 
confirm what many involved with the Kerner Commission suspected all along: that 
McClellan’s investigation was more interested in smearing left-wing activists and the 
Democratic administration by linking them to an American adversary than it was in 
seriously addressing any of the ghetto conditions that caused violence. Writing to 
commission staff members, Kyran McGrath said he was “fearful that some of our reports, 
interim or otherwise, might contain a list of chronology different from sworn testimony 
received at Senator McClellan’s public hearings.”115 The discrepancy, he noted, “could 
be used to discredit the validity of other sections of our report,” thus he recommended 
staff members attend the public hearings in order to “cross-check” testimony with the 
information at commission headquarters.116   
On October 28, Ginsburg forwarded to the commissioners a section from the 
Crime Commission report on police-community relations. The 19-member commission, 
formed by President Johnson and consisting primarily of law professors, had released its 
report in February 1967 and concluded that the 1965 Watts riots “expressed the 
increasing conviction of Negroes that legal methods of protest have not accomplished 
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enough fast enough.”117 They were the “manifestation of a general sense of deep outrage, 
outrage at every aspect of the lives Negroes forced to live, outrage at every element of the 
White community in forcing Negroes to live such lives.”118 The section concluded with 
familiar requests for holding police accountable in instances of brutality, improving 
housing and schools, and ending job discrimination, in addition to the broader 
“psychological deprivation” that came with living in the ghetto.119 Ginsburg did not offer 
details on why he sent this section of the Crime Commission’s report to his own 
commissioners, but results from a recent meeting with social scientists who studied racial 
attitudes in America evoked the sentiments on police-community relations from 
February. The meeting reiterated that Watts was a “black-white confrontation” in the 
minds of those African Americans polled at the time.  
Another survey referenced sought to quantify the “dissatisfaction index” of race 
relations in American life based on 1000 respondents and 30 to 40 “opinion leaders.”120 
Survey participants hailed from San Francisco, Cleveland, and Houston; the results of the 
attitude survey were then compared to the Crime Commission’s post-riot evaluation of 
Watts. Among those contacted, “only 9 percent of whites believed police brutality existed 
compared with 40 percent of the Negroes.”121 Researchers posited that “the ghetto prefers 
massive denial to insincere acknowledgement” of problems because it was “easier to deal 
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with an obvious enemy.”122 Respondents also articulated that integration “was not a 
prime goal in and of itself.”123 Jobs, housing, and education all “rated more important” 
for African Americans than did sharing space with white people.124 Those attending the 
social scientist meeting added that while another national survey of attitudes among 
whites and blacks would not necessarily aid individual cities, it could still be useful and 
might illuminate “how whites can be taught to distinguish between disorder and 
legitimate grievances.”125  Despite the fact that one source had its origins prior to the 
1967 riots and the other stemmed from very recent dialogue, the message in both, as it 
pertained to the Kerner Commission and its goals, was quite clear: realizing fully the 
extent of alienation in American ghettoes and determining how to convey such alienation 
to a resistant or ignorant white readership.  
Following up the issue from weeks prior concerning the commissioners’ influence 
on the interim report, McGrath wrote to Kerner on October 30 indicating that Ginsburg 
and Palmieri seemed more willing to let commissioners be directly involved. He had 
informed some within the staff hierarchy of the “weaknesses of the team trip reports.”126 
McGrath also disclosed that at an October 23 dinner meeting following a day of hearings, 
a discussion on the Poughkeepsie conference “ended abruptly” after several 
commissioners “took issue with its location, format, invitees, and the general way it was 
handled without their being given a chance to offer suggestions before the final version 
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was announced.”127 In another instance, staff members conducting field research in 
Detroit were introduced to commissioners; the commissioners proceeded to grill the 
staffers, asking, “are we to look to these field trips for hard facts?”128 The incidents 
rekindled the tension that had existed between commissioners and staffers from the 
outset. “Since that night, there’s been a marked change in attitude toward the special 
assistants, and toward trying to learn the attitudes of the commissioners before major 
steps are taken,” McGrath told his boss.129 Peden and Corman had also approached him 
and said they believed Kerner and Lindsay were advising Ginsburg, which left them 
“somewhat disappointed at not being consulted.”130 When McGrath replied that Ginsburg 
and Palmieri were calling the shots, the commissioners restated their desire to “reclaim 
the leadership in the drafting of the reports.”131 Most importantly, McGrath told Kerner, 
commissioners now allotted time to hold discussions without the staff present, having 
“learned their lesson in time to salvage a meaningful interim report.”132  
Ginsburg’s Halloween update to the commission on the progress of research and 
field research programs emphasized the massive undertaking that the Kerner 
Commission’s work entailed. The White House wanted national recommendations that 
could aid in future legislative action, and the Commission was using “to the maximum 
possible extent the existing resources of the federal government.”133 The executive 
director then reeled off an exhaustive list of details: congressional relations sources, 
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federal and state agencies, multiple state disorder commissions, external consultants, and 
staffers both in-house in Washington and in the field were all consulted. Field teams in 
each of 35 cities sought a chronology of events and the factors that led to individual 
disorders in a given city for a “national perspective” on the riots.134 Separate studies 
focused on crowd behavior and leadership structures; Ginsburg observed that in the field, 
it became apparent to staff members that “only Negroes would be able to obtain 
information from residents in ghetto areas,” affirming the deep distrust of white America 
among the urban poor.135 Other program studies looked at conspiracy, community 
attitudes, and how particular cities were organized. Congressional relations staffers 
worked on position papers on how programs might be “initiated, altered, or improved” to 
alleviate social and economic conditions without massive expenditures, working under 
the assumption that neither the White House, nor Congress, nor the general public would 
express interest in spending more federal dollars on inner cities and that tax incentives 
could potentially compel private participation.136 Combined with hundreds of hours of 
testimony from witnesses and tours of cities by each city, an interim report, distilled 
down into a cogent document that fairly considered the views of commissioners, staff, 
and witnesses, was a daunting task. With the staff and commissioners taking on such 
different roles, disputes over who had the final say were perhaps inevitable.  
More details surfaced on the Commission’s plan for the interim report by October 
31 as well. The Washington Post ran a story outlining the commission’s plans for training 
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seminars for mayors and city department heads regarding slums, riot prevention, and 
improving performance when riots did arise. According to the article, the commission 
had “sent President Johnson a private recommendation” asserting that city and municipal 
authorities were more to blame for riots than officials at the federal level; the staff would 
conduct the in-depth studies and cross sections of various cities, and the final 
recommendations would be left up to the commissioners themselves. Sources also 
claimed the interim report would highlight “police relations with the minority community 
as the ‘precipitating cause’ for almost every riot,” with broad recommendations to 
overhaul jobs, housing, and education at the federal, state, and local levels.137  The 
strained relationship between African Americans and police was cause for concern on its 
own, but it was especially problematic when contrasted with the largely peaceful 
interactions that suburbanites had with the same officers. The commission would 
reportedly attempt to convince the general public that the riots were not random, 
unpredictable spates of violence, but rather natural reactions from disillusioned 
communities.  
The New York Times, meanwhile, ran a similar story, noting that “the panel 
generally feels that white America must be convinced that Negro riots are not simply 
senseless acts of violence but rather a complicated response” to the failings of local 
governments nationwide.138 As evidence for this contention, the commission would 
reportedly emphasize Pittsburgh and St. Louis, two cities that had “escaped serious 
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violence” due to local power structures—government, along with business and civic 
groups—that were “responsive to many of the needs of local Negroes.”139 In contrast, 
officials in cities like Detroit and Newark supposedly had issues providing “community 
services” and remaining in “close communication” with the urban poor prior to the 
riots.140 The articles were the public’s most in-depth glance at the Commission’s inner 
workings in its three-month existence.  
As October drew to a close, Jenkins wrote to Ginsburg reflecting on the past 
month’s progress and what lay ahead. “I believe that above all else, the commission’s 
report must attempt to clarify the ‘why’ of the summer violence and vigorously 
recommend alternative courses of action which will prevent a recurrence of disorders,” 
wrote the Atlanta Police Chief, referencing an extended discussion the two had at a 
luncheon days earlier.141 The commission’s interim report, he wrote, needed to 
underscore how the population migration from the rural South to the urban North had 
yielded “people totally unprepared for city living…the great majority of these people are 
unskilled, uneducated, and most are Negroes.”142 Jenkins treaded familiar ground when 
referencing the housing segregation African Americans still endured in cities like 
Chicago and Detroit, which resulted in neighborhoods full of crime, poverty, 
unemployment, and health problems. “I believe if the commission could communicate 
the real feelings of desperation of the American Negro to the American white, half the 
problem would be solved,” Jenkins wrote.143 This would entail a “massive rebuilding 
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program in our cities financed by the federal government,” a concerted effort to answer 
the millions of African Americans who believed the white suburbs had left them 
behind.144 Jenkins also included standard rhetoric about maintaining law and order, but 
his impassioned note to the executive director to address ghetto ills in a meaningful 
way—a note coming from a high-ranking police executive in a major metropolitan area 
in the South—spoke to the effect testimony and research had on commissioners. Whether 
Ginsburg and Jenkins’ colleagues would heed his call, however, was to be determined.  
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November 1967 
 
 A November 1 Washington Post editorial cartoon depicted a man in an overcoat 
and a pork pie hat, hurriedly walking past an African American mother and her two 
children. In the man’s left hand was a briefcase labeled “Senate Investigation of Riots.”1 
He told the woman, whose tattered dress bore a “Slum Problems” tag, “One side, Lady—
We’re Looking For A Conspiracy.”2 Based on the activity of the Senate’s riot 
investigation thus far, the cartoon’s assertion—that the Senate Permanent Investigation 
Subcommittee’s goal was unearthing a conspiracy rather than the truth about ghettoes—
was a difficult one to refute.  
Having searched for the roots of conspiracy since its inception, the Senate 
subcommittee’s hearings in Houston, Texas, in early November seeking to link the 
previous spring’s Texas Southern University (TSU) riots to SNCC radicals and workers 
on the Office of Economic Opportunity’s (OEO) payroll came as no surprise. Chairman 
John McClellan had told the press that the investigation sought to determine “whether the 
outbreaks were spontaneous or if they were instigated and precipitated by the calculated 
design of agitators, militants, or lawless elements.”3 Anyone familiar with the chairman, a 
conservative, ardent anti-Communist who did not see eye-to-eye with the Johnson 
Administration, had little doubt as to which way he and his allies on the subcommittee 
would lean. The portrait that emerged at hearings in Texas was of a campus overrun by 
radicals and inspired by a Stokely Carmichael speech to act violently and aggressively. 
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Houston police official M. L. Singleton told investigators that the TSU militants sought 
to incite riots and had summer plans to continue the violence. In May rumors had spread 
of a little girl being shot, and chaos on the TSU campus had proceeded from there. 
McClellan himself pressed the notion that the riot occurred because police had hesitated 
to act against campus radicals, asking one witness, “You mean that this hard-core group, 
this SNCC, actually took over the administration of the campus and so disrupted it that it 
could not operate in normal way?”4 The witness confirmed McClellan’s suspicion, and 
the Arkansas senator scolded the “weak law enforcement” that had freed brick-tossing, 
Molotov-cocktail-hurling students “who publicly advocate violence” without pressing 
charges.5  
A campus climate described as “too dangerous” and “too inflammatory” had also 
dissuaded students from coming forward to identify the instigators. Houston Mayor Louie 
Welch testified that OEO members were “fomenting racial unrest” and that the 
subversive, Communist-sponsored W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America had advised SNCC 
members on campus prior to the riot. Contrary to previous claims that the OEO had hired 
militants and agitators to help them participate in constructive activities, the Senate 
investigation gravitated toward claims that those hired had promoted a Black Power 
agenda. “It is a sad commentary on law and order today; instead of arresting them, you 
give them jobs on taxpayers’ money…It’s kind of sickening when these kinds of things 
happen and nobody gets punished,” McClellan said.6  The following week, Nashville 
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Mayor Beverly Briley told investigators that a similar type of riot at Fisk University arose 
from troublemaking outside agitators preaching “a hatred for white people in general.”7 
As was the case in the TSU riot, the OEO had ties to militants who had spent time on 
Fisk’s campus, a connection investigators and witnesses eagerly pointed out during the 
proceedings. In both Houston and Nashville, the investigation—much the same as with 
the James Eastland-led Senate Internal Security Subcommittee investigation—had no use 
for the source of black frustration, only the Communist and conspiratorial forces behind 
it; linking those forces to Johnsonian programs and liberalism more broadly would play 
to a conservative base eager to punish rioters and restore order.8  
The Kerner Commission, meanwhile, maintained its low profile and deliberate 
approach to its own riot investigation. On November 2 the Commission issued a press 
release declaring that “any prediction about what the commission will or will not include 
in its report is speculative and premature.”9 The statement came in response to rumors 
that commissioners intended to blame city governments; they had, according to the 
statement, “arrived at no such conclusion.”10 Only when they had gathered all their 
evidence, heard all the testimony, and combed through all the relevant information would 
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the commission consider conclusions on the summertime riots. Thus far, it had only made 
two public recommendations: those related to diversity and training in the National Guard 
in August, and the Justice Department–sponsored seminars for law enforcement officials 
on police-community relations. A November 1 release by the DOJ outlined plans for the 
seminars, which intended to focus on, among other subjects, “techniques for controlling 
disorders, joint operations involving different police jurisdictions and the military, and 
police-community relations.”11 The release quoted President Johnson as saying that the 
conferences, sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, would make 
“maximum use of the skills and experience gained by several agencies of the 
government, and of local officials who have been successful in preventing or controlling 
civil disorders.”12   
Beyond these two on-the-record recommendations, the Kerner Commission’s 
research and leanings remained a mystery to the general public. A Providence (RI) 
Bulletin article claimed that the Commission would adopt a “defeatist attitude” and 
hesitate to propose “ambitious programs it believes Congress cannot or will not enact.”13 
In Washington, closed-door testimony continued and staffers prepared for the mid-
November 10-12 media conference in Poughkeepsie, N.Y. Members also monitored the 
upcoming elections across the country; The New York Times claimed that besides 
Vietnam, “the pressure of unmet urban needs is likely to be the dominant issue in 
1968…the bid for power by Negro voters in the Northern cities may tear apart the 
complex coalition that has been the basis of Democratic Party power for 35 years,” a 
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coalition that the president was “relying on for victory next year.”14 Of particular note 
were African American candidates in several mayoral races whose campaigns would 
likely test the strength of the New Deal coalition, namely the loyalty of white working-
class voters who had soured on the party’s steadfast commitment to racial issues.  
The White House, for its part, seemed relatively unbowed by the concerns over 
disorder and forthcoming elections. According to a Wall Street Journal article, Johnson 
and his close advisers had a “magic formula” to stymie riots going forward and were 
keenly aware that “’68 re-election prospects could be as seriously threatened by U.S. 
cities as by prolonged violence in Vietnam.”15 As Congress prepared to vote on whether 
or not to slash antipoverty funding, the Administration found itself strapped and 
contending with the waning optimism over “glowing Johnsonian promises” in slums.16 
Despite Vice President Humphrey’s previous calls for a domestic Marshall Plan, the 
combination of spending questions, a “tax increase in limbo,” and “inflation at the door” 
resulted in Johnson making it “perfectly plain that there could not be a new massive 
federal commitment.”17 Officials needed to offer job training for young black males 
within the existing framework of programs while simultaneously crafting a riot 
prevention plan that was not, as had been the case the previous year, a “grab-bag of 
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assorted programs hastily assembled in late winter and early spring.”18 Lastly, in addition 
to its efforts to placate and employ idle youths, Johnson’s team had to maintain 
surveillance on black militants, a task that had proven more difficult than anticipated to 
that point.  
Academics that the Kerner Commission had contacted reinforced the notion that 
hope had faltered in many American slums and that the forthcoming months were crucial 
for rectifying this sentiment. “Right now we’re at the crossroads,” said Terry Knopf of 
the Brandeis University Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence. Knopf added that 
“only a reasonable commitment to alleviate legitimate grievances of Negroes, only a 
complete reshuffling of national priorities, can avert impending disaster.”19 As levels of 
resentment grew in the ghettoes, white obliviousness remained as well. Knopf pointed to 
the “lack of information for whites as to how Negroes feel and the inability of our 
institutions to meet the need for change.”20 In a reply to a query from staffer Louise 
Sagalyn, Boston University Professor Howard Zinn took a more drastic stance. Zinn 
wrote to Sagalyn that the Commission should make an effort to avoid framing its 
recommendations in terms of control, arguing that “the very concentration on ‘control’ is 
in itself one of the grievances of the ghetto, where the presence of police reinforced by 
soldiers is tantamount to occupation by a foreign army.”21 He offered two measures that 
he acknowledged would encounter resistance: that police cease using firearms entirely, 
and a withdrawal of centralized police control in cities in favor of “letting the ghetto set 
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up its own law enforcement system.”22 The radical transformation Zinn proposed entailed 
“billions of dollars for each major city in the country,” but he reasoned that the 
government could implement this policy and the benefits it would create by reversing the 
order of “70 billions for arms and two billions for poverty.”23 Half measures, Zinn told 
Sagayln, concealed the depth of the problem, and thus were worse than no measures at 
all. He offered harsh closing words for Kerner and his colleagues, stating that unless “the 
Commission bursts out of the frame in which it was created, and challenges the national 
government to reverse its priority system…its report will be another long, tedious, mildly 
interesting document, to be filed away and forgotten.”24 While his proposals were entirely 
unrealistic, the alarmist rhetoric he and Knopf offered spoke to the need to address urban 
ghetto issues beyond platitudes and the status quo.25 
Not everyone within Kerner Commission ranks believed the organization had 
addressed these issues in earnest. On November 6, staffer Charles King sent his letter of 
resignation to David Ginsburg. In his letter, King deemed the policy precluding staffers 
from examining ongoing crises as “totally inconsistent with the hopes and aspirations that 
concerned citizens have” and declared the Commission’s “failure…to make this policy 
publicly clear….regrettable.”26 King also mentioned the lack of hearings held in the 
ghetto, which he argued did not provide “adequate channels for grievances” for the 
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“black John Doe” the Commission sought to assist.27 For King, who had worked on staff 
as a program analyst, a Commission tasked with investigating riots excluded the voice of 
the average rioter at its peril. He criticized the “intense secrecy and tension” in 
Commission ranks, particularly in contrast to the McClellan’s investigation’s highly 
publicized smear campaign.28 “As our Commission works in silence, the ‘subversive’ 
emphasis placed on the current Senate hearings will leave ghetto residents to resent the 
type of one-sided exposure and ask…why the President’s Commission is not active in the 
public hearing area?” he told Ginsburg.29 Memos among Kerner Commission staffers 
raised the question of whether King had confidential commission documents that he 
intended to sell to the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel. When confronted, King denied that 
he had taken the documents from the commission—he claimed he had obtained them 
while attending a Black Power Conference—and was informed that stealing property that 
belonged to the commission left him subject to criminal prosecution. King was scheduled 
to speak publicly in Wisconsin, but there was no indication he planned on bringing up his 
time working for the commission. “What we do about this one, I don’t know,” Merle 
McCurdy wrote to his peers.30  
King’s departure hardly affected day-to-day operations in Washington, but his 
critique and alliances spoke to a potential pitfall for the commission: the risk of losing the 
ghetto’s trust with both guardedness and a lack of diversity. Playing it safe could 
ultimately make final recommendations ring hollow. There was no evidence of 
                                                
27Ibid.; Jean M. White, “Civil Disorders Adviser Quits in Dispute Over Gary,” The Washington Post, Nov. 
8, 1967, A3, “Reaction: Pre-Report,” Box 4, Series 39, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
28 King to Ginsburg, Nov. 6, 1967, “Personnel-Charles King,” Box 1, Series 47, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ 
Library, Austin, TX. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Merle McCurdy to Staff, “Charles King,” Nov. 15, 1967, “Personnel-Charles King,” Box 1, Series 47, 
NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 182 
commissioners or high-ranking staffers discussing King’s letter, but the reasoning for his 
resignation spoke to a burgeoning black consciousness surrounding the Kerner 
Commission’s endeavor that perhaps even the most educated white staffer or 
commissioner had difficulty grasping. The Johnson Administration continued to endure 
its share of criticism on addressing ghetto problems as well. In early November, the 
White House released a report prepared by the Departments of Labor and Commerce that 
rosily touted “signs of great improvement” in the emergence of the black middle class. 
Johnson said that the report “does not confirm the diagnosis of bleakness and despair, 
that there has been no progress for Negroes in America,” and that it also did not “confirm 
the opposite view: that Negroes have been given too much.”31 Statistics in the report 
pointed to an increase in household income for non-white families compared to 1947 and 
1960, respectively. With financial success, however, came migration from non-white 
families out of the slums, making areas already socially and economically depressed even 
worse.  
A November 7 article in the Washington Post levied harsh criticism at both the 
report and the Johnson Administration, claiming that the findings demonstrated that the 
Administration “lacks the intellectual capacity to frame a coherent strategy for dealing 
with what has been recognized for years as this country’s principal internal problem.”32 
For both the Kerner Commission and the man who created it, doubt from both political 
sides continued over what constituted an adequate response to the riots and whether a 
final report or Johnson and his advisers would chart anything other than a middling 
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course. This course signaled a problem for Johnson, as Commission research had also 
indicated that many urban poor “preferred massive denial to insincere acknowledgement 
since it is easier to deal with an obvious enemy.”33 The sense that Johnson’s entire 
agenda consisted of politically motivated half measures thus threatened the goodwill he 
had generated with the Great Society.  
Election day provided mixed reviews nationally on which party had political 
momentum heading into 1968. Although mayoral races in several cities yielded victories 
for black candidates, local and state elections also “produced a powerful undercurrent of 
white discontent over urban violence and Negro progress in society, even though the 
‘white backlash’ did not altogether carry the day.”34 Cleveland and Gary became the first 
major cities to elect African American mayors when they chose Carl Stokes and Richard 
Hatcher, respectively; in Boston and Philadelphia, conservative Republican candidates 
lost major mayoral races. On the other hand, several prominent races, including the 
Kentucky gubernatorial race, featured candidates who ran on anti-Johnson platforms and 
were victorious. Thinning Democratic margins in many strongholds encouraged 
Republican strategists, who interpreted the gains as a consequence of racial issues 
fracturing the Democratic coalition. Many of the victorious Republican candidates 
supported Richard Nixon, whom pundits labeled as a “major beneficiary of the strength 
of GOP conservatives.”35 The Washington Daily News summarized the Democratic racial 
dilemma in part with a political cartoon depicting Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael, 
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clad in sunglasses and jackets; two hacksaws labeled “Cleveland” and “Gary” cut a hole 
around the floor where the two stood. The tagline read, “Suppose They’re Trying to Tell 
Us Something?”36 Not only did the Democratic Party hope to distance itself from black 
radicalism, it also hoped to elect viable African American alternatives; politicians like 
Stokes and Hatcher provided such an opportunity, demonstrating that blacks could make 
gains at the ballot box rather than through rioting and violence.  
With the interim report deadline looming in mid-December, members of the 
Kerner Commission research team continued to discuss the proper approach to the report. 
One memo examined the McClellan language of “law and order” and “justice,” 
interpreting each as code for “control” and “punishment,” respectively. In contrast, the 
Kerner Commission needed to examine how “dark-skinned people, non-speaking English 
people, poor people—have been excluded from a full measure of justice and liberty” in 
America.37 Staffer Howard Margolis described to Victor Palmieri the need to distinguish 
between the local view—focused mostly on maintaining and improving police-
community relations—and the national view, which took into account larger social and 
environmental factors in American slums that needed repair. Margolis himself supported 
an emphasis on the “underlying conditions” of the national view—jobs, education, 
discrimination in ghettoes—and acknowledged that even if broad recommendations did 
not accompany that view, it would still be “less damaging both to the Commission and to 
the Administration than criticism that the report is unsound or politically motivated in its 
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fundamental appreciation of the problem.”38 He also pointed to David Ginsburg’s ties to 
the White House and the president’s “unconcealed predilection for controlling things” as 
reasons why the report focusing on the local view would draw criticism that the 
Administration did not want the Commission to focus on the national view for political 
reasons.39 An emphasis on underlying conditions might be an indirect critique of the 
Johnson Administration, but for Margolis, it trumped pretending those conditions were 
satisfactory and concentrating on specific communities instead.  
Prior to the media conference in Poughkeepsie, scheduled to begin on Friday 
evening, November 10, commissioners met that morning in Washington’s Statler Hotel. 
The meeting satisfied the desire to hold more closed-door sessions discussing issues 
surrounding the riots. With more time to discuss the issues themselves, the hope was that 
commissioners would develop more coherent ideas about recommendations, convey 
those ideas to Ginsburg, Palmieri, and the rest of the staff, and ultimately exert more 
influence on the text of the report itself. Commissioners had plenty of attention from the 
press and influence in the closed-door testimony, but the disconnect with the staffers 
researching and writing the report remained. The first meeting, according to minutes 
written by Kerner assistant Kyran McGrath, centered on the question, “What Causes 
Riots?”  
By and large, the commissioners agreed that racial tension and a chasm between 
police and the poorer communities they served played significant roles in rioting. 
Businessman Tex Thornton began the proceedings by discussing white racial attitudes 
and predicted that racial antipathy—not the Vietnam War—would be the main issue in 
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the 1968 election.40 While Thornton made it clear that the “big problem of race is the 
attitude of whites,” he did not offer a solution and had no interest in the Commission 
dwelling on the history of American racism. “Let’s not mention the slave background,” 
Thornton told his peers, in reference to framing a discussion about the roots of racism, 
adding that the Commission must “look ahead not behind to help the future…so many 
unrealistic whites say that Negroes built our nation and that we owe them something; 
well, they didn’t build it.”41 What was needed, Thornton told the Commission, was 
positivity and signs of progress. He also doubted forced open housing, asking, “why butt 
our heads against the wall of white attitudes?” Thus while he identified the problem of 
white racism, he did not seem interested in tracing the roots and reasons for that racism. 
He did not spare rioters in his criticism either, making it clear that rioters’ attitudes 
needed improvement as well. Thornton argued rioters did not deserve the same treatment 
as peaceful protesters and claimed ignoring law and order would “play right into the 
hands of militants who will use it as justification for violence…a lack of respect for the 
law…that’s what it is, and the report has to bring this out loud and clear.”42    
While commissioners generally agreed on the importance of law and order, 
Thornton seemed to take one of the more conservative stances with regards to race and its 
undertones in rioting and slum living conditions. James Corman pointed directly to race 
as the overarching, unifying cause of rioting and suggested an examination into that cause 
be left for the final report the following year. Herbert Jenkins blamed a genuine 
resentment against the system; frustration in cities, he said, had “developed a group of 
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demagogues there and they resent everything.”43 William McCulloch believed that race 
“maddens and goads most Negroes…it’s responsible for them being unemployed and 
causes an inferiority complex” and that poor housing “drives Negroes to the extremes 
they display.”44 Katherine Peden cited a lack of church and civic responsibility: “people 
who see an accident and don’t stop to help are just as guilty as people throwing gas 
bombs,” she said.45 Roy Wilkins pointed to police brutality as the top cause of rioting and 
wanted the commission to “be careful here not to offend the good police and also not to 
offend the good Negroes.”46 The longtime NAACP executive had harsh words for black 
militants and called on them to display better leadership. “The militants don’t put a dime 
in Negro banks, in Negro insurance companies,” Wilkins said, adding that he hoped the 
Commission “has the courage to say it” in the report.47 When Thornton pointed out that 
black ghettoes had many small racketeers, Wilkins fired back, “yes, but they would have 
devoted their talents along legal lines if they felt they had an opportunity in white 
society.”48 Wilkins and Thornton also sparred over the extent to which the Commission 
should emphasize open housing; Thornton wanted to avoid focusing on it because “we’re 
not going to change attitudes overnight,” while Wilkins did not want to “gloss over it” in 
the final report.49 Thornton had also commented that poverty did not give 30 million 
Americans an excuse to riot, prompting Wilkins to respond that police brutality—and the 
circumstances that helped create the poverty Thornton alluded to—were reasons, not 
excuses, for rioting.   
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Lindsay and Kerner waited for others to comment before offering their own 
opinions on causes of the riots. More than three months in, Lindsay had established 
himself as one of the more progressive—if not the most progressive—voices on the 
commission. “This needs action from every front, because the causes are multiple ones,” 
he told his fellow commissioners.50 The New York mayor referred to the ghetto as “a 
state of mind” in addition to a harsh physical boundary.51 Continuing on what caused 
riots, Lindsay said: 
Most street crimes now are done by kids, not the hard-core professionals as 
thought. This street kid, the group usually by-passed by kids and group efforts, is bright, 
an entrepreneur, and he lives by the code of the street…There is an extraordinary 
patience and sophistication and even humor in the ghetto. Humor explains why there are 
not riots where otherwise there might be. [It is] related to a state of mind, a circle from 
which ghetto people feed and believe there’s no escape…It’s sad that police have to carry 
the burden of ghetto conditions on shoulders. And you won’t solve their problems and 
riots, etc, until you move in with massive solutions to jobs, education, and housing, all of 
which in their absence create this circle of entrapment. This circle of problems is too 
much for the average person to climb over.52  
 
For Lindsay, a passionate liberal Republican and ardent critic of the White House, rioting 
and its causes transcended a few pithy phrases; it was complex and inconvenient. At 
times, it was a wonder it did not occur more often. Only when white attitudes ceased 
isolating the ghettoes and black Americans felt they had sincere police protection and 
adequate opportunities could America start to find the answers to the rioting question. 
Such answers required improved jobs, schools, and housing conditions, and Lindsay 
would not parse words on these issues as the Commission’s second-in-command. 
 Finally, Chairman Kerner weighed in at the proceedings. In describing the 
backlash against police, Kerner said the average officer was “the closest thing to the 
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government that ghetto sees; and he’s usually white, and represents ‘whitey’ and all the 
things the ghetto hates in ‘whitey.’”53 The Commission needed to address both police-
community relations and police tactics, he said. Kerner also took exception with a 
comment made by McCulloch about ghetto conditions; specifically, the congressman had 
said that other ethnic groups who had immigrated to America “got up and out” of 
ghettoes “because they were able to find and keep jobs.”54 Kerner acknowledged this but 
drew the sharp distinction of skin color when differentiating between many ethnic groups 
and African Americans. Italians, Jews, Poles, and other groups could “become” 
American and palatable to suburban communities after a point in a way that African 
Americans and other dark-skinned immigrants simply could not. Ginsburg concluded the 
meeting by telling Commissioners that in the previous 48 hours, “there is some evidence 
of a conspiracy” and an “inquiry into the aftermath of the Black Power conference in 
Newark [in July] because all these riots followed [the conference].”55 Investigators 
examined unconfirmed reports of “rooms in Detroit stacked with guns and firebombs,” 
but there was still no confirmation of any type of conspiracy related to the rioting.56 “We 
can’t say there’s nothing here, but there’s still no basis for positive finding,” Ginsburg 
said.57 At that point, the meeting adjourned, and several commissioners headed North for 
the weekend in Poughkeepsie.  
Seven commissioners, including Kerner and Lindsay, planned to spend all or part 
of the weekend in upstate New York, along with seven staffers. The conference began on 
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Friday afternoon, with limousines waiting to whisk arriving guests to a cocktail party and 
an evening reception. Kerner and Lindsay were scheduled to speak and give media 
members a sense of “what the Commission is trying to do.”58 The chairman told the 
dinner audience that commissioners had just completed the nineteenth day of closed-door 
hearings, provided a timetable for the interim report and final report, and proclaimed it 
was “now the mass media’s turn to come under the microscope.”59 They decided to get 
away from Washington to make the environment less formal and more open. “What do 
you people, who live with the coverage problems, have to say about all of this? And what 
about the racial aspects of news coverage, in general? Just as riots do not occur in a 
vacuum, neither does news coverage,” Kerner told participants.60 Were the complaints 
lodged against media coverage of the riots fair? Did the press treat black Americans 
differently when reporting stories? Did coverage exacerbate the issues in riot areas? 
Kerner and his peers hoped the weekend would offer some answers to these questions. 
In keeping with the goal of a “freer and franker” dialogue for the weekend, most 
of the conversation surrounding media coverage of riots was kept off the record.61 
Roundtables encouraged give-and-take discussions throughout the weekend and touched 
on a variety of topics, including the responsibility of the media in riot cities, an 
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examination of how to cover an actual riot, and how to treat thorny racial issues in such 
coverage. Each topic had two sessions occurring simultaneously, one aimed at television 
and radio coverage, the other at newspaper and periodical coverage. Panelists presented 
papers in each session, with discussion following each presentation and a designated 
chair for each topic helping steer the conversation along the way. Problems addressed, 
according to the conference agenda, included “the dilemma of the reporters in publicizing 
and inadvertently glorifying snipers, fringe agitators, and others who contribute to the 
exacerbation of a riot” as well as “displaying law enforcement officials as ineffectual or 
unable to control the situation.”62 Another discussion posed the question, “can we report 
the news, yet avoid making public figures out of fringe agitators?”63 Topics allotted time 
for discussing content that made it to air, how producers evaluated that content and, in the 
case of radio and television, whether delaying aired information of rioting and violence 
ongoing might serve the community. In both mediums, competitive pressures affected 
when and how outlets publicized riot coverage, particularly in the rapid world of 
television journalism.  
After another reception, dinner, and informal discussion session on Saturday 
evening, attendees reconvened Sunday to discuss race and reporting, particularly how 
black reporters approached riot coverage. Could the media, perhaps, play a constructive 
role in conveying the plights of ghetto life to the rest of a particular metropolitan area?64 
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Could the press—especially the white press—report on other parts of ghetto life beyond 
crime and violence? Among those who led discussions on these topics were Bayard 
Rustin and Lerone Bennett Jr., both of whom had testified before the Kerner 
Commission. The session, titled “Getting Into the Ghetto and Getting the News Out,” 
also looked at how the disconnect in media coverage might contribute to “Negro 
alienation” and “white aloofness” in terms of race relations.65 The media conference 
ended quietly on Sunday; one journalist and commission investigator stated at the 
conclusion of the weekend’s discussions that he still did not have a sense of how the 
commission felt about media coverage of rioting.  
After a weekend to discuss media coverage in seclusion, commissioners and staff 
returned to the task of preparing the interim report. Otto Kerner’s assistant reminded him 
that commissioners should continue to “meet and engage in open discussion about the 
general contents and research effort for the final report.”66 Taking charge of the final 
report’s direction would help avoid issues the Kerner Commission faced in its first three 
months where staff conducted research and wrote without having consulted 
commissioners themselves. A memo between staffers suggested the final report contain a 
bold introductory paragraph on race in America and add appropriate historical context. 
“A statement by this Commission can be very significant,” the staffer wrote, adding that 
the opening “must be sharp, clear, and direct.”67 McCurdy wrote to Kerner and explained 
that before the commission could effectively pitch programs to curb riots to the general 
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public, it needed to explain “that problems do indeed exist.”68 Failure to do so, he told the 
chairman, would mean that “65 percent of the people (according to the polls) will 
continue to believe that Negroes are not disadvantaged in job opportunity, housing, etc., 
and 20 percent will continue to advocate shooting all rioters on site.”69  
By November 15 staffers had crafted a detailed outline for the commission’s 
interim report with the idea that “the final report will supersede the interim report.”70 The 
outline included a summary of the most recent riots as well as historical context of past 
incidents, profiles of each riot city, how riots affected attitudes, an attempt to explain why 
riots occurred, a list of “Negro grievances” and how “actual conditions” in riot-affected 
cites spoke to those grievances, among other topics.71 Separate sections also intended to 
address the “analysis of conspiratorial elements and their role and potential dangers” and 
“the role of media” in covering disorders.72 In requesting a title for the interim report, 
Ginsburg joked privately that the prize for best title “has not yet been determined, but it 
will not be an autographed copy of the report nor a free trip to your favorite ghetto.”73 
The executive director added tongue-in-cheek titles such as “Riots I Have Known” and 
“A Day in the Life of Rap Brown” for good measure.74 The outline’s organization was 
tailored according to President Johnson’s initial directive: section titles included the 
introduction, a report summary, a “what happened” portion, a “why it happened” portion, 
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and a conclusion.75 Its detail spoke to the exhaustive studies conducted up to that point by 
the commission on both the specifics of riots and local attitudes toward them as well as a 
more wide-ranging, sociological survey of their causes and effects.   
As detailed outlines of the commission’s interim report began to circulate, 
conservative critics continued to chime in on where to direct blame for the summer riots. 
Syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop wrote that the violent rhetoric and actions of Black 
Power leaders had escalated to the point that the FBI needed to take note. Alsop also 
linked Cuban funds to “the misnamed SNCC” and refused to rule out conspiracy as a 
driving force behind black militants.76 Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge wrote an 
editorial arguing that instead of “sociological excuses,” the Kerner Commission needed 
to stress “personal and private initiative” as well as “respect for law and order, the proper 
way to seek a redress of grievances in our country, and the duty and responsibility of 
individual citizens.”77 Talmadge added that the commission’s report needed to 
“emphasize more than ever that people do not have the right to take the law into their 
own hands and there can be no apologies or excuses for rioting, shooting, and beating in 
the public streets of America.”78 Another syndicated column from Robert Novak and 
Rowland Evans described an icy interaction between commissioners and black militants 
in Detroit and led with the eye-catching headline, “Riot Commission Finds Deep Hate of 
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White America by Negro Left.”79 The article posed the question of whether extremists 
clad in African garb spoke for the entire ghetto, then raised the possibility that perhaps 
they did. A Birmingham News editorial cited the Novak and Evans and Alsop pieces, 
respectively, as evidence that black militants wanted to destroy the American “system,” 
that they were not real civil rights leaders but rather “subversives committed to the 
violent destruction of American society…and they should be dealt with as such—and 
quickly.”80 The Los Angeles Times noted that the “existence of black revolutionaries 
whose ability to trigger and control violence” had become “the country’s most dangerous 
problem…including Vietnam.”81 Responses on the Right ranged from calculated, classic 
uses of anti-communism and law and order rhetoric to more incendiary, fear-mongering 
language on black militants.  
From the Left, meanwhile, came speculation that the commission would press for 
a “ringing condemnation” of racism in America in its report, detailing how many rioters 
were guilty only of being black in a predominantly white society.82 “For too long, white 
people did not care or they believed black people did not care,” Tom Wicker wrote on 
November 19 in The New York Times.83 The columnist added the progress within the 
Johnson Administration spoke to why there would be pressure for “a strong statement 
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pointing straight to racism in America.”84 Wicker argued that until “white America faces 
up to its own attitudes, it cannot face up to the ultimate question—whether it wants 
repression or integration, a decent order or social chaos, one people or apartheid.”85  
David Ginsburg and his colleagues were keenly aware of these vantage points as 
the date for an interim report loomed. In a memo to the eleven commissioners titled 
“Final Report Options,” Ginsburg wrote that the commission needed to decide whether it 
wished to try and sway the American public on three issues: first, that the “cause of 
recent disorders is embedded in our social system”; second, that force and repression 
against the violence was not a viable strategy; third, that correcting the causes from the 
first point was both “necessary” and “feasible.”86 He acknowledged that the nation 
needed the recommendations well before the following summer but stated that the 
commission needed to be realistic given the “prevailing attitude of the white majority.”87 
That attitude trended toward punishing rioters, Ginsburg claimed, thus recommendations 
needed to address public safety in the interval between mid-December and whenever the 
commission released its final report. The final version of the commission’s findings could 
potentially “offset a white trend toward repression and a Negro counter-reaction to that 
trend” as well.88 The commission needed to convey the cost of upholding the status quo 
and provide a “vivid portrayal of what the nation will look like in twenty years if a policy 
of repression and essentially no change in the social structure is pursued.”89 Ginsburg and 
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his colleagues ascribed to the idea of maintaining law and order, but that maintenance 
could not be at the expense of the broader, underlying conditions that triggered riots.  
Despite previous indications that the commission had made up its mind, another 
issue was determining the relationship of the interim report to the final report. Palmieri 
had told Hale Champion of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government that “we have an 
opportunity to produce an important piece of work and I am anxious not to blow it by 
treating it superficially in the interim report,” and Ginsburg himself was cognizant of the 
importance in determining how each report would inform the other.90 Would the latter 
document supersede the interim findings entirely, or serve as more of a supplement to 
those findings? Would the commission consider whittling fieldwork conducted in 23 
cities for the interim down to fewer, more in-depth profiles for the final product? Would 
public hearings perhaps strengthen the commission’s reputation and “create a sworn 
record of public testimony…as a more credible and visible base for the commission’s 
findings and recommendations”?91 Ginsburg outlined the advantages and drawbacks 
posed by public hearings. Open hearings, he said, provided a “sustained and uniquely 
powerful means of gaining attention…they involve risks, but the potential benefits are 
great.”92 While they could demonstrate transparency in the process of gathering 
testimony, even “potentially allowing some [citizens] to participate,” hearings might also 
“preclude witnesses from explaining the difficult problems under study.”93 Putting 
officials on trial by gauging “their effectiveness in handling the problems” of the ghetto 
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had the potential to backfire, and public hearings might also “possibly exaggerate the 
importance of extreme positions in the Negro and white communities by providing those 
who espouse them with a platform.”94 Given the number of witnesses who had testified 
privately before the commission to that point, how and when the prospect of public 
hearings would affect the broader proceedings was not altogether clear. Ginsburg 
concluded with a tentative, shorter outline for the commission’s final report than the one 
Chambers had sent staffers days earlier. The outline included a “Potential For Our Cities” 
section that would address what would occur if “there is no change in political, social, 
economic structure,” background on the violence epidemic, a profile of 1960s riots in 
terms of frequency, intensity, and the roots of black alienation, and the basic causes that 
included discrimination, segregation, and poverty.95 The outline would also feature 
sections on black and white attitudes as well as one seeking to answer “How Can We 
Change the System?”96 
On November 20, commissioners held their second meeting of the month and 
discussed the prospect of pushing back the mid-December deadline of the interim report, 
a deadline originally set by staff members. “We told news media that only staff work 
could be done by December 16,” Kerner told the other five commissioners in attendance, 
adding that the commission could “go into January and we likely should to get out a good 
report.”97 Minutes show that the commissioners did not discuss pushing back the interim 
deadline extensively, but Kerner’s comments spoke to both the uncertainty surrounding 
the commission’s timetable as well as the disconnect between commissioners and staff. 
                                                
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Minutes of Kerner Commission Meeting, Nov. 20, 1967, “Minutes of Meetings of ACCD Staff,” Box 
1392, Kerner Papers, Lincoln Library, Springfield, IL. 
 199 
Discussion turned to the language of the report and how it “read” to each commissioner. 
Peden brought up the idea of making the report “more readable to hill folk in Kentucky,” 
while others honed in on how the report described poor neighborhoods.98 “We’ve got to 
use abrasive language and keep emotion in this report,” Kerner said.99 Wilkins agreed, 
saying that if “we don’t use some abrasive language in our report, we won’t rock the 
country.”100 Thornton challenged the idea that the language made disorder seem a 
“chronic condition of the ghetto,” when, in fact, many hard-working families lived in 
these neighborhoods. When Ginsburg argued disorder was a symptom of ghettoes, 
Wilkins disagreed, saying, “in New York, everything North of 110th Street is referred to 
as ghetto, but all people up there aren’t bent on disorder or Lindsay wouldn’t be able to 
walk the streets…[ghetto has] a different meeting today.”101 Lindsay told his peers he 
could not find a better word in the dictionary, while Jenkins said the word was seldom 
used in the South and did not “set well” with him.102 On the topic of racial discrimination 
more broadly, Wilkins reiterated that it characterized all of society. When Thornton fired 
back that “other ethnic groups know deprivation, too,” the NAACP executive said, “yes, 
but not like Negroes had to face.”103  
Wilkins and Thornton also sparred over ghetto violence in the meeting. The 
former framed black violence as “usually retaliatory in nature from white violence.” 
Thornton disputed the idea that “Negroes are without adequate channels…and that all 
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mass grievance is real.” Wilkins responded that “in regards to submitting to the 
‘system,’” Thornton and much of white America needed to remember that it was “not 
voluntary, but forced.”104 This dialogue reflected the difficulty of discussing violence and 
race as they related to riots; across racial and political lines there existed sharp divisions 
as to whether grievances were legitimate and just how dire circumstances in the inner city 
had become. Thornton was a successful businessman who had cut his teeth in the private 
sector, but he was not an ardent right-winger; his doubts mirrored those of many 
moderates and right-of-center Americans who saw a violent minority of rioters within 
ghettoes who wished to lay the blame on everyone but themselves for the destruction they 
had wrought. Underlying the violence and the conditions that bred it, Wilkins told his 
colleagues, was the strained relationship between police and ghetto. Jenkins characterized 
the issue not as one of police brutality but rather “police inefficiency and police 
corruption.”105 When McCulloch asked a question about quantifying police brutality, 
staffer Robert Shellow answered it was “more a state of mind” and that the staff 
“[couldn’t] really find many facts on brutality.”106 The commission needed to separate 
fact from fiction with brutality, according to McCulloch, who doubted there was “police 
brutality with every arrest.”107 Ginsburg interjected that commission “would not break 
new ground” on the subject, which the Crime Commission had previously addressed, and 
added that the Kerner Commission would not want to “undermine or indict the police” in 
the report.108 Minutes also indicated a discussion of the relationship between police and 
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the ghetto being a “two-way street” in terms of instigation, and that the police were not 
always at fault. To the extent that the commissioners could classify police brutality 
appropriately, the discussion seemed to show that they would choose their words 
carefully when describing police-community relations, even when research compiled by 
the commission itself revealed police brutality to be a substantial issue in many 
communities.109  
Discussion also turned to the power of rumors during riots. “In downtown and 
white communities rumor isn’t that much, but in black communities it flies like fire,” 
Lindsay said.110 Wilkins cautioned against giving the rhetoric of Brown and Carmichael 
“too much significance…get white condemnation and you make a Negro a hero.”111 
Addressing whether a correlation existed between black militant speeches and riots, 
Kerner said, “we can’t treat this rhetoric as important as police” because “too many 
whites attribute riots to Carmichael and Brown.”112 Regardless of just how much 
incendiary speeches fueled rioting, public opinion against young, black militants was 
such that the commission needed to tread lightly when evaluating those militants’ words. 
Also of note was distinguishing between organized activity in riots and whether that 
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activity entailed a criminal conspiracy. Of the commissioners present, Thornton most 
supported monitoring the conspiracy angle, pointing to commission witness Ernie 
Chambers saying in his testimony that “we’ve been in touch with North Vietnamese” for 
training purposes.113 “That implies criminal conspiracy right there,” Thornton said.114 
Brutality did exist, Wilkins said, but he did not wish to elaborate. He did say, however, 
that he had heard how the commission ultimately would not do much, like other 
commissions, and that he had begun to believe that himself. McCulloch reassured his 
colleague that it would be good, and Lindsay stated the commission had to “go beyond 
jobs, education, and housing or our final report won’t be worth doing.”115 Senior staffer 
Jimmy Jones expressed confidence in the staff’s work to that point but admitted that after 
hearing the commissioners speak, he was “fearful about what will be done with these 
hard-hitting facts, that the commission might be too chicken to use it.”116 Adding to the 
tension was Ginsburg’s admission that he had “no idea what to tell the staff, which is 
posed and awaiting instructions on what position to take at this point” on the matter of 
how federal, state, and local authorities would coordinate on riots going forward.117 As 
with most commissioner meetings, the minutes reflected feelings of uncertainty and 
tension as to how the commission should address certain riot issues and how the public 
might react to various positions on those issues. 
On the same day that commissioners conducted their second closed-door meeting 
of the month, Newsweek published a wide-ranging special report titled “The Negro in 
America: What Must Be Done” on how to address the problems in the nation’s ghettoes. 
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Ginsburg had written editor-in-chief Osborn Elliott after reading an advance issue and 
called the report “admirably done” and “worthy of high praise who have given intensive 
consideration to the problems and proposed solutions set forth.”118 Preceding the report 
and its 12-point program of action was an introductory note from Elliott titled “A Time 
for Advocacy.”119 Elliott wrote that the magazine’s staff had “had started with a question: 
what to do? And they came back with the conclusion that nobody really knows…not 
[even] the Negroes themselves.”120  Newsweek did have a program for action despite this 
ambiguity, a program constructed on the premise that America had failed its minority 
citizens and had the ability to rectify that if it chose to do so. “Most of the talk about the 
racial situation is profoundly pessimistic,” Elliott wrote, adding that a Detroit militant 
who said he had “hope, but not a hell of a lot of faith” spoke for “more influential 
Americans than he imagines.”121 Much of the special report covered familiar ground. The 
riots, described as “the most sustained spasm of civil disorder in the violent history of a 
violent country,” had changed “America’s comfortable image of itself.”122 There was the 
cycle of blame—from liberals criticizing Johnson for betraying domestic commitments to 
conservatives scolding black militants to those same militants scolding large swaths of 
white America in return for ignoring ghetto problems. “Why can’t history’s most 
affluent, technologically advanced society act to make a black man a full participant in 
American life?” the report asked its readers. The answer, it said, was “a meld of 
ignorance and indifference, bigotry and callousness, escapism and sincere 
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confusion…but the inescapable truth is that so far America hasn’t wanted to.”123 Few 
would admit that “blackness is synonymous with inferiority” in the minds of many 
Americans, and that this mindset stifled efforts at economic emancipation.124  
While “enlightened opinion” showed that riots protested the “conditions of Negro 
life,” surveys of white America indicated “most whites are able neither to absorb nor to 
accept even that judgment.”125 Rather, those surveyed fell back on familiar culprits: 
outside agitators and subversive elements associated with communism. “What Must Be 
Done” acknowledged the presence of black militants and communism in some riots, but 
challenged the contention that this could explain riots in 100 American cities over the 
course of four summers; if white people had rioted at that rate, the report claimed, 
Americans would have taken swifter action.126 That the nation was in its eighty-first 
consecutive month of economic growth only made the urban poor more frustrated and 
those in the suburbs more skeptical that a lack of resources and opportunities were to 
blame. The authors of the report quoted one Johnson presidential adviser as saying, “we 
can’t tell them to hire those who have been burning down the ghettoes…America is fed 
up.”127 Compounding the problem was the Vietnam War and its financial ramifications, 
which made Congress less likely to embrace increased domestic legislation. A few 
politicians were quoted faulting Johnson for the stalemate. Commissioner Edward 
Brooke blamed the president, whom he said had “failed miserably” in trying to “educate 
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the people to what it’s all about.”128 Michigan Congressman John Conyers said he would 
“scream and kick and yell and shatter my lance in Congress” if he were Johnson, adding 
that he also would have toured ghettoes to demonstrate a commitment to making 
necessary improvements.129  
The Newsweek report also addressed the rise of black consciousness—what it 
termed “thinking black.” This entailed “breaking old ties of dependency on whites” and 
developing “political and economic sinew of their own,” and it also involved a “growing 
cynicism about anything, however earnest or well-intentioned, that the white man tries to 
do.”130 The notion of “thinking black” spoke to many frustrated, alienated ghetto 
residents; many had traveled North as part of the Great Migration, where “the rainbow 
ends in a ghetto hopelessly mired in a culture of poverty and the pervasive climate of 
failure.”131 Militancy had spread “across the black ninth of the nation…from a deep doubt 
that America [was] even willing to try” to address issues of jobs, housing, and 
education.132 If white Americans could see past much of the inflammatory rhetoric, they 
would see that many in the ghetto simply wanted the “piece of America’s plenty” so 
ingrained in the country’s ethos.133 Black consciousness grew from centuries of 
exclusion, and the sooner that the general public could acknowledge this and offer the 
urban poor a “say in their own destiny,” the sooner riots on such a vast scale would 
cease.134 
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Newsweek framed its program in three sections: immediate action, principles to 
aid the entire effort, and a specific, long-term agenda addressing jobs, housing, and 
“other levers of social change.”135 It described the program as based on “a fundamental 
premise: that America must reorder its priorities to give the plight of the disadvantaged at 
home the same urgency it affords the foreign obligations it has assumed.”136 Twelve 
points guided the program: presidential leadership, top-level direction, inflation control, 
state and local effort, private sector, employment, welfare, housing, education, riot, 
control, enforcement powers and ghetto businesses.137 Johnson needed to work for a 
solution with the same “vigor” he displayed regarding Vietnam; private enterprise needed 
to make “special effort to seek out, promote, and hire the hard-core unemployed”; the 
employment point sought to improve job-training programs, while the welfare point 
called for reforming “needlessly abusive and repressive (and sometimes racist) features 
of the current system.”138 Enforcement powers meant “vigorously enforcing existing civil 
rights laws”; the plan also called for increased citizen participation in curbing riots and 
solving problems of the ghetto.139 Lastly, the magazine listed cost estimates for all 
proposals for the current fiscal year as well as the forthcoming one. Costs for the short-
range package were $6.9 billion (at a time when the total federal budget was $880 billion 
and attempting to cut costs for the following year), with an additional $510 million over 
the remainder of the fiscal year.140 Newsweek neglected to name a long-term cost, but a 
Washington Post article noted that Martin Luther King Jr. had advocated publicly for $20 
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billion a year, while other estimates topped out at $180-200 billion over the following 
decade.141 The report as a whole described the “peculiarly inadequate and worrisome 
response” to the riots, but it broke from typical expressions of concern by suggesting 
concrete proposals with a price tag.142 Ginsburg’s complimentary note to Elliott on the 
project reflected the commission’s appreciation of the effort and awareness of its 
suggestions. Even if commissioners did not intend to replicate all of the special report’s 
suggestions, a separate effort with the same broad goal could prove a worthwhile source.   
A survey paper detailing short-term domestic program options for the commission 
echoed much of what Newsweek said in its report. The revised paper, prepared for 
commissioners in advance of a November 21 meeting, branded riots as a product of 
“three hundred years of common history” and described a “massive tangle of factors—
social, economic, political, and psychological” that informed ghetto attitudes and how 
riots occurred.143 At the center of the examination lay racism and its corrosive effects, 
effects only accentuated by white flight and the alienation of the Great Migration as a 
result of deteriorating ghettoes. Ghettoes meant “men without jobs and families without 
men, schools where children are processed rather than educated, until they return to the 
street—to crime, to narcotics, to dependency on public welfare” and, ultimately, to “the 
hatred of white society.”144 This generated a “deep sense of deprivation and 
victimization” against African Americans by “white society.”145 The paper pointed out, 
however, that jaded attitudes alone did not explain the spike in rioting in recent years; it 
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attributed “powerful new ingredients” of black protest that had “catalyzed” frustrations as 
a significant factor.146  
Among these “ingredients” was the “gap between promise and fulfillment” of the 
civil rights movement and a feeling of “political impotence” on the part of poor African 
Americans—the idea that their political and economic exploitation continued despite civil 
rights gains.147 Racial consciousness had supplanted a willingness to abide by the 
“system,” resulting in a “general erosion of respect for authority in American society.”148 
This erosion led directly to the relationship between law enforcement and rioting; as the 
staff paper worded it, “the police stand precisely at the pivotal point between society’s 
demand for order and public safety and the chaos of ghetto life.”149 Those in uniform 
symbolized mechanisms of power and repression that the ghetto resented, making 
conflicts involving police brutality sharper and the risk of riots higher.150 The paper 
conceded that “inflammatory rhetoric” surrounding much of the black frustration did not 
help matters, but it was less interested in criticism over the decline of law and order than 
it was in assessing how that decline had unfolded.151 Conveying the roots of ghetto 
frustration to commissioners—who in turn would have to convey it to the nation—
without condoning disrespect for law and order, posed a challenge. Whether due to 
witness testimony, riot profiles in each city, or expansive articles like the one published 
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by Newsweek, tracing and grappling with the causes of rioting had clearly resonated with 
much of the Kerner Commission staff.152 
Commission activity slowed over the Thanksgiving break before resuming in 
earnest on November 27. With many city governments looking ahead to 1968—the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, for example, ran a piece on how Louisville, which had 
avoided riots the previous summer, could perhaps find “lessons…to ease white-Negro 
tensions”—there were also efforts to depict ghetto ills in a less sympathetic light relative 
to other disadvantaged groups.153 An article in U.S. News & World Report argued that 
many white Americans living in rural poverty were ignored despite a Department of 
Agriculture study that found most of those classified as poor by the OEO were white. 
Poverty was sometimes classified as a “nonwhite problem” to the detriment of poor 
whites, due to an overemphasis on riots and the ghettoes where those riots took place.154 
In a separate piece, Irving Kristol asserted that many African Americans had risen above 
the poverty line and had a higher quality of life than past immigrants of all races.155 
Kristol made a clumsy attempt at comparing centuries-long racism against African 
Americans to the plight of the Irish and noted slum populations were both decreasing and 
better off than the poor in rural areas. A subsequent Kerner staff paper rebutted this 
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contention indirectly by examining how the experiences of black immigrants differed 
from those of other immigrants. While most immigrants “faced severe handicaps from 
prejudice and discrimination in finding jobs, housing, and social status,” according to the 
piece, they were ultimately “able to move out of their ghetto more easily than the Negro” 
due to the fact that “the white immigrant in America is not instantly identifiable as such 
by skin color nor locked into so rigid a stereotype of servitude, poverty, and all the 
rest.”156 
Letters to the Kerner Commission reflected the outcry over the perceived double 
standard when it came to poverty. One letter from Indiana lamented the focus on King, 
Carmichael, and Brown rather than “respectable people…all of us have rights, not only 
those who holler the loudest?”157 It was, according to the letter, up to African Americans 
to help themselves, and poor whites had little incentive to assist when no one seemed to 
care about them. Another called for charging civil rights organizations with treason and 
giving the death penalty to riot instigators.158 Even letters from private citizens like 
Gerald Curry, who said he was “all for equality,” feared that if “this keeps up, we won’t 
have a country in which to be equal.” Rioters, he wrote in a letter to the president, “know 
they won’t be hurt because in most instances the police have been told to take it easy 
because they might antagonize the colored community.”159 While harsh, race-based 
critiques of riots and inner cities had flooded the inbox of the commission since its 
inception, sympathetic portraits of ghetto residents seemed to spur more class-based 
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criticism through the fall. Racism, both subtle and overt, still existed in many letters, but 
now came an added question from many conservative citizens: if America needed to 
eradicate the culture of poverty, why was the focus so squarely on poor African 
Americans? It was, perhaps, a question the commission needed to ponder as it readied its 
interim report.  
With the prospective interim deadline looming, anxiety at commission 
headquarters had not subsided. Lindsay wrote to Kerner saying he was “somewhat 
troubled by the difficulties of scheduling” that led to commissioners having little time to 
read, consider, or discuss research papers handed over by the staff or outside 
consultants.160 The vice chairman requested a series of additional commission meetings 
for the purposes of reading drafts and having more time to review and grapple with how 
they might impact the broader report. Howard Margolis, a staffer who had written 
extensively on probable courses for the commission to take the previous month, 
announced his resignation, writing to Palmieri that he was walking away because his 
“judgment on management questions was so far at odds with what was being done that I 
was afraid I would end up being a pain in the neck rather than a help.”161 Margolis said 
that if there was “anything significant I thought I had to contribute, I would certainly 
stay…but it is obvious I have not been helpful.”162 Unlike Charles King, who had 
resigned earlier that month, Margolis walked away with no regrets. While the Kerner 
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Commission was a large enough operation that two staff departures within a month had 
no significant effect, it did signal that a few who had signed on that summer had become 
disillusioned with what the commission could—or, perhaps, wanted—to accomplish with 
its platform.   
As the month drew to a close, sample questions from an attitude survey for 
African Americans survey surfaced. The questionnaire, focused mostly on education and 
welfare, asked participants, among other things, whether they preferred integrated 
schools or improved schools of their own, their personal experiences with an opinions on 
income supplements and public housing, and whether they felt blacks had an equal 
chance to attain elected office.163 It offered a rare glimpse into the line of questioning 
used for one of the staff’s surveys, a line of questioning that would help inform much of 
the forthcoming writing that might find its way into the report. In the commission’s inner 
circle, there remained the matter of selecting a title for the interim report. Options, 
according to a November 30 memo from Koskinen to Ginsburg, included: “To Establish 
Justice and Insure Domestic Tranquility”; “America at the Crossroads”; “One Nation or 
Two?” and, if none of these appealed, simply the “Interim Report of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.”164   
The end of the month also saw commissioners writing to Ginsburg and Kerner 
privately on ideas related to the report. Peden reiterated to Kerner that the nation needed 
to turn back to religion, saying that “the greatest change needed in this country is to 
change the attitude of the white man toward the black…this is basically a moral 
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problem…we must look to the institution which has as its basis for existence the morality 
of this nation, the church.”165 Failing to deliver this message, she told the chairman, 
would be a lost opportunity. Herbert Jenkins, who had reiterated his request that the 
commission’s interim and final reports be “easily understood by everyone involved,” also 
called for improved training and increased hiring of African American officers.166 The 
Atlanta police chief told Ginsburg that “action taken by Negro police in a Negro 
community causes less irritation and resistance as the same action, under similar 
circumstances, taken by white policemen, and this cannot be changed by next 
summer.”167 Rather, it would require “several generations” of training to help change the 
perception and culture of law enforcement.168 In spite of the behind-the-scenes tension 
and impending deadlines, many involved with the Kerner Commission remained 
optimistic that their hard work would generate useful results, both in the interim and 
long-term reports, that could assist in halting riots and racial animosity.  
Four months in, however, there still existed skeptics who believed the 
commission was just for show, and that “to entertain the idea” that it could “change the 
national climate require[d] an energetic suspension of disbelief.”169 Writing in Atlanta 
Magazine, Elizabeth Brenner Drew scathingly referred to the commission as having been 
formed “for lack of anything else to do.”170 Otto Kerner was a “weak, amiable Democrat” 
in her words, and the commission’s two black members “no closer” to the daily injustices 
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of ghetto life.171 She reported rumors that the commission was “a fink operation, working 
hand-in-glove with the police and the FBI,” and thus were “not to be cooperated with.”172 
With a timeline that would have its final report released after the year’s legislative 
program and in the middle of the chaos of the presidential election, Drew asserted that 
there was little reason to think anything would change. “No one is betting…that the 
commission’s product will differ radically from one that the president wants,” she said.173 
The author was not alone in her doubting, but she had miscalculated in her exact 
assessment of the commission; while it had worked with the police and FBI, it did not do 
so in a capacity that would absolve authority of blame. Furthermore, as the coming 
months would show, the Kerner Commission had no intention of telling President 
Johnson what he wanted to hear in its report. 
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December 1967 
 “It is my firm conviction that for the Commission to take any position…other 
than one of such ‘massive magnitude’ will be to admit that it is just another Commission 
seeking compromise,” wrote Commissioner I.W. Abel’s assistant, James Jones, to 
Executive Director David Ginsburg.1 Jones, who assured Ginsburg that he spoke for Abel 
in writing, called for a bold, clear-eyed interim report in his December 6 letter; the 
commission needed to convince white America that the problems of the ghetto were 
problems worth fixing while also convincing ghetto residents themselves that the 
commitment to do so was not an empty promise.  
Jones wrote the letter on the same day that the Kerner Commission had released 
September testimony to the public focused on how many poor African Americans had 
lost faith in a system of government they believed was tailored to benefit middle-class 
whites. Roger Wilkins, Director of the Justice Department’s Community Relations 
Service, had lamented in testimony three months prior that discrimination no longer took 
the form of a “southern sheriff or bully,” that it had become increasingly difficult to 
“personalize prejudice.”2 The problem was a broader one, evident in the rotting of 
infrastructure and preference for construction of buildings like the John F. Kennedy 
Center for the Arts to, as Wilkins put it, “communicate something to the Russians and 
Englishmen and Frenchmen,” rather than focusing on improving or rebuilding schools 
and neighborhoods.”3 As Jones called on commissioners to “deal with…the question of 
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police brutality” rather than “gloss over or even question” that it existed, the Kerner 
Commission also released the testimony of Albert Reiss, who had testified that police 
departments across the country “describe Negroes in terms that are not people 
terms…they describe them in terms of the animal kingdom.”4 He told commissioners that 
at least three-fourths of police officers had discriminatory views toward African 
Americans. Improving technology and officer training would only do so much if 
departments nationwide did not address racism; it was a crucial element in improving 
police-community relations.  
 In spite of the damning testimony released and the daunting tasks that lay ahead, 
Jones remained steadfast in his belief that the commission could answer President 
Johnson’s fundamental questions on the riots and offer effective solutions. Even with, as 
he said, “the attitude of Congress and the white community, and the Vietnam War,” Jones 
was “still convinced that the American people will react affirmatively if given the facts 
and recommendations honestly and boldly.”5 The commission needed to “challenge the 
Federal Government to launch massive programs” and “have faith in the people if it is to 
gain the faith of them.”6 A clear timetable needed to accompany the sincere effort as 
well, so “visible signs of change [could] be seen and understood.”7 Jones complimented 
the staff on their work since the summer but noted a “veiled hesitancy” to “‘go all out’ 
for fear of offending commissioners.”8 His was the latest call for an uncompromising 
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report centered on the research staff’s findings that would not worry about the backlash 
or whether most Americans—or commissioners, for that matter—agreed. 
Ginsburg did not reply to the letter, but four months on the job had shown that 
such ambition came with high risk given the American political landscape. Syndicated 
columnist Carl Rowan, a former head of the United States Information Agency who had 
worked in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, wrote that the commission 
had to tell “stark truths without being inflammatory.”9 It needed to, as Jones had written, 
“alert America’s white middle class to the true causes of urban unrest,” but doing so 
without “appearing to apologize for arsonists, looters, and murderers”—whether or not 
those were fair characterizations—was a feat that required more than political platitudes 
of being bold and courageous.10 Explaining that not all Americans viewed law 
enforcement positively was both a “vital” and “delicate” task; as one staffer put it: “what 
white America is unaware of is the entire range of police misconduct which is a daily 
factor in the life of the ghetto resident: actual brutality, rough treatment, unjustified 
stopping on the street...if we sugarcoat these complaints, we have failed in our task of 
alerting the country to the true state of facts.”11 But how could the commission express 
this without undermining police and a society reliant on law and order? How could it 
avoid speaking of ghetto residents categorically and, as one staff member feared, doing a 
“grave disservice…by casually linking ‘ghetto leaders’ with ‘riot leaders’”?12 How could 
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it pivot, then, to offering constructive solutions on mending police-community relations 
and the conditions that yielded riots in the first place?   
 These questions, among other topics, came up as commissioners met again in 
Washington from December 7 to December 9. Ginsburg read staffer Robert Conot’s 
“Narrative History of the Events of 1967” aloud, and commissioners offered feedback 
after each section. Conot, a journalist and historian who had captivated the commission 
with Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness, his account of the Watts riots, authored sections 
that consisted of riot accounts in various cities, as well as comments on the broader civil 
rights movement and leading figures such as Carmichael and Brown. On the whole, 
Conot’s work garnered praise. Commissioners provided minor critiques—Roy Wilkins 
felt the summary incorrectly implied the “Birmingham boycott by itself stemmed 
violence” and that the civil rights movement earlier in the decade “wasn’t just the lunch 
counter frustrations, it was the whole resistance line to desegregation,” for example.13 In 
a few cases, there was sharp disagreement. After Ginsburg finished reading the section on 
Cincinnati, Ohioan William McCulloch objected to “overdramatized facts” on the lack of 
African Americans in that city elected to public office, insisting that Cincinnati “has a 
good record of excellent Negroes serving in public office.”14 Oklahoma Senator Fred 
Harris disagreed, citing field research that indicated the “lack of Negroes in public office 
was very much on Negroes’ minds…but the whites were very proud of their city.”15 
According to interviews in Cincinnati, “the whites weren’t in good relations with the 
Negro community,” and Harris wanted the section to “stress the lack of 
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communication.”16 He added that on a trip to Cincinnati, an African American had noted 
the discrimination in the fire department; “do you think I’m going to go through training 
and jump off a building with a bunch of white men holding that net for me?” he asked 
Harris.17 The exchange summarized the racial divide that characterized many American 
cities when it came to evaluating race relations; while many suburban whites believed 
racial tension was nonexistent or exaggerated prior to rioting, the Kerner Commission’s 
decision to take “field trips” to various cities revealed that many African Americans 
disagreed. McCulloch’s misunderstanding of Cincinnati race relations spoke to a basic 
challenge for the Kerner Commission: convincing millions of white Americans that their 
views of local race relations were likely quite different from the views of their African 
American peers. 
 As in previous meetings, commissioners also fixated on black militants and how 
to classify them in the report. Wilkins bristled at the notion that “militants are made to be 
saviors of the black race” and said he did not want “this to be a militant report, nor an 
NAACP report, either.”18 He also rejected the idea that only militants curried favor in 
poor, black neighborhoods; Harris reassured his colleague that “it’s the middle-class 
Negroes who have spearheaded the movement.”19 Thornton worried about a narrative of 
the year’s events “glorifying irresponsible Negroes and letting responsible leaders fall by 
the wayside.”20 When discussing Carmichael and Brown, Wilkins hesitated to give them 
both a “further platform,” while Ginsburg argued that mentioning their names only in 
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passing when summarizing rioting would show their “ineffectiveness” as radicals.21 On a 
lighter note, Jenkins questioned the way Carmichael dressed, referring specifically to his 
Bermuda shorts. “Anyone who comes out to be a leader wouldn’t dress like that,” he 
remarked, prompting Wilkins to point out that Carmichael was “a leader of people who 
wear these clothes.”22  
Wilkins also disputed the description in Conot’s section on the class divide in the 
African American community; while he agreed that some middle-class African 
Americans had little interest in aiding their poorer brethren, speaking on this 
categorically was both incorrect and lazy. Minutes of commission meetings indicate that 
when civil rights and racial history were discussed, most people at the table deferred to 
Wilkins. While it offered ample opportunities for the NAACP’s Executive Director to 
provide his opinions, it also reflected the diversity problem of the Kerner Commission. 
Wilkins had to walk a fine line in commission meetings, criticizing black militants while 
also explaining their worldview and plight to his white colleagues. He did not agree with 
militants philosophically, but he often had to refute commissioners—particularly 
Thornton—when criticism of young black activists bled over into what Wilkins himself 
believed. The predicament was the consequence of forming a commission to study riots 
in black neighborhoods and including only two black voices at the highest level. 
 Conot’s pacing and description were met with approval, but commissioners also 
expressed concern at how the section had failed to place any blame on the rioters 
themselves. Thornton complained, predictably, that the description of Detroit failed to 
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“read like a description of the largest riot to date.”23 He and McCulloch both objected to a 
portrait of Rap Brown that seemed to “deify” him and depict him as a pacifist; Peden 
wanted a mention of the large amounts of federal money “poured into the city to no 
avail,” while Wilkins complained that Conot’s account of Detroit lacked the “sense of 
drama, of impending disaster” of the profiles on Newark and other cities.24 Conot, who 
was present, defended his description and cited “overwhelming documentation in both 
Newark and Detroit that unfortunate law enforcement prolonged the riot,” but this did not 
seem to appease his critics that day.25  “Obviously there was a disturbance and it doesn’t 
show this here,” Jay Kriegel, John Lindsay’s Chief of Staff, said to Conot.26 Harris 
agreed that the Detroit section indicated that “all the wrong is on the side of the law 
enforcement, that the riots are justified…there’s no feeling that what the rioters did is 
reprehensible.”27 Jenkins seconded Harris, stating that as much as Detroit police had 
clearly erred, “they’re still not as bad as this indicates,” while Peden, the lone female 
commissioner who had admitted to altering her stance on rioters after touring affected 
areas and speaking to citizens, requested more detail about the crime and looting that 
unfolded in Detroit.28 Even Otto Kerner, the face of the commission, chimed in that the 
section needed to include “responsible acts by people, police, and citizens.”29  
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Conot did not reply, and of course minutes do not indicate reactions or facial 
expressions to comments; it is reasonable to assume, however, that at a table with 
powerful commissioners, many of whom had already criticized the working relationship 
they had with research staff, he was reluctant to push back against a concerted effort to 
sanitize what happened in Detroit. Conversely, however, Harris also wanted more detail 
on the allegations of police brutality at the Algiers Motel and police station. Harris did 
not wish to erase accounts of police brutality entirely, but he did feel they were overstated 
at the truth’s expense. There were also political aspects mentioned, specifically the rift 
between Governor Romney and President Johnson. “We can’t ignore the disagreement 
between LBJ and Romney here,” Harris told his colleagues, adding that doing so would 
be seen as “covering up for LBJ.”30 The report needed five or six sentences on the 
dispute. Following a friendly reminder not to speak to the press about anything discussed 
at closed-door meetings, the commissioners adjourned. 
When commissioners resumed the following morning to review a drafted section 
on public safety, questioning of the document’s supposed anti-police stance continued. 
“Very disappointed in this section,” James Corman told his colleagues, adding that it 
“condemns all police and gives little to no constructive advice to upgrade, which has to 
be the reason for issuing an interim report.”31 Thornton, never shy about chiming in, said 
that the draft “gives the feeling that if there’d been no police…there’d have been no 
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riots.”32 The rioting, he said, began when the police were not there, and was not 
representative of all those in riot areas who preferred police protection. “Five hundred 
people starting the burning do not represent half a million down in the ghetto,” Thornton 
added.33 Police were scared, and “you couldn’t pay me to go down [there],” he said.34 
Edward Brooke, who had said little on the previous day, disagreed; “it’s overwhelming 
that most incidents are caused by police action,” he said.35 The Massachusetts Senator 
was not arguing against law and order, but it was, according to him, “a big mistake to 
make police sacrosanct…we should relate police improprieties.”36 Again, Harris and 
Thornton pushed back. “Maybe it’s true you can’t have a riot without police, but society 
needs law and order,” Harris said.37 The report “ought to say society has got to support 
our police, and they haven’t in the past,” and gave “lots of criticism with very little 
assistance.”38 Thornton was a bit franker, stating that “not every black kid wants to kill 
cops, and not all cops want to kill black kids…we need a balance.”39 Brooke interjected 
with a question: “But what if the facts don’t show that balance?”40 In the minutes of the 
discussion, the question went unanswered before Wilkins backed Brooke, telling 
commissioners, “let’s not forget that every riot was started with a police incident” and 
that African Americans were subject to increased scrutiny that resulted in “police 
handcuffing women, handcuffing MLK for four-day expiration of his driver’s license.”41  
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Corman, meanwhile, decried the lack of constructive criticism in the piece. “Sure, 
there are terrible mistakes by police, but I see here nothing about what police should do,” 
adding that the commission “[hasn’t] done our job to say the past was bad, and leave it at 
that.”42 There had to be more explicit mention of what the police had reacted to, Jenkins 
said. Even amid all the discussion of avoiding an “anti-cop” tone, James Jones and Peden 
emphasized that the report “could not deny the facts of police brutality”—Harris, who 
had spent the better part of two days reminding colleagues that there were two sides to a 
riot, agreed.43 There was also the matter of police review boards, opposed by the police 
themselves but favored by many residents in impoverished neighborhoods. “Where does 
a 19-year-old Negro go to complain that he got beat up by police?” Lindsay asked.44 
Commissioners discussed the idea of civilian review boards or, as Wilkins put it, “the 
widespread ghetto feeling that we get nowhere with complaints about police.”45 Beyond 
speaking out against brutality, Wilkins wanted mechanisms in place to hold officers in 
violation accountable for their conduct. 
What the minutes demonstrated here was the difficulty of reconciling police 
brutality with law and order; the commission did not want to absolve police of blame 
given the realities of police brutality in the ghetto, but it also did not want criticism so 
withering that it weakened officers and respect for the law. Walking this fine line was 
crucial. “People in the ghetto are going to read this section first,” Wilkins told his 
colleagues.46 “It’s the backbone of the report,” Corman added.47 Brooke agreed and 
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feared that “there is a gun being held on the staff to turn out these papers,” which made 
him “fearful that these don’t reflect the comments of commissioners.48 That metaphorical 
gun, Wilkins noted, was from the public; not only did commissioners also have to grapple 
with these issues, they had to make the appropriate revisions quickly for an 
administration and public clamoring for hard copies of riot solutions. “It’s all very 
difficult,” Palmieri lamented.49 After brief discussions on riot training for law 
enforcement and gun control legislation, several commissioners voiced concerns over the 
project’s timetable. McCulloch, Lindsay, and Corman all wondered: if the interim report 
was thorough enough, was a final report necessary? Would the commission put its best 
foot forward if writing the report was a “rush act” to placate the public?50 How would 
short-term and long-term programs work with two reports issued? “What the hell is a 
short-term program…we can’t come out with a box of band-aids,” Lindsay told his 
colleagues.51  These questions weighed on commissioners’ minds heading into the week’s 
final round of talks.  
 Commissioners dedicated a portion of their December 9 agenda to meeting, off 
the record, with a number of high-ranking African American publishers. Ginsburg wrote 
to Merle McCurdy the day before with specific instructions on how to brief the publishers 
about the commission’s goals and activities. Beyond the basics—the president’s 
directives, the teams of fact-finders dispatched to conduct interviews and gather 
background information on each city—Ginsburg’s memo made it clear that he wanted 
African American publishers to understand just how prominent African Americans had 
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been in the commission’s work to date. “Note that information which proved to be of 
invaluable assistance to the numerous fact-finding teams came from Negro newspapers,” 
Ginsburg wrote to McCurdy.52 They also needed to hear about the contributions of black 
witnesses like Martin Luther King Jr., Kenneth Clark, and Ernie Chambers, as well as 
how the commission was “taking a hard analytical look at the system which spawned so 
many inequities which appear to be at the bottom of disorders.”53 Ginsburg wanted staff 
members to praise the publishers for “having fought a continuously valiant battle against 
the very conditions that engendered the hopelessness and anger now so prevalent across 
this country…One of the lessons we have learned is that the Negro press should be 
heard.”54 Black publishers needed to know the commission would chronicle black history 
from the origins of slavery to the modern criminal justice system and the Great 
Migration. Their support of the report, Ginsburg wrote, was “extremely important” for 
the goal of “interpreting its significance to their readers.”55 The memo and briefing made 
it clear that Ginsburg remained mindful of the commission’s racial dilemma, of the optics 
of a body devoted to evaluating riots and conditions in non-white neighborhoods 
employing relatively few African Americans and having just two of eleven African 
American commissioners. He sent McCurdy, an African American attorney and staff 
member, to speak with the publishers. While it did not solve the lack of diversity on the 
Kerner Commission by any means, it at least demonstrated that high-ranking white 
employees were well aware of the image they needed to project when speaking to African 
Americans, particularly African American professionals.  
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 The final commission meeting for the week commenced with members reviewing 
“The Roots of Racism and Alienation,” which documented the African American 
freedom struggle over the previous three centuries. Wilkins, who described what 
Ginsburg read aloud as, on the whole, “a remarkably well-written painting of the Negro 
struggle,” had the floor.56 He did, however, have points of contention. “Who made all 
these things possible, desegregating schools?” he asked, adding it “was not the virgin 
birth.”57 He did not want credit, but he did want a more explicit account of Brown v. 
Board, how it spawned hundreds of Citizens Councils, had only resulted in “one percent” 
of schools desegregated, and even now had Congress “debating withholding federal funds 
from Southern school districts which still desegregate, even after 4 months of violence.”58 
When McCulloch cautioned against criticizing Congress, given that it could play a 
pivotal role for the commission’s recommendations, Lindsay declared that the report 
“won’t do much good unless it makes some people uncomfortable,” with Wilkins adding 
that the commission needed to “call the shots as we see them.”59  
This entailed, among other things, an unfiltered account of how America had 
treated black people; “Negro history is essential to American history…we accommodated 
it, tried to hide it, did everything but face it,” Harris said, adding that civil rights progress 
came only when it was in the nation’s best interest as well.60 Americans needed to know 
more about the treatment African Americans in the South faced during Reconstruction 
and understand that, as Corman said, “while slavery was 100 years ago, and no one today 
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owns any slaves, the causes of the problems are directly related.”61 Corman did object, 
however, to framing black history as a continuous cycle of “raising hopes and shattering 
them,” because it would prompt many white Americans to reply cynically that riots 
would cease if the country stopped “doing things to raise their hopes.”62 Brooke wanted a 
harsher view of recent history, including a mention that Washington, D.C. was segregated 
during the New Deal. “Let’s not be partisan, especially when it isn’t factual,” he said.63 
The section also needed more detail on the “very dramatic acts of violence in the last 10 
years,” according to Brooke.64 Americans needed to understand the roots of racism, but 
they also needed to understand that the causes of rioting in 1967 were not dead and gone, 
that riots occurred “because of things that happened in the lifetime of people who riot.”65 
Congress deserved credit for the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act, 
respectively, but the problems with enforcing each needed emphasizing. There was little 
pushback in the room to articulating this view of American history, beyond Thornton 
protesting that some of the more graphic mentions of violence against black children 
were extreme and unnecessary.  
 One question lingered, however, as three days of meetings came to an end: where 
do we go from here? “When we read this thing in totality, it’s very hard and abrasive,” 
Ginsburg noted. He had concerns, however, about the suggestions, saying that short-term 
recommendations were “not very impressive.”66 He spoke on behalf of many staffers in 
labeling the mood as “uncomfortable” over the lack of recommendations; there was 
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plenty of detail and background on what was wrong, but how did the Kerner Commission 
plan to fix it?67 “We have to go big and quick and to do anything less than big will be 
bad. We’ll never get the attention again,” Harris said.68 “Like Roy said yesterday, if we 
don’t get this report out soon, we might as well forget it,” Brooke added.69 At this point, 
commissioners began to speak openly about whether an interim report made sense. 
Brooke had never been in favor of two reports; Corman favored switching to one report, 
as did Wilkins, who said if the commission did “one report with enough in it, we’ll avoid 
criticism of too little too late.”70 Lindsay reminded his colleagues that one report would 
require a delay and leave the commission “vulnerable” in terms of the public’s trust that 
it could offer solutions. The recommendations, he said, had to be “in proportion to the 
problem…if sickness is as large as we see our recommendations for commitment must be 
as big….putting dollars in is alright with [me].”71 Lindsay conceded that it might “put the 
staff in the hospital by January,” but stressed that setting the lofty goals would yield a 
stronger final product for the country.72 At the conclusion of the meeting, commissioners 
indicated they were willing to take that risk, voting unanimously to expand the report 
without agreeing to a specific date. That afternoon, Califano informed President Johnson 
that Ginsburg had called to tell him that the commission would consolidate their work; 
unlike commissioners, who had not given a date, Califano said the single report would 
come “late in December or early January” because the commissioners “felt that the 
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urgency of the situation requires that they report to you as promptly as possible.”73 
Johnson affirmed the decision; “That’s good and tell him I appreciate that,” the president 
replied.74  
 The decision to consolidate the report constituted a major shift in the 
commission’s timeline. While it would require a tireless, around-the-clock effort from 
commission staffers, it would also avoid the delay of dragging a second draft into the 
summer. The commission’s unanimous vote, with the White House’s support, reflected 
pressure on the commission to simplify the final product in the interest of time. Kerner 
and Lindsay issued a joint statement on the following day, December 10, to inform the 
public of the decision. The press release read: 
 The commission, some time ago, advanced its deadlines and planned to put out its 
interim report in January and its final report in May or June. But the commission now 
feels that all of the elements involved should be combined as a related whole into one 
document rather than spaced apart in time and content…The commission’s examination 
of the facts convinces it that to tell only part of the story and to present only a partial 
program in January, and then to issue a second report five months later would not meet 
the critical needs of the nation. A fuller account within the near future must be 
made…Our review of the information we have amassed over four months convinces us 
that we cannot delay until next summer in providing our findings of fact and 
recommendations…The commission has found that there is urgent need for public 
awareness, and widespread action, much sooner than that.75 
 
Unlike the previous day’s meeting, which had not offered a target date for the 
consolidated report, and Califano’s memo, which had indicated some point around the 
beginning of the calendar year, the press release had a new date in mind for issuing its 
findings: March 1. At that point, the commission’s investigation would conclude, several 
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months before the original deadline given for a final report. The decision ensured a busy 
holiday season for everyone involved with the Kerner Commission.  
 Among the rumors swirling about possible commission recommendations was the 
notion that the final report would “force still another reappraisal of the United States’ $30 
billion a year in commitment in Vietnam.”76 Journalist Robert Lucas, writing in the 
Danville (IL) Commercial News, said that the arduous, prolonged conflict in Southeast 
Asia “and its preemption of brain power and attention, is approaching a crisis 
simultaneously with the domestic crises facing major centers of the U.S. population.”77 
Beyond the financial strain brought on by deploying more and more American troops to 
the jungle, Lucas argued that Vietnam had aroused a crisis of conscience, a “clear and 
present danger to the sense of values and the unity of purpose which, in a rough way, 
have tied this country together in emergencies.”78 It did not behoove anyone, he added, to 
claim that America “can meet both its foreign commitments and its local obligations if it 
will only tap its affluent people and get on with the job.”79 The nation needed a clear-
eyed evaluation of how it appropriated its funds. The article also quoted Roy Wilkins, 
who spoke in favor of a rededicated effort to spending money to solve inner-city 
problems. For black Americans living in ghettoes, Wilkins said, “the advances we have 
had are like wind over the trees.”80 Commissioners and staff had mentioned Vietnam 
sparingly—and Lucas had not actually quoted anyone affiliated with the commission 
about foreign commitments explicitly—but with the country mired in an unpopular war 
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that siphoned off billions of dollars per year, Lucas’s article undoubtedly resonated with 
those eager to point to the discrepancy in allocated funds for commitments at home and 
commitments abroad. In the coming months, Vice Chairman Lindsay, a staunch advocate 
of withdrawing from Vietnam, would become increasingly vocal in his criticism of that 
discrepancy. 
 On December 13, four days after the decision to abandon the interim report in 
favor of a consolidated effort, the commission announced significant cutbacks to its staff. 
Thirty staffers, many of whom were clerks, secretaries, and field investigators, were 
given three weeks notice as the commission entered a “phasing out” period. Ginsburg 
denied rumors that staffers were fired due to findings “highly critical of the 
administration,” saying they were simply a consequence of the revised timetable; many 
of the investigators, he claimed, were going to have expired contracts at year’s end 
anyway with investigations in riot cities complete.81 “I know some people are hurt, but it 
has nothing to do with the substantive work of the commission,” he said, adding, “it isn’t 
our duty to criticize the Administration but [rather] to find out what is wrong in our cities 
that causes riots.”82 Wilkins seethed at those wanting to ascribe political significance to 
the commission’s every move, calling such tendencies “subjective and highly 
interpretive.”83 Spivak also denied that the cutbacks were due to “irritation over what is 
in the report,” though in a Washington Star article, an anonymous staff source claimed 
the draft would be heavily critical of the federal government and public and private 
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institutions.84 Some of those leaving would do so at New Year’s, while others would stay 
on until February 1 or March 1, when the report was scheduled for release. On the 
commission’s copy of the Star article was a handwritten comment that read: “the first of 
what I hope will be the only staff leaks resulting from the very poor manner in which the 
personnel action was handled.”85 There was no indication as to who wrote the note. 
 News of the cutbacks also drew the ire of several congressmen. William F. Ryan, 
of New York, and Walter Mondale, of Minnesota, both wrote to Johnson upon hearing 
the news on staff reduction. “I was hopeful that [the commission’s] findings and 
recommendations could lead to a sense of urgency within the Administration,” Rep. Ryan 
wrote, but the decision to lay off workers left him skeptical of the White House 
commitment.86 “I do not doubt that some of the findings of the commission will be 
unpleasant or even impolitic…but solutions with a free and progressive society will not 
be found unless harsh facts are faced candidly,” he said.87 Disbanding this commission, 
Ryan noted, did nothing to advance such goals. The congressman concluded that if “the 
commission simply papers over the problem, the underlying causes of civil disorder will 
persist.”88 The Kerner Commission needed a thorough, truthful report that contained as 
many recommendations as possible. Mondale told Johnson that if the rumors of cutbacks 
were true, “I wish to vigorously and strongly protest.”89 Why, he asked, would the 
commission downsize amid so much progress on urban problems under Johnson’s own 
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watch? “As you also know, your detractors are ridiculing the commission as being a 
cynical dodge, which we know it is not,” Mondale wrote.90 The liberal congressman 
branded it a terrible mistake to “deny the commission the funds and staff it needs” and 
that “such a move would be devastating politically and could be used by our opponents to 
profoundly question the motives of your administration…we would hand them a 
powerful advantage they would undoubtedly use.”91  
 The letters to Johnson from political allies were noteworthy for a few reasons. 
First, they were some of the first official correspondence between congressmen with 
Johnson himself. Most observations, suggestions, praise, or criticism went to Ginsburg, a 
high-ranking staffer, or an actual commissioner, but Ryan and Mondale both went 
straight to the top. Second, each appeal criticized the decision on different terms, though 
both had political ramifications in mind in doing so. Ryan echoed the sentiments of many 
staffers: that the commission needed to be forthright in its findings even if it were 
politically inconvenient (as Johnson had expressed multiple times, most notably in his 
brief, vulgar conversation with Fred Harris in July, he did not necessarily see it this way). 
Sanitizing the report risked validating the criticism that the commission favored 
appearances over substance and undermining a staff that, he claimed, already suffered 
from low morale.92 He also linked the staff cuts to reduced government spending more 
broadly. In contrast to the moral imperative of issuing an honest report, Mondale viewed 
the move purely in terms of politics; how could the White House say that the commission 
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had made a sincere effort when given such a short amount of time to offer solutions? The 
entire episode was a reminder of the commission’s precarious position in terms of its 
findings and relationship to the White House. Even though Ginsburg seemed to be telling 
the truth when he said the cutbacks occurred as a result of a singular, fast-tracked report, 
rumors swirled that it was due to the commission being uncommitted, afraid, or both. 
Any of these criticisms of the commission would elicit cries from liberals and 
conservatives that the entire exercise of the Kerner Commission was ineffective and, 
ultimately, doomed to fail. There was also the matter of just how sensitive the Johnson 
Administration was to criticism; just because layoffs had nothing to do with sensitivity 
did not mean that the White House was thick-skinned. While most of the commission’s 
work, save for released testimony and the occasional press conference, unfolded behind 
closed doors, news of layoffs reminded the commission that every public maneuver was 
subject to inquiry.  
 The following day, Ginsburg received a letter from Thornton detailing his 
concerns about certain sections of the report. Upon returning to his home in California, 
Thornton had decided to expand on some of his comments from the December 9 meeting 
of commissioners, when he expressed doubt at some of the wording in the drafts, 
particularly in “The Roots of Racism and Alienation” and “The Patterns of Urban 
Violence.” After discussing it with a historian whom he did not name, Thornton decided, 
as he told Ginsburg, that the drafts were “too one-sided, inflammatory, and in many ways 
historically inaccurate.”93 There were partisan elements of each paper, Thornton claimed, 
that he did not like, and each paper suffered from an “oversimplification of complex 
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subjects.”94 He turned his attention first to “The Roots of Racism of Alienation,” which 
drew more criticism than its counterpart.95 As an example, Thornton contested the origins 
of slavery, claiming it was rooted more in religious affiliation than skin color and that 
slavery had existed in Africa, with black masters; he also wished to depict “white 
American colonists in a better and more accurate light.”96 He challenged 
characterizations of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, among others; Washington and 
Jefferson were “essentially favorable to Negroes” and the draft needed to clarify that, he 
said. Thornton described statements on Lincoln’s establishing segregated units in the 
Union Army and how he “left them slaves where he had power” and “freed Negroes 
where he had no power” as “highly deplorable.”97  
Thornton’s chief complaint centered on the extent to which America was a racist 
nation; “it is true that millions of Americans rejected Abolitionist principles, as here 
stated…but it should be said that millions also accepted them.”98 Simplifying American 
history as uniformly racist, as Thornton felt the staff had done in its draft, was misguided 
and overlooked the persistence of anti-racist actions over the course of the same period. 
He acknowledged the terroristic presence and rebirth of Ku Klux Klan, but said the draft 
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would be “fairer if it brought out the fact that the Klan perpetrated many outrages on 
white as well as blacks, and if it gave some attention to leading publicists, government 
officials, and community leaders to bring about its suppression.”99 If the report was to 
include a “florid description of a white child cutting off a Negro’s ears near Tuscaloosa,” 
it needed to be balanced out by “an account of the long battle which the Atlanta 
Constitution and New York World valiantly waged to end Klan activities.”100 If it wanted 
to discuss how some factories excluded black workers in World War II, it also needed to 
touch on President Roosevelt’s executive order issued that forbade discrimination in 
defense industries. There was too much focus on “negative tendencies” and not enough 
on “constructive steps in race relations.”101  
Thornton also objected to the description of Brown v. Board, which he said 
needed to be “in more generous and appreciative terms.”102 He characterized the paper as 
“grudging and hostile” and “partisan in character” when it needed to be a “scholarly, 
objective, and well-balanced presentation of the subject.”103 Lyndon Johnson received no 
credit for the Great Society or any of his efforts in a “bitter, prejudiced, and one-sided 
manifesto.”104 Thornton was not quite as harsh on “The Patterns of Urban Violence,” 
telling Ginsburg it was “much less a polemic against white attitudes.”105 Two of his 
primary objections, however, centered around rioting itself; first, that the paper treated 
violence as normal, and second, that it did not condemn the riots. Riots in American 
history were more about religion and economic status than they were race, Thornton 
                                                
99 Thornton to Ginsburg, Dec. 14, 1967, “December 1-December 21,” Box 2, Series 5, NACCD, RG 282, 
LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
 238 
claimed. Violence was not as ingrained in the American tradition as stated, and when it 
was, it had more to do with “differences over ideas and faith than racial antagonisms.”106 
He complemented the “Patterns” draft, however, for avoiding inflammatory language and 
melodrama. Thornton concluded his letter with a simple message for Ginsburg and those 
who believed that the report “should make the white community uncomfortable.”107 The 
commissioner agreed, but not “at the expense of objectivity, fairness, and accuracy in 
drafting the report.”108  
Thornton’s note illuminated the hurdles faced by the Kerner Commission in 
getting white America to confront the nation’s racial issues earnestly; while he was 
certainly one of the more conservative members of the panel, his reaction and hypocrisies 
in documenting race and violence in American history reflected the views of many in the 
broader population. Thornton wanted to say there was violence and strife while omitting 
the actual details on violence and strife; he wanted, he claimed, to make white America 
uncomfortable, as Ginsburg did, but that sentiment came after multiple pages contesting 
material in the drafts that made him uncomfortable. Violence and slavery were somehow 
not rooted in race, in his mind, and yet the conversation on racial tension remained one 
worth having on his terms. Perhaps most importantly, Thornton’s critique that the report 
was too negative seemed to miss the point of the commission’s sections on race and 
violence in America and, arguably, the creation of the commission itself. Nobody denied 
that abolitionists and civil rights allies had fought the Confederate Army, the Klan, and 
citizens councils along the way; to offer equal ink to these “positive” forces, however, 
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was to undersell just how violent and racially tinged much of American history was, to 
take the focus away from violent traditions and the conditions that had bred riots. 
Interracial, bipartisan efforts had not diffused racial tension enough to prevent multiple 
conflagrations in major American cities in the 1960s, thus it did not serve anyone, other 
than perhaps those white moderates and conservatives who wanted more credit for what 
they had done, to dwell on accomplishments rather than shortcomings. At every turn, 
Thornton seemed to challenge the realities of racism—slavery was not about race, there 
were plenty of valiant efforts to fight it, and so forth. The critique that the drafts were 
“one-sided” was derived from fallacious thinking, as though the authors on the Kerner 
Commission staff did not believe white civil rights advocates had ever existed. They 
certainly had, but for every effort against he Klan, there were officials who looked the 
other way, or even endorsed its behavior. A sobering discussion of race that downplayed 
or altogether removed all racial elements simply would not work. For a commission 
predicated on the notion that America needed to do more for its black citizens, Thornton 
seemed to believe that it had already done enough.  
Spokesmen for the Kerner Commission had said all the right things about the staff 
cutbacks, but a memo from McGrath to Kerner on December 15 told a different story. In 
sending newspaper clippings that reacted to the decision to issue a single report, McGrath 
told his boss that the articles touched on “news leaks, future expert critics of our report,” 
and the “need for a boost in morale to ensure many of the staff that the report will reflect 
the true feelings of the commissioners no matter how hard-hitting or abrasive these 
feelings may be to existing institutions.”109 If Kerner could not share this with the staff in 
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person before the holidays, he needed to at least send a reassuring telegram. The 
commission needed all members—staff included—on board given the new grueling task 
that lay ahead. 
The Johnson Administration received good news in the holiday season when 
Congress passed a two-year extension of the War on Poverty on December 15. 
Congressional Quarterly hailed the bill’s approval as “a major legislative triumph” for 
the White House, which for a time, it claimed, “feared the program might be killed in the 
House.”110 Authorization for the anti-poverty programs came at a time of cost-cutting 
pressure amid an unpopular war and the increasing feeling among congressional 
Republicans that many War on Poverty programs were ineffective. The New Republic 
castigated Republicans and southern Democrats for sandbagging legislation designed to 
aid the poor, specifically a $25 million program aimed at feeding the hungry in the 
South.111  Even as the agreement between the House and Senate was lauded, however, 
criticism of Johnson’s domestic platform persisted. While Vice President Humphrey had 
campaigned for an increase in domestic aid and said “this country is in a mood to move 
forward,” Johnson had remained tight-lipped when it came to financial solutions to 
poverty and rioting.112 Journalist Clayton Fritchey had compared Johnson to a Republican 
the previous week, citing his focus on “crime in the streets” and decision to hush 
Humphrey when it came to federal funding.113 The president’s stagnant approach had 
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also drawn criticism from King, who said that the nation had no excuses to increase 
federal funding to combat poverty when it had “power to react, resources to tap, duty to 
respond.”114 After Johnson had rejected a $3 billion program proposed by the Senate to 
increase jobs, King asserted that “what’s needed in 1968 is another Selma or 
Birmingham.”115 Plans for peaceful protests, he hoped, could avoid “the worst chaos, 
violence, and hatred that any nation has ever encountered.”116 
Criticism of the federal government also surfaced with more released testimony 
from Kerner Commission witnesses. Herbert Gans, a sociologist from Columbia 
University, had told commissioners that the War on Poverty treated symptoms rather than 
causes, and that it was nowhere near the “full-scale campaign” necessary for fighting the 
poverty cycle in earnest.117 Programs had failed to “aid the rank in file of the ghetto” 
despite “endless publicity.”118 They “looked good on paper” but frequently failed to bring 
“better jobs, higher incomes or better schools to the ghetto.”119 Many on welfare either 
never received their welfare payments or received less than intended, according to Gans. 
He had seen the War on Poverty “work for a few but fail for many” and encouraged the 
government to execute domestic programs with the same diligence and efficiency it did 
when sending supplies to Vietnam.120 William Taylor of the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission described public industry beset by discrimination with no one willing to take 
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responsibility; rather than offer stability and independence, Taylor told commissioners, 
welfare had the opposite effect. It was not a hopeless situation, but it would require the 
“strongest kind of leadership at the top of every department of the federal government” to 
make the changes necessary for improvement.121 
In the press, some found the decision to expedite the report’s release worrisome. 
An editorial in the Sunday edition of the Washington Star cited an anonymous source 
who said that the situation in American cities was “so critical we cannot afford to waste 
time writing an interim report.”122 It blamed extremists who “cloaked themselves in the 
garb of concern for the Negro” but actually wished to “destroy the government and the 
capitalist system as it functions in America.”123 The editorial cited the travel schedule of 
Stokely Carmichael, who had spent five months fanning the flames of violence by 
speaking publicly in Paris and Havana on American evils and how he wanted the 
Vietnamese to prevail in the Vietnam War. His words were “not the words of a man 
trying to improve the lot of the Negro in the United States.”124 If it was a race war these 
so-called revolutionaries wanted, the editorial concluded, their actions were certainly 
increasing the chances of making that wish a reality. The Star did not fault the Kerner 
Commission for amending its plans but found the elements that made such amendments 
necessary to be unnerving.  
On December 19, The New York Times reported that as part of its revised single 
report plan, the Kerner Commission would not curb its proposals based on costs or the 
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political or economic climate. An article quoted Harris, Brooke, and McCulloch as 
having been “emotionally shocked” by the “depth and intensity” of urban problems.125 
When it came to carrying out proposals from the forthcoming report, Harris had a blunt 
assessment: “we ought to say what it takes to do the job and let the country make a 
conscious choice.”126 The Oklahoma congressman added that “most people in the country 
don’t understand how serious these things are” and that he was “not quite as optimistic as 
I had been…it just seems like a great deal more complex than I thought.”127 As he saw it, 
young black activists were quite cynical when it came to the civil rights movement’s 
ability to engender change, and the commission’s research to date proved that cynicism 
was justified. America needed both law and order and “political and economic equality 
for all,” he said, and needed to decide, after the thorough report’s release, what kind of 
commitment it wished to make.128 Brooke seemed more optimistic, rejecting 1968 riots as 
“inevitable” and arguing that black militants would not wield as much influence “if we 
make a commitment and if the Negro can see progress.”129 McCulloch reiterated his 
shock in visiting riot-torn cities. “I mean that, I was shocked,” he said, adding he had 
become convinced that urban squalor was “the most difficult, deep-seated problem of our 
century so far.”130 While the article did not delve into specifics on proposals or spending, 
it was the latest red flag for a presidential administration that disagreed sharply with the 
notion that the costs of proposals did not matter. In a bit of foreshadowing, a sidebar to 
Joseph Loftus’s Times article featured recent comments made by Kerner on the origins of 
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riots. Kerner pointed to African Americans, once forbidden to marry, unable to “establish 
a culture,” and doomed to a feeling of inferiority.131 The centuries-old mistreatment bred 
cynicism and anger, which eventually “[gave] rise to volcanic expressions: rioting, injury, 
and death.”132 
As commissioners went public with declarations that cost not factor into the 
forthcoming report and its recommendations, more rumors of dissent in the commission’s 
ranks surfaced. This time, a report in The Washington Star-Times framed the rift as one 
between the commission staff’s younger and older members. Younger staffers—those in 
their 20s or early 30s who had conducted much of the field investigation in twenty-three 
cities as part of “city teams”—tended to be more radical and “emotionally upset about the 
plight of big-city Negroes than their older colleagues.”133 Only massive federal spending 
to rectify the problems would suffice, the report claimed, and the innovative, driven 
voices who supported this course needed a platform. On the other side were the senior 
staff members, many of them established liberals who recognized the problems 
illuminated in the investigation while remaining “aware of the political limitations the 
commission faces,” according to the article.134 In the middle were commissioners anxious 
to avoid controversy that had plagued bodies like the Warren Commission after the fact; 
there was a perception, supposedly, that the Kerner Commission had a responsibility “not 
only to the White House but to myriad other political forces brought to bear on an 
investigation of the scope being conducted.”135 A source quoted fiercely rebuked the 
                                                
131 Loftus, “Riot Panel to Ignore Costs,” The New York Times, Dec. 19, 1967, “Newspaper Clippings 
Related to Commission,” Box 1, Series 15, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin TX. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Robert Walters, “A Controversy is Brewing,” The Washington Star-Times, Dec. 19, 1967, “Official 
Correspondence,” Box 1392, Series I, Kerner Papers, Lincoln Library, Springfield, IL. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
 245 
report of White House control, describing it as “so much bunk…while we’re not about to 
apologize for any Democratic administration, we’re also not about to turn out a report 
which can be used in a Republican campaign document next year.”136 Younger staffers 
had evidently not handled such pragmatism well; another source claimed the staffers 
“think they’re being paid with government funds and working in a government office 
building in order to plan a revolution against that government.”137 Internally, these staff 
members firmly believed that the White House had seen their drafts and would have 
influence in choosing existing programs over new ones and avoiding massive spending.  
Supposedly, the dispute had worsened when those younger staff members 
working in the field had finally put pen to paper and offered recommendations and 
conclusions based on their research. Three commissioners who were not named had 
reportedly perused some of the material and became “concerned about a ‘runaway 
investigation’ which might lead to a set of unacceptable and impractical 
recommendations.”138 There was also the matter of the staff cutback, which had targeted 
many of the younger staff members in an alleged effort to “relieve the tension within the 
commission.”139 The article listed 59 of the 93 staff scheduled to leave by the end of 
December and an additional 19 out by the end of January. Those slated to depart feared 
the report would be “in the hands of those who are too sensitive to political pressures and 
too unimaginative to match the scope of the problem.”140 An unidentified staffer on the 
way out said that the younger contingent would be vindicated, in a sense, if the 
                                                
136 Walters, “A Controversy is Brewing,” The Washington Star-Times, Dec. 19, 1967, “Official 
Correspondence,” Box 1392, Series I, Kerner Papers, Lincoln Library, Springfield, IL. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
 246 
commission trotted out toothless proposals. “None of us wants to see any more riots, but 
we’re also tired of ‘band aid’ solutions which only perpetuate the problem,” the staffer 
said.141 An older staffer disagreed, saying he had seen field reports he called inauthentic 
and “extremely impressionistic…we all want to see the problem solved, but it is not 
going to be done on the basis of personal emotions.”142  
Predictably, the Star article did not go over well with the commission. But there 
was more to the story. A memo from Spivak to Ginsburg indicated that the Star had 
received the information it published in its initial article, from December 13, under odd 
circumstances. On the night of December 12, someone had placed anonymous calls to 
both the Star and The Washington Daily News and claimed that the White House “today 
cut off all funds with the commission to do its work.”143 The night editor at the Star 
informed staffer Larry Still of the sudden call, which also made allusions to staff 
members being fired abruptly. The caller had dictated his story to a typist at the Star, who 
then called Still to verify the information. The White House had cut funding “without 
knowledge of the commission,” according to the caller, because “the first draft of the 
report has been written and is somewhat critical of the White House and 
Administration.”144 By terminating much of the staff, according to the caller, the 
commission would be able to craft its message much easier.  
Spivak told Ginsburg that Robert Waters, a reporter at the Star, called Still and 
then spoke with Spivak himself to “work out inaccuracies—of which there are many,” on 
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what the caller had said.145 Both Spivak and Ginsburg had spoken to the Daily News, 
explaining that the layoffs were a matter of logistics, not White House irritation. Waters 
had then written the second story on December 19, which spoke in detail of the rift 
between “devoted but relatively radical youths on the staff” and “older established 
liberals” without consulting the “official viewpoint” from the commission.146 The article, 
Spivak told his boss, had triggered a flood of calls from various media outlets, including 
Newsweek, Time, The Washington Post, and the New York Post. An editor with Time had 
told Spivak that a “member of the academic community who has been a consultant of 
yours” called one of the magazine’s outlying bureaus to “try to peddle roughly the same 
stuff that was in the anonymous caller’s memo.”147 The Washington Post had written an 
“accurate but buried” story on the layoffs, while the New York Post had essentially 
replicated Walters’ story and the Times had refrained from writing on it at all.  
There was now official confirmation that a Kerner Commission employee had 
leaked and attempted to leak damaging information to the press. “I think we can expect 
recurring flak from here on out because there is at least one disgruntled individual trying 
to peddle whatever he can to discredit the commission,” Spivak told Ginsburg.148 His 
hunch, he said, was that it was not a lone actor, but he admitted he had “no evidence as to 
who the guilty party or parties may be.”149 The layoffs had apparently provoked the 
initial call, but did that call come from a disgruntled, soon-to-be-unemployed staff 
member or someone still on the commission’s payroll who disapproved of the decision? 
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In addition to contending with the anonymous sources determined to embarrass the 
commission, staff also had to worry about how various press outlets would handle the 
information. Would they ignore it, as The New York Times had? Would they bury it, like 
The Washington Post? Or would other journalists, as Robert Walters had, decide that the 
provided information was worth printing, regardless of the commission’s input? Just how 
critical the drafts of various sections of the forthcoming report—drafts that most 
commissioners had only seen recently—actually were of the Johnson and the White 
House was open to interpretation, but those nuances did not matter if reports of criticism 
and whitewashing made the headlines. Spivak seemed to think the issue had “fizzled 
out,” but the rumors and leaks were obviously concerning enough to warrant a longer 
memo to the commission’s executive director.150 
For the general public, Walters’ December 19 report was the most publicized, 
detailed account to date of a split within the Kerner Commission, and it brought to the 
surface the very political motivations that older staff members and commissioners wished 
to avoid. The optics of protecting an administration in the name of politics, even if it were 
untrue, was a poisonous way for the country to learn about the commission’s behind-the-
scenes activity. It would call into question the veracity of the commission’s report and 
offer ammunition for every critic eager to lambaste presidential commissions as vapid, 
self-congratulatory wastes of time. The tension between staff and commissioners, which 
had existed for months, framed around the idea of “input” and keeping commissioners in 
the loop, now made more sense. Beyond the matter of bruised egos over not being 
consulted, the commissioners resented the staff members, if the report was to be believed, 
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because those staff members were making considerably more radical judgments based on 
what they had seen in the field, judgments that the commissioners did not necessarily 
share. How representatives of the commission would respond to the Star report—or 
whether they would respond at all—remained unclear, but it did little to assuage doubts 
that had festered for months. 
With the Kerner Commission back in the news due to the new report plan and 
staff reduction, presidential candidate Richard Nixon took the opportunity to speak on 
how to fix issues in American slums. Nixon, who had focused most of his campaign to 
date on international issues, called for an infusion of aid, saying the demonstrations and 
radicalism “have reached a point of diminishing returns.”151 The California native was 
less interested in pursuing integration for integration’s sake and was instead keen on new 
programs and assistance that offered ghetto residents “more than an equal chance…on 
this score, I would be considered almost radical.”152 Nixon described the push for open 
housing as “the will-o’-the-wisp…I know that’s the exciting way to do things…Marching 
feet, protests…But the nation is awake.”153 It was a time, he told his supporters, for 
“reconstruction, not revolution…for builders, not destroyers.”154 Activists like Father 
James Groppi, who had testified before the Kerner Commission, were divisive; they did 
not offer the solution to ghetto problems, in Nixon’s mind. His measured comments made 
a point not to blame the urban poor for their problems or rely on the rhetoric of law and 
order; instead, he blamed old infrastructure and programs that had failed on Johnson’s 
watch. He also praised Democrats Robert F. Kennedy and Jacob Javits for wanting new 
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solutions to urban problems. That both men had criticized the Johnson Administration 
extensively was no coincidence. Nixon wanted to help the ghetto, and he wanted to do so 
on his terms; he made a point to criticize Groppi, a white priest, as an example of 
misguided activism. In seeking to avoid criticizing black activists or discuss segregation, 
Nixon sought to provide financial assistance to the ghetto without any kind of racial 
context. Solving the problems of the slums trumped examining the discriminatory roots 
of those problems; it was a tactically shrewd move, calculated to undermine political 
opponents and address domestic issues fraught with racial tension on moderate, color-
blind terms.  
Three days before Christmas, Ginsburg messaged commissioners on efforts to 
offer social and economic recommendations in light of the final report’s accelerated 
timeline. Two meetings had taken place on December 12, and December 22, respectively, 
with Lindsay, Corman, Peden, and Harris attending. A third, scheduled for December 29, 
invited all commissioners. One of the primary issues discussed in the meetings revolved 
around the target audience for the report’s social and economic remedies: did the 
commission need to speak to African Americans specifically, or tailor its ideas to lower 
classes more broadly? Not only was a focus on African Americans and the racial 
discrimination they had endured the morally appropriate course, Ginsburg told his 
colleagues, it was also less expensive and could prevent future riots. Recommendations 
aimed at poor, black Americans would address the origins of the problems that had 
necessitated the Kerner Commission in the first place. On the other hand, Ginsburg 
wrote, branding remedial programs with a “largely Negro” label risked losing white 
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support.155 The executive director also made it clear that the audience for basic policy in 
the report was a “political judgment” rather than a scientific one, thus it was a decision 
for commissioners rather than staff.156 Beyond the tangible consequences of choosing an 
audience for the final report, Ginsburg knew the importance of symbolism in the 
decision. While he personally believed that not all issues or solutions before the Kerner 
Commission were bound to race, he recognized that how commissioners characterized 
riots and their origins was of vital importance to how the American public would 
perceive the findings and recommendations.157  
Along these lines was the matter of how to reach the American public with the 
findings on March 1. An internal memo from Lindsay to Kerner indicated the vice 
chairman’s desire for the commission to focus on “the ignorance of the white community 
of Negro history and ghetto life and the impact of the mass media on our culture.”158 He 
also noted it would be “ironic if this commission failed to use modern media to 
communicate its message.”159 Conveying the message of America’s troubled racist 
history required a deft use of mass media, whether it was a documentary on that history 
or distilling the comprehensive report into a few paragraphs for those who would only 
consume it in newspapers or on the nightly news. “If we produce a report of several 
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hundred pages, no matter how simply written, it will have a limited audience,” Lindsay 
stated.160 It was up to the mass media to “take our case to the people.”161 Lindsay 
envisioned a documentary film, a “visual representation of the report, our findings and 
recommendations,” created with the help of private funding.162 Just as broadcasts needed 
diligence in reporting on riots to avoid worsening or exaggerating situations, they also 
needed diligence in offering viewers clear, cogent accounts of the Kerner Commission’s 
final report. In addition to the exhaustive effort that the revised timeline for the report 
entailed—whether it involved longer hours for research staff or more frequent briefings 
with commissioners—the commission needed a strategy to disseminate the findings and 
recommendations to the people upon the release of the report.  
Beyond the role of the media, Lindsay also expressed serious concern about the 
progress of the report given the due date. He had sat in on “program review” with other 
staff members and commissioners and come away quite optimistic, he told Kerner; 
sections related to employment issue were solid, but needed “additional refinement and 
hard analysis…this will take time.”163 Furthermore, preparing similar material on 
welfare, education, income maintenance, health, and other topics had not, as far as 
Lindsay could tell, commenced. “I believe that we must multiply significantly our 
resources…if we are to produce an outstanding report within our present stringent time 
limitations,” he wrote to Kerner.164 The commission needed to consider “every possible 
means to beef up this research effort and speed these dates,” he added.165 Lindsay 
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suggested hiring more research staff and consultants and “borrow[ing] on a full-time 
basis some of the leading experts within the government.”166 His vision, he conceded, 
would likely cost “considerable additional money,” but it was necessary to produce 
timely, high-quality work.167 Lindsay also worried about the “gaps that still exist in our 
knowledge of the proposed scope of the report.”168 Commissioners had received a revised 
outline the previous week. “I had thought this would be a detailed document which would 
give us some idea of the content of the newly consolidated single report,” Lindsay 
wrote.169 Instead, the outline was “extremely bare…we will have to await the arrival of a 
full draft before learning the framework of the report.”170 When Lindsay’s representative 
at a commission meeting had requested that the staff “produce a full schedule for all 
sections of the report,” nothing happened.171 Commissioners had yet to see sections on 
“Government Programs,” “Polarization in the Community,” and “Community Response,” 
among other topics, and would see them for the first time the following week.172 He 
wanted commissioners to have “background material” to be “briefed” and “educated” on 
each section, given that it would be the first time they had read it.173 “Without some form 
of briefing, the commissioners might agree on the language of a final draft without ever 
having recognized the difficult decisions that were resolved in its preparations,” Lindsay 
said.174    
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Ginsburg forwarded the note to Joseph Califano and asked him to return his call 
when he read it. Lindsay had been a thorn in the White House’s side from the outset, and 
it did not seem much had changed in that regard. While Ginsburg did not editorialize on 
the letter when forwarding it to his friend at the White House, Lindsay’s requests for 
staffing and funds came just two weeks after the announcement to scale back the entire 
operation. The letter begged another question: if the staff was indeed behind in drafting 
the report under the new guidelines, why was this not expressed more forcefully at a 
commission meeting, beyond passing comments that the staff might work themselves into 
the hospital? While Lindsay was certainly not alone in complaining about the disconnect 
between commissioners and staff that resulted in not having seen large portions of the 
report-in-progress, his decision to frame the situation as dire seemed out of step given the 
unanimous vote to issue one report earlier in the month. As the commission announced it 
would speed matters up, it was in a mood to scale back, to wind down; how was Kerner, 
appointed chairman, supposed to now ask for additional staff and funding with money 
tight and so many employees primed to exit? Neither Kerner nor Califano had a written 
or published response to Lindsay’s letter, but it likely raised eyebrows given how the 
commission’s course had changed in December.  
With a new year on the horizon the commission had one final public crisis to 
address. Thomas Tomlinson, a research worker employed by the OEO, had presented a 
paper at an American Association for Advancement of Science conference in New York. 
In preliminary remarks released to the public, Tomlinson, a former UCLA professor and 
psychologist who had also served as an investigator following the 1965 Watts riots, 
criticized the Kerner Commission and accused it of backing off its original 
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recommendations of up to $25 billion dollars in funding due to political pressure. The 
remarks, which his superiors at the OEO had not seen, indicated the commission had 
dropped its recommendations because “the country would not stand still for such a 
demand…Not with a war and gathering white hostility about Negro behavior…Not in an 
election year.”175 Tomlinson added that America in 1967 “seems to feel that it is cheaper 
to kill Negroes for burning and looting than it is to spend the money which might create a 
life which obviates these responses.”176 He reiterated his claims to CBS News, sending 
staffers and commissioners scrambling. When reached for comment, Fred Harris called 
Tomlinson’s comments “rash, inappropriate, and inaccurate.”177 Ginsburg issued a press 
release responding to the comments as well, calling them “irresponsible and totally 
inaccurate…the quoted remarks do not reflect the facts.”178  
Spivak messaged Ginsburg and told him he had spoken to one of Tomlinson’s 
OEO colleagues who said that Tomlinson “did this on his own hook…he didn’t run it 
through us.”179 Efforts to reach Tomlinson to tell him to “tone the thing down” had been 
unsuccessful; “I hope by tomorrow it will be changed…if we can get ahold of the guy,” 
Tomlinson’s colleague had told Spivak.180 The commission’s press secretary told 
Ginsburg the situation provided “ingredients for a world championship in 
indiscretion.”181 United Press International quoted an unidentified source within 
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commission ranks who denied Tomlinson’s claim that officials had ditched the interim 
report because final recommendations would only consist of short-term solutions. “There 
simply are no short-range solutions to this problem,” the source told UPI, adding that the 
commission was “preparing a landmark report that will require some important decisions 
by the administration, Congress, governors, mayors, and the nation.”182 Low-budget 
recommendations were also not likely, in spite of “President Johnson’s problems with the 
budget and the costly war.”183 The episode was another example of just how difficult 
containing information had proven for the Kerner Commission; rumors of abandoning 
ambitious recommendations did little to quiet the skeptics who remained convinced that 
the commission operated on President Johnson’s terms.  
Soon, it would be 1968. The Kerner Commission would have two full months to 
write and edit the rest of its report before revealing its findings to the nation. More 
testimony had trickled out in the last week of the year—from a number of employment 
experts offering bleak outlooks on the state of the American job market to mayors like 
Jersey City’s Thomas Whelan, who stated it was his “sincere belief that riots are not 
caused by social conditions” and that complaints of police brutality and deprivation were 
excuses and “after-the-fact explanations drilled into the minds of the people.”184 
Whelan’s comments echoed those of another New Jersey mayor, Plainfield’s George 
Hetfield, who had told John McClellan’s Senate investigation earlier in the month that 
riots in Plainfield were perpetrated by violent black criminals with a “thorough 
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knowledge of the science of rioting, if not guerrilla warfare.”185 Whelan and Hetfield’s 
statements, which shirked any kind of responsibility on the part of the government or 
broader society, offered the exact answers many Americans wanted to hear. The 
employment experts whose testimony the commission released on New Year’s Eve were 
more sympathetic to the causes and problems plaguing ghettoes but offered sobering 
assessments. One economist who testified said that in the urban North, “the civil rights 
measures at both federal and state levels have had almost no impact whatsoever, and have 
been almost totally irrelevant.”186 Another said the civil rights activity in the 1960s 
convinced many in white America of progress that never actually played out in ghettoes. 
“We cannot mishandle a social problem for 350 years and assume that palliatives, social 
programs, and so on are going to change it,” said Eli Ginzburg of Columbia 
University.187 It was amid this cacophony of public voices—of thousands of experts and 
self-proclaimed experts, many with different causes, solutions, and interests in the matter, 
each more than willing to frame the stakes of the riots and the broader exercise in a 
particular way—that the Kerner Commission entered the stretch run of producing its 
anticipated report.
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January 1968 
“The basic question is whether he will seek to mediate the issues by interpreting 
the problems of the Negro to the white community,” Victor Palmieri wrote to his 
colleague, David Ginsburg.1 “He,” in this case, was President Lyndon Johnson. The 
memo, dated January 2, offered suggestions on the State of the Union address President 
Johnson would deliver before a joint session of Congress later in the month. “If he were 
to attempt this it would be an act of great political courage but not, let’s say, politically 
rewarding,” Palmieri added.2 Johnson needed a “tone of competence and a sense of 
direction coupled with compassion and charity,” but he also needed to “address the 
problem without saying too much.”3 Palmieri’s comparison was Abraham Lincoln’s 
second inaugural address from 103 years prior; the president had to express how 
unproductive violence had been, how moderate leaders had made significant gains, and 
how the federal government remained committed to measures ensuring equal rights and 
equal opportunities for all Americans. He did not need to discuss the riots directly, but 
there was also, in Palmieri’s opinion, “no way [he] can politically get by” without 
supporting local police and lodging a “heavy attack” on crime and criminal behavior.4 
Johnson thus found himself, yet again, in an unenviable position; many white Americans 
had tired of hearing of the plight of African Americans amid landmark civil rights gains. 
At the same time, in spite of those gains, there remained a “strong current in mistrust 
about the U.S. as it is now run,” a mistrust that lay, in part, in doubts about the intentions 
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of the white power structure and the willingness of police to treat black citizens fairly. 
Palmieri, the Deputy Executive Director of the Kerner Commission, suggested to his 
boss, David Ginsburg, that the commission needed to empathize with the urban poor 
without mentioning the riots or any details.   
As a cover story in the January issue of Fortune detailed, this was a tone-deaf 
strategy given the complex, wide-ranging views of black America at the moment. African 
Americans entered the year 1968 exhibiting both newfound hope for the future and 
lingering frustration with white America for a number of reasons. “Negroes are drawn 
together by a sense of progress, and also by a sharply defined, realistic set of objectives—
notably, more education for their children, more desegregation, better jobs, and better 
police protection,” author Roger Beardwood observed.5 The comprehensive survey, 
organized by a New York–based firm, interviewed African Americans in thirteen cities 
regarding their attitudes on racial issues and the state of the nation. Separately, the firm 
interviewed African Americans in groups. Three in four told researchers their condition 
had improved in recent years, while eight in ten believed their chances for landing a 
superior job had improved. Three in four also felt more optimistic that “Negroes’ 
problems will be solved.”6 This kind of response across such a broad swath of the black 
population certainly displayed hope. 
That hope, however, was “mixed with anger, and it is very aggressive.”7 Nearly 
half of those surveyed described themselves as angrier than in recent years, which the 
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article characterized as an “important ambivalence.”8 Accompanying the optimism and 
“recognition that conditions have improved” was “bitterness and anger and a dominant 
resentment of white people.”9 While 37 percent of those polled said their feelings toward 
white Americans had improved, 33 percent said they had worsened and the remaining 30 
percent answered that their “feelings of mistrust” remained.10 Sentiments of hope and 
anger seemingly contradicted each other, but the Fortune story cited the prevailing belief 
that improvements for African Americans were due to “their own efforts” and “winning 
gains for themselves” rather than action from the white establishment.11 Although the 
Fortune survey indicated that most African Americans preferred charting a nonviolent 
course—83 percent of those polled believed that Dr. King “fights for what the people 
want,” in contrast with just 32 percent believing the same about Stokely Carmichael and 
25 percent about Rap Brown—the statistics also presented evidence that larger numbers 
of black youths supported violence as a necessary means to an end. Of those polled 
between the ages of 16 and 25, 40 percent deemed violence “necessary to achieve Negro 
objectives”; 44 percent of those polled outside of the South gave the same answer to the 
same question.12  
The sense of progress was tempered by mistrust on the part of younger African 
Americans toward “a great many things they have been taught by the white culture.” 
They preferred using “black” instead of “Negro” and believed that large numbers of 
whites lied about their attitudes toward black people. Beardwood asked his readers: “Can 
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America as it is run now solve the problems of black people? Does it really desire to 
solve them?”13 While the wide-ranging survey suggested that “the majority still answer 
those questions with a yes,” it was, he conceded, “often a tremulous yes.”14 If the issue 
was “one of faith,” as the article phrased it, militants seemed to express a loss of faith, “a 
mood shared by many people, particularly the young.”15 A U.S. News & World Report 
article cited concerns, which included a quote from Mayor John Lindsay, that “next 
summer will probably be worse,” that gun sales had spiked, and that some militants had 
even discussed violence in the winter.16 “Let there be no mistake…we are talking about a 
state of total, hostile and aggressive guerrilla warfare carried out on the streets and 
highways of our communities,” activist Harry Edwards said.17 The Fortune article 
acknowledged the unavoidable militant streak, but the numbers of those committed to 
peace and expressing optimism for the future meant its prognosis was not quite as dim. 
Only when nonviolence merged with cooperation and success could “Negro anger and 
violence…diminish.”18 
Beyond the president’s standard election-year overtures, the Kerner Commission 
knew the significance of its report on African American attitudes. With many outlets still 
speculating that riots and inner cities could surpass Vietnam as the most important 
election issue, the stakes for the report—due on March 1—were not lowering anytime 
soon. Writing to Palmieri, staffer Roye Lowry’s revisions on one particular chapter draft 
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declared that African Americans “do not expect this world handed to them on a silver 
platter, but they are deeply resentful of pervasive and continuing affronts to themselves as 
citizens and as human beings.”19 Lowry corroborated the Fortune survey results when he 
noted that data showed that riot-torn cities “have not fully shared in American economic 
growth since World War II,” that there was “a solid factual basis for Negro concern about 
jobs and housing,” and that “Negroes have strong feelings that local governments are not 
responsive to their needs.”20 While the White House negotiated civil rights and racial 
divisions in the broader public, officials in the Kerner Commission worried about the 
political ramifications of commission findings in Washington. Writing on January 2 to 
his boss, Otto Kerner, Kyran McGrath argued that the long-term program section of the 
Kerner Commisison’s report, “if allowed to develop at its current rate, will become an 
embarrassing vehicle on which the Administration will heap all of its Great Society 
programs and use the 1967 riots as a lever to sell them to the public and to the 
Congress.”21 Not only would the Johnson Administration use the long-term findings to 
push its own existing agenda, many would dismiss the report quickly upon reading its 
praise for federal programs. “I think the Commission would be very poorly advised to 
allow this to usurp the real purpose of the report,” McGrath added.22  
McGrath also cautioned against “attaching cost estimates” to expanding federal 
programs, calling it “the height of folly for the commission to attempt in its report.”23 
Telling Congress how to allocate funds on such a contentious issue would bring “a hostile 
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reaction from an already hostile Congress,” and estimates were bound to be inaccurate 
anyway, McGrath wrote. “Any specific cost estimate will draw fire and criticism from 
both liberal and conservative segments of society,” he said, adding that the “liberals will 
say the recommendations are too little, and the conservatives will say the 
recommendations are too much.”24 All of it would distract the commission from its chief 
objective in writing the report: offering the public a harsh assessment on American 
racism. The commission did not need problematic, inexact costs to make its findings a 
partisan issue, nor did it need the report to be a “vehicle for selling the Great Society 
programs to Congress” and a “Christmas tree for Washington bureaucracy.”25 
Acquiescing to partisan feuds or White House desires would doom the report, he said. 
The American public would “discard” it as “another sales pitch from the White House.”26   
The contrast between the two letters, written on the same day, offered more 
evidence that not everyone associated with the Kerner Commission was on the same 
page. This was not a matter of starry-eyed staffers clashing with grizzled, realist 
commissioners, either; on one hand, the Deputy Executive Director of the Kerner 
Commission endorsed to his boss the notion of the president speaking to the nation on 
civil rights and progress without getting into details or the very incidents that required the 
commission to form the previous summer. On the other, the commission chairman’s 
right-hand man told his boss that the report was doomed if it came across as a conduit for 
the Johnson Administration’s goals. The commission could not allow politics or White 
House goals to derail its agenda—and yet its high-ranking staffers were literally phoning 
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private lines offering President Johnson advice on how to discuss publicly the thorny 
subjects the report addressed. Both letters grappled with the idea of the political courage 
required in chronicling the stain of American racism, but they differed on what that 
courage actually entailed. One letter championed federal programs, while the other 
stressed not aligning with them too closely for a number of reasons. These differences 
foretold just how messy choosing the contents of the report and the dialogue surrounding 
that issue would be in the coming months.  
On top of this discrepancy came an unsettling coda to the Tommy Tomlinson 
issue from the previous week. The commission had dispatched staffer Larry Still to New 
York to hear Tomlinson’s paper at the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science conference after a pre-circulated text featuring critical remarks about the Kerner 
Commission. Still reported that Tomlinson “changed his text considerably” in his 
presentation, scrapping his criticism of the president and the commission.27 In a surreal 
twist, however, the moderator for Tomlinson’s panel recognized Still, sitting in the 
audience as a Kerner Commission operative, and asked him questions directly. Writing to 
Alvin Spivak, Still said he told the audience he was not attending as a commission 
spokesman, that the commission staff was aware of Tomlinson’s comments, and that the 
commission would assess all realistic options as it pressed forward. He did little to 
convince the panelists, who agreed in the question-and-answer session that the 
commission’s recommendations would not bring any kind of significant changes because 
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“the American people were not prepared to accept them.”28 Other panels at the 
conference had supposedly criticized the commission more bluntly, with one speculating 
that the commission staff’s “Fruits of Racism” paper on the extent of white racism went 
“beyond acceptable bounds” and triggered a change in the commission’s timeline as well 
as massive staff layoffs.29  
The paper in question—actually called “The Harvest of American Racism”—was 
a 172-page document, rarely discussed in the press or in commission correspondence, 
researched and written by a group of Kerner Commission staff and completed in late 
November. Written by “our friends, the social scientists,” as one senior staffer referred to 
them disparagingly, the “secret” report supposedly claimed that “civil disorder helps, 
rather than hurts, the advancement toward Negro goals” and, contrary to what many had 
said, were actually an effective and even logical reaction in light of the conditions.30 
According to text from a report by the Chicago bureau of United Press International, 
some within the commission believed the controversial paper had led directly to the 
choice not to release an interim report. “Copies of this report are numbered and kept in 
locked files,” the UPI release said, and the report was also “critical of the actions of some 
police departments and National Guard units during riots.”31 Writing to his colleagues, 
Ginsburg and Palmieri, Spivak declared that he “told UPI that the Commission has 
received a vast number of views from a vast number of people in a vast number of 
documents and we were not going to comment on any of them.”32 He denied that the 
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White House had rejected the report and said the Kerner Commission did not “base its 
decision on any staff or consultants’ documents, but [rather] on the reasons given in the 
announcement made by the Commission on Dec. 10.”33   
Spivak’s boilerplate denial did not prevent the mysterious report from receiving 
more press. The Miami Times ran an article speculating that the commission planned to 
publish it in its interim report and reiterated that “because of the highly critical comments 
of this document the report was not made.”34 City governments, according to the article, 
were “indifferent and unresponsive to the demands of Negroes” in the “Harvest” report; 
the staffers who wrote it argued in favor of riots to “dramatize the finding that legitimate 
channels for expressing grievances were either closed or ineffective in the riot cities.”35 
At a press conference later in the month, Kerner and Lindsay would deny having seen the 
report and reason that staff members had linked it to layoffs and the revised timetable due 
to bitterness. “The Harvest of American Racism” and its contents did not become a 
national story in January, but the articles that did surface only increased suspicions that 
the Kerner Commission answered to the White House and risked censorship if it provided 
uncomfortable truths to Johnson and his inner circle. They validated left-leaning concerns 
that even when commissioners and high-ranking liberals said the right things about 
finding the truth through exhaustive research and a detailed report, those findings that 
breached “acceptable bounds” or were deemed politically inconvenient were still subject 
to suppression.   
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As the commission approached its final phase in drafting the report, its budget 
woes emerged once again. In a January 6 memo, Ginsburg told his commissioners that he 
had requested $275,000 to carry the operation through July 28, 1968, the one-year 
anniversary of establishment. At a minimum, he needed $125,000 to pay for the work 
through March 1, the report’s scheduled release date; if the commission did not receive 
this money, Ginsburg wrote, it would “stop work immediately” on the long-range 
program and media study sections and “pay for the work already done with money now 
budgeted for print and distribution.”36 If the commission had to resort to this, it could not 
publish more than 1000 copies of its report when it had intended to distribute at least 
50,000 copies. The consequences of terminating the commission on March 1 would 
include no post-report correspondence, no organizing of commission records—regarded 
as a “unique source material for future studies”—and no completion of the major attitude 
survey sponsored by the Ford Foundation, among other tasks.37 “If the commission’s life 
is terminated as of March 1 some commissioners are likely to be openly critical and the 
press would probably regard the decision as confirming reports that the Administration 
has decided to abort the commission’s effort,” Ginsburg wrote.38 He cited funding issues 
and the decision “not to ask for an appropriation” as a vital factor in the decision to 
“dismiss people sooner than we had planned,” leading to a “good deal of 
misunderstanding and suspicion within the commission and misleading talk, public and 
private,” regarding the report’s contents.39 Now, the commission was asking for a final 
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financial boost; if it did not receive it, according to Ginsburg, “serious trouble, within and 
outside the commission, is almost a certainty.”40 The decision would go a long way in 
determining the commission’s closing timeline, and with the first commissioner-only 
meeting fast approaching, Ginsburg needed to know so that “action can be taken in 
accordance with the available funds.”41  
Ahead of the first commission meeting, where attendees planned to review the 
contents of each chapter extensively, John Lindsay sent his colleagues a scathing critique 
of the chapter drafts he had received. The New York mayor’s main issue with the 
material was a “lack of a sense of urgency…in both tone and content, the report has a 
static quality.”42 There was no national plea for action congruent with the tense, desperate 
climate. He reminded the commissioners that the country was “rapidly polarizing” and 
that disillusioned African Americans, reactionary whites, and repressive police threatened 
to worsen the polarization if the Kerner Commission and the broader nation did not make 
a firm stand.43 “If we are to head off more summers like the last and lead the nation 
toward a constructive program, we must above all deal with this pervading national 
mood,” Lindsay said.44 He continued with his blunt assessment: 
This report must realistically confront these dangerous trends. We must point out 
where they are likely to take us. We must translate present attitudes and actions 
into possible events in the coming months and years. The report, as now written, 
seems hardly relevant to January 1968-June 1968. There is an unreal academic 
quality to the recommendations that don’t seem to relate to the pressing facts of 
life on the streets of urban America. 
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This can’t be just another Presidential Commission with another report for 
America. This is the most serious domestic crisis we have faced in the past 
century. It threatens the peace, stability, and growth of our society. There can be 
no delay. We need action. Our program must call for an unprecedented national 
commitment for a domestic problem. The challenge is equal to any we have ever 
had from outside. And we need no lesser level of a response—a wartime level of 
resources and commitment with a full domestic strategy. 
 
Most Americans view last summer’s racial disturbances as a Negro problem. In 
reality, it is a white problem—the result of white discrimination and prejudice that 
has existed throughout American history.45 
 
Lindsay had established himself as the commission’s progressive, unfiltered voice 
the previous summer, and the critiques offered on what the staff had produced were 
evidence that his passion for embracing this role had not waned. In addition to branding 
the drafts as overwritten and inaccessible, Lindsay did not believe they captured the full 
extent of racism and its corrosive effects on American society. Too many times, he told 
his peers, passages described discrimination and prejudice in past tense, as though it 
filled the past but eluded the present. Where were the documentations of racism in the 
North in the 1960s? Where were the testimonials from African Americans on 
experiencing such discrimination, “how it is exercised and how it is felt”—not in 1936, 
but in recent months? Similarly, the drafts gave “no sense of the history of Negro 
thought.”46 Lindsay wanted to understand the “nature of underlying frustrations,” the 
origins of black consciousness, and how these had come to shape African American 
identity.47 An academically inclined staff needed to incorporate these ideas into a 
comprehensive report on riots and their origins. “Young Negroes are today extremely 
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pessimistic about the nature of race relations in America,” Lindsay wrote, adding that the 
commission “must at least try to understand their feelings.”48  
In concluding, Lindsay offered two final points for his fellow commissioners to 
consider. First, that the report needed to delineate much more clearly the difference 
between concerns over crime rates and a fear of people of color. He described repression 
as a “dangerous step with serious ramifications likely to make Negro hostility even 
deeper and aggravate existing conditions.”49 Not separating the two issues fed into racist 
notions of inner cities and street crime that pathologized all African Americans as 
criminals, offering “official sanction and reinforcement to white prejudices” and 
“evidence to skeptical ghetto residents that America does not intend to deal 
constructively with this problem.”50 If the commission did not choose its words carefully, 
it could offer the impression that “white America wants to eliminate the Negro problem 
rather than deal with it.”51 Lindsay’s second point called for the commission to “measure 
commitment in terms of money.”52 Detailed accounts of America’s flawed sociopolitical 
climate were necessary, but so too was putting a price tag on the solutions necessary to 
ameliorate that climate. The report needed to, in Lindsay’s words, “measure commitment 
in terms of money” and “develop a full plan with a year-by-year time schedule for a total 
national effort to deal with these problems.”53 Even if the projections were 
uncomfortable, Lindsay wrote, they were necessary. His shirking of platitudes in favor of 
explicit costs and a clear recitation of the issues was sure to antagonize some of his peers, 
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but an open letter ahead of face-to-face meetings demonstrated that he did not intend to 
back down from his promises.  
Also on the agenda was Kerner and Lindsay’s first press conference since 
October—the first since the December announcement that the commission would 
consolidate its report. The day before the press conference, Spivak sent a memo to 
Kerner, Lindsay, and Ginsburg anticipating lines of questioning and any issues or topics 
the senior-ranking commissioners might have to address. Ginsburg had not billed it as a 
formal press conference, Spivak said, but that was “obviously what it is…the purpose, in 
mind, is to be in position to answer several questions that are likely to be raised in several 
areas where rumors are now running rampant.”54  Spivak immediately addressed the first 
rumor—which had “run around Capitol Hill and has bounced back repeatedly from 
newsmen”—that Johnson had seen the draft of the report in December and “ordered a 
purge of the staff and demanded that (1) only one report be issued instead of two and (2) 
it be considerably watered down” due to its recommendations for “so vast and far-
reaching and expensive a program.”55 The rumors were “diametrically opposite to the 
truth,” but they had stayed in the press due to the Tomlinson fiasco (though Spivak 
acknowledged Tomlinson “deleted his references to the Commission when he spoke”) 
and an NBC report that claimed unnamed congressmen were “up in arms.”56 Spivak also 
raised the possibility of the press asking questions on the “alleged disagreement among 
commissioners…over how far to go with their recommendations.”57 Even though such 
reports had dwindled in recent weeks, Spivak said the press framed the disagreement as 
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one between “members of Congress being unwilling to go as far as others in pinning 
down legislative proposals” and non-members who felt untethered by such restrictions.58 
He did not editorialize on this issue.  
Members of the press corps would also ask about the staff cutbacks, Spivak said. 
“Here, again, there have been rumors of a purported presidential purge, and claims 
varying from the ‘entire’ staff to ’40 percent’ of it,” he wrote to his colleagues.59 He 
offered an enclosed memo from staffer John Koskinen on the matter, “if you are asked 
about this and want to set it straight.”60 Of the staffers who were “terminated, dropped, or 
what-have-you as of December 31,” Spivak said, “about 25 were supposed to have gone 
then anyway.”61 Kerner and Lindsay could also expect to hear about the commission’s 
budget, about the White House allegedly “cutting the commission off without a dime out 
of pique over its hard-hitting proposals,” and about how the commission had supposedly 
run out of money and had to lay off workers and cut short some of its proposals.62 Spivak 
told the commissioners and executive director his response to the budget questions: that 
the commission, “in deciding to advance its final report and combine it with the interim 
one, at no time mentioned either its budget or the desires of the Administration” and had 
unanimously made its decision on its own and based it entirely on a sense of urgency to 
get its findings to the nation before the spring.”63 Kerner and Lindsay could also expect 
questions on additional staff reductions, when the report would be available in hard copy, 
what it would say, and whether it would make reference to conspiracy and the role of 
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police, respectively. While the commissioners could not get into specifics, the swirling 
rumors made it “a good idea to make yourselves available to reporters so that you can as 
candidly as possible set some of the untruths and half-truths at rest.”64 With Spivak’s 
coaching advice in mind, Kerner and Lindsay stepped to the podium on January 10. 
Media peppered the two commissioners with questions at the 23-minute press 
conference in Washington. When one reporter asked if the commission’s report would 
make the Johnson Administration uncomfortable, Kerner responded: “the report will be 
uncomfortable for the people of the United States…in some places it may even appear 
abrasive…to some people we won’t go far enough and others obviously will think we go 
too far.”65 When pressed to elaborate on what would be uncomfortable, the Illinois 
governor mentioned the extent of American racism and other issues the commission 
could not “sweep under the rug.”66 Another asked about accusations of a “whitewash” by 
former staffers and what motives they might have to make such a claim; Kerner denied 
this accusation, saying, “they may be upset that perhaps they are not still on the staff.”67 
Most staffers let go had advance notice their contract would expire at the end of 
December, he said. He also fielded a question as to whether the White House had seen 
the report and torpedoed it due to content or cost; “I don’t see how the White House 
could tell us to tone it down or tone it up; they haven’t seen it,” Kerner answered.68 If any 
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staff members had discussed the report or its prescriptions with White House staff 
members in the fall, Kerner said, he was unaware of it. Staff members had spoken to the 
White House, he said, but those conversations were not related to any type of diagnosis 
offered by the commission. 
The questions continued rapidly, with the commission chair fielding the majority. 
He expected a bipartisan report that built on existing programs while offering new 
suggestions. No, the suggested upgrades in existing programs were not an indictment of 
the White House, he said. Some suggested changes should have happened long ago. 
Asked for specifics, Kerner divided the recommendations into three categories: 
administrative changes in existing programs, a shift in funds already appropriated to 
encourage using money more efficiently, and new programs in the fields of housing, jobs, 
and education, respectively. No, there was no evidence of a conspiracy, he said. No, the 
commission would not persuade the president to include new programs in his budget. No, 
the commission had not completed its work—in fact it would be “working up until the 
last moment it’s completed” on specific programs, Kerner said.69 The commission did not 
have plans to put costs on its recommendations, but Kerner acknowledged they would 
“cost money, there’s no doubt about that.”70 One article noted that he seemed hesitant to 
even put a “massive” or “moderate” tag on the recommendations, suggesting at one point 
that “the commission may not recommend any single program, preferring instead to 
suggest a variety of different cures from which Congress, state legislatures, and other 
local governing bodies can freely pick and choose.”71 Johnson could also send programs 
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to Congress later in the year based on the report, Kerner suggested. The commission 
refused to be goaded into offering specifics. He did note, however, that not all positive 
changes would come at a cost; a concerted effort at changing racial attitudes and ending 
segregation, for example, “would not cost a penny.”72 
Several reporters also wanted to hear from Lindsay—who stood to the side as 
Kerner answered most of the questions—given that Lindsay was the most outspoken 
member of the commission in calling for a full, honest portrait of America’s ills in the 
forthcoming report. A Baltimore Sun article noted his “vigorously nodding assent” when 
Kerner denied that any commissioner had spoken to the White House about the report.73 
When asked whether the presidential election or supposed “sensitive” findings might 
influence the commission’s direction, Lindsay responded: “No, I don’t think so… the 
commission has been guided by its increased understanding of the nature of the urban 
problems...what we have to do in describing the conditions of the cities of the nation…we 
would have to do under any circumstances.”74 The vice chairman also bristled at a 
question that seemed to imply the “mountains of paperwork” and “hours of testimony” 
had perhaps not taught him anything new; “this has not been a waste of time,” he said, 
adding it was necessary due to the “very serious situation in our country.”75 He also 
reiterated that the report would be “honest, realistic, and cause discomfort if necessary.”76 
It would be difficult, Lindsay admitted, to anticipate how anyone would receive the 
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report. The press conference was ultimately labeled a progress report, one where Kerner 
“seemed to indicate that a key motive” for convening it was “to counteract rumors that 
the President was pressuring the group to tone down its message.”77 Whether the press 
conference had convinced the general public was unclear, but Kerner and Lindsay had 
clearly accomplished their task of addressing the rumors mentioned by Spivak the 
previous day without getting into specifics. Neither man had managed to slip up and 
provide an incendiary quotation for the press, either, which had to be considered a victory 
for the commission. 
 Having survived the press conference without any missteps, Kerner, Lindsay, and 
their nine colleagues convened again on January 11 to discuss its long-term 
recommendations. “We’ve got to get off the dime here and move; deadline drawing 
near,” Herbert Jenkins had said as the meeting commenced.78 Commissioners had spent 
the previous meeting projecting urban and suburban growth into the 1970s and how it 
would affect the economy as well as education and eliminating de facto segregation. 
Following discussions on employment and welfare, the meeting turned to the issue of 
open housing.  William McCulloch and Tex Thornton both argued against involving open 
housing in the recommendations; “we’ll lose more than we’ll gain if we recommend open 
housing without exception,” McCulloch said, adding the recommendation would “bring 
down the political wrath of a nation.”79 Kerner responded: “shouldn’t all who can afford 
it have a chance to buy a house they like…this is basic to integration…this is the trend of 
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nation, we must be at the forefront of the move.”80 Roy Wilkins took things a step 
further, offering up his resignation from the commission if it did not recommend an open 
housing bill. “That’s so basically fundamental,” Wilkins told his peers, saying that when 
“you talk to Negroes fighting in Vietnam…the first thing they ask is that when they get 
home, will they be able to buy a house where they want?”81 Harris called it an essential 
and “basic” element of the commission’s report; Kerner agreed, reiterating: “this is the 
keystone of the report…we can recommend $150 billion and it won’t do any good 
without this.”82 
 Attention in the meeting shifted to the “thrust and tone” of the report. Vice 
Chairman Lindsay wanted it to touch on crime more, both in urban and suburban areas.83 
“If we don’t believe it now in January, we’ll believe it next August,” Lindsay told his 
peers, referring to the potential for more riots the following summer.84 James Corman 
found the report too wordy, which affected the message, and said multiple writers made it 
sound uneven. “Get one writer going through the whole thing,” he said, praising Robert 
Conot’s sections in particular.85 Wilkins agreed; “every 1000 words we drop is all to the 
good,” he said.86 Commissioners lodged various specific complaints about the chapter 
drafts as well. Lindsay, in keeping with his harsh letter from days earlier, wanted a “more 
thorough description of life in the ghetto in this report.”87 Wilkins saw a report that, to its 
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own detriment, sought to narrow its focus rather than widen it. “Listen, if whites were 
treated like Negroes, they’d revolt tomorrow,” Wilkins said, arguing that African 
Americans have been “remarkably patient…these kids are crazy as hell but they 
shouldn’t be sold short—they’ve got a point.”88 If concerns over the tone or its 
consistency continued, Ginsburg reminded commissioners that special assistants were 
available to review the draft report. 
Lindsay spoke up at this point and said a way to address the issue of scope was 
through “priorities”—specifically, contrasting how much America spent on cities with 
money that went into the space program and obligations abroad. Kerner chimed in that he 
had “long felt that major cities have been neglected,” while Thornton pushed back that 
Americans “need a strong defense force to maintain a free world…we can’t say internal 
problems are top priorities over defense.”89 Kerner responded by citing Lincoln’s own 
worry of “dangers from within.”90 Lindsay piggybacked with the statistic that in the 1967 
budget, $60 billion went to the Department of Defense while just $4.37 billion went to 
welfare and labor. Domestic security was a “national problem,” as “great as Vietnam,” 
Herbert Jenkins added.91 Thornton offered no reply, other than to pivot and say he wished 
to focus on jobs and education rather than housing.92 From here, the commissioners 
briefly discussed their next meeting, scheduled for January 18, and adjourned. 
Rep. Corman, however, emerged from the latest round of meetings disgruntled. 
Just as he had three months prior, Corman penned a lengthy letter to Kerner expressing 
concern over the direction of the commission. “The potential for significant national 
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service has virtually slipped from our grasp,” he told the chairman.93 The commission’s 
responsibility was not to provide an “indiscriminate and unstudied attack on every 
problem of American society,” Corman wrote.94 By overstepping its bounds, he feared 
the commission would be “unintentionally…adding fuel to the bonfire of unfulfilled 
promises.”95 A clear-eyed assessment of the issues plaguing inner cities did not have to 
devolve into diagnoses that were not correct and recommendations that seemed destined 
to fail. Corman believed the commission needed to bring African Americans living in 
poverty into the “mainstream of social and economic life” by offering a renewed, 
accelerated commitment to existing institutions and resources; he was not convinced, six 
weeks from the report’s release, that the commission had made a “persuasive statement” 
on this matter.96 Instead, staff presented “revolutionary” recommendations, “designed to 
be controversial,” that were unrealistic and did not seem to address the problems at 
hand.97 “Most of the programs have not been sufficiently studied to merit our 
endorsement,” he said, adding he was “not prepared to state with certainty that a wide 
variety of detailed, experimental and, in some cases, plain silly programs are the proper 
direction for American government.”98  
As it stood, with funds and time dwindling, Corman believed the Kerner 
Commission had two options, both of which he considered “undesirable.”99 It could 
either submit a report “acceptable to all commissioners” with “supplemental views of 
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individual commissioners,” or it could release two reports—one on behalf of the 
majority, the other for the dissenting minority.100 Corman preferred the first option. He 
concluded by complimenting the commission’s good intentions but lamented the “sudden 
zeal for unrealistic and unrealizable recommendations” that had “brought [the 
commission] to a crisis.”101 He called upon Kerner to reorient the commission and staff 
toward a report that offered plausible solutions within the stated framework. While 
Corman did not mention any commissioners or staffers by name, his animosity toward 
the more fervent staff members was clear. When commissioners like Lindsay did nothing 
to dispute this audacity—and, if anything, often praised it—it jeopardized the validity and 
long-term prospects of the bulk of the report. 
Comments from the military on the commission’s public safety portions seemed 
to reflect Corman’s concerns. Under Secretary of the Army David McGiffert sent 
feedback on the public safety draft to Ginsburg; McGiffert told Ginsburg that “while 
agreeing in most of the substance of the report’s observations, the Army staff is of the 
view that perhaps the report has gone into too much detail…which, within the broad 
framework of the report’s observations, might be better left to professional military 
men.”102 McGiffert added that he shared the staff’s view that “this detailed approach 
tends to weaken the credibility of what is covered.”103 Another document from January 
13—from an organization called the Foundation for Volunteer Action—echoed doubts 
from Corman and others on the costs associated with bold and provocative 
                                                
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 David McGiffert to David Ginsburg, with attached comments on draft report regarding U.S. Army, Jan. 
13, 1968, “DoD,” Box 3, Series 46, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
103 McGiffert to Ginsburg, with attached comments on draft report regarding U.S. Army, Jan. 13, 1968, 
“DoD,” Box 3, Series 46, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
 281 
recommendations. The Departments of Labor and HEW, respectively, had developed the 
idea for the foundation, and former HEW Secretary John Gardner had forwarded related 
comments to Joseph Califano to relay to the president. The letter called on Johnson to 
display “national leadership” in responding to the Kerner Commission preemptively.104 
This meant emphasizing that the commission’s response “cannot come in the form of 
costly programs…the response must be inexpensive…and it is clear that the response 
must come soon.”105 Johnson needed to address the nation and clarify that the “best 
minds” in the executive branch contended that the solutions were “already found in 
existing legislation.”106 The letter also recommended he express agreement with 
measures proposed on jobs, housing, education, and welfare while acknowledging the 
limitations. “If it were not for the budgetary constrains of the present time, he would be 
the first to urge broad expansion of existing programs,” the letter stated.107 It was, 
however, “simply not realistic to expect, at this point in time, that vastly greater dollar 
resources can be made available.”108  
The president needed to emphasize those portions of the report that compelled 
individual Americans to do their part as well as the Administration’s own record in 
committing itself to rectifying domestic problems. Additionally, the foundation wanted to 
tap into the “rich vein of volunteer spirit in America” and “enlist those thousands of 
Americans who want to help in this great effort, but who are not sure where to turn.”109 
The letter gave details on its proposed organization, how it would mobilize in cities, and 
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how it needed to act quickly following the president’s proposed address to the nation to 
avoid the perception it was merely a “stopgap measure.”110 The foundation would also 
hold a conference, inviting congressmen and scores of mayors to attend, to discuss how 
individual communities could augment the volunteer effort. A national figure could chair 
the conference, and President Johnson could be the concluding speaker and restate the 
goals. Instead of framing it as a massive federal program, Johnson could characterize it as 
a chance for millions of Americans to perform their civic duty. The Foundation for 
Volunteer Action might have a national reading month, dedicated to reading famous 
American documents like the Declaration of Independence and Gettysburg Address.  
The letter’s proactive vision for volunteerism in America was as calculating as it 
was optimistic. By announcing the foundation’s creation prior to the report, President 
Johnson could offer Americans a solution that undermined the prospect of rampant 
additional spending. Ideally, the foundation could be the vanguard for civic participation 
in Johnson’s second term, a federal program disguised as a massive volunteer effort that 
could complement the broad range of Great Society programs already in place. Pivoting 
the conversation before the public read a word of the commission’s report might allow 
the White House to have the upper hand if Kerner and his colleagues did call for billions 
and billions in new programs. Gardner did not offer an explanation on why two cabinet-
level departments felt compelled to offer the proposal, but they clearly agreed with those 
in Washington who feared the consequences of an embattled president’s commission 
making unattainable recommendations to him so publicly. Those who did favor massive 
spending, on the other hand, would likely view the proposal as an attempt to elude the 
real financial groundwork necessary to solve the problems. The Foundation for Volunteer 
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Action would not be penniless—its letter did propose small grants to cities—but the 
figures paled in comparison to some of the figures and ideas discussed by commissioners. 
Only with such groundwork could the visions set forth on jobs, housing, education, 
welfare, and other matters come to fruition; charting the same course with reheated 
measures and civic bromides was, in the minds of the ambitious staffers and 
commissioners like John Lindsay, a do-nothing approach. Like McGiffert’s letter, the 
Foundation for Volunteer Action letter reinforced two concerns Corman had expressed to 
Kerner from January 13: that the commission’s suggestions might be both uninformed 
and unrealistic. 
A letter sent by a White House staffer made Corman’s contentions more explicit. 
Irving Sprague wrote to Harold “Barefoot” Sanders, who was Legislative Counsel to the 
President, informing him that Corman had telephoned to offer some observations on the 
Kerner Commission. In addition to enclosing the letter Corman had sent to Kerner, 
Sprague told Sanders that “John Lindsay has taken effective control of the commission,” 
according to Corman, proposing a $40-50 billion program that would allow expenditures 
on cities to match those devoted to the Vietnam War and the space program.111 Sprague 
noted it was the “same thing Nixon is saying” and that Corman, Thornton, Peden, and 
McCulloch planned to draft and sign a dissenting minority report.112 Proposals might also 
include “far out” racial quotas in schools, in the workplace, and in neighborhoods, 
Sprague said.113 In a January 15 letter to Kerner, McGrath also questioned Lindsay’s 
                                                
111 Irving Sprague to Harold Sanders, “RE: Corman,” Jan. 15, 1968, John Gardner to Joseph Califano, 
“Foundation for Volunteer Action,” Jan. 13, 1968, “1/1/68-1/25/68,” Box 386, FG 690, NACCD, WHCF, 
LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
112 Sprague to Sanders, “RE: Corman,” Jan. 15, 1968, John Gardner to Joseph Califano, “Foundation for 
Volunteer Action,” Jan. 13, 1968, “1/1/68-1/25/68,” Box 386, FG 690, NACCD, WHCF, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
113 Ibid. 
 284 
motives. “One disturbing element came to light at the close of the day Friday,” McGrath 
told his boss.114 “Rumors are going around that Mayor Lindsay has been telephoning and 
otherwise lobbying some of the other Commissioners prior to their meetings in 
Washington in an effort to line up their support on certain proposals which the 
commission must decide,” he added.115 It was a damning accusation; that the White 
House held Lindsay in contempt was hardly a secret, but the New York mayor had 
remained cordial with commissioners and staff. Covert attempts by Lindsay to sway 
votes in his favor were not, according to McGrath, a surprise, but it was “disturbing that 
if, through that, he should break the faith with you in an effort to enter a meeting with a 
majority of the votes in his pocket,” McGrath wrote to Kerner. McGrath conceded he had 
not substantiated the rumors that Lindsay had contacted commissioners, but he wanted 
the chairman to know that they did exist.  
Kerner and Lindsay did not agree on all commission matters, but neither their 
interactions in commission meetings nor their joint press conference five days earlier 
indicated anything was amiss between them. Rumors that Lindsay had quietly tried to flip 
his peers on a number of issues before a series of pivotal meetings posed a threat to the 
working relationship of the Kerner Commission’s top two officials. The commission had 
already fended off numerous accusations and rumors about White House influence and 
the feasibility of its recommendations but had largely managed to avoid intra-
commissioner squabbles. Any divisions—whether documented in the press or in memos 
exchanged—centered on idealistic staffers and largely pragmatic commissioners; beyond 
the disagreements behind closed doors, there had been little animosity among 
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commissioners themselves. With bulky chapters churned out and the final product in the 
offing, however, the memos from Corman and McGrath indicated significant internal 
strife among commissioners and what they envisioned for March 1. McGrath also 
expressed frustration to Kerner at Ginsburg’s decision to have Jack Rosenthal, a former 
member of the White House staff, “provide the editing and unifying talents that Corman 
and others had hoped Bob Conot would supply.”116 Conot was a reliable, external voice 
for unifying the tone of the report, particularly the sections on history. Ginsburg had 
instead chosen a White House insider. “I don’t know if this will come up Thursday or 
not, but at least it is indicative of the unresponsive attitude in the front office,” McGrath 
wrote to Kerner.117 Frustration with a senior staffer like Ginsburg over commissioner 
preferences, even if stated in private, served as more evidence of dysfunction and frayed 
relationships within commission ranks.  
With questions about Lindsay’s alleged power play swirling, another article 
surfaced documenting a commission “deeply split” on recommendations, specifically 
funding. On one side were Lindsay, Abel, Brooke, Corman, and a number of staffers.118 
As with reports from the previous month, the staffers were described as young, radical, 
and of the belief that “a massive federal expenditure in the neighborhood of $4 billion a 
year is needed to bring racial peace to the larger cities.”119 This “side,” wrote Paul Scott 
of the Long Island Press, favored civilian police review boards, among other mechanisms 
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designed to hold police departments more accountable. The opposing group backed a 
program to allocate $1 billion a year; it consisted of Kerner, McCulloch, Peden, and 
government officials like Cyrus Vance and Ramsey Clark. Scott described this group as 
“deeply concerned about the prospects of renewed rioting this spring” while remaining 
aware of the “political limitations that President Johnson faces Congress” that 
necessitated a “practical approach.”120 The “Kerner group,” as the article described them, 
preferred “building on existing programs rather than introducing new approaches.”121 
Division among commissioners had reportedly reached the point that members had 
mulled asking for assistance, perhaps even from the White House, in order to find a 
compromise. Commissioners had initially dismissed talk of outside agitators in the riots, 
though Scott noted “new evidence has caused several to change their opinion in recent 
weeks.”122 He contrasted this with Sen. John McClellan’s commission, with its clear 
agenda in tracing conspiracy, and even editorialized that McClellan’s investigators had 
“been doing a much more thorough job than those of the President’s commission.”123  
While commissioners spent much of the month poring over chapter drafts, staff 
members continued editing and considering their audience. Ginsburg sent a memo 
summarizing a January 16 meeting of high-ranking staff members that focused on 
fundamental questions the staff needed to consider about its audience. Ginsburg reported 
on his meetings with the commissioners and stated a goal of getting all material—three 
volumes worth—to commissioners by month’s end.124 The first section would reportedly 
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delve into the “underlying causes” of the riots, the second section would be an exposition 
of “what actually happened” during the riots, and the third section would contain 
recommendations.125 All depositions and witness profiles were complete and had been 
rechecked for accuracy. Among the questions posited were whether the report spoke 
“effectively to the average, unconcerned, middle-class white” and if it “focused too 
narrowly on Negroes alone.”126 With the same officials scheduled to reconvene the 
following week, Ginsburg wanted them to consider if the report had an African American 
bias, whether it “considers the future enough,” and if it offered a workable path for white 
Americans to play a role in solving the problems.127 Perhaps most importantly, the 
executive director asked: “do we inadvertently discuss the situation as ‘their’ problem 
that ‘we’ are trying to solve?”128 As the staff mulled these questions, it continued to 
monitor the funding issue that might preclude it from working past the March 1 deadline. 
The decision remained on hold until February, which posed a dilemma: many staffers 
were proceeding as if the Kerner Commission would cease operations March 1, meaning 
they were already hunting for other jobs. John Koskinen suggested that Ginsburg and 
Palmieri “let the commission know” of this issue “so they won’t be irate.”129 If the funds 
did arrive, commissioners would be “very likely to find that the bulk of the staff are no 
longer in position to stay.”130 
                                                                                                                                            
Dept. Heads, 1/16/68,” Jan. 17, 1968, “John Koskinen,” Box 3, Series 37, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, 
Austin, TX. 
125 William Chapman, “Riot Panel Weighs Shift on Welfare,” The Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1968, A1. 
126 Ginsburg to Commission Staff, “Minutes of Meeting of Dept. Heads, 1/16/68,” Jan. 17, 1968, “John 
Koskinen,” Box 3, Series 37, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 John Koskinen to David Ginsburg and Victor Palmieri, “Decision as to Staffing Needs Beyond March 
1,” Jan. 17, 1968, “John Koskinen,” Box 3, Series 37, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
130 Ibid. 
 288 
As feedback on chapter drafts trickled in, Kerner Commission staffers found that 
consultants were often as scathing in their feedback as some of the commissioners. 
Consultant Roye Lowry, a member of the Bureau of the Budget, responded to a section 
on program recommendations for employment, welfare, housing, and education, among 
other subjects. Writing to Victor Palmieri, Lowry said the draft took an “unselective, 
superficial, shopping basket approach” and was riddled with “superfluous detail” that 
added little to achieving the commission’s prime objectives.131 Beyond the “ambiguous 
position which the authors have toward Negroes and their role in American society”—
Lowry asserted that the paper vacillated between welcoming African Americans into 
“meaningful participation” in democracy and wondering if they were capable of doing 
so—the authors needed to consider the consequences of their recommendations.132 He 
saw a “casual disregard of the implications of these proposals” that parroted Corman’s 
concerns over reckless promises.133 The “pitfalls in detail on almost every page” ran the 
risk of “a very serious loss in credibility for the Commission and its work.”134  
Another staffer offered criticism even more withering, writing to Ginsburg that 
most chapter drafts were “a compilation of facts” rather than an “analysis” that “obscures 
more than it reveals…the richness of the qualitative information, which could give the 
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facts meaning, is ignored.”135 The final result was a “flatness and lack of significance 
only occasionally relieved by a well-framed and relevant question competently 
handled.”136 Alvin Spivak had concerns about the report’s reception internationally. 
“Imagine Radio Moscow, right now, [reading that] America is moving toward apartheid,” 
he wrote in provided feedback.137 “How do USIA and the Voice of America handle the 
text of a summary that starts that way?” he asked.138 Spivak also raised issues with 
advertising the fact that commission had called black militants as witnesses (he suggested 
phrasing it as “black moderates and militants”) and the “dreadfully one-sided” riot 
profiles submitted.139 “Reading them, our summary clearly establishes that the riots were 
the work of the police and the National Guard, and those poor, deprived ghetto people 
we’re trying to help out really didn’t commit much mayhem at all,” he wrote.140 Spivak 
wanted the commission to state clearly how America had failed many of its poor, black 
citizens, but not at the expense of the truth—that some of those involved in riots had to be 
held accountable for their violent behavior. 
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On January 18 commissioners began a round of meetings on long-term 
programs.141 Roy Wilkins, who had cautioned against fighting integration in the first 
meeting by saying it was “strewing seeds of 1975 and 1980 riots,” debated James 
Corman the following day on the relationship between poverty and racism and how each 
influenced education in America.142 Corman viewed racism as the issue, telling his 
colleagues, “I hope this report won’t dwell on details of how to reduce poverty or 
improve education…Stress racism.”143 Wilkins disagreed. “We can’t separate these ills 
from racism,” he said, adding that the commission could not be “soft” on the 
shortcomings of school systems.”144 When Corman responded that there were “a lot of 
whites living on less than $3000 per year who didn’t throw fire bombs” and called for a 
“need to stress racism” and separate it from poverty, Wilkins again voiced his 
disagreement, and Lindsay intervened.145 “You can’t live with this problem without 
coming back to housing, jobs, and education,” the vice chairman said.146 “But the reason 
he can’t get good housing, jobs, and education is because he’s Negro,” Corman 
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replied.147 Wilkins interjected, saying the commission “can’t just repeat, ‘erase all 
prejudice and we’ll solve the problem’…we need more wide-ranging changes than in the 
past. We have got to recommend something.”148 As an example of the recommendations 
he believed strayed from the commission’s original intent, Corman said he was not 
interested in addressing the minimum wage when it had nothing to do with riots. “If you 
don’t think struggling to get to 90 cents per hour by Negroes doesn’t lead to riots, you’re 
being naïve,” Wilkins said in retort.149  
Commissioners also discussed the media chapter draft, with Katherine Peden and 
Tex Thornton continuing their crusade to levy harsher criticism against outlets who had 
covered rioting. All forms of media were complicit in biased, misleading coverage, 
according to the duo.150 When Ginsburg told Thornton that research and facts did not 
show any evidence faulting the media, Thornton asked, “Why are they in a better position 
to say no TV abuse than us?”151 He denounced the lack of “balanced news coverage” and 
focus on “the extremes to give a false understanding of ghetto residents.”152 Thornton 
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continued: “it is unbelievable that TV deserves a clean bill of health…[they] must have 
the audio part of TV newscasts.”153 Newark and Detroit, he claimed, would have “been 
quickly contained,” had stations “blacked out news.”154 Cameras did not even need to be 
in the ghetto when riots broke out, Thornton argued; it could only have dire 
consequences.155 Peden had similar critiques for print, telling commissioners that 
“newspapers, in many whites’ minds, are one of two principal causes of riots.”156 If the 
“manner in which media covered” riots did not receive extended attention, she said, the 
commission risked “heavy criticism.”157 Abel agreed with both, saying that the press 
“tries to make a monkey out of everyone.”158 Kerner and Lindsay stressed a need for 
balance in coverage as well, but had praise for most outlets rather than blame. Lindsay 
cited the “good deal of restraint” shown on television and said that while newspapers 
tended to be “worse than TV,” even they were “pretty good” with handling riots.159 
Wilkins bemoaned riot coverage, but for different reasons, saying that it “reflects failures 
to inform whites about goals and desires and problems of Negroes.”160 Lindsay assured 
his colleagues that the commission did not want to “keep patting [the media] on the 
back,” but some were unconvinced.161 The minutes show “several” commissioners 
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replied: “the draft appears to be trying to bend over backwards to be kind to the 
press…don’t bother.”162 
Discussion of the public safety sections of the report also resumed. Thornton 
complimented the staff for an improved draft from the one submitted earlier in the month, 
but he still thought the chapter had “an implication that police are bad…they have a 
tremendous burden.”163 He repeated the assertion that a few bad officers did not mean the 
commission needed to “take a paint brush here and kick all the police in the mouths.”164 
Beyond his evergreen complaints and mixed metaphors, commissioners discussed the 
costs of programs aimed at improving law enforcement infrastructure; Ginsburg told his 
colleagues that the Department of Justice had worked on legislation, and there was also 
speculation that the Safe Streets Act, yet to be enacted, might help with some of the 
funding questions. Lindsay voiced support for federal funding and local appropriation, 
arguing that if states had access to the money, cities would never see it. Also up for 
discussion were the types of weapons police might have in their arsenals going forward. 
Palmieri noted that some arms manufacturers had pressured local police forces to upgrade 
and “buy these weapons of mass destruction,” prompting a discussion over whether such 
weapons were necessary in riot conditions.165 Staffer Arnold Sagalyn asserted that assault 
weapons “in any hands but highly trained police, with the tension of a riot,” could yield a 
“horrendous result.”166 He encountered little resistance; Corman said even a trained 
machine gunner could not distinguish between an innocent civilian and a “bank robber,” 
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while Lindsay said, “once you turn loose police with weapons of mass destruction, you’ll 
have innocent mothers and children lying all over the streets with pools of blood.”167 That 
unsettling visual truncated weaponry as a topic of discussion. Commissioners then 
discussed the potential for interstate compacts—the right to deploy National Guardsmen 
across states lines. Attorney General Ramsey Clark had already opposed it, and Lindsay 
told the group it “gives me the shudders.” What if quick action were necessary, Kerner 
asked. “The thought of Lester Maddox, my governor, calling on Lurleen Wallace to send 
in her troops scares me more than the rioters,” Jenkins quipped.168 What if Guardsmen 
refused to cross state lines? Kerner said he would have them court-martialed, while 
McCulloch said he would support the right of refusal. 
In the January 20 meeting, commissioners also discussed the undeniable fact that 
“police harassment does exist.”169 Staffer Bill Bower said of police brutality that the 
research team’s “investigations show these are fact,” and that in 23 cities they found 
substantial evidence of “harassment by police.”170 John Lindsay agreed, but he added that 
the report needed to “hammer away that police can’t do it alone.”171 The officer “had 
placed on his shoulders all the ills of society” and needed help from white and black 
communities.172 When Ramsey Clark spoke publicly on riot prevention on the same day, 
the burden of law enforcement served as the cornerstone of his remarks. The year 1968, 
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he claimed, would be the year of the policeman; they would “tell more about the future of 
this country than will any other person in our society because this is a critical year.”173 
How police responded would have long-term ramifications for law and order in America. 
The policeman was “a man on a tightrope,” forced to find the middle ground between 
leniency and repression, either of which risked bloodshed.174 Clark continued that 
officers needed to “reach the unreachable … communicate with people who don’t want to 
communicate…people who want to provoke you and who win if they succeed.”175 
Furthermore, as Lindsay had mentioned to commissioners, peaceful police-community 
relations depended on more than just those in uniform. “We can’t expect one man in blue 
with a stick to control a youth who was not under control at home, in church, in school,” 
Clark said, adding “we cannot control a permissive society by force.”176 Public officials 
recognized the unenviable task that police departments faced going forward, and while 
they needed to confront it directly, they also wished to remind the public that police-
community relations required a joint peacekeeping effort. 
On January 24, President Johnson delivered a special message to Congress related 
to prospective civil rights legislation. Exactly one week before, Johnson had given his 
1968 State of the Union; while he was interrupted 53 times total in that address, the only 
“prolonged, spontaneous ovation” the big Texan received was when he declared that 
Americans “have had enough of rising crime and lawlessness in this country.”177 When 
he had mentioned “vital” civil rights laws to Congress, his pleas were met with “total 
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silence” by the joint session.178 Time noted this silence stood in stark contrast to the 
applause received a dozen times when he spoke of curbing crime. Johnson told Congress 
that the federal government “can and should help the states and cities in their war on 
crime, and this we shall do,” and spoke of “no more urgent” priority than passing the Safe 
Streets Act.179 A week later, he reiterated to Congress the need to augment the breadth of 
civil rights laws. As America grappled with civil rights, he told legislators, Johnson 
realized that the “position of minorities in American society is defined not merely by law, 
but by social, educational, and economic conditions.”180 He came armed with statistics as 
well. Income for nonwhite families had doubled over the past seven years. The 
unemployment rate had fallen from 10.8 percent to 7.4 percent between 1963 and 1967. 
Over one-and-a-half million African Americans had registered to vote, more than double 
the number registered in 1965. More African Americans had won elections to political 
office.181 As with all presidents, Johnson was willing to restate the litany of positive 
developments that had happened on his watch. 
But Johnson had not appeared simply to boast. Damning statistics and trends 
lingered. One in three nonwhite families lived in poverty. Unemployment rates for 
nonwhites were double rates for white Americans. In many neighborhoods, residential 
segregation and living conditions had worsened. “In the State of the Union message last 
week I spoke of a spirit of restlessness in our land,” he said, adding it was “more 
pronounced in race relations than in any other area of domestic concern.”182 He chastised 
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extremists on both sides—those who “decry the awakening of new expectations in people 
who have found cause to hope” and those who “promote violence and force as an 
alternative to orderly change.”183 Each extreme constituted slivers of a broader 
population, black and white, most of whom had “not lent their hearts or efforts to either 
form of extremism.”184 He called on America to strive for “meaningful integration” 
through a combination of new and existing legislation.185 Johnson alluded to efforts 
already in motion—the DOJ filing a record number of civil rights suits, including 
obtaining convictions in the deaths of three civil rights workers in Mississippi in 1964, 
HEW working with 2000 school districts to comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and 
efforts by the Department of Defense to desegregate neighborhoods around military 
bases—as assuring measures that needed to continue and expand. The three major pieces 
of civil rights legislation in the previous decade were critical precedents, “in education, in 
health…in the war against poverty,” but “critical work remains,” Johnson told 
legislators.186  
The president appealed for legislation that would strengthen federal laws 
“prohibiting violent interference with the exercise of civil rights,” especially in instances 
when activists attempted to integrate public spaces.187 “Century-old criminal civil rights 
law,” he argued, was outdated and insufficient, failing to vest judges with the proper 
authority to punish those who committed “blatant acts of violence” against African 
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Americans.188 A bill before the Senate Judiciary Committee would allow for harsher 
punishment for such crimes. Johnson also wanted to grant the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the “authority it needs to carry out its vital 
responsibilities.”189 He told Congress that the DOJ had taken on more than 150 cases of 
workplace discrimination against minorities and that the EEOC needed legal authority to 
intervene when necessary against culpable employers.190 Elsewhere, the nation needed to 
confront housing discrimination; Johnson pointed to the Model Cities program and plans 
to build six million new housing units for low and middle-income families.191  
In conclusion, the president sought to personalize the situation he brought before 
Congress. “For many members of minority groups, the past decade has brought 
meaningful advances,” Johnson said, but he also made clear that for “most minorities—
locked in urban ghettoes or rural areas—economic and social progress has come 
slowly.”192 Ensconced in the president’s message of unfinished business was a reminder 
that while most marginalized groups were thought of in terms of “statistics, percentages, 
and trends,” the problems that persisted were problems of “individual human beings—of 
individual Americans.”193 Housing discrimination meant that “the Negro veteran of 
Vietnam can’t live in an apartment which advertises vacancies,” while employment 
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figures failed to capture the plight of “the Puerto Rican father who cannot earn enough to 
feed his children.”194 He concluded with a reminder that no one suffered from 
lawlessness more than “the majority of slum-dwellers” and a plea for Congress to enact 
“legislation fundamental to the human rights and dignity of every American.”195 Notably, 
the president’s lengthy speech made no mention of the Kerner Commission, its timeline, 
or any of its potential recommendations. 
In the press, Johnson’s comments on curbing street crime garnered more 
attention, both in his State of the Union address and to Congress a week later, than did his 
elongated plea to enact more civil rights legislation. Time speculated that “crime in 
streets” could be the top issue in the presidential election.196 Vice President Humphrey 
conceded that another violent summer “could really sink us next fall.”197 With fears that 
the violence could reach the suburbs, “concern over the Negro’s welfare has been largely 
replaced by consternation at the prospect of anarchy.”198 U.S. News & World Report 
designated 1967 as the “worst year for racial strife in U.S. history,” reeling off statistics 
while referencing “talk of open racial warfare” and the notion that more groups had 
resorted to “violence or a show of force” to advance their cause.199 Newsweek described 
police departments purchasing armored cars in anticipation of more rioting and ran a 
harrowing photograph of armed housewives at a gun range, their weapons pointed at the 
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camera. Kansas City and Dearborn, Michigan, offered six-week courses in firearms 
training, and many suburban women had signed up.  
In Miami, local police heightened their presence in ghettoes to ward off local 
gangs; officers patrolled neighborhoods with shotguns and police dogs. While some 
ghetto residents welcomed the changes, saying they finally felt safe to leave their homes 
at night, critics said “get-tough” policies only invited more violence.200 One local African 
American minister said police “could justify machine guns and lions, if that’s what it 
took to wipe out crime in our streets.”201 Weeks earlier, Daniel Watts, editor of Liberator, 
a black nationalist magazine, had written in The Saturday Evening Post that “white 
America has no reason to share the pie willingly” and that African Americans needed “a 
torch and a gun to get [their] slice.”202 Watts lashed out at moderate black leaders and 
white liberal paternalism, saying that “not once have we been allowed to decide what we 
want.”203 He was tired of white Americans telling him that African Americans would 
“overcome as long as we don’t rock the boat,” and urged the more militant factions of 
black activism to respond.204 On the whole, America was an uneasy nation in 1968, 
dreading what the impending summer months might hold. 
With the commission’s penultimate month drawing to a close, yet another story of 
internal discord leaked to the press. Writing in The New York Times, Vincent Burke 
reported that commissioners remained at an impasse over long-term recommendations. 
“The disputes center on proposals that would enlarge the government’s job-creating 
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responsibilities, revamp the welfare program, decentralize local school systems and 
transfer some governmental power from city hall to the ghetto,” Burke wrote.205 On the 
subject of school systems, those in favor of decentralizing school systems pointed to 
failed ghetto schools as evidence to provide “parents with greater power in running the 
system,” while those against believed it was not the commission’s duty to “recommend a 
radical transformation of the institution simply because it hasn’t worked well in the 
ghetto.”206 The commission also discussed a policy that would allow parents to “buy 
instruction outside the public school system,” a proposal that met fierce opposition amid 
fears that it would prompt well-to-do and talented students to “leave the public schools 
entirely” and leave the system with “the dregs.”207 With employment and welfare, 
commissioners reportedly differed—though the article offered few specifics on where 
specific members stood on the issues—on whether to reinvigorate existing programs or 
introduce new recommendations. The Washington Post reported that most commissioners 
“pretty much agreed that the present welfare system is a failure,” and that some favored a 
guaranteed annual income instead.208 Others supposedly preferred a system involving 
federal, state, and local governments contributing to payments; the federal share would be 
“drastically increased” to help poorer states “pay the higher minimums.”209  
Burke also quoted several commissioners anonymously on the scope of the 
project. One interviewed said that the riot investigation was “simply unbelievable…it’s 
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like a foreign country of which the average American has no knowledge.”210 The same 
commissioner told Burke that America “could start spending billions of dollars a year on 
the problem and we would still be working a generation from now.”211 Another 
commissioner offered a similarly pessimistic view; “sometimes I feel that we’re going 
through an exercise in futility,” the commissioner said.212 As the panel reportedly tussled 
over framing recommendations on jobs, welfare, education, and ghetto agency, Burke 
reported it “remains to be seen whether the split will be reflected in the commission’s 
report, or whether the members will manage to agree on compromise language that 
conceals their differences.”213 Based on the minutes of commission meetings available, 
the friction described by Burke’s story was indeed accurate. Despite multiple warnings, 
someone at the commission table continued to feed guarded information to the press. 
Spivak seethed over the latest development in a memo to Ginsburg and Palmieri. 
“I don’t know what more we can do to emphasize the need for security on the part of staff 
personnel and consultants,” he wrote to his colleagues.214 Spivak noted that the journalist 
who recently ran a “reasonably accurate piece” about the commission in the Washington 
Post “told me he got his information from ‘someone other than a commission 
member.’”215 The Post reporter also told Spivak that he “had talked to ‘three people in 
the last two days who told me they had seen all these volumes’ of the drafts, and that he 
got a glimmering of insight into the Media section from a ‘deputy managing editor of the 
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Post who heard about it at a cocktail party.’”216 Commissioners and staff needed “another 
reminder,” though at that point, he said, “it ought not to be necessary.”217 On the same 
day, Palmieri relayed the message to the staff; “recurrent items in the newspaper indicate 
that our security problem is growing,” he wrote.218 Every leak, Palmieri told staffers, 
“can only detract from the chances of [the report] making a real impact.”219 He concluded 
by saying he hoped “every member of the staff ‘will do everything in his power to keep 
the lid on and interrupt the stream of ‘revelations’ about the Commission and its work 
that are appearing in the papers.”220 
As February approached, however, the biggest priorities remained revising the 
report in time for the March 1 deadline and extending commission funding past the 
release date. Spivak made reference to the commission’s time and funding dwindling in a 
memo to Ginsburg and Palmieri. He had contacted renowned filmmaker Charles 
Guggenheim about the possibility of making a documentary to promote the commission’s 
report. The commission would need about $80,000 to produce a “powerful 
documentary,” which would take five or so months to complete.221 Spivak noted much of 
the documentary footage would be black and white rather than the preferred color format, 
but said, “for the topic at hand this would be a better form of presentation anyway.”222 All 
that commission brass needed, Spivak said, was “$80,000 and 5 months.”223 For a panel 
beset by rumors and criticism from every possible angle, by an unnerving, often self-
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inflicted pressure to mean all things to all people, some humor on the unattainable was in 
order. It was not clear, however, whether Spivak’s remark was in earnest or in jest. 
 
 305 
February 1968 
 Adrian Dove had a quiz for middle-class, white America, an aptitude test for 
those suburbanites with either a solemn interest in helping the marginalized or a 
willingness to launch into prescriptive tirades on how to fix American ghettoes.1 Did 
white America know what a “handkerchief head” was, in ghetto parlance?2 What about a 
“gas head”?3 Was Bo Diddley a renowned singer, a camp for children, or a boxed wine 
available at the corner store?4 Who were the Dixie Hummingbirds—an arm of the Ku 
Klux Klan, a contemporary black gospel outfit, or a black paramilitary force 
headquartered in Mississippi?5  What was the opposite of a “square?”6  
On February 15 The Washington Post printed this 21-question, “soul folk 
aptitude” test.7 Each multiple-choice question sought to confound the white majority 
readership; for every tongue-in-cheek wrong answer, there were a few, Dove surmised, 
that those unfamiliar with street terminology would struggle to choose between. He thus 
wished to nettle those living in quiet suburbs, to push them out of their cultural comfort 
zones and into a foreign lexicon to prove a point: black wisdom did not always sync with 
accepted white mindsets. Dove, a social worker from Los Angeles, declared “a score of 
11 or less classifies you as an intellectual failure—a ghetto drop-out…it means that you 
                                                
1 “Attention Honkies: Are You Deprived?” The Washington Post, February 15, 1968, A24, “Newspaper 
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are culturally depraved.”8 If the quiz stumped the average white Washington Post reader, 
perhaps that reader could sympathize with neglected residents of black ghettoes, blamed 
for their own misfortunes, scorned for not excelling on tests “keyed to white, middle class 
cultural standards.”9 Whether or not test-takers knew precisely what a “hype” was—it 
was, in slang, a heroin addict—missed the point; white Americans were so accustomed to 
their values and worldview that they failed to recognize that many people of color 
trafficked in a different world, a world with which whites were deeply unfamiliar.10 
Before offering well-intentioned assistance or a condescending lecture, white Americans 
needed a reminder that they did not know this world; to speak about it authoritatively was 
to speak out of turn.  
As America experienced unprecedented economic growth through the 1960s, 
inner cities languished in isolation, with no stake in an abiding prosperity that, as the 
previous summer revealed, had harshly demarcated borders. The Kerner Commission, 
like much of America, knew about these borders. It knew how these borders had 
originated and how certain factions of white society wished for them to persist. With the 
report’s March 1 release date fast approaching, its job was to show the country how these 
borders, literal and metaphorical, had produced violence, how ignoring immutable truths 
about race in America would only produce more of the same in the years and months 
ahead. It was, as President Johnson had said at the outset, a tall order.11  
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That did not mean, however, that the commission planned to take heed of black 
militant voices wholesale. In early February, Larry Still sent Victor Palmieri updated 
materials on CORE and SNCC, two civil rights organizations with moderate, interracial 
roots that had been overrun by militants by 1967. Still, who enclosed pamphlets and 
brochures with his letter, described CORE as having transformed from “an interracial 
organization to a predominantly black organization which once advocated non-violence 
to one which now defends the use of violence in seeking its goals.”12 In tracing CORE’s 
inception in 1943 to its integral role in the 1961 Freedom Rides to its “Black Power 
position of today,” Still’s letter carried a tone of disappointment and suspicion.13 The 
forwarded materials “make no mention of Charles Oldham, a white St. Louis attorney 
who was the first national chairman of CORE,” nor did they track McKissick’s ascent to 
his position of power.14 Furthermore, the materials traced the “beatings, terror, and 
murder of CORE members (during the Mississippi summer of 1964 and before) under the 
nonviolent concept” to the organization’s current stance that could “no longer advocate 
such a policy today because of the continued lack of protection of civil rights workers by 
local, state and the federal government.”15 Still did not offer an opinion on CORE’s 
updated stance explicitly, but the letter’s overall tone clearly disapproved of the decision. 
While the commission did not dismiss black militant thinking wholly, officials were 
surely incredulous that CORE, an organization that had experienced lethal violence like 
few others in the civil rights struggle—that had buried some of its own followers along 
                                                                                                                                            
Cater and David Ginsburg, Feb. 20, 1968, “1/26/68-2/27/68,” Box 387, FG 690, National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, White House Central Files, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
12 Larry Still to Victor Pamieri, “CORE Material,” Feb. 5, 1968, “SNCC,” Box 1, Series 11, NACCD, RG 
282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
 308 
the way—would reverse course and refuse to condemn methods that bore consequences it 
knew all too well.   
Still also noted that the commission had interviewed McKissick in New York 
City; in his on-the-record interview with Merle McCurdy, the CORE leader was quite 
forthcoming. He wished to expel white members from CORE due to their inability to 
relate to the lived experience of African Americans or the programs planned with that 
experience in mind. In his testimony, he also called for a session of Congress to “deal 
with this entire domestic problem.”16 The “problem,” as he saw it, ranged from the need 
for “post offices, department stores, banks, etc. located in black communities [to be] 
owned and operated by black people” to an earnest dialogue on how to address “vice in 
the ghetto.”17 Congress needed, McKissick said, to “listen to some black talk for a 
change.”18 The same applied to the Kerner Commission, which he reminded McCurdy 
had not one black militant voice at the highest level. As a result, McKissick had grave 
concerns about its ability “to make the necessary changes in the system.”19 America 
needed “people on the Commission who know what they’re doing…the commission 
should plot the role of the white people and what they have done to black people.”20 If, 
instead, commissioners were interested in placing “blame on black people,” McKissick 
said, “then I am hell-bent against you.”21 He singled out liberal whites, whom he labeled 
as “among those who lack the necessary commitment about black people’s 
conditions….When CORE began to address itself to the ghetto problem, liberal whites 
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deserted, picked up their marbles and went home.”22 McKissick also offered no 
guarantees as to what the forthcoming summer might hold; it was possible, he said, that 
African Americans “might not decide to let the police shoot them down like cats and 
dogs.”23 As he closed his deposition at the United States Court House in New York City, 
McKissick made one thing clear to McCurdy and his associate: “if I got to go, I ain’t 
going to march to no gas chamber.”24 
Still also passed along information on SNCC, a civil rights organization with a 
similar mild-to-malevolent trajectory—at least in the eyes of the commission officials—
over the course of the decade. Unlike Floyd McKissick, SNCC leader Stokely 
Carmichael refused to hold an on-the-record meeting with the Kerner Commission—
though he did agree to have his “views reflected to the commission” informally.25 
Materials sent to Palmieri indicated the events that had culminated in SNCC’s realization 
that it was “not possible to work within the present Democratic structure.”26 Still wrote 
that the organization had “never accepted non-violence as a philosophy, but only as a 
technique…to deal with the realities of the civil rights struggle in the South.”27 He 
continued that once the civil rights movement had turned northward into urban areas, 
SNCC believed there was “no need to preach non-violence as a technique or a philosophy 
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to masses of embittered blacks.”28 Violence was not advised; it was simply a 
consequence of the struggle for “black control of their own neighborhoods by any means 
necessary,” according to SNCC leaders.29 Until white America acknowledged this 
struggle, there would be “no hope for the end of ‘black exploitation and oppression’ by 
racist whites within the present American system.”30 SNCC permitted white activists to 
aid in their cause, but they had to do so on SNCC’s terms; if whites would listen instead 
of speaking with unearned, misguided authority, they reasoned, then there would be no 
violence. SNCC also likened its own struggle to the struggle of subjugated peoples 
around the world, citing both American Indians and the Vietnam War as “proof that U.S. 
will allow no force, great or small, to stand in the way of its materialistic goals.”31 
In addition to tracking SNCC as an organization, the commission also tracked 
Carmichael individually. A message at the end of February from Herbert Jenkins to 
David Ginsburg featured an attached report filed by two African American detectives 
with the Atlanta Police Department. “I do not have words to express my appreciation for 
the most excellent service that you furnished the Commission and the nation,” Jenkins 
wrote in reference to the report’s release; after this gratitude came a detailed summary 
from the detectives on Carmichael’s movements in Atlanta on February 28.32 “We were 
called into the office today…for the purpose of working on a special assignment of 
locating Stokely Carmichael and to attend a meeting on the Morehouse Campus at Sage 
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Hall,” the detectives wrote.33 After following him to a local restaurant, the detectives 
attended Carmichael’s speech on the Morehouse campus; it featured Carmichael’s usual 
impassioned rhetoric about black self-determination and the hypocrisy of the white power 
structure and broader American government. At one point, Carmichael told the crowd 
that for every African American victim of police brutality, there should be “ten dead 
hunkies” or “ten dead stinking cops.”34 He traced the roots of socioeconomic struggles 
for African Americans to white pillaging and greed; at the conclusion, he “read a letter 
which he received from Rap Brown in jail expressing his views ‘that if he had to die in 
jail, this would be a worthy cause.’”35  
After he had spoken, Carmichael met with the Black Student Alliance at 
Morehouse—a meeting the detectives could not infiltrate—before going to the office of 
local activist Dr. Roy Bell. After one of Bell’s cars picked Carmichael up, the detectives 
tracked him to the airport and learned that he “traveled under an assumed name…A. 
Kuttati.”36 The detectives concluded that he was bound for his home in Washington, 
D.C., and provided his address and the license plate for the car that transported him to the 
Atlanta airport. If the Kerner Commission had made it known that it did not take 
criticisms of its lack of a militant voice lightly, these concerns rang a bit hollow with 
revelations that one of the commissioners had assigned two of his men to track perhaps 
the most prominent black militant in America. Carmichael’s alarming rhetoric aside, the 
surveillance spoke to a disconnect that remained between established power structures 
and young black militants; those in power were willing to say what sounded conciliatory 
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and self-aware while simultaneously watching militants with considerable tenacity and 
zeal. There were no indications that other commissioners or staff beyond Ginsburg were 
aware of the memo from Jenkins on the report his detectives had filed. 
Beyond the monitoring and subtle condemnation of black militancy, 
commissioner Roy Wilkins, who had a regular column, rebutted claims made in late 
January by Columbia sociologist Amital Etzioni that the Kerner Commission was “bound 
to fail because it had no black militants as members.”37 Wilkins sarcastically chided 
Etzioni’s critique, saying that he and other members of the “black militant coterie” took 
exception to the commission because “it has no social scientists as members!”38 He 
defended the commission’s membership, saying that “some have more practical 
experience in the field than many a social scientist.” Rather than focusing on the 
commission and its goals, Dr. Etzioni and his peers seemed more interested in harping on 
its shortcomings, on labeling it an ersatz gesture comprised of the wrong minds to 
address the problems. Wilkins put it more colorfully, saying that these critics wanted the 
commission’s findings “to be a treated like a commodity—say a crate of tomatoes.”39 
They would observe this “crate of tomatoes,” the “color, size, firmness, and price” before 
loudly declaring it “falls short of being a crate of cantaloupes, and thus may create 
reverberations in Colorado, Michigan, and the Rio Grande Valley, to say nothing of the 
effect it might have on Israeli exports to Denmark.”40  
Quips aside, Wilkins believed Etzioni was both harsh and naïve, offering 
impractical solutions that made public officials scoff. He cited the sociologist calling for 
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“all civilians, white and black, and the police [to] be disarmed.”41 How, Wilkins 
wondered aloud in his own column, Etzioni believed this might occur “in the face of 
rampant, rugged American individualism, plus the gun lobby, plus the crime industry” 
was not evident, but such an unrealistic proposal demonstrated that social scientists were 
often disconnected from hard-nosed, pragmatic political operations.42 Wilkins noted to 
his readers that early days of testimony in the Kerner Commission revealed the 
“bewildering, interlocking, monumental and frightening complexity of the ingredients of 
civil disorders sharpened by the race issue.” To expect an ephemeral commission “under 
the burden of [a] time bomb” to offer comprehensive solutions to “manifold problems 
wrapped up in old hatreds” was to misunderstand its purpose.43 The commission had 
known from the outset, he said, “that it could not please everyone,” but that did not make 
its tireless work a futile exercise.44 What Wilkins referred to as the “chorusing of ‘bound 
to fail’” risked obscuring a “deadly serious effort to meet a deadly serious crisis.”45 If 
critiques of that effort were so withering that they invalidated it entirely, such critiques 
did nothing for solving the problems at the heart of the Kerner Commission. Wilkins had, 
to this point, offered an array of criticisms against black militants and leftists in general, 
but whereas many of those centered on those groups not speaking for all African 
Americans, this particular column depicted them as cynical and out of touch.  
Lamenting the direction of civil rights organizations and pushing back against 
militants did not mean, however, that the commission had softened in its intention of 
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showing the extent and pervasive effects of American racism. A February 18 New York 
Times article noted that in “a small, first-floor room of the Capitol beneath the Senate 
chamber, 10 men and a woman have been putting the finishing touches on a document 
that will tell the people they are in deep trouble.”46 The commission, according to 
journalist John Herbers, would tell the nation that conditions in inner cities were even 
worse than initially feared. On top of the host of recommendations on welfare, housing, 
education, law enforcement and a number of other subjects, the report would chronicle 
simmering hostilities, black and white, that only worsened racial tension.47 Another 
article the following week in the Times reported the commission would cite “massive 
failure of the white majority, through prejudice and neglect, to deal justly with the Negro 
minority.”48  
Accordingly, a source within the commission told the Times the report would be 
“particularly harsh on whites, asserting that many who disclaim any prejudice toward 
Negroes do harbor prejudices sometimes unknown to themselves but easily detected by 
blacks.”49 The Kerner Commission would also describe sniping during riots as mythical, 
police in many of the disorders as largely ignorant of the communities they patrolled and 
ill-equipped to handle riotous scenarios, and ghetto residents as understandably 
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distrustful of those designated to protect and serve their neighborhoods.50 These factors 
were among many that fostered a climate of mutual distrust in American ghettoes: 
officers on edge in crime-ridden neighborhoods and residents afraid of police brutality 
with no accountability. The report would also recommend establishing a “nonprofit, 
nongovernment institute of urban communications to help close a chasm that the 
commission found between the mass news media and Negroes.”51 The blame was not so 
much on how the media reported on riots and chronicled American ghettoes as it was on 
the lack of diversity in television and print journalism itself; hiring more African 
Americans to report news would abate the chances of white Americans seeing ghettoes 
and their inhabitants exclusively as hopeless and vice-prone. Part of the burden, then, was 
on the African American moderates—not white politicians, not black militants—who 
spoke for the majority of black communities across the country. Said one anonymous 
commissioner: “it’s a hell of a job; all of us are completely worn out.”52 Another noted 
that “the race problem is the core” but posed the question: “What the hell do you do 
about racism? When you get down to it, what can you do really quickly?”53 
Commissioner Fred Harris expressed hope that the white majority would act when 
confronted with “the terrible conditions in which other Americans live and how this 
threatens society.”54 Furthermore, the message delivered by a commission “composed 
chiefly of moderates,” the article noted, would ideally “stir more interest” in the issues at 
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hand.55 Commissioners would acknowledge the costs of the recommendations while 
arguing that the “price of inaction” would “accelerate the trend toward two separate and 
hostile societies.”56 The article also quoted Katherine Peden, who downplayed fears 
about the nation “sitting on a power keg” in 1968; in contrast, President Johnson had told 
a group of students visiting the White House on February 12: “I don’t think you can avert 
a bad summer. We’ll have a bad summer. We’ll have several bad summers.”57 The 
commission had ultimately decided to shun cost concerns related to the budget and 
Vietnam War, according to the Times; Lindsay and Harris, both keenly aware of the 
political fallout tied to the commission and its findings, had emerged victorious with 
some of the panel’s more conservative members who “wanted to restrict the 
recommendations to programs that would have a reasonable chance of succeeding under 
present conditions.”58 While the commission insisted it had reached a consensus in 
issuing its report, concern remained as to whether or not the findings or any additional 
measures could quell tensions. 
As news of the commission’s probable findings began to leak, private citizens 
wrote to the commission and offered a variety of opinions on what they had heard. S.A. 
Barbour of Virginia wrote to Ginbsurg claiming that “Mr. [Lyndon] Johnson must be told 
in your report that it is up to him to tell these unfortunate people that they must obey the 
law,” that more rioting would “get them nowhere but into trouble and further away from 
the things that might be done for them.”59 Those complaining needed to get jobs, but the 
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problem, according to this particular letter, was that “nobody seems to have the good 
sense to tell the Negro what he should do to become a good citizen.”60 A report that 
coddled rioters and explained away their violent behavior would “do the greatest possible 
disservice to America and create more and more trouble.”61 Others wanted officials to 
determine who influenced rioters, intimating that Soviet Communists and lingering Cold 
War antipathy were to blame.62 Citizens like William Werber were less deliberate in their 
letters. Werber wrote to Kerner arguing that the “white man can’t hold a candle to the 
black man when it comes to Racism.” He continued that universities “are all supported by 
white people” and asked: “how could any group of intelligent and reasonable men feel 
that taxing productive people to maintain unproductive people in a perpetual state of 
indolence will solve any problems at all?”63 Werber argued that the welfare state, over 
the course of 35 years, had failed, and that it had not fixed crime or any of the conditions 
that precipitated its creation in the first place. “Quite frankly, isn’t it gross stupidity to 
recommend more of the same?” he asked, adding, “the report isn’t going to solve 
problem one…all it will do is to sink this Nation deeper into the mud…I guarantee it.”64  
Floridian Haven Page told Kerner that while the commission “has been huddling 
over how to interpret months-old causes and effects, a shift has occurred in the concerns 
and slogans of the Negro leaders: they are moving toward a militant separate Black 
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Society and away from integration.”65 Page pointed to the “recent bloody outbursts at all-
Negro colleges,” the “fumings and frustrations of Rap Brown,” and the “Carmichael-
directed ‘dislocation’ pageant being staged by Martin Luther King Jr. in time for the 
Washington cherry blossom festival” as proof that the “black leaders don’t want hostility 
to diminish.”66 Based on reports, Page concluded: “maybe your commission doesn’t 
either,” dismissing comparisons of American society to apartheid as “sheer 
gobbledegook…I’ll wager $100 that no member of your Commission has first-hand 
knowledge of ‘apartheid’ and that you recorded no testimony on this subject.”67 
Not all letters were quite as harsh in assessing the leaks over the commission’s 
report. Californian Charles Holmquist wrote to President Johnson that he had 
“considerable sympathy” for African Americans and Mexican Americans “who really 
want to work hard to get ahead…I have helped individuals of these groups find jobs and a 
number of them worked their way out of the ghetto.”68 His sympathy had waned, 
however; now that minorities wanted “things handed to them at gunpoint,” he said, his 
attitude was “one of complete indifference.”69 Not all letters to those affiliated with the 
commission levied criticism, either; Arthur Wolfe, of Syracuse, New York, wrote to the 
president in praise of the commission. The report, he said, came at “a very critical time 
when Americans have the opportunity to make the U.S. a true Democracy with individual 
freedom and opportunity for all” rather than “a nation that claims to be a Democracy for 
all, but in reality is a racist state moving closer and closer to racial Apartheid as is 
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practiced in South Africa.”70 Arthur Ocker, an Illinois transplant living in North Carolina, 
wrote to Gov. Kerner to “commend the entire commission for its courage.”71 Ocker noted 
it was “not easy for a dominantly white society, of which I am a part, to recognize its 
failures and to accept major responsibility,” and that he wanted Kerner to know that 
while he knew there would be criticism, “just know that there are others like myself who 
admire your honesty, courage, and that there will be many, while not applauding, will 
perhaps grudgingly admit that there’s some truth in what the Commission says.”72 
Behind the scenes, several commissioners, most notably James Corman, remained 
bothered by the commission’s disregard for costs. In a February 1 memo assistant Kyran 
McGrath recommended that Otto Kerner pay a visit to Corman while in Washington. 
“Something is bothering him, and he showed an intense opposition to a number of the 
subjects discussed this week, to the point where he was contradicting statements from the 
day before and earlier in the month,” McGrath wrote, adding, “Even Katherine and Tex 
are worried about him.”73 There was no on-the-record account of Kerner’s meeting with 
Corman—or whether a meeting had even happened—but the California congressman 
went to staffer Roye Lowry with direct questioning on how the Kerner Commission 
could bankroll its extensive set of recommendations. Lowry responded on February 14, 
telling Corman the estimates were “in line with the President’s assumption as to what 
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would happen within 18 months after the end of the armed conflict of Vietnam,” though 
there was no projection as to when that end would happen.74  
With murmurs of the Kerner Commission’s findings growing louder as March 1 
approached, some staffers remained concerned about aspects of the framing and 
conclusions slated to hit presses in February.75 On two separate occasions in February, 
staffer Mel Bergheim expressed reservation over portions of the draft report. He 
criticized police departments across the nation for stocking up on weaponry in 
anticipation of more riots given commission findings that the “police response last 
summer was generally appropriate to the level of violence,” saying that both the 
commission and the country “must distinguish between control and warfare.”76 
Bergheim’s concerns on police militarization were not unfounded; a February 26 article 
in U.S. News & World Report detailed police departments across the country testing a 
bevy of new and unusual anti-riot tools. Among the trial runs were an “instant banana 
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peel” that would coat a city block with a “slippery substance,” a gun that could penetrate 
brick, and a machine that would “spew out masses of bubbly foam” in an effort to stun 
rioters, “making it almost impossible for them to stand up and difficult for them to 
breathe,” though officials described the foam as “physically harmless.”77 Other devices 
mentioned would “create bloodcurdling noises” or spew flames that “would frighten but 
not seriously burn.”78 Police in Los Angeles had experimented with armored cars and 
foam; they had a SWAT-style plan that entailed loading up on bulletproof vests, shields, 
and helicopters to hover over inevitable commotion. In Detroit, officers “refused to reveal 
their battle plans” but had detailed riot measures in the works.79 In DC, officials braced 
for more demonstrations by Martin Luther King Jr. scheduled for April. “Rioters are 
going to find this country more prepared than it was last year to meet force with force,” 
the article concluded.80 As summer approached, and the Kerner Commission searched for 
solutions, American law enforcement prepared to treat inner cities like war zones.  
Bergheim also worried about how the report classified nonwhite peoples in 
American cities.81 “Our emphasis has been on the Negro, but he is not the only minority 
in trouble,” Bergheim wrote to Victor Palmieri.82 Other groups also lacked resources to 
escape horrid living conditions; “they too have grievances that could fuel social 
explosions…they, too, need help,” Bergheim noted.83 Among groups not mentioned as 
part of the nonwhite population were Asian Americans, Native Americans, Puerto 
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Ricans, and Mexican Americans. Bergheim also claimed that the Census classifying 
Hispanics as white skewed poverty data, saying the “statistical effect…is that, given the 
high incidence of poverty among the Central and South American immigrant population, 
it tends to depress the overall level of white affluence and thereby seem to diminish the 
economic gap between Negroes and whites of European stock.”84 The term “Negro,” in 
Bergheim’s estimation, “oversimplified” the black community, rendering it monolithic in 
thought and action, while the interchangeable nature of “Negro” and “nonwhite” within 
the report draft risked the perception that the commission had ignored many people of 
color who faced struggles similar to those of African Americans.85  
As part of the effort to quell tensions, the Kerner Commission also sought the 
advice of those who had successfully mobilized interracial support. Commission staff 
sent a detailed questionnaire to Carl Stokes, the recently elected African American mayor 
of Cleveland, in advance of scheduled testimony on February 20. The purpose was 
ascertaining how Stokes and his advisers had canvassed black voters so effectively; 
commission attorney Merle McCurdy sought Stokes’s advice as both a candidate and a 
mayor. “The Commission is interested in obtaining your views on the future of the 
political process as an instrument of urban change,” fellow Clevelander McCurdy wrote 
to Stokes.86 Staffers also wanted Mayor Stokes’s input on his “strategy employed to reach 
white voters and its success,” as well as whether black activists had tried to influence him 
and “methods by which local governmental institutions can be made more responsive to 
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needs of city ghetto residents.”87 Ideally, consulting officials like Stokes would hew a 
navigable path to black political influence that was not overrun by militants; it would 
allow the Kerner Commission to advance on its own terms, clear-eyed and armed with 
pragmatic solutions. 
The commission did not have to send a questionnaire to Gary Mayor Richard 
Hatcher; he had agreed to a formal deposition. Hatcher, like Stokes, was a newly minted 
African American mayor. While he did not subscribe to the tenets of black militancy, he 
expressed empathy and said he understood militant reaction based on white attitudes that 
vacillated between hostility and lethargy in addressing African American issues. In 
summarizing Hatcher’s testimony, Ginsburg said that the mayor noted riots had “a 
beneficial effect in terms of creating greater awareness on the part of the white majority 
as to the conditions of our cities,” though he added that only “time will tell if the riots 
actually created a greater commitment to correct conditions on the part of white people in 
the country.”88 Hatcher also criticized governing officials on both the federal and local 
level; the anti-riot legislation proposed by the president, he told commissioners, 
demonstrated there had been “no great awakening” within the federal government or 
white power structure, while repressive measures in local governments conveyed a 
similar attitude.89 On the subject of law and order, Hatcher stated that while he supported 
it in theory, “I’m not an advocate of law and order at any cost.”90 He also disputed the 
notion that spending on the Vietnam War had cut into potential spending on domestic 
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issues. “This money was not being spent on the slums before the war; what makes them 
think the war is keeping it from the slums now?” Hatcher asked the commission.91 He 
cited specific programs within Johnson’s domestic agenda, programs like Model Cities 
and the anti-poverty program, which had unaddressed “funding problems” apart from 
spending abroad.92 The onus was on the federal government to “bring about the type of 
tangible results people expect.”93 While Hatcher remained encouraged in some respects 
about how officials in Washington wanted to help the nation’s poor, he told 
commissioners that the “real test is whether these goal signs can be translated into 
concrete results for people…If they are not, then we will fail.”94  
On February 22 Ginsburg forwarded an excerpt from the previous commission 
meeting at Lindsay’s request. The excerpt was a rough draft of the report’s introduction 
penned by the vice chairman himself. In keeping with his defiant stances as a 
commissioner, Lindsay’s introduction was uncompromising in setting the nation’s 
tableau. He declared: 
Those Americans who took to the ghetto streets last summer were neither cautious 
 nor tentative in expressing their reaction to the promises and performance of the 
 community around them.  
In reporting to the President and the nation on these events and their origins we 
 will be neither cautious nor tentative; we will not blunt the message we bear in 
 order to reassure those who expect a diagnosis less damning or recommendations 
 less far-reaching. 
The Commission has looked back—to see what has happened and what had 
 happened. And we have looked ahead—to see what might happen in the future. In 
 both cases, our conclusions differ drastically from those held by many Americans. 
 Above all, we have concluded that this nation today confronts a critical choice 
 about the future of American society. 
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This nation is at present moving toward two separate societies, one black, one 
 white, separate and unequal. Reaction to last summer’s disorders has quickened 
 that movement and deepened that division. It threatens to make absolute the 
 discrimination and segregation that have always permeated so much of American 
 life and attitudes.  
Yet this growing racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be 
 reversed; the races can be brought together. New attitudes on the part of 
 individuals and new policies on behalf of the nation can shape a future consistent 
 with the historic ideals of our society.  
We place this choice before the American people: one society or two. Our 
 principle task is to define this choice and wage a national resolution. To continue 
 present policies without regard to their future implications is to make unconscious 
 choices which may have the most ominous consequences for our society.95 
 
 Lindsay’s speech—foreboding, unmerciful, not-yet-public—presented, in some  
respects, the worst-case scenario for the Johnson Administration. Here was a public 
official interested in appeasing no one in the final analysis, a man who knew the spotlight 
would be on the report’s introduction and who took the opportunity to declare the need to 
confront America’s racial wounds on an unprecedented scale. He pointed to three “strong 
forces” at work for the violence from the previous summer: the “corrosive and 
humiliating effects” of discrimination and segregation, the formation of inner-city 
ghettoes as a result of the Great Migration and “white flight” to the suburbs, and the 
“intersection of segregation in poverty” in those ghettoes and its demoralizing 
consequences.96 Using similar rhetoric—“neither cautious nor tentative”—in describing 
both rioters and the report’s ambition was not a coincidence. New York’s mayor saw it as 
a moment to follow through on his aspirations, to offer a forthright account in the interest 
of every American. For other commissioners, the transcript surely confirmed what they 
had already heard with their own ears previously: John Lindsay was not bluffing. 
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Initially, what the Kerner Commission might recommend did not alter or strain 
White House plans as the release date loomed. In mid-February, the Kerner Commission 
made plans to meet with President Johnson in the Oval Office upon the report’s release. 
Writing to the president on February 13, White House Chief of Staff Marvin Watson said 
that David Ginsburg had phoned him and said the commission was readying a 
typewritten report for March 1. The executive director wanted the entire commission to 
meet with President Johnson and “present the report” and take photographs.97 Later on 
that Friday afternoon, the commission would release copies of report to the press. “Will 
the President see members of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on 
Friday, March 1,” Watson’s memo inquired, offering lines for a “YES” and “NO” 
answer.98 Johnson checked yes. He scrawled at the bottom of the memo that if “Joe”—
referring to White House aide Joseph Califano—had seen the report and agreed, he would 
agree to the meeting as well.99 
With a meeting with President Johnson secured, the Kerner Commission also 
planned a multivalent media barrage, saturating television, radio, and newspapers in the 
first weekend in March with details on the Kerner Commission report. The list as 
constituted in a February 21 memo from Alvin Spivak to Ginsburg was an exhaustive 
one. Wall-to-wall coverage included a March 3 one-hour special on ABC titled “Issues 
and Answers” featuring Kerner, Harris, and Wilkins as guests; an expanded edition of 
NBC’s Meet the Press with six mayors of major cities; a one-hour documentary about the 
report and the issues it addressed on CBS; a one-hour television special with a similar 
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approach on NBC; radio coverage on Saturday, March 2, on both NBC and CBS radio; 
cover stories in Newsweek and Life magazines, respectively; appearances by Harris and 
Brooke on NBC’s March 4 Today, and a summaries of the report in a scores of 
newspapers—including the Los Angeles, Times, The Boston Globe, and New York Daily 
News.100 Spivak also reported that Face the Nation on CBS had “expressed interest” and 
that there was a “likelihood that at least The New York Times will run the [full] text of our 
summary.”101 There was “extreme interest on the part of British television and 
newspapers,” which Spivak said was a reminder of “the foreign impact of this document 
(which USIA has already emphasized), and we are in contact.”102 Bantam Books would 
publish the full text of the entire report, printing its first 250,000 copies for sale on March 
4. Local television affiliates in New York would have coverage focused on Newark, and 
several trade publishers expressed interest in a hard-cover publication at some point. “It is 
clear to me that the impact of the report will be huge, and that the exposure mentioned 
above will be expanded by other outlets as we approach the release time,” Spivak told his 
colleague.103 It was a monumental press junket that sought to leave no questions 
unanswered while the commission had the limelight. Spivak, Ginsburg, and their 
colleagues wished to make the commission and its work available and even overexposed 
in the interest of crystalizing its message to the American people.  
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By February 26 memos from Johnson’s inner circle indicated that the president 
had serious misgivings about what the Kerner Commission might release later in the 
week. Texan attorney Larry Temple, who served as the president’s special counsel, sent 
two separate memos on February 26 in an effort to assuage anxieties. According to 
Temple, Ramsey Clark had read the report over the weekend for the first time and “sees 
nothing to cause any great concern,” though he added that Clark “recognizes your 
concern about the costs of the recommendations to rebuild the cities.”104 Clark planned to 
meet with Kerner in Washington on the same day to raise the issue of costs. In a 
postscript, Temple added that Clark had called back to say that “Budget is computing the 
costs of this report and will have figures later tonight.”105 After conferring with other 
officials, Clark reported that the costs would not “be so high as to cause BOB [Budget of 
Bureau] any concern or alarm.”106 He added that the press already knew about the 
recommendations on rebuilding cities. A separate memo later that evening sent to the 
president revealed that Califano planned to have breakfast with Kerner and Ginsburg the 
following morning and would have the Bureau of the Budget’s figures available to 
discuss with them. “Joe [Califano] said the Commission report has virtually no figures of 
cost in it,” Temple wrote, though he added Califano noted there “is a paragraph which 
says that all of the recommendations ‘depend on our will to tax ourselves.’”107 Temple 
added that Califano planned to “advise Kerner and Ginsburg that any recommendations 
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must be accompanied by suggestions for their financing.”108 President Johnson scrawled 
some notes at the bottom of the missive expressing displeasure.  
That displeasure came through more clearly in a formal response to Califano. “I 
HAVE BEEN SEEING ON THE WIRE AND HEARING ON THE RADIO ALL DAY 
LONG WHAT THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS IS GOING TO REPORT 
TO ME,” Johnson wrote to his aide.109 He added that he would “PREFER TO RECEIVE 
THE REPORT BEFORE I HEARD ABOUT IT FROM NEWS MEDIA…WHATEVER 
THE REPORT RECOMMENDS, I HOPE IT WILL ALSO CONTAIN 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO FINANCE THESE PROPOSALS.”110 The telegram in 
capital letters only accentuated the president’s annoyance. “ANYONE CAN 
RECOMMEND SPENDING, BUT PREPARING METHODS TO FUND THE COSTS 
OF NEW PROGRAMS TAKES MORE ABILITY,” he continued.111 Johnson said that 
spenders needed “LENDERS TO LEND” or taxpayers who would not object to increased 
taxes.112 He concluded: “SO I HOPE THOSE WHO ARE PREPARING THE FINAL 
REPORT WILL BE AS IMAGINATIVE ON TAXING AS THEY ARE ON 
SPENDING.”113 The report’s release was just three days away, and now, the harried, ill-
tempered man who had green-lighted the commission to begin with seemed quite irritated 
with the direction that its report might take.  
The following day, Spivak sent Ginsburg a memo anticipating how the media 
would likely cover the release of the commission’s report. Spivak, whose memo 
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contained twenty separate numbered thoughts, surmised that media outlets would latch 
onto the “call for across-the-board action—in jobs, housing, welfare, education, and other 
fields—to give America’s Negroes a better life and reduce the threat of urban riots” first 
and foremost.114 The press would also likely gravitate toward the “moving toward two 
societies” line from Lindsay’s fiery introduction draft, Spivak said, as well as the 
commission’s “charge that ‘white racism is essentially responsible for the explosive 
mixture’ which has culminated in city riots over the last four years.”115 Beyond these 
broader emphases, Spivak guessed that “some quarters may be more specific” in how 
they framed the report, perhaps touting program proposals that would create 2 million 
jobs and 6 million housing units, respectively, and a “call for city governments to narrow 
the widening gap between the local power structure and the ghetto and for police to 
smooth their relationships with the Negro if riots are to be averted.”116 Newspapers might 
also report on the lack of evidence for a conspiracy, “highly exaggerated” sniper fire in 
riot areas, and the commission’s claim that eradicating the “causes of violence” was 
crucial “even if ‘new taxes’ are necessary to achieve this.”117 Spivak continued with a list 
of newsworthy tidbits from the report, many of which were embedded within specific 
sections, including the forecast in Chapter 16 (“The Future of Cities”) and a side article 
from Chapter 9 “comparing the immigrant and Negro” experiences.118 The press would 
also “pick up, probably as a sidebar, the Commission’s findings that the news media tried 
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to do well but showed instances of sensationalism, inaccuracy, and distortion in riot 
news, thus exaggerating both mood and event,” he speculated.119 His final point touched 
on the likelihood of the press’s specific criticisms of the report, specifically “making 
something of the fact that Vietnam goes almost entirely unmentioned,” that the “program 
proposals aren’t costed,” and that “most of the program recommendations aren’t new.”120 
While Spivak did not offer advice on this final point, the memo served as a reminder that 
just as the White House tried to anticipate the commission’s findings, the commission 
sought to guess what the press would emphasize and the sections of the massive 
undertaking it might critique. 
Spivak sent a separate memo on February 27 that sought to anticipate precise 
questions the press might have about the report. “I have tried to think of some as nasty as 
those I used to ask the president, but eight months of this easy commission life have 
caused the sap to run dry,” Spivak wrote, referring to his own journalism career.121 The 
commission had hired Spivak due to his press credentials and knowledge of the “Fourth 
Estate”; now, in advance of releasing the report to the world, it relied on those credentials 
to navigate the political climate and advise how Spivak’s ex-colleagues might approach 
the report. His memo, addressed to Ginsburg, featured twenty-four hypothetical questions 
and potential answers for Ginsburg and other commission officials slated to speak to the 
media. “A basic question—regardless of whether the Commissioners themselves say 
anything—will be: were they unanimous? Did all of them agree on everything in the 
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report?” Spivak asked at the outset.122  He wrote that while spokespeople needed to 
acknowledge the “great diversity of opinion” due to the “wide spectrum” of people 
serving on the commission, they also needed to stress that the “important thing is that 
gaps were narrowed and this stands as a Commission document, signed by all.”123 The 
press would, as Spivak mentioned in his previous memo, ask about Vietnam; “Roy 
Wilkins phrased this pretty well during the meeting, to the effect that the Commission 
had a big enough job on its hands looking into this crisis without going into the other one 
also,” he wrote.124 A reporter might ask why there were no prices attached to the 
proposals, and the commission needed to respond, as it had done “quite eloquently,” in 
Spivak’s estimation, that it was “the Commission’s aim to set goals” and suggest 
“programs illustrative of ways to meet those goals” irrespective of cost.125 On questions 
of conspiracy, “black agitation,” and anyone wondering, “Isn’t there black racism too?” 
Spivak referred to answers at committee meetings that had sufficed and “validly stand 
now.”126  
Another question the commission would have to contend with was whether 
recommendations were “soft-pedaled as a result of White House pressure.”127 Spokesmen 
needed to deny this firmly with “a flat no, plus insistence that they…weren’t watered 
down, or whatever other word the newsman might use.”128 On the subject of Black Power 
and why no such militants were “heard by the Commission,” officials needed to point to 
the witness list and respond that commissioners and staff had spoken with militants and 
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that “some of their information is in the form of depositions which can be made public,” 
while some “must remain confidential.”129 On accusations that “the Commission ducks 
the question of whether there will be more riots in 1968,” pointing to President Johnson’s 
own quote on the possibility of a bad summer, Spivak urged officials to be forthright in 
saying that the report, its officials, and the broader public did not know either way what 
the future would hold, and that the focus should instead be “to get on with the job, to 
make the choices that the report sets forth, so that disorders will not recur.”130  
Spivak’s list continued. No, the bipartisan commission, all of whom wanted 
solutions and deplored violence, would not affect the 1968 election. No, the president did 
not expedite the timeline and order the commission to abolish its interim report for the 
purposes of his re-election campaign. On questions regarding disgruntled staff members, 
commission officials should stick to their old answers, Spivak wrote. To potential 
accusations of an “unbalanced” report that absolved those rioting African Americans of 
blame, Spivak said: “the Commission’s assignment was to trace the causes of the 
violence by Negroes in slums last year—and the evidence, without by any means 
condoning the violence that ensued, points overwhelmingly to the causes we have 
cited.”131 On whether the commission was “damning with faint praise” in its 
endorsements of Johnson’s proposals on gun control and antiriot legislation by including 
them as a supplement, Spivak urged spokesmen to say it was “a part of the report and a 
substantial part of it,” supplementary only in name.132 On the criticism that none of the 
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recommendations could pass in time to enact any change in the short term, Spivak 
resisted, saying, “much in this report can be done soon, can be done now—particularly at 
the community level, in the private sector, by the police, and, indeed, by the federal 
government in paying more attention to enforcing laws that are already on the books.”133 
Regarding a separate, second possible question on Vietnam—how the commission might 
reconcile the funding with the vast resources the war had drained from domestic 
coffers—he encouraged the commission to defer expertise on Vietnam, reasoning, “we 
would not expect a commission on Vietnam to come up with answers about the domestic 
riots.”134 
The memo featured a number of needling questions in an attempt to prepare the 
commission for potential criticism, not all of which might necessarily seem fair to those 
tasked with fielding questions. Spivak posed a question, related to the commission’s 
portrait of “trigger-happy guardsmen, police violence, and the like,” that asked bluntly: 
“Are you trying to say that the public is dreaming? That there were no riots last year? 
That it was all a police and guard invasion?”135 The commission needed to clarify that 
there was rioting and disheartening consequences to that rioting—though “a lot less 
sniping than people thought”—but that the public had a “picture of far vaster rioting last 
year” than what had actually happened, and that the picture had rarely elaborated on the 
causes or conditions of violence.136 If a media member followed up asking why, if the 
public misunderstood the scope of the riots, the commission gave “generally good grades 
to the press in its riot coverage,” Spivak said he would “leave this to [the individual’s] 
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judgment in answering.”137 If one asked whether housing and job recommendations 
doubling those of President Johnson constituted “criticism of his program on your part,” 
Spivak preferred to pivot and say that it was not a criticism of Johnson’s programs, but 
rather a “presentation of our own suggestions….what we are saying is that we should not 
stop there [at president’s agenda recommendations], but should forge ever farther.”138 
Asked whether the report might “end the life of the commission,” Spivak told Ginsburg: 
“this was a question left hanging on Tuesday; it will, somehow, require an answer.”139 
While Spivak’s answers to hypothetical questions offered no guarantee for satiating the 
press or the broader public over the contents of the report, they at least demonstrated that 
the Kerner Commission had thought ahead in an effort to assuage critics and convince the 
general public of a truthful report filled with meaningful recommendations for the 
country in the coming years.  
On the same day, Spivak sent Ginsburg a third memo plotting the distribution of 
the Kerner Commission’s final report. Press copies would be made available on the 
afternoon of Thursday, February 29, and the commission’s press secretary wanted media 
to have a copy “certainly no later than 9 AM Friday” so that they could read it in time for 
Ginsburg’s Friday afternoon press briefing. Spivak cited the report’s “extreme length” for 
the early distribution, adding, “I’m not sure how it’s in excess of 250,000 words.”140 He 
hoped Ginsburg would brief the press only after Kerner and Lindsay had time to make a 
brief statement “so that television and radio will have something on hand they can 
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use.”141 Spivak had urged against the chairman and vice chairman scheduling a Friday 
press conference before or during the report’s release because “it will only be a waste of 
time if they have nothing to add and it will detract from the report if they have anything 
to add.”142 The commission planned to inform the press of report distribution by 
Thursday morning, though Spivak said this was not because “we have to drum up 
interest…it will help immeasurably in having competent, thorough coverage of a 
significant—but bulky—document.”143 
Across town, Califano told the president he worked with members of the White 
House staff to review the report in advance of its national release. At the outset, Califano 
and those assisting him—he mentioned “Budget Bureau and Gaither, Nimetz, and Bohen 
of our staff,” specifically—considered two questions.144 The first: “what items in the 
report will make news?”; the second: “how do their recommendations for action compare 
with what we are doing?”145 Califano told Johnson that “although the program 
recommendations are ambitious in latitude,” those gathered doubted they would make as 
many headlines as certain observations not anchored in the report’s findings.146 To begin 
with, Califano wrote, the report “indicts latent and pervasive racism throughout the white 
community, rooted in three centuries of oppression, callous neglect, and indifference to 
the Negro people” that riots and their aftermath had only exposed further.147 “The report 
spares no one, and, by inference, does not believe that there has been significant progress 
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toward racial justice since the Supreme Court decision of 1954 or the Civil Rights 
legislation of the last decade,” Califano told his boss, knowing how much this sentence 
would sting Johnson when he read it.148 Additionally, the report chastised “ineffective, 
indifferent, backward city governments” as well as “local police competence and the 
national guard.”149 It condemned violence but also emphasized the “conditions that 
produce despair in ghettoes, and the ineffective, often inflammatory actions that were 
taken by law enforcement officials.”150 Overall, Califano and his colleagues deemed the 
commission’s findings “constructive in approach,” and while they believed it needed 
“editing and compression,” they considered the tone “reasonable, deliberate, and not 
inflammatory.”151 He reiterated the commission’s “two Americas” thesis—a “white, 
suburban America on one side, and a black, urban America on the other”—and added that 
“even if we spend a lot more they believe we will still end up with two Americas albeit 
with gilded ghettoes.”152 It was a recipe, according to the commission, for ongoing 
violence. “In general, their direction of motion is similar to the Administration’s, 
although faster in some areas,” Califano wrote before delving into a few illustrative 
examples of commission recommendations from the chapters provided.153 He proffered 
no blistering criticisms in this message to Johnson; there were subtle indications that the 
exhaustive report was perhaps a bit ambitious and wordy, but nothing to indicate the 
Administration’s extreme displeasure or that the president’s scheduled meeting with the 
commissioners was in any kind of peril. 
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The following day, however, Califano sent a more substantive message on the 
commission’s findings and possible courses of action for the White House. In this 
February 28 memo, the president’s assistant laid out some of the commission’s findings 
in more detail. On the role that Black Power and other activists groups had on violence, 
Califano paraphrased the commission as finding that “their tolerable encouragement of 
violence heightened tensions, created a mood of acceptance and expectation, 
and…contributed to the eruption of the disorders last summer.”154 On the commission’s 
four-prong plan in terms of recommendations—jobs, housing, education, and welfare—
Califano said that “in general, their direction is similar to ours, but much more ambitious, 
and in some cases unrealistic in the short run.”155 Among the recommendations were 2 
million new jobs for the “unemployed and under-employed” over the next three years, 
which Califano noted, according to the Bureau of the Budget, would “increase the budget 
by $6 billion in fiscal year 1968.”156 In the realm of education, the commission wanted 
“immediate and massive increases in Head Start and Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act,” as well as “putting more muscle behind the school 
desegregation Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through construction aid to overcome 
racial imbalance, exemplary schools, tying federal aid to integration, etc.”157 Califano 
branded this massive expansion of Johnson’s own Great Society measures as “very 
costly” and said it “amounts to massive bribes to induce suburbs to school Negroes.”158 
In housing, the commission wanted 600,000 subsidized housing units for the coming year 
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and 6 million new units over the next five years; Califano wrote to Johnson that this 
request “doubles the program you announced last week and is totally unrealistic.”159 He 
added that there was “clearly not available the private finance, the skilled labor, the land, 
the entrepreneurial leadership to justify these figures as targets.”160 If markets could “just 
barely support” the Johnson’s housing program in place, they “could not support the 
Commission’s program,” Califano said.161 Lastly, on welfare, Califano noted that eleven 
of the sixteen recommendations made by the Kerner Commission had already been 
endorsed or proposed by the Johnson Administration. Four recommendations went 
beyond these measures; they included national standards for welfare payments at the 
poverty line, federally financing 90 percent of welfare payments to match appropriate 
standards (a request that BOB said would add $7 billion to $9 billion for the fiscal year 
1968), championing a guaranteed minimum income, and ridding the welfare system of 
“bureaucracy and red tape” in favor of aiding those “who meet simple income tests.”162 
A memo from the Bureau of the Budget with “tentative pricing 
recommendations” for Kerner’s proposals corroborated Califano’s concerns.163 “A rough 
tabulation of unscreened figures shows that the Commission’s recommendations would 
require additional new obligational authority in the federal budget of $11.9 billion fiscal 
[year] 1969 and probable add-ons of $24.5 billion in 1971,” wrote BOB employee 
Michael Marsh in a February 29 message.164 Marsh separated the numbers categorically 
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for each year’s budget; for 1969, it entailed $59 million more for crime and disorders, 
$1.571 billion more for employment, $2.87 billion for education, $7.19 billion for 
welfare, and $259 million for housing.165 For the 1971 budget, the pricing estimated a 
$308 million increase for crime and disorders, a $3.619 billion increase for employment, 
a $10.762 billion increase for education, a $9.225 billion increase for welfare, and a $560 
million increase for housing.166 According to Marsh, the bureau could not account for the 
smaller recommendations; “the Commission’s recommendations related to cities are very 
general and no pricing has been included above for rebuilding the cities, except in the 
Housing category,” he wrote.167 Furthermore, he estimated that the proposal for 6 million 
new federally funded housing units in five years “will probably require about $45 billion 
of private financing in the 5-year period on top of an already big housing effort.”168 
Marsh lastly predicted that state and local governments would have to “fund substantial 
outlays” for police-related proposals and for “matching funds for some of the proposed 
new Federal programs.”169 If the memo underscored the harsh financial realities attached 
to the Kerner Commission’s recommendations and vision for America going forward, it 
also told Lyndon Johnson exactly what he wanted to hear: that substantive research 
indicated that America could not afford to bankroll what the commission advised. On top 
of his slow-growing animus toward the commission and some of its more recalcitrant 
members, Johnson now had fiscal evidence backing the idea that the commission’s pie-
in-the-sky rhetoric was simply not workable.  
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In the short term, Califano told President Johnson, the Kerner Commission “puts 
the responsibility for averting or controlling disorder on local officials through more 
responsive police and local governments, better police training and better preparation.”170 
In the long term, the commission said the Johnson Administration “is heading in the right 
direction, but it is moving too slowly, devoting insufficient resources to make a dramatic 
difference and organizationally scattering its shots.”171 Change would require a renewed 
effort to “strike down artificial barriers to jobs, education, and housing to fund social 
programs at the level required to make a major difference generally.”172 Califano, who 
had editorialized already in his memo, knew he needed to give no opinion in this section 
to enrage his boss. He noted as well that “with very few exceptions, the report is almost 
completely silent on the cost of the recommendations.”173 Estimates provided were based 
on a “quick reading of the report” from BOB, and Califano assured the president that the 
bureau would “price out all the recommendations in the attached list and have some for 
us tomorrow afternoon.”174 He also pointed to the “strongest language” in the report on 
the notion of raising taxes and paying for the programs, a passage where Kerner and 
Ginsburg referred to a “commitment to national action—compassionate, massive and 
sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this 
earth…the vital needs of the nation must be met; hard choices must be made, and, if 
necessary, new taxes enacted.”175 Internally, Califano reported that while the report 
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issued was a unanimous one, two commissioners “at heart have different views.”176 
Thornton believed the report to be too ambitious, while Lindsay wanted the commission 
to be more vocal in its opposition to the Vietnam War “because of the resources it’s 
draining away from the cities.”177 
After listing the weekend “public relations operation” schedule for commission 
luminaries, Califano included a section with the underlined title, “How Do We Handle 
It.”178 Unsurprisingly, he suggested separate public and private approaches to the report. 
Publicly, he recommended that Johnson “sign Thursday (for Friday release) the attached 
statement or something similar in response to a transmittal from Governor Kerner 
praising your progress to date,” though Califano added in parentheses, “the report itself 
has very little good to say about anyone,” a strikingly different assessment than the one 
he had delivered the previous day.179 Privately, Califano advised that Johnson give “[Jim] 
Christian and me approval to start leaking the report to diminish its overall impact, point 
up its enormous cost and the unrealistic nature of its recommendations.”180 In a 
handwritten note accompanying the typed memo, Califano wrote, “I have assumed you 
would not want to receive the report personally,” an indication that an already seething 
Lyndon Johnson would only grow angrier if he read the Kerner Commission’s 
introduction.181 Califano perhaps figured that he could at least offer a more levelheaded 
assessment when reviewing the report with fellow staffers, though this reading also 
turned out to be an unfavorable one. “I doubt whether you should reconvene the 
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Commission to have them give you ways to raise the money to implement their 
proposals,” he wrote, adding that he feared “many members (led by Lindsay) would get 
into Vietnam and some members would recommend that we pull out of Vietnam to pay 
for their programs.”182  
Here was a Johnson assistant, a man who commanded the president’s attention 
and respect, telling the commander-in-chief that the White House goal on the heels of a 
seven-month exercise of its own making should be damage control. Signs had long 
pointed to the Johnson Administration undermining the Kerner Commission’s efforts, 
and now, with a copy in hand, Califano’s message to the Oval Office seemed to affirm 
those signs. As commission staffers prepared tirelessly in an attempt to anticipate 
questioning and criticisms of its thick final report, they could not have known the extent 
to which the White House, the Kerner Commission’s brainchild and very reason for 
existence, made preparations of its own to stymie what months of hard work had yielded. 
The disparity between Califano’s public and private responses, on top of President 
Johnson’s festering resentment over the idea that the commission might tell him he had 
not done enough, called into question whether there would be a meeting between the 
commissioners and the president as scheduled. A February 28 White House Cabinet 
meeting was a reminder of the prominent backdrop to the Kerner Commission saga, the 
Vietnam War. Johnson railed against Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh in the meeting, 
comparing him to Adolf Hitler and lamenting that “we, the President and the Cabinet, are 
the murderers and they never say anything about Mr. Ho.”183 He lashed out at protestors, 
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saying “the signs are all over here” but “you never see any of them over there,” and the 
decision to launch the Tet offensive “at the time that we are offering a bombing 
pause.”184 The president told his inner circle: “it is like the country lawyer who made the 
greatest speech of his life but they electrocuted his client. We are just like that now….”185  
Johnson sounded tired and defeated, a man with an already spotty temperament 
whose foreign policy misgivings meant that Califano’s memo warning of what the Kerner 
Commission would bring was the last thing he wanted to see on his desk. The meeting 
minutes indicated Johnson had told his Cabinet, “I sometimes think that we are lonely 
voices speaking in the wind,” noting that adviser John Kenneth Galbraith had told him 
that liberalism had “died with President Kennedy.”186 Johnson continued that Vice 
President Humphrey had written and “pointed out what this Administration has done, 
what this social budget means to the American people.”187 If Lyndon Johnson had soured 
on Vietnam and how America seemed to “have out shirttails out all around the world,” 
overcommitted and inundated by proposals on how to fix an unpopular war, he remained 
both proud and defiant of his domestic record, and was eager to tout it whenever criticism 
over the war did mount.188 Johnson made no mention of the forthcoming Kerner 
Commission report to his Cabinet, but given how mired the Administration was in 
Vietnam, the commission’s recommendations would seem to him yet another public 
declaration of what he needed to improve, of criticism for how his Great Society had 
failed rather than praise for what it had offered. The president did not address the report 
publicly in February, but as the commission’s press junket commenced and its critiques 
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splashed across headlines nationally, he would need to walk a fine line between public 
praise for the fruits of his own commission’s labor and private rage at how it had 
managed to humiliate him at a moment when he already felt like a political piñata. With 
the ink dried and the report’s Leap Day release in the offing, the final chapter loomed.  
 346 
 
March 1968 
 After seven months of grueling work, President Johnson’s National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders released its full-length report on rioting in American 
cities in March 1968. National newspapers published a summary text on March 1 before 
the commission released the report in its entirety on March 3. Amid hundreds of pages, 
one line seemed to stand out: the observation by the commission that “our nation is 
moving toward two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal.”1 Beyond the 
three-question framework—“What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to 
prevent it from happening again?”—and charges of white racism as a primary factor in 
riots the previous summer, the Kerner Commission had reached a startling and perhaps 
even more disturbing conclusion: the nation faced divisions that, if not confronted 
earnestly and properly, risked a path to racial apartheid.  
 In envisioning such apartheid, the commission feared that beyond the need to 
understand why riots had occurred and how to prevent them going forward, white 
America might stop trying to understand altogether, cordoning off its spaces and further 
isolating black ghettoes.  The line cut against civil rights progress, harkening back to the 
1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that had struck down legal notions of 
“separate but equal” in schools and insinuating that life in America fourteen years later 
remained unchanged for many in the black community. The hardback version of the 
report released by the United States Government Printing Office was 425 pages, while 
paperback versions ran well over a thousand pages. As those reading the summary or the 
whole report would find out, the commission had opted for a sobering assessment that did 
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not feign enthusiasm when laying out the state of race in America. Columnist Carl 
Rowan observed that the report did not “mince words” nor “reassure racists, comfort 
bigots or give solace to those who want easy, cheap tranquility.”2 
 The Kerner Commission framed its final report around President Johnson’s three 
central questions posed the previous July: “What happened? Why did it happen? What 
can be done to prevent it from happening again?”3 Each comprised a section of the body 
of the report; Section I, the “What Happened?” section, contained three chapters; Section 
II, the “Why Did It Happen?” section, contained six chapters; Section III, the “What Can 
Be Done?” section, contained eight chapters, the last of which laid out the commission’s 
“Recommendations for National Action” in employment, education, welfare, and housing 
in light of its findings.4 The 250,000-word report also had a resounding, ambitious 
introduction and a cautionary conclusion. After the aforementioned “basic conclusion” 
that America was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and 
unequal,” the commission declared that the fallout from riots the previous summer had 
“quickened the movement and deepened the division,” amplifying discriminatory 
mechanisms that had “long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the 
future of every American.”5 
 While much of the thorough report made for difficult and, at times, dull reading, 
the introduction’s soaring rhetoric and stern assessment of the country’s racial climate 
grabbed the reader’s attention. “This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The 
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movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal task is to define 
that voice and to press for a national resolution,” the report proclaimed.6 If the nation did 
not act on the commission’s recommendations, the “continuing polarization of the 
American community” would yield the “destruction of basic democratic values.”7 This 
did not entail “blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness,” as many of the 
commission’s critics had intimated along the way, but rather the “realization of common 
opportunities for all within a single society.”8 It required “a commitment to national 
action—compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most 
powerful and the richest nation on this earth.”9 In the same vein, it called on each 
American citizen to have “new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will” in 
confronting racial divisions and their perilous consequences.10 America would face tough 
decisions, the commission warned—decisions that might require raising taxes. Violence 
would not “build a better society,” and America could not afford to “tolerate coercion and 
mob rule.”11  
The introduction also spoke to white Americans specifically, stating that most did 
not fully grasp how “segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a 
destructive environment.”12 It followed with another resonant passage: “What white 
Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that 
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white 
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institutions maintain it and white society condones it.”13 Here, the Kerner Commission 
introduced another prevailing theme in the report: that white racism played a prominent 
role in the conditions that bad bred inner-city riots and was thus culpable in the disorder 
that had unfolded. “It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the 
major unfinished business of this nation,” the commission said, adding that it hoped the 
nation would “adopt strategies for action that will produce quick and visible progress” 
and “make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens—urban and rural, 
white and black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every minority group.”14 
Commissioners called for “programs on a scale equal to the dimension of the problems” 
that sought “high impact in the immediate future in order to close the gap between 
promise and performance.”15 They also sought measures that could “change the system of 
failure and frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.”16 While 
conceding that programs and recommendations put forth would “require unprecedented 
levels of funding and performance,” the commission claimed they “neither probe deeper 
nor demand more than the problems which called them forth” and that there “can be no 
higher priority for national action and no higher claim on the nation’s conscience.”17 
Acknowledging that “some differences remain” among commissioners, the report ended 
its introduction with a reminder that the “gravity of the problem and the pressing need for 
action are too clear to allow further delay in the issuance of this report.”18  
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The report’s first three chapters—the “What Happened?” section—focused on the 
riots themselves. After an opening chapter that featured extremely detailed summaries on 
rioting in Newark, Detroit, and six other cities, Chapter 2 attempted to extract broader 
trends from the tumult. There was no “typical” riot, according to the report; collectively, 
riots in the summer of 1967 were “unusual, irregular, complex and unpredictable social 
processes” that did not “unfold in an orderly sequence.”19 Broadly, the commission 
declared, riots involved black Americans “acting against local symbols of white 
American society, authority and property” in their own neighborhoods more so than 
“against white persons.”20 Of twenty-four riots in twenty-three cities surveyed by the 
commission staff, a number of patterns occurred. Riots tended to happen at night in areas 
that attracted crowds; while a “routine or trivial incident” was often the catalyst for a riot, 
that incident was typically the “breaking point,” the culmination of “a series of tension-
heightening incidents over a period of weeks or months that became linked…with a 
shared network of underlying grievances” among those in the local black community.21 
In a number of disturbances classified as “prior” and “final” incidents in instigating riots, 
police action played a role. Contrary to reports that riot instigators were outside agitators 
or migrants who had recently moved from the South, the report described the “typical 
rioter” as a “teenager or young adult, a lifelong resident of the city in which he rioted,” 
and a “high school dropout” who was still “somewhat better educated than his nonrioting 
Negro neighbor.”22 He was either underemployed or “employed in a menial job” and 
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“proud of his race, extremely hostile to both whites and middle-class Negroes and, 
although informed about politics, highly distrustful of the political system.”23 This profile 
also contradicted the notion that rioters were ignorant slum-dwellers who did not engage 
with politics and thus did not have any conviction in their actions.  
The commission’s second chapter also addressed the grievances and hostility that 
created riot conditions; it observed that “although almost all cities had some sort of 
formal grievance mechanism for handling citizens’ complaints,” African Americans 
regarded the system as “ineffective” and “generally ignored” it.24 Specific grievances 
varied by city, but among those cities researched, the report listed “12 deeply held 
grievances identified, ranked into three levels of relative intensity.”25 First-level 
grievances included police practices, unemployment, and inadequate housing; second-
level grievances included inadequate education, subpar recreation programs and facilities, 
and issues with grievance mechanisms; third-level grievances included white attitudes—
deemed disrespectful—a discriminatory administration of justice, flawed federal 
programs, inadequate municipal services, discriminatory consumer and credit practices, 
and subpar welfare programs.26 While admitting that the genesis of each disorder varied, 
the commission reached the broad conclusion that urban conditions “constituted a clear 
pattern of severe disadvantage for Negroes compared with whites, whether the Negroes 
lived in the area where the riot took place or outside it.”27 It also found residents to be 
less educated, likelier to be unemployed, in an unskilled job, or living in poverty, and 
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more likely to live in “overcrowded” or “substandard” housing unit; a clear discrepancy 
existed between these conditions and those in white suburbs.28 An examination of the 
aftermath of riots in particular cities revealed that conditions remained largely 
unchanged; police received training with more sophisticated weapons—which the 
commission did not regard as a positive trend—and interracial communication had not 
improved, increasing the “growth of white segregationist or black separatist groups.”29   
Chapter 3 focused on whether or not the riots involved “organized activity” and 
conspiracy. The commission had conducted its own investigations in some cities and 
examined “data collected by federal agencies and Congressional committees, including 
thousands of documents supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”30 Despite the 
fact that militant organizations had “repeatedly forecast and called for violence,” 
fostering an “atmosphere that contributed to the outbreak of disorder,” the report 
concluded there was “no evidence that all or any of the disorders” unfolded as a result of 
planning or conspiracy at the “international, national, or local” level.31 Acknowledging 
militant groups as troublemakers while refusing to hold them directly responsible rankled 
plenty of conservative officials. The report noted the McClellan committee and other 
groups conducting investigations, and it admitted that the tense racial climate increased 
the likelihood of “organized exploitation in the future” and needed monitoring; but it did 
not expand further.32  
The report’s fourth chapter, titled “Basic Causes,” began Section II. After 
conceding that “complex and interacting” factors that “vary significantly” between cities 
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and time periods bred riot conditions, the chapter parsed out some fundamental truths that 
applied to all riots.33 Specifically, “the racial attitude and behavior of white Americans 
toward black Americans,” it stated, served as a fundamental cause.34 The chapter 
observed that white racism was “essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which 
has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II.”35 The mixture’s 
ingredients included “three of the most bitter fruits of white racial attitudes”: 
discrimination in employment, education and housing; white flight amid a massive influx 
of African Americans to urban centers; a culture of poverty that created a downward 
spiral of failure and lingering resentment in ghettoes.36 As these factors “converged on 
the inner city in recent years,” many in the white suburbs and wealthier African 
Americans had “prospered to a degree unparalleled in the history of civilization.”37 To 
make matters worse, the affluent society was “endlessly flaunted” before ghetto 
residents.38 The chapter also cited more recent factors, including an assertion that civil 
rights victories had only exacerbated the problems that remained and that “frustrated 
hopes are the residue of unfulfilled expectations.”39 When state and local officials defied 
Federal authority on civil rights and did little to deter violence against civil rights 
activists, the report stated, more and more African Americans came to believe there was 
“no effective alternative to violence as a means of achieving redress of grievances and of 
‘moving the system.’”40 This fury sparked the Black Power movement. Police 
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represented “white power, white racism, and white repression,” a symbol of both the 
torpor in addressing civil rights and the racial double standard that existed in 
administering justice.41 Now that the Kerner Commission had identified the factors that 
spawned violence, it sought to “analyze them in the perspective of history.”42 
The report’s “historical sketch” of black American protest asserted that riots were 
“embedded in a tangle of issues and circumstances—social, economic, political and 
psychological—that arose out of the pattern of Negro-white relations in America.”43  
Chapter 5 profiled the struggle, from the institution of slavery to a century plagued by 
white violence against black activism thereafter; it also traced the forms black protest 
took—“accommodation, separatism, and self-help,” among others—and connected them 
to contemporary strains of Black Power thought.44 In fact, the Kerner Commission 
argued, the Black Power movement was not as radical as its followers thought; by eliding 
a “direct confrontation with American society on the issue of integration and, by 
preaching separatism,” Black Power proponents “unconsciously function as an 
accommodation to white racism.”45 Furthermore, their philosophy, grounded in a clear-
eyed portrayal of black history, racial uplift, and removing themselves from the white 
society that had oppressed them, was “reminiscent of Booker T. Washington,” the report 
said.46 
The report also surveyed how inner-city, largely black neighborhoods became 
spaces prone to rioting. Chapter 6, titled “Formation of the Racial Ghettoes,” pointed to 
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the Great Migration as a catalyst for dire conditions in northern cities; African Americans 
who moved northward and westward to escape the Jim Crow South encountered similar 
hostility from white locals.47 In 1910, 91 percent of the nearly 10 million African 
Americans lived in the South; by 1966, when the black population had more than 
doubled, the “number living in metropolitan areas rose more than fivefold (from 2.6 
million to 14.8 million)” and the “number living outside the South rose elevenfold (from 
880,000 to 9.7 million).”48 As the urban black population grew in cities, white flight 
continued—the report noted that since 1960, the white urban population had decreased by 
1.3 million people nationally. Furthermore, compiled data found that the nation’s twelve 
largest cities had two-thirds of the black population outside the South and one-third of the 
entire black American population. Just as whites had excluded blacks from entering 
“their spaces” by residential segregation, they were also fleeing “neighborhoods where 
Negroes are moving or already residing” in droves.49 When white families refused to 
move into “changing areas when ‘vacancies’ occur,” the report noted, black families 
tended to fill those vacancies, which only worsened residential segregation.50 The 
commission cited a recent study that classified the “average segregation index” of 207 of 
America’s largest cities as 86.2, meaning that “to create an unsegregated population 
distribution, an average of over 86 percent of all Negroes would have to change their 
place of residence within the city.”51 
Building off the pattern of residential segregation, the report’s seventh chapter 
detailed the specific issues that had plagued ghettoes for decades. Commissioners 
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estimated that 16 to 20 percent of all African Americans—or between two and two-and-
a-half million people—lived in “squalor and deprivation in ghetto neighborhoods.”52 The 
black unemployment rate was more than double that of the white unemployment rate in 
1967; black males were “more than three times as likely as white men” to work in “low-
paying, unskilled or service jobs.”53 The commission identified this as the most pivotal 
source of poverty in ghettoes. Compounding the employment issue was the steady arrival 
of migrants from the South who sought jobs and a better life but in the process made the 
poverty issue worse. In 1966, 11.9 percent of white Americans but 40.6 percent of 
nonwhites lived below the poverty level defined by the Social Security Administration; of 
those nonwhites living in poverty, 40 percent lived in central cities.54  Employment issues 
had a trickle-down effect on family structures, according to the report; job problems 
resulted in men “unable or unwilling to remain with their families,” which created a 
“handicap imposed on children growing up without fathers in an atmosphere of poverty 
and deprivation” with single mothers “forced to work to provide support.”55 The 
subsequent “culture of poverty” created a “system of ruthless, exploitative relationships 
within the ghetto,” defined by crime, drug addiction, prostitution, and other factors that 
were exceedingly difficult to overcome and only ripened conditions for civil disorder.56  
Chapter 8, titled “Conditions of Life in the Racial Ghetto,” offered evidence of 
the havoc wrought by life in the slums. The crime rate was much higher—the report used 
one city as an example and said “one low-income Negro district had 35 times as many 
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crimes against persons as did a high-income white district.”57 A dim forecast surmised 
that crime would only get worse with an expanding ghetto population that would 
“outstrip police resources.”58 Additionally, substandard living conditions and sanitation 
spurred higher rates of disease and mortality and inferior medical care. The report noted 
the alarming statistic that the infant mortality rate for nonwhite babies less than a month 
old was “58 percent higher than for whites; for one to 12 months it is almost three times 
as high.”59 Life in the ghetto meant fewer times for garbage collection and exploitation 
from local merchants. Through the spine of the Kerner Commission’s report, its authors 
filled out the harrowing portrait of ghetto life.  
Making this portrait even more disheartening was the contrast between the 
experience of black Americans and earlier European immigrants; this contrast was the 
subject of the report’s ninth chapter. In addition to black migrants failing to find the same 
unskilled labor positions their European counterparts had upon arrival, the commission 
pointed to a “structure of discrimination” that “stringently narrowed opportunities for the 
Negro and restricted his prospects.”60 European immigrants encountered discrimination 
initially but “never so pervasively”; these immigrants also allied with urban political 
machines that “enabled [them] to make [their] voice heard and [their] power felt.”61 
African Americans, meanwhile, failed to enter into these political machines for a variety 
of reasons. While discrimination precluded black males from moving upward, 
immigrants had the opportunity for a “vision of the future—one that led to a life outside 
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the ghetto,” that provided the “incentive necessary to endure the present.”62 
Discrimination barred African Americans from realizing that vision; segregation “denied 
Negroes access to good jobs and the opportunity to leave the ghetto…the future seemed 
to lead only to a dead end.”63 This disparate experience not only allowed European 
immigrants to “exaggerate how well and quickly they escaped from poverty,” it also 
allowed them to pin the blame on African Americans for not working hard enough to get 
ahead, setting up an entire framework that posited that black America’s problems of the 
ghetto were problems of their own making.64 The report noted that although some 
African Americans had escaped poverty, “few have been able to escape the urban 
ghetto.”65 
The report’s third and final section, “What Can Be Done?” began with a profile of 
how communities responded to ghetto grievances. Chapter 10 commenced with the 
assertion that “every major episode of violence was foreshadowed by an accumulation of 
unresolved grievances and by widespread dissatisfaction among Negroes with the 
unwillingness and inability of local government to respond.”66 It called upon city 
governments to “improve their capacity to respond effectively to community needs 
before they become community grievances” while allowing residents to have a say in 
“shaping programs and policies which affect the community.”67 Official 
recommendations included forming neighborhood task forces, creating more robust 
grievance mechanisms, establishing neighborhood outlets for administrative and public 
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service agencies at all levels, and the aforementioned move of giving affected residents a 
more prominent voice. In this endeavor, city governments needed the full support of state 
and federal authorities.68 As Chapter 11 outlined, ghetto communities also needed to 
improve relationships with law enforcement; the commission placed the onus in this 
regard on the cops. “The abrasive relationship between the police and the ghetto 
community has been a major—and expensive—source of grievance, tension, and 
disorder,” the report said.69 While acknowledging the bravery and service of officers, the 
commission noted that “aggressive patrol practices” did little to diffuse tension; the 
police-community relationship also suffered from the “lack of effective mechanisms for 
handling complaints against the police.”70 Police needed to improve their tactics, which 
started with reviewing police behavior to ensure “proper conduct by officers” in slums.71 
Officers also needed to disprove to ghetto residents the “existence of a dual standard of 
law enforcement” based on race, a reputed double standard that the commission believed 
had merit.72 Departments needed “fair and effective mechanisms for redress of grievances 
against police,” more stringent policy guidelines in directing officers how to avoid 
tension in slums, programs that would address trust issues between the community and 
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officers, more African American officers recruited to the force, and fair promotion for 
those officers who did protect and serve.73  
Avoiding disorder, however, was a mutual initiative; it did not depend solely on 
police officers—public officials also needed to play an active role. Chapter 12, “Control 
of Disorder,” made a number of recommendations to “preserve peace and rule of law” 
and “maintain control of incidents which would lead to disorders.”74 These included 
having veteran officers patrol inner-city neighborhoods, offering special riot control 
training, constructing intelligence systems to use “reliable information that may help to 
prevent outbreak of disorder,” avoid using lethal weapons in controlling disorder, and 
ensuring that communications systems could “collect and evaluate rumors that may lead 
to civil disorder.”75 Commissioners wanted the federal government to share the burden 
for “financing programs for improvement of police forces”; the report also featured a 
supplemental section on riot control that evaluated police, National Guard, and Army 
troops, their capabilities to respond to riots, and suggestions for how they could 
coordinate to respond more effectively.76 In the chaos of disorder, Chapter 13 noted that 
many cities “had breakdowns in mechanisms for processing, prosecuting, and protecting 
arrested persons” due to “structural deficiencies in criminal court systems” and the 
“failure of communities to anticipate and plan for emergency demands of civil 
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disorders.”77 The commission wanted to better the criminal justice system during rioting 
“so that its deliberative functions are protected, and the quality of justice is 
maintained.”78 Beyond laws “sufficient to deter and punish riot conduct,” the commission 
wanted procedures in place that separated “minor offenders from those dangerous to the 
community in order that serious offenders may be detained and prosecuted effectively.”79 
After a brief chapter that recommended how to assess and compensate for 
damages in the aftermath of riots, which recommended the federal government “permit 
Federal emergency food and medical assistance to cities during major civil disorders” as 
well as providing more incentive for private insurers to offer coverage in high-risk areas, 
the report moved to its assessment of news media during the riots.80 While the report 
commended the press on the whole for offering a “balanced, factual account of the 1967 
disorders” in its newspaper, radio, and television coverage, it had criticisms related to 
how the press captured the areas where riots occurred and the urban poor who lived in 
those areas.81 The media, according to Chapter 15, had failed to “report adequately on 
causes and consequences of civil disorders and on underlying problems of race 
relations.”82 To the extent that white Americans did not understand the “degradation, 
misery and hopelessness of life in the ghetto,” it was the media’s job to inform them; on 
this score, said the Kerner Commission, the media had failed.83 The report recommended 
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that reporters more “familiar with urban and racial affairs” and with “better links with the 
Negro community” report on those communities; newspapers and television needed to 
report on black communities beyond violence, depicting them as “a group within the 
community and as a part of the larger community.”84 Doing so would require recruiting 
more African Americans into journalism at the high school and college levels and 
solidifying guidelines for “accurate and responsible reporting of riot and racial news.”85 
Those white journalists ill-equipped to report on these issues needed training and 
education for responsible reporting, which would also help improve the relationship 
between police and the press if future riots occurred.  
In its penultimate chapter, the commission foresaw a bleak future for American 
cities if demographic trends persisted. The commission estimated that by the year 1985, 
the black population in inner cities would grow up 20.8 million, or 72 percent; when 
combined with the “contained exodus of white families to the suburbs,” a recipe existed 
that could make American cities even more treacherous.86 An influx of poor black 
Americans into areas that already had meager tax bases and high rates of unemployment 
spelled trouble. Commissioners offered three options for the nation: continue the flawed 
present course, choose the “enrichment” route, which entailed “improving dramatically 
the quality of ghetto life while abandoning integration as a goal,” and, lastly, focusing on 
integration by “combining ghetto ‘enrichment’ with policies which will encourage Negro 
movement out of central city areas.”87 The current rate would “make permanent the 
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division of our country into two societies,” while the “enrichment” plan was “another 
way of choosing a permanently divided country.”88 The chapter said that the third 
choice—improving quality of urban life while stimulating “programs designed to 
encourage integration of substantial numbers of Negroes into the society outside the 
ghetto,” was the most desirable.89 It would not abandon integration, but it would also 
recognize that “no matter how ambitious or energetic the program, few Negroes now 
living in central cities can be quickly integrated.”90 All of this, commissioners noted, 
could only serve as a temporary solution, for the broader goals needed to allow for 
“substantial Negro movement out of the ghettoes” with the goal of achieving a “single 
society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according to his capabilities 
and desires, not his color.”91 
With this goal of a “true union—a single society and a single American identity” 
in mind, the Kerner Commission presented its seventeenth and final chapter, titled 
“Recommendations for National Action.”92 Declaring that “No American—white or 
black—can escape the consequences of the continuing social and economic decay of our 
major cities,” the commission laid out a comprehensive plan “on an unprecedented scale” 
that it believed could “shape a future compatible with the historic ideals of American 
society.”93 The plan would rely on “the great productivity of our economy” and require 
the need to “generate new will—the will to tax ourselves to the extent necessary to meet 
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the vital needs of the nation.”94 Broadly, Chapter 17’s introduction had three objectives: 
creating changes for those affected by racial discrimination by eradicating barriers related 
to jobs, education, and housing; combatting the helpless feeling of ghetto residents by 
offering “means for them to deal with the problems that affect their own lives” and by 
“increasing the capacity of our public and private institutions to respond to these 
problems”; using improved interracial communication to “destroy stereotypes…halt 
polarization, end distrust and hostility and create common ground for efforts toward 
public order and social justice.”95 
These objectives were admirable, but they were also vague. The commission 
expanded on them by offering tailored recommendations for employment, education, 
welfare, and housing. In the “Employment” section, the commissioners classified 
unemployment and underemployment as “the most persistent and serious grievances in 
the Negro ghetto.”96 They focused specifically on the “hard-core unemployed” in central 
cities, those African American males ages 18 to 25 who had neither a steady job nor the 
education and skills necessary to acquire one.97 African Americans were three times as 
likely to hold unskilled, “dead end” jobs as white Americans; when measuring the 
demographics of the “hard-core unemployed” against the profile of the typical urban 
rioter, the commission noted the overlap.98 The commission wanted the Federal 
Government to “take immediate action to create two million new jobs over the next three 
years—one million in the public sector and one million in the private sector—to absorb 
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the hard-core unemployed and materially reduce the level of underemployment for all 
workers, black and white.”99 The plan called for 550,000 new jobs within the first year. 
Commissioners also proposed job training from the public and private sectors that would 
reimburse private employers for the cost as well as tax incentives for those investing in 
“rural as well as urban poverty areas in order to offer to the rural poor an alternative to 
migration to urban centers.”100 Employers also needed to “remove artificial barriers” that 
hindered employment, including “not only racial discrimination, but, in certain cases, 
arrest records or lack of a high school diploma.”101 Fighting racism in this arena meant 
strengthening the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and supporting Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.102 The commission complimented those who had already 
taken steps to address issues of race, discrimination, and employment but provided no 
cost estimates on its job programs and proposals.  
Turning to education, the commission argued that for “many minorities, and 
particularly for the children of the ghetto, the schools have failed to provide the 
educational experience which could overcome the effects of discrimination and 
deprivation,” resulting in lingering resentment and frustration in black communities.103 
The correlation between “ghetto youth who have not completed high school” and the 
“high incidence of riot participation,” commissioners argued, constituted “dramatic 
evidence of the relationship between education practices and civil disorders.”104 
Substandard school systems created the “high unemployment and underemployment rate” 
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and advanced the “consequences of racial isolation at all levels…produced by three 
centuries of myth, ignorance and bias.”105  Integrated schools were “essential to the future 
of American society,” though the report conceded that current demographics made this 
goal unattainable for many schoolchildren.106 “If existing disadvantages are not to be 
perpetuated, we must drastically improve the quality of ghetto education,” the report 
stated, adding that striving for “equality of results with all-white schools must be the 
goal.”107 The commission wanted “sharply increased efforts to eliminate de facto 
segregation in our schools,” which it believed required “Federal aid to school systems 
seeking to desegregate” and an earnest application of the aforementioned Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act to counter lingering racial discrimination in all regions of the United 
States.108 At-risk schoolchildren needed better education earlier in their lives, which 
necessitated “substantial Federal funding of year-round quality compensatory education 
programs, improved teaching, and expanded experimentation and research.”109 The 
commission also wanted literacy programs for adults with the help of Federal support and 
more opportunities for parents to link themselves with school communities; it wanted the 
Federal government to provide more avenues for at-risk students to pursue higher 
education, and assurance that states would revise “per student” formulas when providing 
funding to districts with a “high-proportion” of disadvantaged students.110 Again 
commissioners wanted the federal government to play a prominent role in implementing 
recommendations, and again they offered no cost estimates for their sweeping proposals.  
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The commission next set its sights on recommendations for improving the welfare 
system. It identified two “critical deficiencies” with the system: first, that it “excludes 
large numbers of persons who are in great need” who “if provided a decent level of 
support, might be able to become productive and self-sufficient.”111 Specifically, the 
commission referred to the poor who were not old, handicapped, or parents. Second, 
those who did qualify received assistance “well below the minimum necessary for a 
decent level existence,” encouraging “continued dependency on welfare and 
undermin[ing] self-respect.”112 As currently constituted, the commission claimed, welfare 
made its recipients feel “untrustworthy, promiscuous, and lazy.”113 Reform 
recommendations included rejiggering “national standards of assistance” so that they 
matched the poverty level, defined by the Social Security Administration as $3,335 per 
year for an urban family of four; taking on a “substantially greater portion of all welfare 
costs—at least 90 per cent of total payments”; removing “restrictions that would compel 
mothers of young children to work,” recently passed by Congress; and eradicating 
residency requirements, among other suggestions.114 In the long term, the federal 
government needed to “develop a national system of income supplementation based 
strictly on need with two broad and basic purposes.”115 The first sought to offer “any 
necessary supplements in such a way as to develop incentives for fuller employment,” 
while the second would aim to provide for “those who cannot work and for mothers who 
decide to remain with their children, a minimum standard of decent living, and aid in 
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saving children from the prison of poverty that has held their parents.”116 While admitting 
this would all entail “substantially greater Federal expenditures” than ever before, the 
ultimate goal would be breaking the cycle of poverty and ensuing spiral of despair.117  
The final section of recommendations focused on housing. Commissioners 
attributed the “nearly six million substandard housing units” in the country, many of 
which were in poor, black neighborhoods, to increased rent and discrimination in areas 
outside the ghetto.118 Noting that federal programs had done “comparatively little to 
provide housing for the disadvantaged” in the history of subsidized federal housing, the 
commission championed housing programs that would topple “prevailing patterns of 
racial segregation” and require help from the private sector.119 First and foremost, the 
commission recommended a “comprehensive and enforceable” federal open housing law 
that would combat residential segregation.120 It also sought programs that would build 
more public housing outside of the ghetto and the construction of “six million new and 
existing units of decent housing” through 1972, beginning with 600,000 units in the next 
twelve months.121 This ambitious number would require “expansion and modification” to 
the rent supplement program to existing housing, creating an ownership supplement 
program structure “to make home ownership possible for low-income families,” growing 
the public housing and model cities programs, respectively, and an “expansion and 
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reorientation” of urban renewal that prioritized “projects directly assisting low-income 
households to obtain adequate housing.”122 
The commission’s brief conclusion to its massive report cited veteran 
psychologist Kenneth Clark, who had testified before commissioners the previous fall. 
Clark said that when he read a report chronicling the 1919 riot in Chicago, “it is as if I 
were reading the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of ’35, the 
report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of ’43, the reports of the 
McCone Commission on the Watts riot.”123 With this in mind, Clark told the commission 
“in candor” that it “is a kind of Alice in Wonderland—with the same moving picture 
reshown over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the 
same inaction.”124 His message to the commission here was clear: do not let your hard 
work become another impotent, dust-collecting report. While the commission said it had 
“provided an honest beginning” and “learned much,” it also admitted it had “uncovered 
no startling truths, no unique insights, no simple solutions.”125 In portraying extensively 
the “destruction and the bitterness of racial disorder, the harsh polemics of black revolt 
and white repression,” the Kerner Commission portrayed what had been “seen and heard 
before in this country.”126 Its closing sentence declared it was “time now to end the 
destruction and the violence, not only in the streets of the ghetto but in the lives of 
people.”127 With this peaceful message, the eleven commissioners rested their case for a 
comprehensive, national call to action.  
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Immediately, the Kerner Commission’s report vaulted to the top of the news and 
became a national conversation. Reaction from public officials and media outlets came 
swiftly. The commission’s gambit to secure extensive coverage of the report upon release 
meant that discussion of its conclusions and consequences for the nation was everywhere 
in the first weekend in March. Journalist Jack Gould observed that the blanket coverage 
was “an exceedingly rare demonstration…of coverage on a social issue,” and that 
television “was able to go behind the pages of the report and visually show the conditions 
and moods that prompted the commission report’s tone of urgency before the advent of 
summer.”128 From the outset, editorial pages in newspapers across the country praised the 
report. “The report of the Riot Commission splits the darkness like a flash of lightning,” 
The Washington Post proclaimed, a “distinguished, powerful and potentially useful 
document not because it presents any startling revelations or novel solutions but because 
it tells the truth with stark candor” of the “hideous cancer of racial discrimination and 
injustice.”129 The commission’s report, said The Baltimore Sun, “calls for a great deal 
more than a mere nod of the head…It demands a grasp of the full breadth of the ferment 
which explodes into riots…a clear knowledge of the harsh facts of racial 
discrimination.”130 The Chicago Daily News extended congratulations to “the 
commission and its chairman for having the wisdom to grasp the heart of the problem and 
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the courage to expose it to view…the prejudice that grips the white community.”131 The 
editorial staff at the Los Angeles Times requested that “every American must become 
aware of this challenge to our national survival…the commission report should be read 
and re-read by the President and every candidate for his office, every governor, and every 
mayor of every city where bigotry and poverty exist.”132 
Interviews indicated that the leading commissioners themselves were at peace 
with the forceful, alarming document they had authored. Writing to Chairman Otto 
Kerner, commissioner Fred Harris said, “I believe that in the years to come all of us who 
were connected with the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders will look 
back on it with pride as one of the high points of each of our lives.”133 In response to the 
commission’s broader findings, Harris said that while commissioners “all knew these 
things intellectually,” serving on the commission made them “feel it in the pit of our 
stomachs” and feel obligated to “tell it like it is” to the American people—to “see this as 
we did”—even if that sight made millions uncomfortable.134 The report, Harris said, 
needed to be “tough for everyone to live with—tough for Senators, Mayors, labor leaders, 
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businessmen and police.”135 Months and months of research, testimony, and closed-door 
discussion yielded “no easy answers.”136 He was optimistic, given that many of the 
proposals were “currently in the legislative mill,” but on ABC’s Issues and Answers, 
Harris also noted that the Kerner Commission’s proposals were primarily “not a program 
of legislation or money, but of will.”137 Changes in attitudes needed to accompany 
changes in policy. Harris recognized that tangible change would be as complex as the 
process of diagnosing the problems, but he remained clear-eyed and optimistic that 
workable solutions existed in the report; it was now a matter of putting the issues before 
the public and framing the broader solutions as both political and moral imperatives.  
In an interview with the Chicago Daily News, Kerner described the creation of the 
report as “very fatiguing.”138 Speaking from his suite in the Washington Hilton as he 
smoked a cigarette, the Illinois Governor continued: 
I thought I knew the problem fairly well, but I certainly was not aware of the 
depth and breadth of it. For one thing, I became aware that it is not only color that 
prevents the Negroes from developing in our society. It is as much the educational 
barriers, the manner in which he is forced to live. The Negro has never been able to 
develop the work habits of the white community for these reasons….The report contains 
only facts as to why the riots happened. They are not incontrovertible. We may not like 
the facts, but they are facts and have to be accepted.139  
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Kerner admitted that the commission was also “an education for himself,” inspiring him 
to read Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. DuBois late into the night.140  
White America did not have “any conception of conditions in the ghettoes….if they did, 
they would understand, why the frustration, why the high emotions,” he said.141 What if 
they did not like the answers provided? “Facts are facts,” Kerner said, adding that the 
“only thing you can say to persons who have their mind made up is that they should 
consider the facts, that they should try to place themselves in the subjective position of 
the person who lives in the ghetto.”142 Asked what would happen now that America could 
read his commission’s conclusions, the chairman predicted that one of three things would 
happen: the American public would either accept the report and not act on it, accept it 
and take action, or embrace the “gap between black and white, thus leading to two 
separate societies.”143 Kerner hoped America would choose the second option, stating it 
“aims at achieving the ideals and philosophy always stated as that of the United States of 
America.”144 Ultimately, he had faith in the American people to embrace this option, he 
said, because if “American people know what the facts are, know what the situation is, 
they always rise to the occasion. I am confident they will in this instance too.”145 The 
reporter noted that Kerner had notes of optimism in his voice, his tone was grave, and he 
trailed off a few times when considering the consequences of ignoring the report. Like 
Harris, Kerner suggested that urban issues needed to receive as much attention as the 
Vietnam War. Appearing on the same program as Harris and Wilkins, journalists pressed 
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Kerner on the cost and scope of the proposals. He replied that the commission “could not 
possibly implement” all recommendations and that it was “quite impossible” to determine 
the cost because “these are the decisions that must be made by the executive and 
members of Congress.”146  
Kerner expressed genuine hope that Congress, President Johnson, and the broader 
public would heed the commission’s recommendations, but he also tempered his 
statements with the realism of a seasoned, jaded politician; the commission would not 
succeed on all scores, but it needed to succeed on at least some of them. Furthermore, the 
dialogue surrounding the report, a dialogue that entailed the realization and 
acknowledgement of American racial problems and how they fostered rioting, would in 
itself be a worthwhile exercise. If the nation could not implement everything in the 
report, perhaps citizens could at least read an honest assessment and have an honest 
discussion about the issues with the goal of trying to follow recommendations in the 
future. Simply recognizing the level of racism and plight of the black poor in America, 
after all, would not cost a dollar.   
In his own public statements, Vice Chairman John Lindsay was not quite as 
conciliatory in this regard. On CBS’s Face the Nation, Lindsay said that though the 
proposals “undoubtedly will be costly, Americans have risen to challenges before. 
Congress must lead, and the people must push the Congress; both must happen. Unless it 
happens, we’re in for trouble.”147 The New York mayor also called upon individual 
commissioners to fight for their work and “make as much of an impact as possible” to 
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“excite the people about the dimensions of this problem.”148 Lindsay did not emphasize 
the common ground between the commission’s proposals and those already before 
Congress or in the Great Society; he also refused to answer a question about the 
connection between expenses on urban issues and the Vietnam War and, as a White 
House aide noted, “passed up chances” to criticize President Johnson personally.149 
Ultimately, this reticence would prove to be short-lived. As was the case through much of 
the commission’s investigation, Lindsay was not quite as diplomatic as many of his 
colleagues, and he saw no issue with challenging other officials and traversing what he 
viewed as lip service in the name of attaining objectives. “I’ve never seen in history 
where progress was not served by honesty,” Lindsay said, proclaiming the report was the 
Kerner Commission saying, “for heaven’s sake, put this up on the front burners of the 
stove, this crisis which is affecting our cities.”150 
Commissioner Roy Wilkins, who also appeared on Issues and Answers, was 
proud and elated at the report’s release. “It’s a good report; if I wasn’t so modest I’d say 
it was an excellent report,” he said.151 Wilkins labeled the commission’s report as unique 
in that for the “first time in any report, it points to racism in American life, all through 
American life…as a basic cause of the attitudes which can lead to riot.”152 He hoped it 
could assist in program proposals already before Congress and pledged that the report 
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would have the grassroots backing of more than 1,500 NAACP chapters. Asked if the 
report was merely a repackaging of past commission volumes, as Kenneth Clark had 
lamented, Wilkins replied: “there is a good reason for that…because nothing has been 
done on the recommendations of 1919, 1937, 1943, and so we have the same 
recommendations in 1968.”153 Whether the commission had produced a wholly original 
report was secondary to implementing what was there.154 “Negroes resent very much 
being treated differently than whites,” Wilkins said, adding that if “you just treat people 
as people…this will not cost one cent, and I think will remove a lot of the anger and 
frustration and hatred that exists.”155 He expressed confidence in African Americans 
cooperating and embracing the report because it was not “phony tokenism like in the 
1950s and [early] 1960s.”156  
Executive Director David Ginsburg agreed, saying the commission was “aware 
that many commission reports have ended upon the shelf…it is better to recognize this 
problem by emphasizing the clarity of this position to avoid that result.”157 He branded 
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the implementation of the report’s recommendations as “an act of will” with stakes on par 
with Pearl Harbor or the Marshall Plan.158 A close friend of the president, Ginsburg said 
that Johnson “has already sought more funds for his model cities and rent supplements 
programs which was recommended by the commission, but the prospects for funding are 
not bright” due to the “congressional economy bloc” intent on cutting spending.159 James 
Corman said he intended to endorse “implementation for almost all of the report…the 
most important aspects, which need immediate attention before this summer, are help to 
the police, jobs for young people and summer education,” while William McCulloch did 
not anticipate new legislation “because much of it is now before the Congress in one 
form or another.”160 McCulloch told the Chicago Tribune he had “a general knowledge of 
ghetto conditions, but in some instances, they were much worse than I expected.”161 The 
report, he said, detailed “a story that has long needed to be told. It’s a story that has been 
known in parts of its details to many people in America.”162 
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In the wake of the report’s release, commissioners were also quick to deny that 
there had been a political slant or external pressure in the investigation. “We were, most 
of us, middle-of-the-roaders, neither extreme right nor extreme left, people already aware 
of the conditions, busy involved with the situation,” Kerner said.163 He let all 
commissioners express their opinions, and by “getting their feelings out on top of the 
table, we eliminated questions people may have had in their minds…We made the report 
in almost complete unanimity.”164 While there were differences in word choice, Kerner 
said the commission “overcame these differences rather easily,” and that they paled in 
comparison to time constraints. The chairman had to “cut out certain things I had 
committed myself to previously…I had no personal life whatsoever.”165 Harris told 
Newsweek that while commissioners had “occasional differences” on issues like “whether 
to specify politically and economically practical programs or take a more sweeping moral 
approach,” the give-and-take “rarely waxed hot” between factions in the room.166 
Lindsay concurred, stating that any disagreements had “focused on the programs the 
commission was recommending and not on the findings.”167 Skepticism remained that the 
report might go unheeded, but the hope was that the findings would resonate a bit more 
given that they had the blessing of a cross section of officials. 
The New York Times reported a different story regarding the Kerner 
Commission’s internal politics, citing inside sources and conversations with 
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commissioners and staff. According to the article, “until a month ago, some liberal 
members of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders were seriously 
contemplating a dissenting report” because they “believed, and to some extent still 
believe, that the report lacked a sense of urgency” and did not propose enough ambitious 
programs.168 Although they did not always vote in consistent blocs, Kerner, Lindsay, 
Harris, Wilkins, Brooke, and Jenkins were identified as liberals on the commission, while 
Corman, McCulloch, Thornton, Abel, and Peden were conservatives.169 The liberal cadre 
had reportedly “won several key victories” in “the last few weeks” that appeased its 
concerns and even prompted the conservatives to threaten a dissenting report “until the 
last moment the report was released last Thursday.”170 The liberals had the advantage of 
having the more prominent members, particularly Lindsay; “the threat of his dissent, 
which he almost never raised explicitly, was a powerful lever in the final weeks of 
bargaining,” the article stated.171 It was also the liberals on the commission who had 
lobbied for writing a summary of the report that would succinctly convey its message to 
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white America, particularly with regards to housing recommendations, that conservatives 
had resisted initially.172  
Conservative doubt had grown slowly; a source told the Times there had “been no 
votes at first, only discussion…But when they began to read the full text, and see the 
breadth and scope of what they were saying, they began to worry whether they could sign 
the report.”173 A staff aide claimed that it was “not the report the same commission would 
have written eight months ago…most of them never in their lives with have signed a 
report like this at the outset.”174 Meetings had initially discussed black militancy and 
conspiracies, but visits to the ghetto, witness testimony, and extensive reading made 
commissioners “understand the depth of the problem” and angle for something more 
radical.175 Most recommendations put forth in the final report constituted a compromise, 
and the liberals did not win every dispute.176 Wording was often “closely argued,” and 
sources said commissioners “decided to recommend what should be done, rather than 
what the members thought could be done under current political circumstances.”177 The 
article added that “reliable sources” claimed that while the White House did not try to 
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influence the report, Johnson aides “expressed displeasure” when they got the report 
because it “did not complement current efforts to aid the poor.”178 Commissioners were 
also surprised that the final copy of the report contained a preliminary quote from the 
president on “conditions that breed despair and violence” that they “could not recall ever 
approving.”179 Even after the commission had released its findings, reports of internal 
friction between commission members as well as the commission and the White House 
persisted. How they would ultimately affect the reaction and possible implementation of 
the report remained unknown.  
On the whole, civil rights leaders found the report encouraging, an invigorating 
call-to-civic-arms that shirked safe rhetoric in favor of bold truths. From his vacation spot 
in Jamaica, Martin Luther King Jr. praised the report, calling it a “monumental revelation 
of what we have seen since the burning fires of Watts.”180 Privately, King composed a 
telegram to Gov. Kerner from Montego Bay. It read: 
You, as a member of the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders, deserve the 
gratitude of the nation because you had both the wisdom to perceive the truth and the 
courage to state it. The commission’s findings that America is a racist society and that 
white racism is the root cause of today’s urban disorders is an important confession of a 
harsh truth. My only hope now is that white America and our national government will 
heed your warnings and implement your recommendations. By ignoring them we will 
sink inevitably into a nightmarish racial doomsday. God grant that your excellent report 
will educate the nation and lead to action before it is too late.181 
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Speaking on Meet the Press, Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes lauded the report and rebuked 
a question from a moderator on why the report did not include more “self-help measures” 
from successful African Americans.182 Stokes offered a scathing response: 
 This is the first time that there has been a report which placed the focus, the 
burden on the primary party that is responsible here, and in that regard, for you to try to 
denigrate the report, diminish it in any way, by saying, ‘You should have included what 
they ought to be doing themselves,’ is ridiculous. I can just show you volumes of things 
that are written all year long about ‘Why don’t you do for yourself,’ while at the same 
time the institution precludes you from doing for yourself…‘Pull yourself by your 
bootstraps,’ you know. [To] the very people who do not have any boots.183 
 
An official statement from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, signed by six members 
who served on that commission at the time, welcomed the document’s “hard dose of 
medicine for the American people” and hoped that officials would “avoid the temptation 
to quibble over details of the report to ignore its clear warnings, or to respond with 
superficial remedies.”184 Floyd McKissick also offered praise, saying the country was  
“on our way to reaching the moment of truth…It’s the first time whites have said, ‘we’re 
racists.’ Now’s the time to seek common truths.”185 While the commission offered 
information and conclusions that McKissick and his peers already knew, it was 
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“important that a blue-chip panel put it in writing.”186 Jesse Jackson agreed as well, 
saying the report was “important only because a white commission is saying it,” thus “a 
thousand black speakers’ words are validated by this report.”187 In his typical incendiary, 
theatrical style, Rap Brown proposed that the commissioners “should be put in jail under 
$100,000 bail each, because they’re saying essentially what I’ve been saying.”188 Bayard 
Rustin wanted America to rectify the “economic justice” first by placing the tangible 
recommendations in the foreground.189 “The problem is not some vague psychological 
racism,” he said.190 Racism existed, but “anyone who wants to get rid of racism is 
proposing that we take 50 million psychiatrists to analyze American society for the next 
10 years.”191 The only “antidote to disorder” would come in the form of program 
recommendations.192 
 The report was a beginning, but “only a beginning,” and some activists 
“expressed skepticism” that it would bring change.193 James Farmer did not think the 
report went far enough in its scathing assessment, though he praised the commission for 
“correctly identifying” the fundamental problem and noted it was “that much more 
important to empower the powerless communities” and use influence to “combat 
racism.”194 Whitney Young complimented the report but declared that preventing riots in 
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the coming summer “depends on whether the nation adopts the cures recommended by 
the commission…action must begin immediately to end poverty and discrimination.”195 
Claude Lightfoot, a member of the Negro Affairs Commission of the American 
Communist Party, offered a more cynical view, welcoming the report’s conclusions but 
saying, “only those who are naïve will expect this Administration to carry it into life.”196 
Even among those who praised the commission’s findings, doubts lingered as to whether 
Congress and the Johnson Administration would put in the time and effort to accomplish 
them. An anonymous commission member concurred, telling The Washington Daily 
News that the commission had “issued a visionary report that will go almost nowhere 
because of the practical demands of the country right now.”197 A separate report cited 
staff sources within the commission who “conceded there is a strong possibility that their 
report will go the way of...other [commissions] and study groups,” though they hoped 
there were “new circumstances that could make a difference.”198 Commission staff 
compiled a list of reactions from foreign newspapers as well, ranging from Toronto to 
Madrid to New Delhi; on the whole, commentary “expressed doubt that massive action 
would be taken” on the Kerner report due to the “high cost of the Vietnam War and 
difficulty of changing established public attitudes…Observers also saw a lack of will to 
make drastic changes.”199 
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 Members of Johnson’s own cabinet did little to assuage such concerns. Wilbur 
Cohen, a nominee to be Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare who had not yet 
been confirmed, attacked the report as oversimplifying causes of the riots and avoiding 
crucial internal issues in black communities. “I’ve thought a good deal about that term 
‘white racism,’” Cohen said, adding it “bothers me a good deal, because I think you could 
also say there is black racism and brown racism and red racism.”200 Cohen continued it 
was “no great help…to use slogans” as the commission did and wished “some of the 
energy that has gone into rioting” would instead choose “efforts…for self-
improvement.”201 The comments, coming from a key figure in the liberal administrations 
of both Lyndon Johnson and Franklin Roosevelt, puzzled many observers and infuriated 
members of the Kerner Commission. Cohen was simply responding to a question 
regarding comments from outgoing HEW Secretary John Gardner on America not 
grasping its own issues, but his answer was still a “departure from the traditional 
behavior of Cabinet nominees.”202 Ginsburg wrote a blistering letter to Cohen in late 
March that scrutinized the original exchange where Cohen criticized the commission. “If 
the transcript doesn’t accurately reflect your views, I do hope you’ll find an opportunity 
soon to correct the record,” Ginsburg said, referring to Cohen’s insistence that the 
commission made plenty of valid assertions in spite of his criticism.203 Ginsburg 
continued: “in my view your remarks have hurt the Report, the members of the 
Commission and those associated with it…My guess is that it will also hurt you, your 
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Department and the President—because the text of the Report makes clear that the 
implications of most of what you said are untrue and the attributions to the Commission 
misleading and wrong.”204 The commission’s executive director concluded his letter by 
saying that the people most harmed by the remarks would be those the commission 
sought to help; “no one who had read that Report, and wanted to describe it, could have 
said what you said,” Ginsburg wrote to Cohen.205 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey also cast skepticism upon the report on March 
5, calling it “open to challenge” and denying that the country was bound for two separate 
societies.206 “Separatism in America today is a minority movement, led by white and 
black extremists who can take advantage of current frustration but do not speak for the 
bulk of Americans, black and white,” Humphrey said.207 He did not want America to 
“fall into the error of condemning whole societies—white or black or German or Arab or 
Chinese…let us not look for scapegoats.”208 White House Press Secretary George 
Christian distanced the Johnson Administration from Humphrey’s comments, saying the 
vice president was “expressing his conclusions” and that “the President would have 
nothing to say about the report until he has examined it carefully.”209 Humphrey soon 
backtracked, writing to every commissioner in praise of the report’s “eloquence and 
honesty.”210 He wrote to Harris that history would “come to view this report as the 
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turning point in America’s long-standing commitment to achieve a just and open society 
for all her citizens…we now possess a document of immense value and importance.”211 
One of Humphrey’s aides insisted that the initial comments were interpreted in a “far 
more critical vein than they were intended to be,” but the vice president nevertheless 
reiterated his stance at a speech late in the month, saying he wished to “make it clear once 
and for all: I believe the most important and principal conclusions of the report are right, 
and I commend the report and thank its authors.”212 While the commission and White 
House spokesmen had managed to put out fires regarding criticism of the final report, 
President Johnson’s silence on the matter well into the first week of March remained the 
Texas-sized elephant in the room.213  
As the president continued to stay silent, however, members of Congress voiced 
their opinions on the Kerner Commission report and what its recommendations meant for 
America going forward. Congressmen who had served on the commission expressed 
optimism that the report would provide a “strong push toward passage of legislation” 
currently before the House and Senate, especially the civil rights bill that featured a 
provision outlawing housing discrimination. Additionally, thirty-six members in the 
right-leaning House of Representatives pledged total support for the commission’s 
recommendations. In a statement drafted by New York Representative Benjamin 
Rosenthal, the coalition—thirty-two Democrats, four Republicans—said it would 
“endeavor, in every way open to us in Congress and in our communities…to affirm the 
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priority of the Commission’s work…We stand ready to act.”214 For some Congressional 
liberals willing to address urban problems at any cost, the Kerner Commission report 
seemed a desired script, a clear path to realizing goals passed over due to foreign-policy 
commitments and obstinate conservative peers. A report authored by “11 moderates 
whose loyalty to the American system could not be questioned” should not be dismissed 
as a fringe manifesto, after all.215 
Many in Congress disagreed with the commissioners, however. The White House 
already “anticipated a hard fight” on Johnson’s own proposals to Congress, a fight where 
“the more costly” programs “would have to be compromised.”216 Following the report’s 
release, Michigan Senator Philip Hart and Bayard Rustin sent a letter to hundreds of 
Democratic officials, Kerner included, indicating they were “deeply troubled” at both the 
report’s findings and the direction of Congress.217 “Even though the nation is verging 
toward greater violence, the brutal fact is that most of the action called for by the 
commission would be not be implemented by the present narrowly divided Congress 
even if the war were to end tomorrow,” the joint statement read.218 In losing 47 seats in 
the House in the 1966 midterms, liberals had “since been fighting a series of bitter but 
successful rear guard battles to defend those accomplishments against a revived 
conservative coalition.”219 Now that the Kerner Commission had sounded its alarm, Hart 
and Rustin said, the need to unearth capable challengers and keep existing seats was even 
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more pressing; “if the history of the past two decades is any guide, the choice between 
action and reaction will not be made in the White House, but in the Congress—and 
especially in the House of Representatives, where liberal power is now most needed and 
most threatened,” Hart and Rustin said.220 In the mean time, those 150 liberals who were 
in the House needed to fight a right-wing movement bolstered by “campaigns subtly 
appealing to racism in the guise of concern about ‘crime in the streets.’”221 Said another 
liberal official: “This is fundamentally a conservative Congress…The report will produce 
no concrete action,” though he hoped the “long-run effect could be more positive” as a 
“blueprint for urban overhaul” whenever the nation mercifully withdrew from 
Vietnam.222  
In March 1968, however, that moment did not appear imminent. Beset by a costly 
war with flagging support and aims to slash spending, the Kerner Commission tome was 
the last thing many members of Congress wanted on their desks, particularly as right-
leaning members impeded the civil rights bill and its open housing centerpiece. Even 
when a 61-19 Senate vote “halted unlimited debate on civil rights” and “cleared the way 
for action on open housing and protection of Negroes and civil rights workers,” concern 
remained about the broader bill “languishing in the House, [now] a citadel of Capitol Hill 
conservatism.”223 The New York Times offered optimism that the action constituted “an 
impressive first response” to the Kerner Commission’s open housing request, proving 
that “the democratic process can move effectively to smash the barriers to equal 
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treatment” and speculating that perhaps the report’s prominence since its release 
influenced the Senate vote.224 The Senate’s action on the open-housing portion of the 
civil rights bill was a starting point, but that starting point did not guarantee broader 
action on behalf of the Kerner report. Commentator Charles Bartlett argued that the 
report “is stirring more irritation than gratitude in Congress...where many feel caught 
between their awareness of city needs and their fear of the taxpayer,” and that it 
“aggravated Congress’s sense of being threatened by the black militants.”225 Congress 
also, of course, awaited Johnson’s reply to the report, though those wishing to cut 
spending seemed primed to reject the recommendations even if the White House did 
endorse them. Not all Republicans agreed with this strategy, and several members in the 
House opted for a proposal that would cut spending in the current budget “in order to 
commit more money to the critical needs of the cities.”226 
Johnson had already asked for a 10 percent tax increase for Vietnam expenditures 
and fighting inflation, which prompted an “ultimatum” from Wilbur Mills, the 
longstanding chair of the House Ways and Mean Committee: either cut domestic 
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spending, or a tax increase would not happen.227 Now came a report with tens of 
recommendations that would undoubtedly add billions to the ledger. If many 
Congressional Republicans and southern Democrats strained to raise taxes on account of 
the Vietnam War, a fight to contain communism in Southeast Asia that many of them 
supported in principle, the chances of securing funds for “new domestic outlays” seemed 
grim.228 Some of the commission’s recommendations, such as open housing and 
combatting discrimination, did not cost anything, but others, like increased welfare 
standards of which the government would pay 90 percent, garnered less appeal to an 
exasperated Congress. Its detractors lodged their criticism on two fronts: the 
recommendations were ill-timed in the current climate, and the basic conclusions of who 
was culpable for the summer’s bloodshed were misguided as well.  
George Mahon, a Texas Democrat and chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee, branded the findings as “wholly unrealistic” to implement, given their scope, 
and said the commission’s work might “raise hopes and expectations which could do 
more harm than good.”229 Mahon was one of many right-leaning congressmen in a mood 
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to cut spending, and thus a report with vague assertions of doing the opposite did not go 
over well. “We will spend $25 billion this year to help the poor,” he said, adding, “I do 
not see how we can make this great leap forward at this time of fiscal stringency.”230 
Mahon compared the $27.7 billion Johnson asked for to assist the poor in the coming 
fiscal year to the $9.5 billion and $12.5 billion spent on the poor in the last years of the 
Eisenhower Administration and Kennedy Administration, respectively.231 “If you can’t 
pass a surtax of 10 percent, how can you expect to pass a surtax of 50 to 100 percent to 
cover the cost of massive new programs?” he asked.232 Louisiana Democrat Edward 
Hebert called the report “propaganda ad nauseam” from a left-leaning commission under 
the instruction of a left-leaning president.233 South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond took his 
criticism a step further; after President Johnson nominated Kerner to a judicial vacancy 
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Thurmond attended the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee hearing to cross-examine Kerner over his role on the riot commission. “I 
have mixed emotions,” Thurmond said of Kerner, adding he admired the Illinois 
governor for “his long and dedicated service in various capacities” but did not 
“understand…trying to blame the white race” for riots.234 Kerner did not relent, insisting 
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that white racism “has a great deal to do with these riots”; he was eventually confirmed 
by the bipartisan subcommittee.235 
Another South Carolinian, Albert Watson, did not limit his criticism to the cost of 
the findings; he also castigated the findings themselves, stating that to “lay the blame for 
these riots on so-called white racism is an incredible rationalization” that provided 
“further emphasis to the cry of police brutality” and refrained from blaming riot 
instigators in any meaningful way.236 Mississippi Senator James Eastland called for a 
return to law and order and said that with the report, America saw “the results of 
stripping our police of effective power and of coddling those who infringe on the rights 
of others in the name of some cause.”237 Louisiana Rep. Allen Ellender told the press the 
report gave “the demagogues a chance to take the stage,” while Virginian Rep. Watkins 
Abbitt said that classifying “wrong conditions does not open the door to lawbreakers and 
hoodlums who can act under the guise that they are trying to rectify the misdeeds of 
society.”238 Abbitt blasted national leaders as well, accusing “so-called do-gooders, as 
well as certain organizations and elements of the federal judiciary” of having “paved the 
way for the summer riots.”239 The criticism reached the point that an exasperated 
Ginsburg wrote to the entire commission requesting that “more important editorials and 
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clippings which Al Spivak is sending are inserted into the Congressional Record” 
because “a number of Senate and House members hostile to the report have mounted a 
campaign against it…it would be extremely helpful if the favorable side of the story were 
also told.”240 On March 20 the House Rules Committee “refused to clear fair housing 
legislation,” prompting an outcry from liberals and halting the momentum of the civil 
rights bill.241  
One Nashville businessman spoke for many conservatives in a local column about 
why the report signaled a nation, guided by liberalism, heading in the wrong direction. 
He wrote: 
The commission’s report is indicative of what is wrong. It says, in effect, that the 
riot is the fault of society, of the self-reliant citizens who mind their own business. This is 
absurd. It is not the task of American society in general or government in particular to 
lavish gifts on every disadvantaged citizen so that he has the same amount of goods and 
services enjoyed by more productive, able and prudent citizens. People aren’t trapped in 
slums by society. If they have been trapped, it is because they haven’t taken advantage of 
the opportunities that exist in free enterprise America. People leave the slums all the 
time; people who are energetic and self-reliant. Others, unfortunately, don’t have the will 
to work and get ahead. The danger we face extends beyond riots. The danger is that the 
least productive, least self-reliant, least independent elements will become convinced that 
society owes them a living—a very good living. They also may become convinced that if 
society fails to pay off handsomely, they have a right to riot.242  
 
All of these criticisms folded into a broader critique of liberalism and of the 
fundamental worldview that the Kerner Commission seemed to take in its assessment of 
America. They became a rallying point among conservatives and opponents of the report: 
why did the Kerner Commission downplay the behavior of the rioters themselves? Not 
only was it unfair, according to these critics, it would also embolden rioters to repeat such 
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behavior if they believed there would be no consequences. This line of thinking permitted 
critics of the report to pivot away from many of the findings and recommendations and 
instead focus on the shortcomings, deflecting the attention away from diagnosed 
problems and toward liberals willing to soft-pedal rioting while casting criminals as 
victims. Critics sometimes used coded language to make their point, and at other times, 
they said it explicitly: the commission was so reluctant to blame black criminals for 
rioting that it had instead drawn the wrong conclusions and held white suburbanites 
responsible.  
These critics found an ally in Sen. John McClellan’s subcommittee investigation, 
slated to conduct a new round of open hearings on Detroit and Newark riots beginning on 
March 19; the hearings promised “a lot of ‘law and order’ talk,” according to The Wall 
Street Journal.243 George Romney answered questions and read a prepared statement at 
the hearings in Detroit, where he called the Kerner Commission’s conclusions misguided 
and expressed support for “individual changes of attitude to Negroes and ‘self-help’ by 
local government, private industry, and individuals.”244 This was the investigation many 
Americans wanted, one that refused to rule out conspiracy. Senator Carl Curtis of 
Nebraska, who referred to the Kerner report as a “barrage of propaganda,” also believed 
that the “patterns of fires” in Detroit showed “somebody organized it…it was not just 
spontaneous combustion.”245 The subcommittee received testimony from Michigan State 
Police Commander Frederick Davids, who told officials that the “fires and false alarms 
were deliberately spread throughout the city” to stretch resources and “so that they could 
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make certain that the town burned down.”246 Romney complicated matters a bit by 
backing open-housing legislation and racial tolerance at the hearings. These points, 
according to a report, “were not…what McClellan and his colleagues wished to hear.”247 
Responding to accusations of police brutality, McClellan wrote “frostily” that “it makes 
no sense that this should have any impact.”248 Told that African Americans in Detroit 
resented being called “boy,” McClellan replied: “Do you have any reports about whites 
being called ‘whitey ‘ and ‘honky?’ Nobody ever used to think of it as offensive. It used 
to be a friendly term.”249  
Along with Vietnam, civil disorders figured to be the most prevalent issue in the 
upcoming election. Columnist Robert Roth praised Johnson and Nixon for having 
“handled this explosive matter with responsibility,” but he doubted that third-party 
candidate George Wallace could “be counted on for equal circumspection…his very 
presence in the presidential race as an independent candidate is an incitement to racist 
dissention.”250 William White of The Washington Post concurred that riots would be an 
issue, with the report itself as “a brooding factor X.”251 In addition to calling the report 
“plainly inflammatory in some of its conclusions and unwisely evangelical in some of its 
rhetoric,” White predicted that the result would be more, rather than less, disorder.252 In 
response to the report’s fiery tone, he said: “the hot breath of evangelism should be the 
                                                
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Robert Roth, “Civil Disorders Become No. 1 Election Issue,” Sunday Bulletin, Mar. 3, 1968, “News 
Clippings,” Box 6, Series 47, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
251 William S. White, “Riot Report Certain to Help Republicans, Hurt Democrats,” The Washington Post, 
Mar. 6, 1968, “News Clippings,” Box 6, Series 47, NACCD, RG 282, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
252 Ibid. 
 397 
very last breath to be blown upon this livid coal.”253 By “suggesting that the very 
Administration which created this Commission has not done much about this frightful 
problem,” he said, the report would “almost certainly injure” Democrats while bolstering 
Republicans, particularly Nixon (“He is not going to go all the way with the Commission, 
and obviously not with the unhappily Uncle Tom’s Cabin approach which in some 
instances it has taken,” White wrote).254 White also feared Wallace would benefit from 
the report, his agenda and supporters buoyed “by any and every Negro riot.”255 More than 
likely, he concluded, the “forces of racial extremism, black and white, will be the 
ultimate gainers from the Commission’s manifesto.”256  
On the campaign trail in advance of the New Hampshire Primary, Republican 
presidential candidate Richard Nixon capitalized on the criticism and frustration over the 
Kerner Commission’s report. It was here, in the nascent days of his drive toward the 
White House, that Nixon crafted his message as law and order’s standard-bearer. 
Speaking at a radio station in Keene, New Hampshire, the former vice president levied a 
harsh assessment of the report. By placing “undue emphasis on the idea we are in effect a 
racist society, white racists versus black racists,” and laying the blame on “everyone 
except the perpetrators of the riots,” he told his audience, the commission of moderates 
and liberals had missed the mark on what plagued inner cities.257 “We have got to make it 
very clear to potential rioters that in the event something starts next summer, the law will 
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move in with adequate force to put down rioting and looting,” Nixon said.258 He did not 
deny that prejudice and injustice existed, but what the Kerner Commission had put forth 
“tends to divide people, to build a wall in between people” that did not help matters.259  
“Violence in a free society is never inevitable unless we accept the inevitability,” he 
said.260 What America needed, he reasoned, was reconciliation, calls for unity that relied 
more on private enterprise than massive federal spending. He did not broach specifics, 
but did concede the report contained “good things.”261 
Nixon reserved his harshest criticism for President Johnson, whose 
Administration he said was “voicing defeatism and counseling despair as it predicts 
another summer of racial violence.”262 He linked ghetto violence to Vietnam War 
violence, claiming the “first lesson is that the best time to display both power and the will 
to use it is before trouble starts…force alone is not enough…it is no answer to those who 
think they have nothing to lose.”263 Achievement in inner cities needed to “rest not on the 
expectation of being given something, but on the chance to do something,” Nixon said.264 
He remained hopeful that the summer of 1968 would be more peaceful for three reasons: 
America had “been warned,” responsible African American leaders were resisting the 
“extremists,” and the election year would facilitate a “peaceful, political focus” for the 
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country.265 As president, Nixon said he would “prepare to meet force with force if 
necessary” and ensure that “retaliation against the perpetrators and the planners of 
violence will be swift and sure,” but the first option needed to be the “conviction to bring 
the American dream to the ghetto.”266 Johnson and his Great Society gave the country the 
misleading impression that “the evils of centuries could be overcome overnight,” he 
said.267 
In his criticism, Nixon channeled millions of American conservatives who 
seethed at requests for more federal funding on the heels of burning cities and billions 
already poured into the Great Society and civil rights measures. For his supporters, he 
was a levelheaded voice, more deliberate than firebrand third-party candidate George 
Wallace but tougher on crime than the sitting president. He was a man who had begun the 
decade narrowly losing a presidential election and now wished to halt an eight-year cycle 
of liberalism and all of its pervasive consequences, the voice for a group of white 
Americans who felt under siege, resenting the notion that they were responsible for both 
distant violence and footing the bill to fix the conditions that generated that violence. 
This was the America concerned with “how to curb riots rather than how to deal with 
their underlying causes,” more concerned with outside agitators and links to extremism 
than police brutality and the spiral of poverty.268  
Nixon channeled conservative critic James Kilpatrick, who called the Kerner 
report a “whitewash” packed with false conclusions and subterfuge.269 He channeled The 
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Wall Street Journal editorial that castigated naïve, sentimental liberals who “imagine 
there is a cure in the outpouring of money” rather than pragmatism.270 He channeled 
David Lawrence in The Washington Star, who accused the Kerner Commission of 
“avoiding entirely” that “militant Negro organizations have preached violence and 
threatened more and more riots unless Congress grants the demands of mobocracy.”271 
He channeled Charles Bartlett, who said that moderate, sensible men, “after a close look 
at the circumstances, produced a report which is radical by any yardstick.”272 He 
channeled The Dallas Morning News, which ran an editorial ripping the Kerner 
Commission for reheating failed liberal strategies that had “made old problems worse and 
new problems grow…more welfare, more public housing, more restrictions on the police, 
more social engineering, more direction from the top and, of course, more spending all 
around.”273 He channeled The Newark Evening Star, blaming the report for sending a 
message to the urban poor that “there is nothing they can do, even with help, to extricate 
themselves from the ‘racist’ oppression,” and thus perpetuating the cycle of dependence 
and squalor.274 He channeled the Montgomery Advertiser that claimed nothing had 
“poured as much gas on the flames still flickering in the cities as the Honkey Report…it 
is to the war of the cities what Munich was to World War II.”275 As Nixon embarked on 
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his presidential campaign, he hoped to convince the millions of conservatives who 
believed these sentiments that he was a capable challenger, worthy of their vote.  
Those enraged by the leak of an unpublished Kerner Commission staff report that 
claimed police did more to incite a riot in Cambridge, Maryland, than did Rap Brown 
also found an ally with Nixon. “It may be emotionally satisfying to think that Brown 
came to Cambridge and that therefore there was a riot, and it may be simpler for the 
public to grasp,” the unpublished report read, but the facts of the incident were “more 
complex and quite different.”276 The leaked assessment called to mind African American 
conservative George Schuyler’s fierce defense of police, whom he said were the 
“perennial whipping boys of those running interference for demonstrators” despite the 
fact they were “the first line of defense against the troglodytes ever waiting.”277 Many in 
and around law enforcement shared this view. For Nixon and throngs of his supporters, 
this kind of rhetoric rewarded rioters and encouraged more wasteful spending. Putting an 
end to it meant assailing the Kerner Commission’s findings and, more importantly, 
pinning blame on the bloody aftermath of the Great Society and sweeping civil rights 
reforms on Lyndon Johnson himself. How successful right-leaning critics would fare on 
this score would be determined in the forthcoming months.  
Beyond finger-wagging conservatives, finger-crossing liberals, an obdurate 
Congress, and officials, pundits, and activists all scrambling to guess what would come of 
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the report in an election year, there was an awaited reply from the President of the United 
States, the man whose pen stroke had founded the Kerner Commission and whose legacy 
in the months preceding the November election seemed to be in the balance. All of 
Nixon’s criticisms presupposed, of course, that Johnson agreed with the Kerner 
Commission’s findings and intended to brook the sweeping recommendations. On the 
snowy day in Washington that the commission released its report, Johnson was at Ramey 
Air Force Base in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. The first message came from Joe Califano, 
who informed the president on March 2 that Ramsey Clark, Douglass Cater, and Harry 
McPherson all agreed that he “do or say something about the Kerner Commission report 
to indicate that you are taking it seriously and not ignoring it.”278 Options included a 
government task force and having cabinet officers look at specific recommendations in 
their own areas followed by press conferences to summarize the evaluation of 
“recommendations we are implementing and [to] explain why we are not moving on 
others.”279 
Clark’s plan for a task force sought to determine how the federal government 
could put the report’s recommendations into effect while encouraging cities and states to 
cast their own critical eye. “In accepting the report, you can praise the work and 
dedication of the commission members, but you need not embrace all of its findings or 
recommendations,” Clark wrote to Johnson.280 It would be a gesture, acknowledging the 
report as “a searching and comprehensive statement of problems and goals” without 
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articulating how many of the goals might be realized.281 The task force could measure 
recommendations against existing federal programs, the cost of each recommendation, 
how many, if any, might involve executive action, and how many might require preparing 
legislation. “If you do this right away, you will show decisive action without subscribing 
to everything the report says and encourage governors and mayors to act,” Clark 
concluded.282  
McPherson, special counsel to the president and a fellow Texan, favored the latter 
approach and wrote with some concern to Califano on March 1. “The more I think about 
it, the more I fear that a cold reception to the Kerner report is bad policy for us,” he 
said.283 While he acknowledged the funding issues and the report’s “lack of economic 
and political realism in some areas,” McPherson reviewed the Kerner Commission’s own 
timeline for Johnson: riots; a commission “chaired by the only big state Northern 
Democratic Governor, and including the Mayor of New York, moderate Negro leaders, 
responsible Senators and Congressmen, and even for God’s sake the police chief of 
Atlanta,” with a staff overseen by “a brilliant lawyer, known to be an intimate friend and 
counselor of the President”; a seven-month study that left many commissioners “stunned 
by the gravity and urgency of the Negro’s problems”; lastly, a report that denounced the 
role of conspiracy, cited white racism, and said that “worse trouble will follow unless 
cities, state, and the Federal government move massively and rapidly to change living 
conditions in urban Negro areas.”284 McPherson asked: “if our response is, ‘we’ll study 
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it,’ what will people think? I don’t mean bomb-throwing liberals, New York Times 
editorial writers, columnists, or militant Negroes…I mean ordinary moderate people.”285 
These citizens, he said, “though they are concerned about their own safety, disturbed 
about black violence in their cities, and much less sympathetic toward civil rights than 
they used to be,” were “also concerned about finding some way out of the tragic tailspin 
we are in.”286  
Acknowledging that arming “every white man in sight” did not seem a viable 
option, McPherson told Johnson that America would look to the Oval Office for 
leadership.287 If Johnson demurred and merely said he would study the study, it would 
leave many unsatisfied. Instead, McPherson proposed looking at every Kerner 
Commission recommendation tied to the federal government and measuring it against 
“what we have asked for, which ones have been turned down in Congress in past years, 
which are extensions of what is already under way, etc.—treating it seriously in other 
words.”288 Members of Johnson’s Cabinet could then brief the press in a “realistic, candid 
way” before Johnson himself gave an address “weighing the possibilities for action, and 
dealing with the Commission’s recommendations for city, state, and private action.”289 
McPherson reasoned that concerned white moderates wanting answers would sympathize 
with budgetary and other constraints that “prevent the complete implementation of the 
report.”290 If the commission did not act, he reiterated that “we will be in trouble,” and 
                                                
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
288 McPherson to Califano, Mar. 1, 1968, Folder 16, Box 39, FG 690, NACCD, CF, LBJ Library, Austin, 
TX. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
 405 
there would be “little public acceptance of future Presidential commissions as even 
temporary palliatives in meeting national problems, if we are silent on this one.”291  
While McPherson and Clark’s ideas did not explicitly respond to anything 
Johnson had suggested, their thinking illuminated initial White House strategy after the 
Kerner Commission had released its report; rather than rallying liberals to the causes 
espoused in the bulky document, Johnson staffers sought the support of white moderates, 
relying on bland lip service to placate concerns and offer a dose of realism. As a starting 
point for March, this approach did not bode well for the Kerner agenda or the 
commissioners bullish on the report’s prospects. Perhaps even more disconcerting was 
the tone of the statement draft McPherson sent to Johnson; rather than throwing cold 
water on the report, the draft opted for faux sincerity, thanking the commission for a 
report that “speaks to every American citizen concerned about the quality of life in our 
towns and cities” and expressing the president’s gratitude for laying the groundwork for 
“a national dialogue—and, more important, a national movement of good will to assure 
both order and justice for all citizens.”292 The statement mentioned the commission’s 
efforts with creating jobs and improving education and health care as well. McPherson 
recommended that Johnson issue the statement “in the form of a wire from you to 
Kerner” as a show of gratitude, though he added it “in no way commits you and leaves 
you free” to decide how to respond.293 In the mean time, the Budget Bureau would 
analyze the findings and offer its own review; “we have a good story to tell about what 
we are doing and why we are not doing some of the things the commission recommends 
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and we ought to get it out promptly,” McPherson wrote.294 If Kerner sent the letter to 
others, McPherson believed it could “place some of the heat on the local level and on the 
Congress, where it belongs.”295  
As Johnson visited Puerto Rico, Christian fielded questions on March 2 regarding 
the president’s response to the report back in Washington. “The president wants to do 
everything he can in this field, and the report will be very carefully considered,” Christian 
told the media.”296 Asked if the report might make Johnson more resigned about 
impending racial violence, Christian replied: “he certainly expects some problems to 
continue.”297 While many waited for Johnson’s response, commissioners like Fred Harris 
thanked the president. “I have done my best to give the job the ‘objectivity and hard 
work’ you asked for when you called me that night,” Harris wrote, adding that though it 
was “not a pleasant or easy task,” he was grateful to Johnson “for giving me this 
opportunity to learn and grow as a person…I truly believe that we have produced an 
honest and truthful report which I hope will be a blueprint for our country for many years 
to come.”298 On Face the Nation, Lindsay passed on the opportunity to criticize the 
president’s slow response; when asked why commissioners had not spoken with Johnson 
before releasing the report, the New York mayor was “emphatic that that was not 
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expected by any member.”299 A few days later, Lindsay again ducked a question on the 
president’s silence, calling the finished product “a very large report that needs lots of 
review…he has had little time to read it since it was published.”300 
Johnson could be forgiven for feeling slighted by the Kerner Commission’s 
recommendations, which in several instances called for a greater commitment to the same 
causes, implying that the president had not gone far enough. The commission wanted two 
million new jobs—one million in the public sector, one million in the private sector—
over the next three years to address unemployment; Johnson had aspired to create 
500,000 jobs in the same period. The commission set a national housing goal to build six 
million new units within five years; the president’s housing goal, by contrast, sought to 
produce six million units over the next decade. A disparity also existed in the first-year 
goal: the Kerner Commission wanted 600,000 units built, while the Johnson had only 
called for 300,000 units.301 Beyond trumping explicit recommendations, the commission 
also wanted a guaranteed minimum-income plan with “substantially greater Federal 
expenditures than anything now contemplated”—a proposal never supported by the 
Johnson administration—and to increase federal contributions to state welfare programs 
from 59 percent to over 90 percent as part of welfare reform.302  
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A March 5 memo to Califano from Louis Martin, the Deputy Chair for Minorities 
on the Democratic National Committee, exclaimed that the Kerner report was “getting 
great reception in the liberal community” for its “forthright approach…to Negro-white 
relationships in our society.”303 Martin wrote that he recognized that the “efforts of the 
Administration to resolve the problems were given little credit and the Commissioners 
were not realistic regarding taxes and the sources of revenue without which their 
proposals will die on the vine,” but he also argued it was “an LBJ commission”—in 
establishing it, the president deserved partial credit.304 Along these lines, Martin 
expressed hesitancy at “losing any capital we may be building up with the liberal 
community by nit-picking the report. It seems to me the President might accept the report 
with praise and use the opportunity to point out that he has been moving in the right 
direction all along.”305 After all, Martin told his colleague: “the report confirms the 
wisdom of the president in his civil rights program and proposals.”306 The letter lent 
credence to the idea, espoused elsewhere, that the report might “convince many Negroes 
that there are whites in high places who understand and care,” which could be “a first 
step in restoring faith among Negroes in the Government” based on both the findings and 
Johnson’s own programs.307 While passing programs might convince African Americans, 
the ideas in the report, ideally, could “make some impression on white Americans who 
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ultimately decide the course the country will take.”308 Califano did not editorialize on this 
letter, but he did forward it to the president for night reading. 
If Martin and the commissioners saw the final report as piggybacking on 
Johnson’s proposals and thus solidifying his ideas, the president did not necessarily see it 
this way.309 Not only did the Kerner Commission call for new programs, it detailed how 
the “combined social and welfare programs of the Federal, state, and local governments 
were reaching only a fraction of those Negroes in need because of poor administration 
and inadequacy of funds.”310 Writing in the New York Daily News, Ted Lewis wondered 
why Johnson had “let the commission report stand for itself” rather than voicing support 
for it.311 Lewis speculated Johnson was “unhappy about its strong appeal for drastic 
crisis-type action” that went “far beyond” anything the White House or Congress had 
envisioned; he pointed to Johnson failing to “have the commission summoned to his 
presence…to praise the members for a task well done” as proof that the report had 
perhaps irked the president.312 America needed an explanation as to “why the White 
House has acted as if the commission’s findings did not have presidential support in full,” 
why Johnson was in Puerto Rico, where he made no mention of the report or its 
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findings.313 “It was almost as if he considered the commission unmentionable,” Lewis 
wrote. Prior to his trek to Puerto Rico, Johnson had spoken in Beaumont, Texas, and 
touted the social welfare spending of his administration compared to past presidents. It 
was difficult to argue Johnson was being a political realist with the commission, Lewis 
said, when he so frequently “proposed far-reaching, high-cost social welfare programs” 
and took what he could get from Congress.314 To this end, Charles Bartlett compared 
Johnson’s predicament to Franklin Roosevelt witnessing Congress “begin to regurgitate 
his legislative proposals” because it was “asked to swallow more than they can digest, 
and the President does not have in this election year the air of a man willing to risk 
congressional indigestion.”315 Johnson could point to programs already in place and in 
the congressional pipeline to liberals clamoring for spending, Bartlett argued; anything 
more in the current political climate simply would not stick. 
As Johnson kept quiet, Liz Carpenter, an aide to the First Lady, wrote to him with 
a suggestion on how to “recoup our position on the Kerner report.”316 The plan entailed 
taking his wife, Lady Bird, Gov. Kerner, and Washington, D.C. Mayor Walter 
Washington to church when he returned from Puerto Rico on Sunday, March 4, then 
embarking on a surprise visit to the largely African American Shaw neighborhood in 
D.C. There, Carpenter, reasoned, “you have already started what the Kerner report is 
recommending to other cities” in terms of programs for urban renewal and 
development.317 “You wrote the ORIGINAL script so let’s get the credit with a dramatic 
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quick stop,” Carpenter said; she added that “Walter knows all these people and I believe 
you could in and out and make some points, and let KERNER help make them by saying 
that this example inspired parts of the report.”318 Johnson liked Kerner personally, and 
did not hold the report against him—as the forthcoming judicial nomination 
demonstrated—but Carpenter’s suggestion demonstrated an awareness within the 
Administration’s inner circle that keeping up appearances would have to suffice for a 
man who simmered privately at what the commission had handed him.  
Johnson finally spoke publicly on the report on March 6 at a meeting with the 
Joint Savings Bank-Savings and Loan Committee at the White House. He told the 
twenty-two committee members in attendance that the report was “one of the most 
thorough and exhaustive studies ever made.”319 The president, who divided the report 
into three categories—what has been done, what has not been done, and what should be 
done—did not expect approval for every recommendation, but he asked committee 
members to “do what you can” in supporting the report.320 While he described it as 
“prepared by a very distinguished group which worked hard on this project,” Johnson 
also expressed skepticism at how Congress might receive it.321 “You cannot correct the 
errors of centuries in four years or forty years. How much more we can get the Congress 
to do I don’t know,” the president said, but he vowed to do “just as much as that traffic 
will bear—as much as the Congress and the budget will permit.”322 He avoided 
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commenting on the line about America hurtling toward separate societies, and also took 
the time to “review the achievements of his administration, including the open housing 
bill now moving through the Senate, and contrasted his ability to enact costly programs 
with what he called the handwringing and empty talk of past years.”323 Along these lines, 
he lamented: “they always print that we don’t do enough. They don’t print what we 
do.”324 What he had done, he reminded committee members and the press in attendance, 
was increase spending on housing, healthcare, and education from $9 billion to $22 
billion. The committee pledged to prioritize between $3-5 billion in credit under 
Johnson’s model cities program.  
The New York Times took Johnson to task for the delayed response and meeting. 
“It is not easy to twist 250,000 words on the most urgent social problem of the day into a 
personal grievance, but this is standard operating procedure for President Johnson these 
days,” James Reston wrote.325 He excoriated Johnson for “personalizing all problems, 
seeing everything in terms of personal advantage or disadvantage helps explain the 
poisonous mood of the capital today,” making it difficult to take an objective approach to 
pressing issues.326 “The question becomes not where the cities stand today but where the 
President stands; not where the nation is but where Lyndon Johnson is; not what the facts 
of the problem are but what the politics of the problem are,” Reston wrote.327 By making 
every political issue about him, Johnson took attention away from an “urban crisis now 
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more dangerous than ever before.”328 It was, in Reston’s estimation, a remarkably selfish 
maneuver from a self-proclaimed altruist, a man who had “striven mightily to deal with 
the problems of the cities and deserves great credit for the progress that has been 
made.”329 Writing in The Washington Post, Drew Pearson called it “ironic that the 
President, who has done more for race relations than any President since Abraham 
Lincoln, is not enthusiastic over the penetrating report,” and that he had “let a whole 
week go by before giving a guarded comment.”330 
Privately, Johnson stood firm in resentment. A letter from Califano to the 
president on March 8 indicated that Tex Thornton had spoken to White House assistant 
James Gaither and “expressed his concern that the Riot Commission may have 
embarrassed you.”331 Thornton also told Gaither that he agreed with Johnson’s proposals 
to the Congress and was “troubled by the fact that some of the Riot Commission’s 
proposals are not realistic.”332 Gaither seemed to think Thornton might question the 
report publicly, based on the conversation. Johnson had a two-word, handwritten message 
in response to the memo: “I agree.”333 The exchange validated a report from March 10 
suggesting that “the White House was in fact disappointed because the report did not 
point out progress that President Johnson feels has been made for poor Americans under 
the Great Society and civil rights programs” and that Johnson felt the “recommendations 
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went far beyond [his] legislative proposals, which are in trouble in an economy-minded 
Congress.”334 Newsweek quoted a top presidential aide as saying the commission’s report 
was “an impressive piece of work, a vast piece of goods. Its aims are desirable—but 
some of it just can’t be done.”335 
In their own correspondence, commission staffers refuted criticisms that the 
report had not given Johnson enough credit. While celebrating the largely favorable 
reaction from the media, Henry Tailaferro told Ginsburg he was “puzzled by some press 
comments to the effect that the report did not recognize how much has been done in the 
recent past (during President Johnson’s administration and by his leadership) to attack the 
urban and racial problems which gave rise to the riots of 1967.”336 He reviewed the report 
and said anyone lodging this critique “did not read the book” before listing numerous 
references to Johnson’s programs, leadership, and progress in his time in the White 
House.337 Taliaferro quoted directly from the final report the instances where 
commissioners had praised Johnson for his work on employment, education, welfare, 
housing, and law enforcement and chided Congress for its inflexibility with these 
programs. There were plenty of charts in the report that “detailed expenditures made in 
support of such programs,” as well as direct credit for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and improved employment rates during the Johnson 
Administration.338 “Any reader will see at once that it was the President’s objectives that 
guided the commission,” Taliaferro wrote, adding that the “obvious truth is that President 
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Johnson has provided the strongest leadership in the fight against racism and poverty” 
and that this “emerged clearly in the report.”339 Taliaferro did not attribute the criticism to 
the White House directly, nor did he offer an indication that anyone on the commission 
intended to go public with such a rebuttal, but the letter offered proof that the criticism of 
ignoring Johnson’s work had irritated some involved with the commission’s undertaking.  
On March 13, McPherson sent Johnson thirteen letters that awaited a presidential 
signature. The letters, boilerplate thank-you notes to each commissioner and high-ranking 
staffer who had served on the Kerner Commission, were drafted by Gaither, edited by 
Califano and, according to McPherson, made “no reference to the specific proposals 
which the commission made.”340 Each letter expressed a “deep appreciation for your 
service on the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders” and lauded an 
“exhaustive study” that could create “a better America for all Americans” by “reaching 
into the hearts and minds of our citizens.”341 They were, Johnson’s aide reminded him, 
“similar to the letters of thanks which you have sent members of task forces and other 
commissions.”342  
At 4:20 that afternoon, McPherson received a call from the Oval Office from an 
angry President Johnson. “I can’t just signed this group of letters,” Johnson said to his 
aide; “I’d be a hypocrite. And I don’t even want it let known that they got this far, 
otherwise somebody somewhere will leak that I wouldn’t sign them. Just file them—or 
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get rid of them.”343 Ten days after the report’s full release, Johnson’s refusal to sign 
thank-you notes provided the most direct indication yet of just how he felt about the 
Kerner Commission’s final report. His delayed response had not been a coincidence, nor 
had the decision to scrap a White House meeting with the eleven commissioners on the 
eve of the report’s release. If he bristled at signing thank-you notes, it was fair to assume 
that he also bristled in private at the details of the thick report’s recommendations. 
Whether this was due to the report not giving him full credit, the recommendations 
making him look bad, the recommendations putting him in an untenable position with 
Congress, or with Vietnam, or with the American people, or a combination of these 
reasons, what was now evident was that the man who had founded the Kerner 
Commission wanted to forget that it ever existed. He had signed his name welcoming 
them to the White House seven-and-a-half months earlier, but he had no desire to 
bookend that signature with a “thank you” for a report that he did not appreciate. He was 
not about to fake sincerity with a second signature when he seemed to believe that the 
first signature had been a mistake.  
The Cabinet meeting that Johnson had led earlier that afternoon, March 13, had 
likely not helped his mood before he telephoned McPherson. The meeting lasted an hour, 
twice as long as the planned schedule indicated. Johnson spoke about the Kerner 
Commission about ten minutes into the meeting, telling Cabinet members he had 
instructed his budget director to analyze the recommendations and divide them into four 
categories: “1. Things we are doing now. 2. The things which are left to be done by other 
than the federal government—where we can stimulate and encourage these activities” 3. 
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The things covered by our present legislative program—for example, rent supplements 
and poverty funding. 4. The things we haven’t yet embraced—so that the planners in each 
Department may consider their feasibility.”344 New programs would cost money, Johnson 
told the Cabinet. “If we funded all the Commission’s recommendations now, it would 
add several billion dollars to the FY (fiscal year) 1969 budget and an estimated $75-100 
billion over several years,” the president said.345 Top priority was “getting a favorable 
response from Congress on our present requests,” he added; “as I read the Congressional 
mood, non-Vietnam expenditures will probably be reduced by at least $5 billion from our 
requests—and by even more if we don’t get the tax bill.”346 He predicted that while 
Congress increased the budget at the moment--$91 million for school aid to impacted 
areas and $25 million for the Headstart program, he told them---that would soon change. 
Johnson challenged each Cabinet member to “take a hard look” at costs, ranging from the 
new programs put forth by the Kerner Commisison in terms of “feasibility and cost” to 
“opportunities for reductions in your present budget if Congress begins to cut back.”347 
Johnson concluded: “if you get your allowance cut from $100 a month to $50 a month, 
you must know where to spend what’s left.”348  
From here, Johnson ceded the floor to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who 
spoke first on Martin Luther King Jr.’s planned demonstrations in Washington in April. If 
the House passed the civil rights bill with an open housing component, Clark said, it 
would decrease the chances of a King-led march. Johnson interjected on the legislative 
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matter: “if any Cabinet member has a ‘deposit in the bank’ with any House member—
particularly Republicans or Southern Democrats—now is the time to use it…as of today, 
we don’t have the needed votes and must go out and get them.”349 Clark continued by 
asserting that there was an “excellent chance” to prevent riots the upcoming summer and 
by crediting the Kerner Commission’s report as “most helpful in encouraging the right 
attitude” toward riot prevention.350 “Mayors and Police Chiefs are more willing to ‘say 
things that were politically unacceptable’ before the Kerner Commission said them,” 
Clark said to Cabinet members.351 The attorney general also pointed to the jobs program 
as crucial in curtailing riots before President Johnson reiterated that each attendee needed 
to “study the Kerner Commission report—analyze how you would implement its 
provisions—and make recommendations to the President.”352 After requesting a “brief 
analysis of the primary situations” in several states in advance of the upcoming election, 
Johnson stated that “up to Convention time, he planned to put the highest priority on 
problems in the world, the cities, and in the economy” and “do the best he can and let the 
primaries take care of themselves.”353   
While Johnson had made his feelings known on the Kerner Commission and its 
recommendations to McPherson and members of his Cabinet, neither instance was a 
public response. Liberal members of Congress had grown impatient with his lukewarm 
reception to the report. At the forefront of the criticism were New York senators Jacob 
Javits and Robert Kennedy, members of a Senate Labor Subcommittee, along with 
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Pennsylvania’s Joseph Clark, who spoke to Harris, Lindsay, and Kerner. The three 
commissioners were on the Senate floor in support of a bill proposing to create 2.4 
million jobs for the “hardcore unemployed” over a four-year period, which would cost an 
estimated $10.3 billion.354 Given the commission’s own employment recommendations, 
the three commissioners speaking on behalf of the proposal made sense. Javits, who said 
he had “no desire to see the Administration fall on its face on this,” hoped that Johnson 
“had the wit to do his duty” and called on him to respond in earnest to the commission’s 
report lest he “make a mess of this in the 1968 [presidential] campaign.355 It was 
“fantastic” in the worst sense of the word, Javits said, that Johnson had “remained 
silent.”356  
Kennedy, rumored to be considering a presidential run and thus emerging as a 
Democratic challenger to Johnson, decried the “lack of urgency” from the president and 
called the issues addressed in the final report “the greatest crisis to face the country in 
100 years…we need the Executive—the President—to support a program, to make 
concrete suggestions, and we haven’t had that at all.”357 Kennedy scoffed at the White 
House using a “commission and a day of prayer” to solve the issue and then not offering 
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a word on the commission findings when released.358 “Let’s get on with it...I don’t see 
how the country can go along without the direction that’s so desperately needed,” he 
said.359 The former attorney general wanted a plan of action; in a press conference later in 
the day, Kennedy told reporters that he was so irritated with Johnson’s silence on the 
report that he was “reassessing his political plans.”360 He pressed Kerner on the 
president’s lackluster response on the Senate floor; when the chairman “noted the broad 
range of social programs President Johnson has pressed through to enactment,” Kennedy, 
with an “inflection of incredulity” in his voice, asked: “Do you find that satisfactory? Is it 
possible that what we are doing right now is satisfactory?”361 Kerner refused to condemn 
Johnson, though Lindsay, while he avoided offering a direct criticism, was asked if the 
White House response was sufficient. “Not as yet,” he answered.362   
Sales of the Kerner Commission report indicated that beyond the media and 
members of Congress pummeling Johnson for his inaction on the report, it was fair to 
wonder if the general public had become restless as well. The paperback edition of the 
report, released on March 3, had sold a staggering 740,000 copies in its first ten days in 
print. Copies of the report were “being purchased in bulk quantities by civic 
organizations, industry, libraries, colleges, and police departments” across the country at 
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$1.25 per book.363 The report’s publisher, Bantam, admitted that it had “underestimated 
the impact of the document” with a first printing of 250,000 in the belief that “only social 
welfare groups, federal, and city officials would want to read it.”364 Bantam editorial 
director Marc Jaffe estimated that at the current rate of sale, the paperback edition of the 
final report would sell one million copies before the end of March, surpassing sales of the 
Warren Commission in October 1964. Whether or not the bulk of purchases constituted 
agreement with the commission, the numbers hardly conveyed apathy; the American 
public was interested in what the Kerner Commission had to say, and it seemed 
reasonable that they were also interested in what the president had to say about what the 
commission had provided him.  
Commission staffers received a few proposals that sought to “actualize” the report 
recommendations beyond the noted channels.365 Arthur Brackman’s comprehensive 
memo to Alvin Spivak suggested forming an Institute of Urban Communications that 
would involve organizing and sponsoring workshops, recruiting and training more black 
journalists, mobilizing privately and publicly to challenge more discrimination structures 
with African Americans in the media, and launching an “urban news service” to improve 
dispatches from inner cities.366 Brackman also proposed a “100 Days” program that he 
labeled a “100-day educational crusade—a plan for enlisting the masses in a summer-
long campaign to put teeth in the Riot Commission’s report.”367 The program would seek 
to rally public opinion to “demand Congressional and other implementation” of the 
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recommendations while also “showing the Negro community that millions of white 
Americans are working desperately on their behalf and enlisting Negro support on behalf 
of these constructive rather than destructive efforts.”368 The “100 Days” campaign would 
last through the summer, using every medium possible, from TV and radio to “pulpits, 
rostrums, schoolrooms, stages, and movies” to convey the “urgency of a plan.”369 The 
campaign needed money and an African American luminary to lead the charge, 
Brackman said. White House fellow Timothy Wirth wanted a focus on “the need for 
stimulating greater citizen action” through a conference on citizen participation 
spearheaded by the president and the establishment of a Foundation for Volunteer Action, 
as suggested in the report.370 The conference would “outline broad guidelines for 
community response to the call for broader citizen participation” in accordance with the 
recommendations.371 “I am operating on the assumption that time is extremely important, 
and the longer the time gap following the Kerner Report submission, the more difficult it 
becomes for the Administration to respond,” Wirth wrote.372 The Urban League 
announced it had plans for a summer “cultural-enrichment program,” contingent on 
volunteer participation where “white youngsters would study the Negro heritage and 
perhaps live in Negro homes” with a goal of “closing the gap between the races.”373 Such 
proposals hoped to have the backing of legislative and executive officials, but they relied 
more on the grassroots approach within communities. Grassroots organizing was a tried-
and-true tactic, but the political climate afforded little faith in Congress or the Johnson 
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White House to devote full attention to the Kerner report. If they would not, then perhaps 
citizens across the country would answer the call.  
On March 15, Johnson held an initially unpublicized meeting with African 
American editors and publishers at the White House.374 When an editor in attendance 
asked Johnson what he thought of the Kerner report, he rehashed the same thinking from 
the Cabinet meeting two days earlier, informing the audience that he had read the report, 
spoken with Cabinet members about it, and divided the recommendations into several 
categories for evaluation. He continued that the Kerner Commission had submitted “the 
most important report to me since I have been President” and said, “in addition to the 
specific recommendations, the final result concerning the cause of the problems primarily 
revolving from white racism was an important factor.”375 It was here that the smooth talk 
ended; Johnson told the publishers that many of the recommendations were not practical 
and that he could not possibly get Congress to allocate the necessary funding for every 
endeavor. “I do not think it can or will be fully implemented this year,” Johnson said, in 
reference to the report’s recommendations.376 Notes from the meeting indicated he also 
told publishers: “there is no sense of holding out false hopes or expectations” on the $80 
billion price tag on the recommendations.377 “I can’t get that,” he told them.378 As with 
his previous comments on the report, the president seemed a bit defensive. “I set up that 
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commission…I’m the daddy of it,” Johnson told those present; “I picked the men on it…I 
gave them over a million dollars, more than ever has been spent on a study before.”379  
He considered himself “more practical than some of those who wrote the report and some 
of the staff who sent it to me,” and said he viewed the report as a launching point.380 
“First thing we have got to do is find the money,” Johnson said.381 “They didn’t touch 
upon that problem,” which he analogized to “saying we need sirloin steaks three nights a 
week, but we only have the money to pay for two steaks.”382 Securing the funds for the 
metaphorical third steak, he said, started with his proposed tax bill.  
On the same day, Budget Bureau director Charles Zwick sent a memo to Johnson 
that addressed the Kerner Commission’s recommendations. Zwick told Johnson that 
preliminary analysis from the Office of Economic Opportunity “strongly supports almost 
all of the Commission’s recommendations in the area of private employment, education, 
welfare, and housing,” with some minor disagreements, and also gave full-throated 
support to “decentralization of city government” recommended in the commission’s 
“Community Response” chapter.383 The OEO analysis acknowledged the costs of 
recommendations but did note that most “require no new legislative authority.”384 Zwick 
also reported that the Department of Commerce “concurs with the commission that a 
Federal strategy for the cities is needed” and acknowledged this would require additional 
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funding and legislation.385 The U.S. Army, meanwhile, found the recommendations on 
“planning for civil disturbance control” to be “feasible within the existing Army 
budget.”386 On the whole, Zwick told his boss, the Budget Bureau staff had run numbers 
and assessed that the recommendations would have a significant impact on the budget, 
increasing it by about $25 billion from 1969 to 1971. “It would not be feasible to 
implement all the proposals immediately so the estimated add-on in outlays in fiscal 1969 
would be about $10 billion,” Zwick said.387 His staff was in the process of preparing 
more detailed analysis, which he thought would be available by early April. Zwick told 
Johnson in closing that he would offer day-to-day updates on “significant findings.”388 
Johnson did not reply to this memo, but he now had substantive proof that the 
Kerner Commission’s recommendations were too ambitious and would need curbing if 
implemented in the short term. Nevertheless, he had remained tight-lipped on the report 
with the exception of the March 6 meeting with the Joint Savings Bank-Savings and Loan 
Committee. The New York Times again reprimanded Johnson for his “evasion of 
responsibility” in not speaking on a report with “overwhelmingly favorable” feedback.389 
“The President and the nation are like mountain climbers who have gone a third of the 
way up Mount Everest” when it came to the civil rights movement, the Times wrote in an 
editorial.390 It was “no small feat to have climbed so far, but it still not the same as 
reaching the top, and the longer and harder part of the journey still lies ahead.”391 
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Democratic presidential candidates Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy had spoken in 
favor of the Kerner Commission, so why not Johnson? Progress would not come “if the 
man in that pulpit stands mute or querulous.”392  
In fact, Liz Carpenter sent a memo to both President and Mrs. Johnson three days 
prior, which quoted longtime Roosevelt and Truman adviser Anna Rosenberg, that 
seemed to agree. “We need to dramatize other things in the President’s program,” 
Rosenberg had told Carpenter, including “picking up the Kerner report even at this date 
to say, ‘I have now had a chance to read it carefully, and I feel that it has many points to 
pursue.”393 She pointed to the president’s open housing message as an example. 
Rosenberg also had a parting shot for Bobby Kennedy, who had announced his entrance 
into the presidential race on March 16, branding him as “cheap and crooked” and that 
“this will come through and all we have to do is simply be above him.”394 Aide Douglass 
Cater sent Johnson a memo on March 22 suggesting that he “review publicly the Budget 
Bureau analysis of the Kerner Commission report” in conjunction with some other kind 
of initiative, in this instance announcing the head of the Urban Affairs Institute.395 “I 
believe this would be a good opportunity to respond to the critics by showing that you are 
taking calm, deliberative actions on city problems while others are striking emotional 
postures,” Cater wrote.396 Asked if a work conference in the Rose Garden that invited 
“leaders on the urban front” to “demonstrate your keen interest in the multi-prong effort 
[that] has begin with your leadership and encouragement” was something he would favor, 
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Johnson marked an “X” next to the “YES” line at the end of the memo.397 No further 
details were provided on when this meeting would occur.  
At a March 22 White House press conference, Johnson finally addressed his 
stance on the report at length. A reporter noted there had been “some people in public life 
who expressed disappointment that you did not react the way they felt you should to the 
report of the commission you appointed on civil disorders” and asked if he could “tell us 
how you feel about the come of this criticism and about the report.”398 Johnson replied 
that he was unaware of the criticism and that he “thought [I] picked a very good 
commission…I tried to select men of ability and dedication and competence in this 
field.”399 He denied having any contact with commissioners after appointment or that he 
“explained to them the kind of study I hoped could be made.”400 The White House had 
cooperated, “provided a good many Government people,” and received the report, which 
Johnson said was “a very thorough one, very comprehensive, and made many good 
recommendations,” though he admitted that he did not agree with all 
recommendations.401 “We felt that overall the commission wanted to be and was 
constructive and helpful,” Johnson said.402 There were certainly differences between 
existing proposals and the commission’s recommendations, but given that the 
commission did not offer exact costs, he did not give the press specifics. Johnson used 
housing as an example of both the overlap and difference between the Administration’s 
“cities message” and the Kerner report: “We recommended all that we thought we could 
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get the Congress to act upon--$6 million over this period of time—and it represented a 
great acceleration. The commission felt that it should be more. I would not oppose more 
if we could get more and if we could get more funded, but we recommended what we 
thought we could build, realistically, and what we could get funded.”403  
The president told reporters that he asked each Cabinet officer to divide the 
recommendations into three phases: recommendations for programs that already existed 
and seeing how to improve upon them; recommendations on programs requested by the 
White House, including housing, jobs, employment, and civil rights issues, and to try and 
accelerate them; and lastly, items recommended that the Johnson administration had yet 
to act upon, or measures that certain Cabinet officers believed needed addressing. 
Johnson continued: 
We don’t agree with everything in this report and they don’t agree with 
everything we are doing. But there is a general ‘simpatico’ of views, I think, between the 
Cabinet officers who handle these programs and the recommendations of the 
commission. In some cases there is a different sum, and amounts and emphasis. We think 
it was a good report made by good men of goodwill that will have a good influence. We 
hope that every person in the country can read it and try to take action as they can to 
implement it.404 
 
Johnson rattled off the names of officials and civil rights leaders with whom he had 
spoken about the civil rights issue, and said that “some of our people talked to the leaders 
in the Senate and House” and that all wanted to “take action on every recommendation 
that we can embrace that they think would be helpful.”405 He had detailed comments 
from some officials on portions of the report, and read, as an example, comments from 
the Department of Commerce from what Zwick had sent to him the previous week.  The 
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president had instructed various departments to examine whether allocated funds might 
need to go elsewhere in line with recommendations, whether existing funds might satisfy 
some recommendations, which ones simply did not work with budget constraints, and 
how many state, local, and private agencies could potentially “promote adoption and 
acceptance of the commission’s recommendations.”406 With that, Johnson, moved on to 
another topic. 
 The president addressed the report in a noncommittal way, and he did so as the 
Kerner Commission’s aperture for attention in the news cycle seemed to close. On March 
26, CBS announced that it would air a special on April 23 titled, “What Happened to the 
Riot Report?” that planned to delve into both “encouraging signs” like the “community-
level response to the report” and “discouraging signs” like the “limited action and 
inaction at the higher levels of government.”407 Correspondents would assess how well 
programs had been implemented, and whether the Congress’s “austerity” measures had 
any effect on the recommendations.408 With Johnson’s displeasure known and waning 
optimism on congressional action, front pages turned to the presidential race, shaken now 
by Kennedy’s entry and Nixon’s dominance in New Hampshire in Republican ranks.  
 As Johnson hesitated to speak on the Kerner report before eventually offering a 
few half-hearted public responses in contrast to his private displeasure, the Vietnam War 
cast a shadow over his every move. On the heels of the January Tet Offensive and 
accelerated numbers of U.S. troops to Vietnam with seemingly no end in sight, Johnson 
had lackluster approval ratings and a vocal anti-war movement brimming with rage and 
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demanding new leadership. The commission had not mentioned the Vietnam War, but in 
a report deemed “as electrifying as the summer riots that brought it into being,” it seemed 
clear to many Americans that the White House had a “long overdue reordering of 
priorities in Washington—a turn toward de-escalation of the military combat in Vietnam 
and escalation of the war against poverty and discrimination at home.”409 Carl Stokes 
stated on Meet the Press that “we don’t need to scrap the Vietnam War to fulfill these 
obligations” and said Johnson was “less guilty than Congress in using Vietnam to cut or 
block domestic programs,” but many saw a direct correlation between the billions 
funneled into the war and a report that called for massive increases in funding to save 
American cities.410 Harris, Lindsay, and Wilkins did not advocate withdrawing from 
Vietnam, but each intimated that crises in the cities needed to have as much if not more 
priority than the war. Jack Gould noted that the round-the-clock television coverage of 
the report helped “bring the racial issue into unusually sharp focus in a given 24 hours 
and to leave scant doubt that the destiny of the Negro at home and the cost of the war 
overseas will not be easily separated in the political campaign months to come.”411  
 Johnson’s attempted tax hike aimed at the war while overlooking the Kerner 
Commission’s findings ensured that the report would have a link to Vietnam and the 
enormous spending it required. “Money cannot go to the Vietnam War and the race war 
at the same time,” Drew Pearson wrote; the notion that the U.S. would need to spend “as 
much at home as we are in Vietnam or else experience guerilla fighting here as well as in 
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Saigon,” lest the nation become “another South Africa,” undoubtedly rankled White 
House officials.412 Nixon’s aforementioned linking of violence in Vietnam to violence in 
cities did not diffuse comparisons in the election cycle, either. “When historians look 
back over the torturous and melancholy path of the Vietnam War,” James Reston wrote, 
they would invariably find that the “personal element in decision-making is 
extraordinarily high” in an Administration fronted by a man who reportedly said, “I am 
not going to be the first America President to lose a war.”413 The White House had 
become “prisoners of their own propaganda” on Vietnam, he said, a place where 
“loyalty…is prized above objectivity” and a refusal to admit past fault would only 
guarantee a bleaker future.414 Like Vietnam, the urban crisis required a “most scrupulous 
analysis of the facts” on “the scale of its importance.”415 Johnson’s intractable approach 
to the war offered little confidence, Reston wrote, that he would cast laurels aside and 
realize that the problems of the cities required more work. The Wall Street Journal 
reported that Johnson’s “decision-making leaves key lieutenants in the dark…Pentagon 
officials have hardly an inkling what he’ll do about new manpower requests for 
Vietnam—or when he’ll do it.”416  
 Vietnam was the lead topic at the aforementioned March 13 Cabinet meeting. 
Military officials now had a “better evaluation of the impact of the Tet Offensive” six 
weeks after it occurred.417 On one hand, the enemy had “failed to achieve his most 
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important goal” of holding attacked cities and garnering popular support; on the other 
hand, the offensive was an “adverse psychological blow dealt to the South Vietnamese 
people…the fact that the enemy could penetrate 34 cities—including Saigon and the 
American Embassy—was a devastating morale blow.”418 With the concession that 
alliances, both political and religious, remained fragile in South Vietnam, officials 
discussed three options: “go all out to achieve a military victory,” which meant more 
bombing and more troops deployed; “maintain the present level of activity” and continue 
a war of attrition; lastly, contingent on “analysis of the viability of the South Vietnam 
government and its army,” America could “withdraw from constant contact and use our 
forces as a protective shield,” which might ward off “subjugation of South Vietnam while 
its government proved that it was a viable political unit.”419 Johnson then asked Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk his thoughts on the situation. Rusk replied that the Vietnam problem 
had become a Southeast Asia problem and that “we should focus realistically on the 
meaning of alternatives that confront us.”420 Rusk did not believe many Americans 
wanted full withdrawal from South Vietnam immediately, but they did support “moves 
which must inevitably lead to withdrawal.”421 The Tet Offensive had weakened morale, 
and that needed to change; furthermore, Rusk told his colleagues, “we are being tested 
here at home,” in reference to the Kerner Commission.422 If America did not “keep our 
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word in Southeast Asia, the inevitable result would be isolationism.”423 Johnson told 
Cabinet members he could not “emphasize too strongly the critical nature of this 
situation,” and that as president he had “responsibility of searching for and arriving at the 
proper solution.”424 It was frustrating, he said, feeling like “a football coach after the 
Thanksgiving game listening to the Monday morning quarterbacks…This is particularly 
true of certain Congressional leaders.”425 He did not name names.  
 The lingering doubt about strategy and results in Vietnam indicated that in March 
1968, Johnson was besieged on two fronts, both at home and abroad. Ramsey Clark could 
barely finish a speech at the University of Wisconsin on March 28 whereby he called 
Johnson the “greatest doer I have ever witnessed” to a chorus of hissing and boos.426 
Clark, in Madison to speak on behalf of the president in advance of the Wisconsin 
primary as part of an escalated effort to rebuke Kennedy’s entrance into the race, first 
received “stony silence” from the crowd as he “blamed Hanoi for blocking peace in 
Vietnam…the hissing came when [he] defended the Administration against charges that 
Vietnam spending is blocking progress at home.”427 Clark admitted that the 
Administration “need[ed] to do much more than has been done,” but he also touted how it 
had “in the past four years…done much more to remedy social ills than ever before.”428 
After students proclaiming themselves as part of the resistance movement against the war 
handed in their Selective Service classification cards to interrupt a subsequent press 
conference, Clark defended Johnson against Kennedy’s complaints that the White House 
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had a “cool response” to the Kerner Commission’s report.429 Clark reiterated that the 
president had “ordered to do ‘everything practicable’ to carry out the commission’s 
recommendations” before lobbing a Shakespearean barb at Kennedy, his former boss at 
the Department of Justice: “it’s easy enough like Laertes to leap into Ophelia’s grave and 
show them how torn up you are about things. But what does that accomplish?”430 
Kennedy himself spoke at Brigham Young University on the same day; he did not 
mention the Kerner Commission or Vietnam by name, but called for “new kinds of 
organizations, small in size and scale, working in neighborhoods, able to establish that 
sense of personal concern and co-operation we have lost all too often with the growth of 
government.”431 In a fledgling campaign that had started to gain momentum, the New 
York senator called for an ambitious employment program—“what is needed is not 
handouts but jobs for men and women able to work,” he said—and tax incentives for 
private business to set foot in ghettos, making government an “employer of last resort.”432 
A Wall Street Journal dispatch indicated “much of Johnson’s party support is shaky,” and 
that it was Kennedy “jarring some of it loose.”433  
 As the primary campaign trudged along, John Lindsay was back to his pre-March 
ways, bashing the Johnson Administration for ignoring the commission’s 
recommendations and continued misguided policy in Vietnam. Lindsay had spoken at 
several universities, including Vanderbilt and New York University; on March 31, he 
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spoke in Denver. “I think it’s wrong to send more American men to fight and perhaps to 
die in an unwarranted war,” he said, because it created the “diversion of vast national 
resources to the armaments of warfare…those resources are essential to the cause of 
peace in our troubled cities.”434 The present strategy portended “more bloodshed, more 
inhumanity,” he said; “I think we need a fresh beginning at the highest levels of our 
government, and I think the time for that beginning is now.”435 Lindsay did not expect 
that Washington would “move either as fast or as far as the commission advised” on 
matters of housing, employment, and education, and said he “based that pessimism 
largely on precedent.”436 America could not count on the executive or the legislative 
branch to rally support for “pioneering empty financed programs to help the cities…given 
the present mood in Washington, it is probably unrealistic to expect substantial progress 
before the coming summer.”437 The Johnson Administration deserved credit for 
supporting new housing legislation, he said, before he scolded Congress for slashing 
funding for Johnson’s Model Cities program, Medicaid, the rent-supplement program, 
and what amounted to “dismantling the Office of Economic Opportunity.”438  
 Later that evening, President Johnson gave a bombshell television address to the 
nation. Solemn, nattily attired, and flanked by pale curtains and the flags of the United 
States and the president at his Oval Office desk, Johnson first briefed the country on the 
situation in Vietnam. After lamenting the Tet Offensive and the potential to prolong the 
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war in a nation that had now fought for over two decades, Johnson proposed peace talks. 
“There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an end to this long and bloody war,” 
he said.439 The United States would largely halt bombing in North Vietnam and was 
“prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations,” he said, hoping that 
“our restraint is matched by restraint in [North Vietnamese capital] Hanoi.”440 In 
deescalating, Johnson said the nation wanted “to bring this ugly war to an end” provided 
that Ho Chi Minh respond “positively and favorably”; if not, the U.S. would continue to 
defend South Vietnam.441 Johnson praised the South Vietnamese for their resolve and 
willingness to take on more of the “main burden of preserving their freedom”; in the 
mean time, however, America would commit 13,500 more troops and take on an even 
greater financial cost.442 Without raising taxes or cutting spending, Johnson said, a $20 
billion deficit would remain. He did not mention the Kerner Commission by name, but 
stated that the tax bill and “expenditure control” were “absolutely necessary to protect 
this nation’s security, to continue our prosperity, and to meet the needs of our people.”443 
It was up to Congress, he said, to spearhead “appropriate reductions” in the president’s 
January budget, which he would then approve.444 Johnson hoped for peace, but he could 
not guarantee it; he repeated a previous offer to “withdraw our forces from South 
Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the north, stops the infiltration, and the 
level of violence thus subsides,” but that depended on the other side agreeing to such 
terms.445 Peace would come, he said, because the “people of Southeast Asia want it,” and 
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because “America sent her sons to help secure it.”446 Johnson said he would pray for the 
North Vietnamese leaders to cooperate.  
 But then the president changed the subject abruptly, some thirty-three minutes 
into his address. He quoted John F. Kennedy in complimenting a generation of 
Americans willing to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”447 The nation’s 
strength would lie with the “unity of our people,” he said, just it always had.448 Johnson 
had tried to abide by this mantra throughout his political career, even amid partisan 
bickering and trying times. “There is division in the American house now. There is 
divisiveness among us all tonight,” he said.449 Johnson continued, with a somber tone and 
a slight tilt of his head: 
Fifty-two months and 10 days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties 
of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God's, that we might continue 
America on its course, binding up our wounds, healing our history, moving forward in 
new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American commitment for all of 
our people. United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that 
commitment…What we won when all of our people united just must not now be lost in 
suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people. Believing this as I 
do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidency to become involved in the 
partisan divisions that are developing in this political year. With America's sons in the 
fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes 
and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should 
devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other 
than the awesome duties of this office--the Presidency of your country. Accordingly, I 
shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your 
President.450 
 
Even in a decade accustomed to tumult, Johnson’s revelation that he would not 
seek reelection was a stunning moment in American politics. Mired in an unpopular war 
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and facing sagging approval ratings and a presidential primary campaign in a divided 
party, the sitting president announced to the country that his political life now had an 
expiration date. It was a staggering announcement by many measures, not the least of 
which for what it meant for the Kerner Commission. The man whose executive order had 
signed the commission into existence, whose Rose Garden rhetoric had given those he 
appointed a sense of honor, duty, and genuine optimism that the task would not be in 
vain, had quit, eulogizing his remarkable political ascent in just under seven minutes 
before the nation. Suddenly, the presidential election became even more significant; 
perhaps anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy or commission supporter Robert Kennedy 
could carry the Democratic mantle, but there were no guarantees. Perhaps Richard Nixon, 
the leading Republican candidate who had already voiced his disapproval over much of 
the report’s approach, would win office and abandon the report entirely. There were 
additional questions looming as well. How could President Johnson, even if he decided to 
suddenly support many of the commission’s recommendations, convince Congress to 
increase spending when he was on his way out? What would happen to the tangible 
recommendations in housing, in employment, in education, in welfare that seemed 
feasible, or the ones that seemed far-fetched? What would become of the conclusions and 
recommendations that came at no cost? Who would emerge as the mouthpiece for 
liberals, and would he or she rescue the Kerner Commission’s report from twisting in the 
wind? Would anyone carry on the dialogue sought by the commission addressing the 
maladies of America’s ugly racial history? Was the report consigned to its fate—just 
another commission product destined to stay unread on a shelf?  
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By formally announcing he was in the twilight of his presidency, Johnson sparked 
all of these questions while also ensuring that the spotlight was no longer on the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders or its enterprising report. The focus would shift 
to the political horse race, to how Johnson would handle Vietnam in his final ten months; 
any momentum that commission recommendations had—though such momentum was 
admittedly scant—was now halted. The commission still had a few studies to complete, 
but it was, on the whole, now on standby. No one could have known what the first week 
of April 1968 would bring. If the commissioners, staffers, and supporters of the Kerner 
report thought their all-consuming exercise was merely on hold for the time being, a 
tragic reset awaited them.  
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April 1968 and Beyond 
 On March 31, 1968, an overflow audience of more than four thousand people 
packed the National Cathedral in Washington, DC, to hear Martin Luther King Jr. speak 
on behalf of the upcoming Poor People’s Campaign. King’s usual magnetism was on full 
display, with “slow, deliberate, and restrained” speech and a sermon peppered with 
Biblical and literary references.1 The Poor People’s Campaign had a march planned in 
three weeks, and King wanted to make its intentions clear. “We are not coming to 
Washington to engage in any histrionic action, nor are we coming to tear up 
Washington,” he told worshippers; “I don’t like to predict violence, but if nothing is done 
between now and June to raise ghetto hope, I feel this summer will not only be as bad, 
but worse than last year.”2 King admitted that recent demonstrations for a sanitation 
workers’ strike in Memphis devolving into violence had convinced him to change course 
for his Washington campaign, though he would not cancel it “unless the President and 
Congress took some concrete action.”3 Rather than bring thousands of demonstrators to 
Washington later in the month, a large demonstration was now postponed to June; the 
violence also persuaded King to cancel a planned trip to Nigeria that would have put him 
abroad during the first demonstration.  
 In his sermon, King lashed out at a Congress “dominated by rural Southern 
conservatives and reactionaries who are unconcerned about the plight of the poor” and a 
president who approved of spending $50,000 to “deal death to a Vietcong solder in 
Vietnam while spending $53 for every poor person in this country.”4 King had not 
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decided on which candidate to support in the Democratic primaries, but he assured his 
audience it would not be Lyndon Johnson. King also made it clear that “the only action 
that would lead to calling off the demonstration” would be “Congressional 
implementation of the recommendations of the Kerner Commission Report and those that 
came out of last year’s White House Conference on Civil Rights.”5 America had grown 
weary of slow replies and “vague promises,” he said.6 “The Kerner Commission came 
out with its report just a few days ago and then made specific recommendations,” King 
told his supporters, but “nothing has been done.”7 If Congress and the White House did 
not show deeper concern for the plight of the poor, King predicted a “real awakening in 
Chicago,” in reference to the site of the summer’s upcoming Democratic National 
Convention.8   
 Later that evening, President Johnson would announce to the nation that he would 
not seek reelection in the fall. Four days later, King was murdered while standing on the 
balcony of his hotel room in Memphis. His death triggered a wave of riots and unrest 
across America and erased the Kerner Commission’s report from the national 
conversation almost entirely. Just as America had begun to process the fallout from 
Johnson’s bombshell announcement, the towering figure of the American civil rights 
movement was gone at age thirty-nine. Violent riots erupted and many Americans, 
particularly black Americans, asked the question: if a man who had built his legacy and 
entire platform on peaceful resistance could be murdered in cold blood, then who, 
exactly, would white America accept as the voice of the disenfranchised? Suddenly, few 
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Americans cared about the Kerner Commission’s four-prong plan of action, or message 
to white America to empathize with the black experience. Rioting in numerous cities 
continued for over a week; thousands were arrested or injured, and scores were killed. In 
response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which President Johnson signed 
into law exactly one week after King’s assassination. The centerpiece of the legislation 
was open housing—the act outlawed discrimination based on race, religion, or national 
origin, in the sale, rental, or financing of a house. With riots unfolding only miles from 
the U.S. capitol, Johnson urged that the House of Representatives pass what became 
known informally as the Fair Housing Act. While it was a long-awaited goal 
accomplished, it required King’s murder for the House to take action and put legislation 
on Johnson’s desk.  
 In passing the Fair Housing Act, Congress and President Johnson had fulfilled a 
key recommendation from the Kerner Commission’s report. Unfortunately for 
commissioners and staff, that is where momentum seemed to stop. “Only a month from 
its issuance, the strident urgency of the Kerner Commission report on urban rioting has 
been muffled by the manifold political pressures of an election year,” the Baltimore Sun 
noted on April 1, adding that “commission members, all of whom remain convinced that 
the alarm sounded in their report was necessary, seem resigned to this fact.”9 Only 
Edward Brooke had criticized Johnson publicly for failing to support the Kerner report 
more forcefully. “I wouldn’t want to charge that he is playing politics, but he is being 
cautious about a subject that demands him to speak out,” Senator Brooke said, declaring 
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that other commissioners were also “disappointed” despite their silence.10 Otto Kerner 
himself, who had fended off attacks from Strom Thurmond on the report during Kerner’s 
own confirmation hearing for a federal judgeship, described Johnson’s approach as 
“judicious,” while Fred Harris was “very pleased with the response the report has been 
getting.”11 Harris pointed to Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s letter that commended 
the commission’s “eloquence and honestly,” as did William McCulloch, who said, 
“judging from the letter I got [from Humphrey], the story of his opinion is not quite 
accurate.”12 Speaking before the National Press Club, Roy Wilkins called for the 
“implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on Civil Disorders” but also 
praised President Johnson for his accomplishments.13 Johnson, he said, had “pointed the 
way for the nation to proceed out of the thicket of racial injustice,” contrary to what his 
Texas accent would seem to indicate.14 “This man has been better in pronouncement and 
in performance on America’s old and emotional problem of race than any other President 
in our history,” Wilkins said to applause.15 One month on, the article indicated that 
commissioners agreed that “the report was in any case addressed as much to the 
American people as it was to the President or a balky Congress,” and that “the best hope 
for action lay with the wide readership the paperback publication of the report appears to 
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have won.”16 Harris asserted: “It’s a runaway best seller. Nearly a million copies were 
sold in the first ten days. The report is not going to die.”17  
 As in so many other instances in the life of the Kerner Commission, however, 
public statements did not match private concerns. Harris sent a telegram to Kerner in 
Springfield, Illinois, on April 2 proposing that the commissioners reconvene. “I believe it 
would be helpful if the commission, whose existence as you know extends until July, 
were to be called together again soon, and I propose such a meeting,” Harris wrote to the 
governor.18 In the meeting, the commission “could assess and discuss reaction to the 
report and respond to some of the mistaken criticism of it. I have in mind, for example, 
the charge made by some who had obviously not read the report that we condoned 
violence, when in fact, the opposite is quietly clearly the case,” he said.19 Harris also 
wanted the meeting to discuss “means of aiding the more rapid implementation of the 
report.”20 The commission needed to measure its effect thus far and note the 
organizations and agencies that had heeded the recommendations; it also needed to 
discuss how to cast a wider net so that the report and its impact did not fade. Harris asked 
Kerner to respond when he had time to mull over the suggestion.  
 But Kerner, who vacationed in Miami before cutting his trip short to return home 
on the heels of post-King assassination riots in Chicago, had no such plans to reconvene 
his commission. He told United Press International that commissioners would not meet 
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anytime soon; “it could be June,” he said.21 While in Miami, he branded critics of the 
commission report “people who don’t want to do anything about [urban issues] and won’t 
take the first step” to try and understand.22 He also asserted that “some of the trouble 
could have been averted if more people had acted on the commission’s report.”23 At a 
press conference in New York in April 10, John Lindsay stated the Kerner Commission 
would meet to “push its recommendations to help racial violence in the nation’s cities,” 
and that Kerner himself agreed to meet “in the next several days.”24 The New York City 
mayor also “charged Congress hasn’t acted because its members have failed to get the 
‘message’ sent by ghetto rioters” and cited a “lack of leadership” from the White 
House.25 He followed with a blistering 2000-word statement on the torpor of Congress 
and the president with a promise to embark on a speaking tour promoting commission 
recommendations. “This has nothing to do with politics,” Lindsay said; “I’m doing this 
because I’m the chief executive of the largest city in the country and I’m a very worried 
man.”26 Commissioners would meet with the president, he said, “if he will see us.”27 
After reading the statement Dr. King had sent in response to the Kerner Commission’s 
report a month earlier, Lindsay said that while it was “too late to answer the martyred Dr. 
King,” it was “not too late…for the nation to move against this crisis with the urgency 
and enterprise that the commission sought to generate.”28 
                                                
21 Richard Reeves, “Lindsay Asks Riot Panel Action,” The New York Times, Apr. 11, 1968, 1. 
22 “Kerner Says he Fears for Nation’s Stability,” The New York Times, Apr. 8, 1968, 31. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Riot Panel Meeting Planned,” The Washington Post, Apr. 11, 1968, A8; Reeves, “Lindsay Asks Riot 
Panel Action,” The New York Times, Apr. 11, 1968, 1. 
25 “Riot Panel,” The Washington Post, Apr. 11, 1968, A8; Reeves, “Lindsay Asks Riot Panel Action,” The 
New York Times, Apr. 11, 1968, 1. 
26 Reeves, “Lindsay Asks Riot Panel Action,” The New York Times, Apr. 11, 1968, 1. 
27 Ibid.,32. 
28 Ibid. 
 446 
 Lindsay’s rhetoric prompted a message from Joseph Califano to President 
Johnson. “Dave Ginsburg has seen the Lindsay ticker on the Riot Commission. He has 
already spoken with Otto and told him to cool it off,” Califano said.29 There was “no 
meeting set” for the commissioners, and “none will be set for the time being—and 
certainly no ‘emergency meeting’ or any meeting designed to ‘carry out’ the report.”30 
There is no record of Johnson’s reply, but Califano followed up the next afternoon, 
telling the president that he had “called Governor Kerner and delivered your message.”31 
He wrote that he had also told Kerner that “the commission was terminated when it 
submitted its final report on March 1; Kerner asked what he could do, I said the most 
effective thing he could do was get a public statement on the record that the 
commission’s life was terminated when it submitted its final report. He said he would do 
this.”32 If the White House had been falsely accused of meddling in the commission’s 
affairs throughout its research phase, those claims now had veracity. It had no interest in 
any additional Kerner Commission meetings and, against the wishes of men like Lindsay 
and Harris, Gov. Kerner seemed willing to oblige. “It’s just a matter of tying up loose 
ends and closing our books. I don’t know at this point if we will have another meeting,” 
Kerner told The New York Times.33 A spokesman for the governor noted that the 
president had only instructed the commission to “look into the riots of 1967 and not any 
other disturbances” and said the governor would “likely wait for reports by the 
commission staff as addenda to the commission report and for Mr. Johnson to give an 
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address to Congress on civil rights.”34 When informed that the chairman did not plan to 
call an emergency meeting of the Kerner Commission amid rioting nationwide, Lindsay 
said: “I am disappointed. It could have had a salutary effect in the ghettoes if the people 
felt the commission was willing to stand up and fight for its recommendations.”35 
Lindsay hoped that Kerner would reconsider.  
 While a weekly report from The Wall Street Journal’s capital bureau claimed the 
Kerner Commission had “gained more respect now,” with “some lawmakers credit[ing] 
the panel for turning them in favor of open housing,” Johnson remained firm in his 
assessment of the report and additional spending.36 The same bureau report said the 
president was “coming down hard on the side of law and order” following the King 
assassination riots, and that “aides feel a get-tough-with-rioters line is popular, with many 
Negroes as well as whites.”37 The White House Cabinet meeting a day prior to King’s 
death showed furthermore that Johnson’s defensiveness over his domestic contributions 
had not subsided following his announcement that he would not seek reelection. At the 
conclusion of the April 3 meeting, after he had thanked many of his loyal public servants 
for their contributions, Johnson said: 
 I hope you all know the figures on what has been done for the poor and the young 
people of this country. I had [political reporter] Theodore White in for a visit recently and 
I went over these figures with him. I showed him what had been done in the Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations—how the spending compared in such categories 
as health, education and poverty. He was shocked and couldn’t believe the figures. He 
asked why we didn’t tell that story. I told him what you have heard me say many times, 
and I told the story myself a hundred times but no one seems to be listening. We’ve been 
terribly neglectful in telling our story….I don’t want any of you to bring me any more 
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grandiose plans without bringing me another plan at the same time showing how you are 
going to tell the story in the press. Bring me both plans together or don’t bring any.38 
 
In his fledgling days as a lame duck, the president had not softened; if anything, he 
seemed perhaps now even more determined to defend his contributions and preserve his 
legacy than ever. There would be neither dramatic shifts in policy nor a move off his 
fundamental beliefs on the Kerner report—that it shortchanged the Administration’s own 
contributions to American cities and that the nation could not afford it. Perhaps nothing—
not King’s death, not a week of rioting thereafter—would deter the president from this 
stance. After avoiding King’s funeral in Atlanta as a safety precaution, Johnson had 
signed the Fair Housing Act; now, he wanted the Kerner Commission and some of its 
more overzealous members to go away, and he was willing to deploy his staffers to 
deliver this message.  
 If the White House had no interest in following up on Kerner Commission claims, 
neither did much of white America, according to a Harris survey released in mid-April in 
The Washington Post. The survey found that at the time of King’s assassination, black 
and white Americans were “sharply divided in their views” over the Kerner 
Commission’s “central finding” that “the 1967 riots were brought on by white racism.”39 
Whites disagreed with the assertion by a count of 53 to 35 percent, whereas 58 percent of 
African Americans agreed and only 17 percent disagreed. The survey also found that 
while white Americans “approved, by a narrow margin of 45 to 43 percent, the principle 
of giving cities enough money to rehabilitate their slums,” the same group of whites 
polled “also rejected, by 63 to 23 percent, the suggestion that they pay higher taxes to 
                                                
38 Minutes of White House Cabinet Meeting, Apr. 3, 1968, “Cabinet Meeting, 4/3/68,” Box 13, Office Files 
of Joseph A. Califano Jr., LBJ Library, Austin, TX. 
39 Louis Harris, “Whites and Negroes Split on Riot Report,” The Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1968, A5. 
 449 
accomplish the task.”40 Ninety-one percent of African Americans, on the other hand, 
wanted open housing, and 66 percent said they would pay higher taxes to rehabilitate 
slums. There was general agreement that a “lack of progress in giving Negroes equality 
in education, jobs and housing have been major contributory elements in provoking the 
riots,” but whites, the survey said, “had not yet come to the point of accepting sacrifices 
to alleviate the plight of Negroes.”41 Accordingly, there were “clear and ominous signs 
that Negro patience with white unwillingness to take drastic action was running out.”42 
There were plenty of points of agreement—“81 percent of whites and 84 percent of 
Negroes agree that there should be more Negro police officers in Negro ghetto areas…68 
percent of whites and 88 percent of Negroes agree that Negroes should have a greater 
voice in programs affecting them…70 percent of whites and 86 percent of Negroes agree 
that most white people don’t know what the misery and poverty is like in Negro 
ghettoes”—but on the more specific questions, there remained telling disparities as 
well.43 Among these: that 51 percent of African Americans believed that “brutality was a 
major cause of last year’s riots,” while only 10 percent of whites polled felt similarly.44 
Whites also disagreed—by a margin of 2 to 1—that riots were not organized, whereas 
African Americans agreed with the commission’s assessment on the matter.45 The ratio of 
whites who believed the federal government should shoulder a greater burden of welfare 
costs to those who disagreed was 2 to 1, whereas African Americans believed the 
opposite at a ratio of 4 to 1.46 
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 On the whole, the survey signaled some alarming trends with regard to the Kerner 
Commission’s impact: white Americans seemed to concede that they did not understand 
the black experience and wanted action taken, but they had little interest in playing a 
central role in such action. They did not agree—as black America did—that their own 
racial attitudes were to blame, nor did they support paying for such problems. This data 
presented an obvious question: how could white America claim to sympathize and want 
to address conditions that bred riots, yet also oppose the underpinnings of the report in 
terms of increased spending and improving attitudes? It was just one survey, of course, 
but it did not bode well for how white America might reckon with its own racial attitudes, 
assuming the Johnson Administration would not follow most of the program 
recommendations put forth.  
 What many Americans wanted, in fact, was an evaluation of the riots more along 
the lines of John McClellan’s Senate Permanent Investigation Subcommittee. McClellan 
and his team had yet to complete their hearings by April 1968, but the tone of the 
investigation was established. As the Kerner Commission stressed environmental factors, 
improving racial attitudes, and increasing spending on inner-city programs, the right-
leaning McClellan investigation emphasized law and order, the question of whether 
outsiders had orchestrated instances of chaos, and on how those responsible were violent 
criminals linked to the more extreme tenets of liberalism. “The blunt truth is that the 
divide between the white and the black societies is as wide as ever,” columnist Marquis 
Childs wrote in the Washington Post.47 The riots were predictable, he said, “to anyone 
who took seriously the report of the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders,” yet 
“few, and this goes for many in the top level of government, heeded the warning that any 
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spark could touch off an explosion.”48 Johnson had the chance to “let it be known [he] 
would go to Congress” after the King assassination and “call for a greatly expanded 
program for ghettoes.”49 He “abandoned the idea…in the face of opposition from Capitol 
Hill,” a decision that had “not escaped the notice of the black minority…even failure to 
get what he asked for would have been taken as evidence he had done his best in the face 
of implacable resistance.”50 Instead, Childs wrote, Johnson had not even tried. 
Speculation on the outcome was “as idle as speculation over the reaction to the King 
assassination if it had not been followed by riots…attitudes have hardened and it is 
difficult to see what can prevent further violence and bloodshed.”51 For Childs and many 
others, the window of opportunity to act on the Kerner Commission and in the wake of 
King’s murder had tragically passed.  
 As the end of April drew near, Califano remained concerned about the “obvious 
effort to use the commission for political purposes.”52 In addition to the civic and 
religious groups who had spoken out in support of the report in April—American 
Catholic bishops had released a seven-page statement that “endorsed the judgment of the 
Kerner Commission on the causes of social unrest,” for example—a New York 
Congressional delegation had vowed to “unite to promote federal legislation 
implementing the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders.”53 A bipartisan group informed Lindsay of this plan at a private breakfast in 
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New York after the mayor had “made the argument…to introduce legislation based on 
commission recommendations for massive national housing, education, and employment 
programs.”54 Lindsay also told the delegation that the commission needed to meet again 
to “focus national attention on ignored recommendations.”55 To those who commended 
the White House for its efforts and claimed there was plenty of overlap between its 
current agenda and commission recommendations, Lindsay compared his own task 
force’s work “with Washington action in this way”: 
 In general the Administration requests funds for 100,000 new jobs this year 
compared with 550,000 proposed by the commission, 300,000 housing units this year 
compared to the 600,000 recommended by the commission, none of the basic 
requirements of our welfare system recommended by the commission and limited 
funding of existing elementary and secondary education programs, compared to the 
substantially increased authorization suggested by the commission.56 
 
 Califano, exasperated at the effort to keep the commission in the news, told 
Kerner he had “tried, and I think successfully, to prevent the commission from being used 
for any political purposes during its hearings, and the report itself.”57 Further meetings, 
he told the governor, would “detract from the report,” and the commission would only 
meet “based upon the President’s judgment of whether the Commission should 
investigate further into any of the more recent disorders.”58 Kerner agreed and issued 
what he hoped would be a final statement on the status of the commission. “I reiterate 
that the commission has fulfilled its mission as outlined by the President, and no further 
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meetings are contemplated by the chairman,” he said in the statement.59 The Kerner 
Commission did not “expect that all of our proposals would be immediately adopted,” he 
said, but believed “that the federal government would begin to move in the direction we 
mapped...however, the recent economies effected by Congress and the Administration 
move in the opposite direction.”60 Kerner proclaimed the report to be an “exhaustive and 
comprehensive document…submitted to the President with our views and findings 
concerning those three questions about the summer of 1967,” and with no additional 
change, he could “see no further work for this particular commission.”61 With pressure 
from the White House, Kerner had officially dismissed the notion that the commission 
would meet again given the new wave of riots. While there is no record about his 
personal feelings on the matter, his nomination to the federal judiciary likely made him 
hesitant to upset the Johnson Administration and ensured that no formal gatherings, to the 
dismay of Lindsay and Harris, would happen. 
 Kerner nixing a commission reunion did not deter Harris from persisting, 
however. Speaking before social workers at an “Urban Crisis” workshop in late April, 
Harris emphasized that civil rights needed to be “much more than the right to eat at a 
lunch counter or use a particular restroom, because the struggle’s focus has moved to the 
deeper social ills.”62 New civil rights would focus on employment, education, and health 
care, he said. Harris also refuted the charge that the commission’s recommendations had 
been unrealistic. “We decided we would tell it like it is,” he said, and stressed that its job 
was not simply to “express just as much of the truth as the House Appropriations 
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Committee would approve.”63 With rumors of a possible march that would request 
“action on the Commission’s recommendations” and “passage of a guaranteed annual 
income,” Harris pled for activists to heed the call to assist the poor.64  
 By May 7, when David Ginsburg had tendered his resignation as the Kerner 
Commission’s executive director, all that remained were two supplemental studies 
sponsored by the Ford Foundation and a third study examining police records of over 
30,000 people arrested during riots.65 “All should be completed by July,” Ginsburg told 
the president, and the only other order of business was to “complete the orderly transfer 
to Archives of the records of the Commission.”66 The first two studies—“Racial Attitudes 
in 15 American Cities” and “Between White and Black: The Faces of American 
Institutions in the Ghetto”—were authored by members of the Kerner Commission staff 
but not endorsed by the commissioners themselves.67 The third study, called “Who 
Riots?” was conducted at Columbia University. Ginsburg told Johnson that he 
sympathized with his predicament; “I have understood the anguish you must have 
suffered during these past months and have shared it,” he wrote.68 In a separate note, 
Ginsburg told Johnson he was “deeply grateful” for the “opportunity you gave me to 
work with the Commission.”69 His final line was forlorn: “I would have given a great 
deal to be able to hand you a report which would have brought you joy and 
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satisfaction.”70 With this message, one of the commission’s most tireless workers walked 
away from a project he so desperately wanted to succeed.  
 The report’s findings had lost traction altogether as summer approached, but it did 
not mean they did not surface in the news occasionally. In May, Bayard Rustin testified 
before a House Labor Subcommittee in support of a proposed $4 billion federal program 
to create one million public service jobs for the hard-core unemployed. Rustin told the 
subcommittee that the reaction to the Kerner Commission’s final report frustrated him. 
Not only was white America in a “psychological jag” over the indictment of white 
racism, Rustin said; the focus on such attitudes had “diverted efforts to attack the real 
heart of the nation’s problems—the racist-tainted institutions that keep Negroes in 
inequality.”71 The commission report did not “deal with ‘individual whites as being 
racists,’” he said; if that were the case, “the only answer is to put 180 million white 
Americans on the couch with psychiatrists and perhaps in ten years the nation might find 
what problem it faces.”72 Individual racism detracted from institutional racism, he told 
the subcommittee. Only when America confronted its racist institutions could it hope to 
alter attitudes. This sentiment prompted Rustin to back the Guaranteed Employment Act, 
proposed legislation with the backing of 80 congressmen but not the Johnson 
Administration. It was the kind of “first bit of legislation,” he said, that could have “ a 
visible effect on the lives of people in the ghetto...something dramatic to restore their 
hope that their lives can improve.”73 Rustin also had harsh words for Congress, which he 
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said was “not only inept but intensely crippled in its social insight.”74 Responsibility for 
forthcoming riots lay in part, he said, with obstinate lawmakers, not civil rights leaders 
and police. “The responsibility for disorder is on the Hill, not in the ghetto,” he 
testified.75 Until Congress ceased its “perverse genius” for “passing bills it feels will keep 
law and order instead of getting at the injustice that makes disorder inevitable,” Rustin 
said, the institutionalized maladies described in the Kerner Commission report would 
persist.76   
 In the aftermath of the Kerner Commission’s report and the tepid response it 
received from the White House, four thousand academic and professional psychologists 
signed a statement in June supporting the report’s findings. The organization, known as 
Psychologists for Social Involvement, sent separate statements to both President Johnson 
and the American Psychological Association. “As psychologists we strongly agree with 
the conclusions of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and are 
dismayed that the report has had so little impact in Washington,” the organization wrote 
to Johnson.77 In its statement to the APA, the psychologists endorsed the findings that 
“the recent disorders result largely from conditions of discrimination, poverty, and 
unemployment; which have their roots in racial prejudice…As citizens we strongly urge 
that direct action be taken to combat these unjust conditions.”78 Of the professionals who 
signed the statement, over a third wished the organization had written an even stronger 
statement on behalf of implementing commission proposals. Many of the undersigned 
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mentioned “specific community efforts in which they are engaged and programs they are 
attempting to implement,” but they agreed that the “major responsibility” for 
coordinating such efforts in employment, education, housing, and other fields lay with 
the “legislative and executive branches of government.”79 In the statement to Johnson, the 
psychologists said they endorsed “the psychological validity and soundness of the major 
conclusions of the Kerner Report” and were “dismayed at the lack of support or even 
recognition that the report has received at the highest levels of government.”80 Even in 
June, weeks after Robert Kennedy’s assassination, months after Johnson had announced 
he would not seek reelection, and long after the commission’s report had faded from 
headlines, the psychologists made their message to the president clear: “The importance 
of your leadership in this regard cannot be overstated.”81 
 Johnson remained uninterested in pushing the final report, but in July, Ginsburg 
forwarded commissioners information on someone who believed there was “no more 
important text in American schools” than what the Kerner Commission had produced.82 
Connecticut high school teacher Franklin Gross wanted to use the document in 
classrooms, believing it “may help students find a way to do something constructive 
about the problems they have uncovered.”83 In an article in Scholastic Teacher from 
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May, Gross described scenes and reactions from his students following the King 
assassination: 
 As we sat in numbed silence, one of the students said, “Do me one favor. Don’t 
read the black man any more lectures about nonviolence, I’ve seen what white people 
really believe about nonviolence.” Then he walked out of the room, and we were 
agonizingly aware that those who remained were white and that our piece of America, 
too, had been split wide open.84 
 
With these sentiments in mind and the pressing need “to understand the cold realities that 
produce the pain—the realities of the ghetto,” Gross proposed a book guide aimed at high 
school students that would focus on the Kerner Commission’s report.85 In its full form, 
Gross said, the report “deals courageously and honestly with the most vital issue America 
faces today…it is complex, but don’t let its complexity frighten you. It is beautifully 
organized for systematic study, on many grade levels.”86 The book guide could, in theory, 
help students “learn about the overall problem as it affects the nation” while also 
“applying these insights to learn what is happening right in your own community.”87 
Students could “evaluate the national picture” when reading the report and then “apply 
the same questions to the local community.”88 With his call for the book guide “to make a 
new beginning for relevance in the classroom, responsibility in the nation, and dignity for 
all our people,” Gross seemed interested in realizing many of the Kerner Commission 
proposals with regard to evaluating America and having earnest discussions on race 
relations.89 The problem, of course, was that such proposals were few and far between; 
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for the majority of Americans, the report and its prescriptions had now faded from 
prominence.   
 Writing in The Wall Street Journal, sociologist Amitai Etzioni attributed the 
failure of the Kerner Commission report, along with many other task forces before it, to a 
number of factors. He noted the commission’s lack of social scientists, which he 
compared to “setting up a National Commission to study cancer and then excluding 
doctors from it.”90 Etzioni also said that while the commission was given a year to submit 
its report, moving the date up meant that “its writing staff did not even have a chance to 
read significant parts of what the farmed-out research was turning up.”91 The rushed 
effort, he argued, spoke to the tendency of commissions to “treat the politics of the 
situation rather than the situation” in many instances.92 Too often commissions were 
more interested in consensus-building than determining causes and cures. Etzioni pointed 
to the European model—where task forces gathered their research in private—as an 
example of how to avoid the Kerner debacle, where “they recommend spending and 
programs without explaining how to pay for them.”93 Going forward, commissions 
needed specialists conducting more of the research, high-ranking officials on 
administrative duties, and politicians as public representatives. More social scientists and 
fewer lawyers, he argued, would decrease the chances of opposition “by the government 
agencies that must participate in their implementation,” as was the case with Johnson and 
the Kerner Commission.94 Whether or not the commission’s makeup and methodology 
had doomed its report was certainly up for debate—and it had not been a frequent 
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criticism to that point. With the commission’s work and correspondence finished, there 
was no official response, though it seems fair to assume they would have disputed 
Etzioni’s contentions that the methods and members involved were the reasons the report 
had faltered.   
 On the campaign trail that summer, Democratic candidate Eugene McCarthy 
lamented the nation’s failure to heed the Kerner Commission’s warning. “Since then we 
have talked much and done little…the conditions remain,” he said.95 A Washington Post 
columnist penned a column with the headline: “Separation of Races is Growing” and 
noted how even “integration-minded black moderates” had become part of black 
militancy’s “polarizing trend.”96 It was a famously tumultuous summer bookended by 
violence; in June, presidential candidate Robert Kennedy was assassinated in a Los 
Angeles hotel; in late August, chaos at Chicago’s Democratic National Convention 
displayed a white-hot rage that had seemingly worsened in American cities. With a 
second Kennedy brother deceased and a Vietnam War that had seemingly no end in sight 
in spite of Johnson’s March address, thousands of young, left-leaning activists took to the 
streets of Chicago during the convention. Clad in riot gear, Chicago police descended on 
many of the protesters and began beating them; riots unfolded before a national television 
audience, and many protesters famously chanted, “The whole world is watching!” in their 
clashes with police. The Democratic Party seemed broken—stunned by Johnson’s 
decision not to seek re-election, even more stunned by Kennedy’s assassination during 
primary season, and now splintered more than at any point in the decade. It was not a 
party that conveyed stability, and for many critics, the police riots at the Democratic 
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convention indicated that liberalism on the national level had run its course. “None of this 
adds up to the politics of joy, or even the politics of coexistence,” observed one 
reporter.97  
 By the time the Democrats had tabbed Hubert Humphrey as their nominee in the 
fall, Nixon had targeted recent liberal administrations as the culprits for the spike in 
violence and deteriorating conditions in American cities. When Humphrey touted his own 
administration’s achievements, Nixon sarcastically asked if that pride included the 
increase in violence and crime. “No mob tried to burn down D.C. while Dwight 
Eisenhower was in the White House,” he said.98 Contrary to what the Kerner 
Commission claimed, Nixon faulted neither rioters nor white America; he faulted the 
court system, the Department of Justice, Robert Kennedy, and the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administration, among others. He was betting that blaming urban violence on liberalism 
and its luminaries would pay off in the November general election, and he was proven 
correct, winning the presidency with 301 electoral votes and thirty-two states carried. On 
the same day, Katherine Graham Peden lost her bid for a seat in the United States Senate. 
Peden, who “staunchly supported the Commission’s controversial findings,” lost to 
Marlow Cook, described as an “advocate of law and order.”99 She had tried to position 
herself as a candidate who “stood for social justice through law and order,” but prior to 
Johnson’s bombshell announcement, she had also been an “all-the-way-with-LBJ 
Democrat.”100 Her defeat, much like Nixon’s victory, dealt a resounding blow to the 
findings in the Kerner Commission report in how it illustrated a broad political shift. The 
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report was hardly the only factor on voters’ minds on November 5, 1968, but Republican 
gains revealed what many Americans felt about urban riots and liberals’ ability to reckon 
with them going forward.  
 The following February, a task force independent of the Kerner Commission 
issued a “follow-up assessment of how the nation has responded to the Kerner report.”101 
The assessment, titled “One Year Later,” came through a joint effort of the Urban 
Coalition and Urban America; Harris and Lindsay were on the review board. A source 
told a Washington Post reporter that the assessment “records both progress and failures 
but ‘can hardly be called encouraging.’”102 After organizations like the Justice 
Department, League of Women Voters, and American Jewish Committee had asked for a 
follow-up report, the Urban Coalition had taken action so that the report would not “be 
filed and forgotten.”103 One staffer insisted it was “not so much a memorial to the Kerner 
Commission as an attempt to keep up the momentum to move on urban problems.”104 
Washington Post columnist William Raspberry said the study was “cause for dismay in 
the fact that we aren’t even moving, at least not moving very forcefully,” toward the 
Kerner Commission’s recommendations.105 “The Commission told us that unfulfilled 
promises were a major cause of urban unrest, and our response has been to make fewer 
promises,” he said, adding that while there had been “government-sponsored job-training 
programs,” such measures were merely “aspirin tablets and the urban disease is too far 
advanced to respond to aspirin.”106 Raspberry continued: 
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 More than anything else, the Commission tried to make us see that it would take a 
massive commitment in employment, in economic development of the black ghettos, in 
welfare reform, and in some system of income maintenance to steer us out of our 
headlong plunge toward disaster.  
 And we haven’t seen that at all. Or at any rate, we haven’t acted on it. President 
Johnson never felt that he could endorse the Kerner report. President Nixon, in his 
reliance on private business to do much of the battle against poverty, seems to be 
suggesting a lessening of the nation’s official commitment.107 
 
 He continued that while getting “black and white people talking to each other 
again” was an encouraging sign, it had its limitations until there were tangible programs 
aimed at racial discrepancies.108 “Even the most earnest dialogue cannot improve a ghetto 
resident’s credit rating or get rid of the vermin in his overpriced tenement or find him a 
meaningful job or educate his ignorant children,” Raspberry said.109 Unless the “national 
government is willing to lead,” the willingness of so many Americans to listen and 
“search for ways to do what they can” was “meaningless.”110 David Broder, another 
Washington Post columnist, agreed, saying it was “marvelous that everyone has become 
so concerned” about the plight of black America, but that the “gap between ‘Mr. 
Forgotten America’ and his white suburban neighbors—in education and income and 
health and every other measure of well-being—and those living in the black urban 
ghettos has not closed.”111 Instead, the “rage, frustration, and sense of isolation” had 
grown in the face of the very gradualism the Kerner Commission had warned would not 
alleviate the problems.112 A subsequent report in June of 1970 stated that in the two years 
since the Kerner Commission’s report, the commission’s warning on separate societies 
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had “become even truer, the gulf of misunderstanding wider and the hope for racial peace 
and progress slimmer.”113 Violence and de facto racial segregation in America had 
increased; according to the report, “fewer and fewer whites are welcome in black 
communities” and “the policeman’s badge is no longer a sufficient symbol of his 
authority and now in many places he wears an American flag as part of his regalia.”114 
Said one concerned citizen in Houston: “there is no doubt that if there is a riot in this 
town, police will kill a lot of black people.”115 At the dawn of a new decade, white 
America was “besieged by dark visions” but had “chosen to ignore them.”116  
 Ten years after the report’s release, in 1978, another retrospective reflected on the 
commission’s findings. “The stark fact was that, in the atmosphere of ’68, this total 
package had no more chance of being put through Congress than the fat lady had of being 
put through the wringer,” the article noted.117 It noted the “dynamite” of the “separate 
societies” sentence, a sentence that “shocked American sensibilities not because it 
unwrapped a discovery,” but rather because “an official body, appointed by the President, 
should have come right out and so bluntly said it.”118 In hindsight, given the “emerging 
trends in the black Movement,” the editorial argued that the Kerner report “was useless as 
a coolant.”119 Even as the recommendations floundered, however, the singular, incendiary 
sentence remained. What America discovered in 1968, however, is that there were not 
just two Americas; the nation discovered that its psyche was “infinitely splittable,” with 
“blacks railing at whites, the young shocking the old, the coasts boggling the plains, [and] 
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hippies freaking out hard-hats.”120 The Democrats were fractured, as was the New Left, 
and a gap existed between “those who noisily wanted, and those who quietly feared 
change.”121  
 A 1988 Washington Post survey seemed to corroborate the notion of separate 
societies in the Washington, D.C. area, of a society “divided by race, equal under the law 
but virtually nowhere else.”122 There were areas of improvement in terms of race 
relations, including social contact, but the survey summary noted that after “the parties 
are over, the races return to their homes in largely segregated neighborhoods, send their 
children to largely segregated schools, and pray in largely segregated houses of 
worship.”123 Discrimination, according to the African Americans polled, remained a “fact 
of life” in spite of the civil rights advancements of the 1960s.124 Local minister Ernest 
Gibson said that after the abolition of legal segregation, “we have discovered how deep 
the racial division goes.”125 Of the survey participants, 85 percent of blacks and 71 
percent of whites believed that some form of discrimination remained in Washington; of 
the black Americans polled, over 40 percent said they had “faced discrimination when 
seeking housing, education, or employment or in pay sometime in their lives…of those 
who reported instances of discrimination, half said the most recent incident occurred 
within the last 10 years.”126 Among the topics covered in the survey, employment was the 
most polarizing between races; over 60 percent of blacks believed “less qualified whites 
are frequently promoted over more qualified blacks,” while only 29 percent of whites 
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agreed.127 A “clear majority” of whites surveyed opposed affirmative action programs, 
while an “even larger majority” of blacks supported such measures.128 The survey also 
described neighborhoods as “studies in black and white,” with pronounced patterns of 
racial segregation that open housing had apparently failed to alter.129 Many black 
residents believed they would “not be welcome in certain neighborhoods,” while many 
white residents said they were “suspicious of the predominantly black D.C. 
government.”130 Two decades on from the commission’s report, the study seemed to 
indicate that in at least one major American city, the divides that plagued the nation in the 
turbulent 1960s remained.  
 Nearly a quarter-century after the release of the Kerner Commission report, Fred 
Harris, by that point a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico, 
responded publicly to columnist George Will’s accusations that the Kerner Commission 
portended the “moral and intellectual decline of the civil rights impulse” because it 
“declared that blacks, unlike the immigrants who prospered in earlier times, could not 
achieve unassisted upward mobility because entry-level jobs were disappearing.”131 
Harris, no longer an upstart senator, took exception to this characterization. “Many who 
oppose the achievement of the civil rights movement are in a great hurry these days to 
forget our racial history and apparently determined to relive old mistakes,” Harris wrote 
in The Washington Post.132 Will and those who agreed with him, Harris said, 
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misunderstood both the commission and the history of black people in America. He 
continued: 
 In fact, blacks do have a special place in the life of our nation. The Kerner 
Commission recognized that fact. It found that American racism had severely damaged 
the life chances and the status of black people and had created and maintained the ghettos 
in which the poorest of them were obliged to live. It was essential, the commission 
concluded, for the nation to take substantial and sustained action to repair the damage.133 
 
 Will’s comparison of African Americans to other immigrants was unfortunate,  
 
Harris continued, because “the fact is that blacks aren’t like other immigrant groups…no 
other group in America save Native Americans has been the object of such sustained 
virulence in American public and private and policy.”134  The former commissioner 
chastised Will for believing that “a few words on paper and a handful of federal programs 
healed all wounds and stopped racism and the attendant discrimination in its tracks.”135 
Rather, what had happened in the 1960s constituted significant progress, but it did not 
eradicate three-and-a-half centuries of suffering. “Whatever flaws are to be found in 
black leadership strategies, and whatever defects of character are to be found among the 
population of the poorest blacks, the gravamens of our racial problems are not to be 
found in those precincts,” Harris declared; almost twenty-four years after the report, he 
noted, “the black unemployment and poverty rates are regularly two-and-a-half and three 
times the white rate. Black family wealth is, at most, one tenth of whites.”136 Contrary to 
Will’s depiction, the Kerner Commission “didn’t take the civil rights movement off its 
moral rails. Rather, the enemies of black progress gained the upper hand in national 
politics, just as they did after Reconstruction. And today, as then, we will gain nothing by 
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running away from our history.”137 Decades after the commission’s report, there were 
still criticisms, at least from Harris’s perspective, that seemed to misinterpret the 
commission’s broader points and the expansive, unsettling history that compelled them to 
make those points.  
 In August 2014, forty-seven years after the riots that tore apart cities like Newark 
and Detroit, rioting took place in Ferguson, Missouri, following the shooting death of 
black teenager Michael Brown by white police officer Darren Wilson. A Washington 
Post piece by scholar Merlin Chowkwanyun recalled the McCone and Kerner 
Commissions that “came to the same conclusion” that “riots were about far more than 
just the police” in the 1960s.138 “Yet politicians ignored the important diagnoses,” 
Chowkwanyun said, and if “history is any guide, the Ferguson riots will teach nothing. In 
urban affairs, it turns out, past is often just prologue.”139 The Kerner Commission 
addressed the “deep grievances afflicting African Americans denied the fruits of the post-
war economic boom and so-called ‘affluent society,’” declaring that “police brutality was 
a final intolerable insult in a larger cycle of everyday deprivation and denial of basic 
needs and resources.”140 Ultimately, the author noted, the Kerner report “never quite 
came to full fruition,” helping to “explain why so little changed.”141 Chowkwanyun 
assessed the next step: 
 The choice is a clear one, between concrete action and public policy on one hand, 
and endless commissions and ‘conversations on races’ on the other. It’s great that the 
Justice Department will investigate the Ferguson Police Department, an agency that is 
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clearly out of control and incapable of policing itself. But if this results only in a 
document that sits on a shelf, its efforts will serve nobody but the politicians and civil 
servants who should really be held accountable for the Ferguson debacle.142 
  
 On April 30, 2015, days after Freddie Gray died in police custody under 
suspicious circumstances in Baltimore, Atlantic correspondent and public intellectual Ta-
Nehisi Coates spoke on the matter at nearby Johns Hopkins University. Coates, a 
Baltimore native who had grown up in the city in the 1980s, reacted to rhetoric from local 
and state officials condemning violence. He found that odd, given that “as a young man 
from West Baltimore…I thought about how violence was tolerated for all of my life here 
in West Baltimore.”143 Coates spoke of state-sanctioned violence in America, of the 
federal, state, and local policies inflicted on black people in inner cities daily with little 
regard from white officials or much of white America. He continued: 
 …I have a problem when you begin the clock with the violence on Tuesday. 
Because the fact of the matter is that the lives of black people in this city, the lives of 
black people in this country have been violent for a long time. Violence is how 
enslavement actually happened….Violence is not even in our past. Violence continues 
today.144 
 
 Coates spoke in 2015, when students and attendees could record him on their 
iPads, or chronicle his remarks in real time on Twitter, but as he would readily 
acknowledge, he could have been speaking in 1967, or 1947, or 1927. The spate of police 
incidents in the 2010s have mirrored incidents from decades before, with accusations of 
police brutality and mistreatment of black people by white authorities; the incidents have 
not only often been fatal, they have also spoken to larger symptoms of institutional 
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racism in America today. The violence that defined the black, inner-city experience 
triggered the riots in Watts, in Newark, in Detroit; the incident itself was usually violent, 
as was the community-wide reaction. The National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders examined these incidents, a broad spectrum across a wide swath of America, 
and decided to sympathize. The riots were not merely about the incident or the burning 
and looting thereafter; they were about a compendium of wrongs against black America, 
about shattered lives and men and women mistreated and neglected for generations on 
end.  
 The Kerner Commission so desperately wanted the nation to see past the images 
of the riots themselves, down to the roots of what transformed the beating of a cab driver 
or the raiding of a blind pig into days of chaos and destruction. A comprehensive 
document, rushed but eloquent, measured but concerned, the Kerner report summoned 
the nation to understand the truth behind riots. It came at a complicated, turbulent 
moment in American history, and then it vanished almost entirely, only referenced in 
passing mention when new riots occurred. Today, the Kerner Commission resurfaces 
with discussions of rioting and police brutality, a reminder that these incidents and the 
broader issues they illuminate have precedent. America turned away from the 
commission’s final report at a perilous hour in 1968; as we look to the future, we can 
learn from this missed opportunity and hope that the difficult, persistent questions about 
race in America do not remain unanswered. 
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